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abstract

Nationality conflicts frequently contribute to political con
frontations.

Communists claim that these confrontations are merely

reflections of class conflict.

Yet, nationality conflicts have also

taken place in communist systems.

The dissertation examines the n a 

tionality policies of two communist states, to determine whether or not
ideological commitments can prevent such conflicts.
Focusing on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in
Transylvania and the Vojvodina, the dissertation seeks answers to a
number of key questions concerning nationality relations.

Is the

communist workers' class solidarity a "solution" of the Rumanian and
Yugoslav nationality problems?

W h y or why not?

To what extent?

considerations guide the nationality policies of these states?
are the policies of these states similar?

What
How

How are they different?

W h y are they different?
The dissertation probes for answers by comparing statements of
policy and ideology with actual political practices in both Tran
sylvania and the Vojvodina.

The comparison is carried out, first, by

putting the problem into historical and ideological perspective.
Second, attention is focused on the constitutional and ideological
"solutions" which were adopted with the advent of Communist control.
This is followed by the examination of the political position of the
Hungarians in both the party and governmental organizations of the two
xii
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political systems and by the examination of the actual economic, social
and cultural policies affecting the Hungarians.

The analysis concludes

by tying together the intra-national and international implications of
the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies.
The dissertation depends, in large part, on a content analysis
of the Hungarian minority publications of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

It

relates observations gained through such content analysis to long-range
trends which are discernible from an examination of aggregate data con
cerning demographic, social, economic and cultural existence.

These

trends are in turn related to domestic and international developments
which impinge on the problem in any way.

In relation to the latter,

the dissertation has also drawn extensively on the studies of Western
observers.
The findings of the dissertation indicate that political con
siderations rather than communist ideology guides the nationality
policies of the two states.

Ideology guides nationality policies only

when its demands do not conflict with assumed national interests.

In

the Vojvodina the Hungarians are treated with tolerance because both
the internal and external political needs of Yugoslavia are well
served by such treatment.

It enables Yugoslavia to act as a unified

state in spite of its multi-national composition.

In Transylvania, on

the other hand, the Hungarians suffer outright discrimination.

Rumania

can afford such intolerant policies only because its political unity
is already ensured by the party's successful appeal to the nationalism
of the dominant Rumanian nationality.
As nationalism grows unabated in the polycentric setting of
xiii
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East-Central Europe, the outlook remains bleak for the Hungarians in
Transylvania.

However, Yugoslavia's more humane policies provide a

standard for minority treatment from which all the peoples of EastCentral Europe could learn and benefit.

xiv
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PROLOGUE

Little attention has been paid to the ethnic minorities in
the Balkans and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II.

This

neglect can be explained by the area's communization aud the limited
newsworthyness--until recently--of ethnic discord in that part of the
world.

These two reasons have complemented one another insofar as

the area's incorporation into the Communist "camp" has also cut it off
from easy access.

In this way, East Europe's nationality conflicts

have been concealed behind an "iron curtain" of ideological platitudes
and Soviet hegemony.
I
I.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to go behind the iron curtain of
ideology and hegemony, to examine the solution of the nationality
question claimed by Communist Rumanians in Transylvania and Communist
Yugoslavs in the V o j v o d i n a . T h e

solution, according to these Com

munists, is based on class solidarity and the concomitant relegation
of national animosities to the "trash heap of history."

In view of

■'■In this study reference to Transylvania includes the terri
tories of the eastern half of the Banat, all of the Crisana (the
Partium, composed of Arad and Bihar), all of Maramures (Maramaros) as
well as "historical Transylvania," since in the popular mind all three
were grouped together; by the Hungarians as the territory lost to
Rumania through the Treaty of Trianon following World War I; by the
Rumanians as the new areas acquired on the "other" (i.e., western and
northern) side of the Carpathian mountain range.
The Vojvodina includes the western half of the Banat, all of
the Ba£ka (Bacska), and most of Baranya (the Ddrda triangle).
1
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this claim, this study will examine the actual position of the Hungarian
inhabitants in Transylvania and the Vojvodina to determine to what
extent such claims have been realized in Rumania and Yugoslavia.
More specifically, it will attempt to isolate the factors which
have determined the nature of Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationalities
policies.

To this end, particular attention will be given to ideo-

logical and power relationships.

o

Rumania and Yugoslavia are ideal subjects because both contain
large Hungarian minorities whose treatment provides opportunities for
comparison and contrast.

In Yugoslavia there are about one-half

O
nJnder ideological relationships I am thinking mainly of
Communism.
But, nationalism is also an "ideology." It is an ideology
according to A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 455, when it seeks "to justify the nation-state as
the ideal form of political organization." When it does this,
nationalism like Communism, becomes a pattern of beliefs and concepts
which gives its adherents guide-lines for behavior.
Of course,
Communism is a much more complex and intellectualized ideology, but
as a consequence, it is also less appealing to the masses.
In the present context, I will view both Communism and
nationalism as non-physical political "forces" which are at the di s
posal of ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia. Unlike George W.
Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New
York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 5, I do not believe that
Communism "uses" nationalism or that nationalism "uses" Communism.
Rather, I think that the new ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia—
those that run the Party organizations--use both Communism and
nationalism, where one or the other of these "forces" best serves
their political standing. These organization men of the Party, are
after all, not only Communists but also nationals of their respective
countries. They are, therefore, a product of both Communist and
national traditions, and borrow freely from both to undergird their
own positions of power. A very informative discussion of the conflict
between nationalism and communism is provided by Ferenc Vali, Rift and
Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1961)
pp. 493-513.
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million Hungarians in the Vojvodina, while in Rumania there are nearly
two million in Transylvania.
The selection of these two countries is also desirable because
both have had some latitude in determining their "own" (i.e., national)
policies vis-a-vis their respective ethnic minorities.

The elimination

of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia in 1948, and the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, have allowed both countries to map
out their own solutions to their nationality problems.

Both of them

have done just that, with somewhat different consequences.

While both

Rumania and Yugoslavia pay homage to the same ideological authorities
(i.e., Marx, Lenin) both countries have ended up with different, even
conflicting nationality policies.
The purpose of this study is to examine these differences and
similarities.

In this way the status of minorities in Communist states

will be better understood.

It will be possible on the basis of such a

comparison to determine whether Communism has or has not been able to
overcome nationalism in these areas.

Furthermore, it will also pro

vide an indication of the conditions needed for a tolerant nationality
policy as opposed to a repressive one.

II.

SCOPE

The differences and similarities between Rumanian and Yugo
slavian nationality policies will be examined within specific
topical, geographical and historical limitations.
Topically we will be concerned with Communist nationality
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policies in

Rumania and Yugoslavia as they relate to the Hungarian

inhabitants

of these two

countries.

Furthermore, we shall treat this

subject in terms of post-World War II developments.

References to

pre-war aspects of the problem will be made only to provide a necessary
background for understanding the present and more recent developments.
In other words, references to pre-war ethnic relations will be made
only to throw light on the problem's present state, and to emphasize
the ideological and political rather than the historical implications
of Yugoslav

and Rumanian

The

scope of our

nationality policies.
study will be further limited geographically

to the areas known as Transylvania in Rumania and the Vojvodina in
Yugoslavia.

Transylvania includes the territory that lies east of

present-day Hungary and Yugoslavia and west and north of the former
province of Moldavia and Wallachia (the latter is divided into
Muntenia and Oltenia today) which had composed the "old" kingdom of
Rumania prior to World War I.

(Figures I and II illustrate the

geographic location and limits of Transylvania.)

3

The Vojvodina, on

the other hand, lies directly south of present-day Hungary and west
of Rumania.

It occupies the area of the great Hungarian plain which

now makes up the north-central part of Yugoslavia.

(Figures I and III

■’Transylvania means "land beyond the forest." This is the name
by which the area is known internationally, but the Hungarians call it
"Erdely" (wooded land) and the Rumanians call it "Ardeal."
In the
future, when reference is made to specific areas in Transylvania, the
present Rumanian name will be given first, followed by the enclosed
Hungarian name.
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illustrate the geographic location and limits of the Vojvodina.)^
This 1 * aitation in scope does not mean that Transylvania and
the Vojvodina will be studied in isolation from the surrounding areas.
Rather, the limitation means only that the role of Rumania, Yugoslavia,
Hungary or the Soviet Union (or any other state or area) will be con
sidered only insofar as that role relates to nationality problems in
the two areas which provide the focus for the present analysis.

III.

PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The nature and extent of ethnic discord, and the Communi;-st
efforts made to solve them, have received insufficient attention even
in serious treatments of East-Central Europe.

However, the study of

such discord in Transylvania and the Vojvodina has a voluminous
literature.

Of the two areas Transylvania fares somewhat better.

Lamentably, most of this material relates to the period up to the
Peace Treaties following World War II.**

After that, there exist only

fragments and a few scattered articles that touch on the subject in
general.
The pre-Peace Treaty material, which composes the bulk of
studies and other writings on the fate of ethnic minorities in

^Vojvodina means "duchy" in Serbian.
In Hungarian the same
name would be Vajdasdg. As in the case of Rumania, when reference is
made to any area in the Vojvodina, its present Serbo-Croatian name will
be given first with its former Hungarian name following enclosed.
^Pre-Peace Treaty source-material includes studies written
after 1947, as long as the subject matter or the area of concern in
such studies relates to pre-1947 affairs and developments.
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Transylvania and the Vojvodina, can be divided into three main groups;
(1) non-partisan studies,
works.

(2) partisan studies, and (3) propaganda

The first group includes the investigations of such scholars

as C. A. Macartney, A. W. Palmer, L. S. Stavrianos, John Cabot Moors,
Zoltan M. Szdz and Hugh Seton-Watson.
characterize these sources.

Objectivity and thoroughness

The second group contains no less valuable

studies, but studies that are to some degree partisan.

These include

such investigations as those of Louis Craig Cornish, Joseph S. Roucek,
R. H. Markham, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Charles Upson Clark.

The

third and last group is composed primarily of propaganda material.
Such writers on the problem as Andrew Fall, Hewlett Johnson, Sylvius
Dragomir and Pavel Pavel fall into this category.

Here objectivity is

subordinated to propaganda objectives, thereby making these works of
questionable value for a serious study of the problem.

Nonetheless,

such works are of interest as indications of the times, as well as the
explosive nt-uure of the subject matter.^

The three categories provide some basis for criticism regard
ing available sources. However, it should be kept in mind that the
categories do not reflect differences that exist between works put into
the same group nor do they draw sharp lines of demarcation between the
groups.
For example, in the third or propaganda category, the books
written by Andrew Fall are relatively more moderate and historically
sound than the absolutely race-baiting pamphlets of Pavel Pavel, which
often resort to outright historical distortions.
Or in the first cate
gory, the studies of C. A. Macartney by far outweigh in depth of insight
and thoroughness the book written by John Cabot Moors.
Both investiga
tors provide objective studies, but these are qualitatively different:.
The differences noted for the first and third categories also find
similar counterparts in the second category which includes partisan
studies.
Clark, for example, writes a more skillful partisan study
than does Cornish, who at times veers from the cold facts and appeals to
emotions.
The above presentation is far from a complete analysis of
available pre-1947 sources, but it does give a general outline.
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IV.

SOURCES OF DATA

It has been noted above that most scholarly studies pertain to
the years preceding 1947.

The lack of any serious investigations since

that date, particularly in English, necessitates the examination of
other sources for the period from World War II to the present (1970).
As we have seen, the absence of such investigations is due, in large
part, to the limitations imposed by an "iron curtain" upon the possi
bilities and opportunities of analysis and investigation.

The limita

tion affects Communist scholars, Western scholars and also emigre
scholars.
Among Communist scholars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians,
the question of national minorities is ideologically determined.
Accordingly, they treat the question as one that is no longer of major
concern in Socialist countries since presumably it has been "solved."
They usually refer to it only to demonstrate the "contrast" between
the socialist and the capitalist approaches to the nationality ques
tion and the oppression of colonies.

However, there are some recent

n
indications of change.7

While Rumanian scholars--and to a lesser

extent Yugoslavian scholars— understandably want to gloss over the
problem, the revival of nationalism as reflected by polycentrism and
"separate roads to socialism" will, to some extent, make even Communist
Hungarian scholars more restless and less willing to "hold their

^David Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist
Drive," New York T i m e s , July 14, 1964, p. 4; C. Daicoviciu, "Debates
of Historians," Contemporanu1 (May 29, 1964), trans. in Rumanian Press
Survey N o . 446 (Radio Free Europe, July 8 , 1964), pp. 2-6.
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tongues" regarding the fate of their fellow nationals under Rumanian and
Yugoslavian jurisdiction— particularly if that jurisdiction happens to
Q
take on revisionist and "bourgeois nationalist" overtones.
Western scholars are affected differently.

The lack of coopera

tion of the governments concerned and the difficulty of learning
Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian and Hungarian (Magyar) make the problem seem
more remote than it really is.

Furthermore, the problem has not been

considered "timely" until very recently, and therefore has aroused
little interest.

In fact, the only recent studies from a Western

source were written after the problem was "revived" by the press during
9

the spring and summer of 1963.
The effects on emigre scholars are again of a different nature.
Rumanian and Serbian emigre scholars, due to their status quo
territorial perspectives, have more or less ignored the subject and
have usually taken the view that the question of nationalities is now

O
One indication of the growth of such restlessness is the
sending of complete bibliographies, on the Transylvanian ethnic
discord, to Western universities and libraries.
This would seem to
show that some Hungarian scholars favor someone else speaking out on
the issue even if they themselves cannot.
^J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The
World T o d a y . XIX (Nov., 1963), 498-506, is one of the articles being
referred to. It appeared just a few months after Edward Crankshaw's
reports concerning the ethnic minorities of Transylvania, as well as
some articles by David Binder and Paul Underwood.
Two more studies
along this line are:
Paul Shoup's "Yugoslavia's National Minorities
under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII (March, 1963), 64-81, and
Ferenc A. Vali's "Transylvania and the Hungarian Minority," Journal
of International A f f a i r s , XX (No. 1, 1966), 32-44.
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c l o s e d . H u n g a r i a n and Croatian emigre scholars, on the other hand,
have hammered away at the problem under unfavorable conditions.

Finan

cial limitations as well as the lack of adequate information have, in
general, kept many of their studies more in the nature of partisan
polemics than of scholarly treatises.

At any rate, Yugoslav, Rumanian

and Hungarian emigre scholars, while unhindered by language difficul
ties, are handicapped by emotional involvement by the lack of sources
of information and data, and by the lack of financial means to carry
out investigations.
Apparently, the limitations in this area of scholarly research
are great, but they are not insurmountable.

There is a great deal of

source material that can be utilized for a better understanding of
Communist nationality policies in Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Six main

source areas come immediately to mind.
(1)

The Hungarian language Rumanian and Yugoslav periodicals

which are published for Transylvanian and Vojvodinian consumption.
These include such journals and periodicals as Korunk, Utunk, Igaz S z o ,
and El6‘re for Rumania and H i d , Magyar S z o , Polgoz6k, and Kepes Ujs^g
for Yugoslavia.

English language periodicals meant for Western con

sumption also reflect the official attitudes of the two countries
regarding the nationalities question.

These include periodicals like

^®Two examples of this type of scholarship are:
Stephen
Fischer-Galati (ed.), Romania in East-Central Europe under the Com
munists , Gen. Ed. Robert F. Byrnes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1957), and Robert J. Kerner (ed.) Yugoslavia (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1949). Both books devote only
a few pages to the nationality problem--merely acknowledging that the
problem exists.
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Rumania T o d a y , News from R umania, Documents, Articles and Information
on Rumania, Yugoslav Survey, Socialist Thought and Practice, and
Review of International Affairs,

These Hungarian and English language

periodicals reflect the Communist Rumanian and Yugoslav positions on
the issues of the day in the realm of art, literature, education,
politics, economics, etc.
(2)

The second source is provided by Communist Hungarian

periodicals and papers appearing in Magyar and English.

These include

Szabad N d p , Tarsadalmi Szemle, Foldrajzi K5zlemenyek, and The New
Hungarian Quarterly.

They all reflect the Communist Hungarian view,

or lack of view, on the issues of the day.
(3)

A third source is provided by the Yugoslav and Rumanian

constitutions, their revisions and any such other laws as deal with
the problem of ethnic minorities.

These legal documents, together

with Party pronouncements and statements on the nationality issue,
directly mirror the "official" attitudes of the governments concerned.
(4)

The fourth source includes Rumanian, Serbian, Croatian and

Hungarian exile periodicals and newspapers.

Besides the distinctively

Vojvodinian and Transylvanian exile publications like Ljtrmafa and
Transsylvinia, consideration must be given to periodicals like Uj
Litohatir, Nemzetor, Irodalmi U j s a g , Magyar Szabadshg, Katolikusok
Va s i rnapja, and VjeSnik Ujedinjenih Ameri&kih Hr v a t a .
(5)

Western studies, press translations and newspaper reports

compose the fifth source.

These include recent books dealing with

Rumania and Yugoslavia, some scattered studies in social science
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journals, and some news reports.

Some scholarly journals that are

particularly helpful include Central Europe Journal, Slavic Re v i e w ,
Balkania, East E urope, Survey, Journal of Central European A f f airs,
Problems of Communism, Balkan Studies, and Per Europaische O s t e n .

How

ever, this is also supplemented by information that can be obtained
from the United States Department of State, Radio Free Europe, and some
private church groups, particularly the Unitarians and the Roman
Catholics,
(6 )

Government publications of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary

which in any way touch upon the nationality problem are the last and
most limited source.

They are mainly White Books, statistical compila

tions, the texts of treaties and agreements between two or more Com
munist states, and also some propaganda pamphlets.

Here again care

must be used in the analysis of the given material.

V.

METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The preceding brief survey indicates the variety of sources
available.

Working with this type of source material, it is imperative

that the problem be examined from all sides.

Attention must be focused

on the voices of Communist Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians as well
as the voices of the exiles from the respective countries.

The views

of minority and majority nationalities must also be evaluated and com
pared w ith the commentary of "aloof" Westerners who have taken an
interest in the problem.
Objective examination of all facets of the issue, is merely a
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first step toward an analysis of our problem.

It must be followed by

an attempt at systematic reconstruction relating the points of national
contention to their ideological implications.

Only the relation of the

actual situation of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina
to the promises of Communist ideology can provide comparative and
analytical opportunities.
This study will be concerned with the examination of the
nationality policies of the two countries always in relation to some
specific aspect of the Hungarian ethnic group's existence.

For example,

the employment or educational policies of the two countries will be
compared in relation to their Hungarian inhabitants.

First, the Yugo

slav and Rumanian employment or educational policies will be described
independently and only then will similarities and differences be
pointed out.

Therefore, each chapter will begin with a general state

ment of the problem being dealt with.

After such a statement, the

Yugoslav and the Rumanian approaches and solutions will be treated
separately, while the concluding portions will sum up the points of
divergence and convergence.

This will be followed by an evaluation of

the respective policies and their implications for all concerned.
Comparing actual practices with Communist theoretical inter
pretations, as they affect the Hungarians living under Rumanian and
Yugoslavian jurisdiction, leads the analysis along a horizontal as well
as a vertical plane.

It will proceed vertically when ideological

demands are compared with existential realities in. the respective coun
tries.

It will proceed horizontally when the policies of the two coun

tries are compared to one another.
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The comparison on the lowest levels, where specific policies
(e.g., educational, employment, etc.) are analyzed, will depend primar
ily on aggregate data, content analyses and informal investigations of
a personal nature.

The conclusions and observations drawn from these

sources will be checked against and supplemented by studies discussing
Yugoslav and Rumanian nationality policies.
Aggregate data is readily available in the standard statistical
enumerations of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

These include census data and

a variety of other governmental statistics.

They provide a great deal

of the supporting data indicating trends in economic or cultural
policies.

The correlation of there statistical trends with specific

political events (e.g., Tito-Stalin split 1948, Hungarian Revolt 1956,
Rumanian "rebellion" within Comecon 1963, invasion of Czechoslovakia,
1968) provides one of the means of uncovering the "connections" between
nationality policies and political developments.
The shifts in these policies will be followed also through a
content analysis of a variety of sources.

Content analysis of printed

materials will be resorted to most frequently.

Unlike the electronic

news media, films and other instruments of communication, the printed
sources (i.e., newspapers, periodicals, books) are more easily acces
sible.

Thus, textbooks will be examined to see whether or not "de

nationalization" or "assimilation" is aimed at.

Periodicals and

newspapers will be examined for their cultural content.

Through such

content analysis it will be possible to isolate the dominant cultural
and political symbols of the particular society in question.
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frequency and the intensity of the use of such symbols will provide addi
tional insights into the prevailing nationality policies.
Finally, personal observations of the student and other investi
gators who have visited the areas of concern, provide yet another means
of making evaluations.

Personal visits to libraries, schools, cultural

centers and economic enterprises compose the basis for these observa
tions.

These, together with studies extant on this problem, provide a

check and a supplement to the use of aggregate data and content analyses.

VII.

DEFINITION OF TERMS RELEVANT TO THE DISSERTATION

To begin, it will be necessary to define certain key terms,
relating to the confrontation of nationalism and Communism in
Transylvania and the Vojvodina.

Included are those tenets of Communist

ideology which pertain to questions of internationality cooperation.
Thus, clarification is required for the concepts of "proletarian inter
nationalism," "socialist patriotism" and "bourgeois nationalism."
Nationalism is the first concept that demands attention.

Ac-

coring to Hans Kohn it is, above anything else, "a state of mind, an
act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more
and more common to man k i n d ."•*•

This "state of mind" is determined by

objective factors like common descent, a common language, common

■^Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (Fifth Edition; New York:
The Macmillan Co,, 1951), pp. 10-11.
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customs and traditions, common religion and a common t e r r i t o r y . ^

For

Kohn, the last mentioned is the most important objective f a c t o r ; ^ for
Elie Kedourie, however, language plays this r o l e . ^

Nonetheless, both

agree that "the most essential element is a living and active corporate
will.Because,

as Kedourie points out, nationalism is "largely a

doctrine of national self-determination,"^ and this is, "in the final
analysis, a determination of the will."-*-^
I

Thus defined, nationalism is

*1 O

an idea, an "idee-force." °
I
The character of this idee-force is Janus-faced insofar as it
promotes greater cooperation, homogeneity, and social solidarity
intranationally, but leads to indifference, dissention or even conflict
internationally. ^

Vested interests are in. large part responsible for

this dual character of nationalism— vested interests not only of a
political or economic nature, but of an emotional and intellectual

12

I b i d ., pp. 14-15; Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and
Colonial Question trans. A. Fineberg, Ed. I. Tovstukha (New York;
International Publishers [n.d.]), pp. 6-9, presents a very similar
listing. However, he is much more dogmatic than Kohn in that he ma i n 
tains:
"It is only when all these characteristics are present that we
have a nation."
12

XJKohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.
■^Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London:
1960), p. 64.

Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.,

■^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.
■^Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 31.
•
^ I b i d ., p. 81.
■^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 19.
19 Ibid., p. 2 0 .
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Thus, it should come as no surprise that attempts to

re-make the world along national lines have not increased the prospects
of peace and cooperation.

As Kedourie points out, the history of

Europe since 1919 testifies to the "inherent" disruptive power of
O1
nationalism.

Transylvania, and to a lesser extent the Vojvodina, are

just two outstanding examples of the above observation, for they have
become festering sores of political discontent since just about that
time.
The Communist definition of nationalism is somewhat different,
permitting Communists to claim--even in contradiction to existing con
ditions— that no festering sore of national discontent exists in
OO
Transylvania t o d a y . J u s t what is the Communist (or as they prefer,
Marxist-Leninist) interpretation of nationalism?

The answer to this

question can be found, in part, in the definition of some key terms
used by Communists.
"Bourgeois nationalism" is used by Communists when they refer
to the phenomenon described by Kohn as an idee-force.

While they do

not disagree with Kohn about the formation of nationalism through "the
growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of history,

^ I b i d ., pp. 2 1 -2 2 .
^ K e d o u r i e , Nationalism, p. 138; Stalin, Marxism and the
National and Colonial Question, p. 90, presents a similar conclusion.

22

To avoid doctrinal embarrassment and to maintain a sound
ideological footing Communists can always blame national discontent
on manifestations of the class struggle.
^ K o h n , The Idea of Nationalism, p. 6 .
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they see this development as a reflection of the productive forces of
society, as the specific reflection of the capitalist "stage" of
h i s t o r y . A c c o r d i n g to the Marxist-Leninist definition, "bourgeois
nationalism" is nothing more than the oppression of national minorities,
encroachment on the territories of neighboring states, and the finan
cial, economic, and military subjection of the smaller to the larger
imperialist p o w e r s . A s

Stalin sums it up, "private property and

capital inevitably disunite people, inflame national enmity and intensiO

(L

fy national oppression." °
The development of capitalism, which produced nationalism, is,
however, also responsible for the demise of this phenomenon.

At the

dawn of capitalism the nation-state and nationalism emerged; but with
the internationalization of capitalism, the nation-state has become an
anachronism.

While capitalism "unified" the world from the economic

standpoint, this unity was politically negated by antagonistic
nationalisms which dissected the world into innumerable quarreling
political fragments .27
Only "Communist" or "proletarian internationalism" can resolve
this contradiction.

For "proletarian internationalism" is the exact

2 ^Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, pp.

13, 8 8 .
2 ^ I bid., p. 90.
2 6 Ibid., p. 91.
2 7 Ibid., pp. 100 - 1 0 1 .
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opposite of "bourgeois nationalism" in the political arena.
eliminates national enmity, oppression, and exploitation.

As such, it
Instead of

dividing the masses according to their national origin, it unifies them
through their class consciousness— through international proletarian
OO

solidarity. °

According to Stalin and his present successors, this

international unification has already been achieved in the Soviet Union
and in the Communist bloc (The Tito-Stalin split, the Sino-Soviet rift
and the Czech-Soviet crisis, however, have played havoc with this inter
pretation) .
The proponents of "proletarian internationalism" are not so
blind, however, as to ignore the dynamic nature of nationalism.

In

order to take this dynamism into account a double standard has evolved
oq

regarding the manifestations of nationalism. 7

In certain areas

national revolutions (i.e., "wars of liberation") are considered pro
gressive, while in other cases (i.e., wars among capitalists) they are
on

regarded as the epitome of "black reaction."

This double standard

reflects the extent of flexibility in the interpretation of Communist
ideology.

It indicates that ideology can be used to rationalize

political acts, even when such rationalizations seem contradictory.
Yet, this double standard has solid ideological foundations, since the
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Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet U n i o n , trans. E. W.
Dickes (Second Edition; London:
George Routledge & Sons, Lts., 1933),
pp. 33, 35, 72.
2Q
7 Ibid..» pp. 47, 52; Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 243; F. Borkenau, World
Communism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), p. 285.
^^Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York:
sity Press, 1958), pp. 71-72, 96-97.

Columbia Univer
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development of nations toward Socialism is seen in stages.
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Thus, a

national revolution in a colonial domain like Algeria or Vietnam is
considered a "progressive" revolution, while the Hungarian revolt of
1956 is characterized as a counter-revolutionary imperialist plot.

Ac

cording to this standard, the world must view all national revolts
against the Western "imperialist" powers as "progressive," while forcing
it to view national discontent in the Communist bloc as "bourgeois
reaction."

32

To forestall any such "bourgeois reaction" citizens of Communist
bloc countries are exhorted to be "socialist patriots."

"Socialist

patriotism" describes the loyalty and pride which should prevail among
inhabitants of Communist countries.

Evidently, it is supposed to be

different from patriotism which exists in non-Communist states.

Patri

otism in this latter sense is nothing more than "bourgeois chauvinism"
according to the Communists.

"Socialist patriotism," on the other hand,

is not tied to nationality, it is supposed to transcend nationality for
33

the greater good of the World Socialist movement. J

Above all, it is

^^Borkenau, World Communism, pp. 290-291.
32"TeX t of C.P.S.U. Draft Program 1961," Ideology in Conflict,
ed. Dieter Dux (Princeton, New Jersey:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
1963), p. 175, contains a typical harangue against the dangers of
nationalism in the bloc, and advises that, "Nationalism can gain the
upper hand only where it is not consistently combated."
•^"Statement issued by the Conference of Representatives of
Communist Parties: Moscow— November, 1960," Ideology in Conflict, p.
141, states this obligation thus:
"The common interests of the
peoples of the socialist countries and the interests of peace and
socialism demand the proper combination of the principles of socialist
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loyalty and solidarity which motivates all peoples under the banner
of "proletarian internationalism" to heed the admonition, "proletarians
of the world unite!"

34

"Socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism" have
been invoked on numerous occasions in Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia
to describe the obligations of citizens in multi-national Transylvania
35

and Vojvodina. J

The invective of "bourgeois nationalism" has also

been invoked to circumscribe the rights of certain citizens in these
areas.

What is disturbing about the use of these terms is that they

can be interpreted to mean the exact opposite of their "official"
definitions by the Rumanian or Yugoslav ruling elites.

This great

internationalism and social patriotism in politics.
Every Communist
party which has become the ruling party in the state, bears historical
responsibility for the destinies of both its country and the entire
socialist camp."
■^Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The U . S . S . R . : Monolithic Controls
at Home and Abroad," Modern Political Pa r t i e s , ed. Sigmund Neumann
(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 233, 238, shows
that nationalities which had been found lagging in their support of
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat during World War II, as the Volga
Germans and Crimean Tartars had been, found themselves deported to the
more remote areas of Siberia. A more thorough consideration of this
side of Soviet nationalities policy can be found in Nikolai K. Deker
and Andrei Lebed (eds.) Genocide in the USSR (New York;
The Scare
crow Press, Inc., 1958), Chs. II-III.
This aspect of Soviet nationali
ties is taboo to scholars in the Communist bloc.
See for example,
Istvan Dolmanyos, A Nemzetisdgi Politika Tortdnete A Szovjetunioban
(Budapest; Kossuth Konyvkiadd, 1964).
•^Az Igaz Szd Szerkesztosdge, "A Szocialista ^pitds SzolgAlataban," Igaz S z o , X (Dec., 1962), 892.
■^It must be pointed out, however, that the Yugoslav leadership
is in this respect much more circumspect.
For the classic Yugoslav
statement on the nationalities question see Edvard Kardelj-Sperans,
A Szlovdn Nemzeti Kdrdds FejlSddse tr a n s . into Hungarian by IstvAn
Bodrits, et al. (Novi Sad, Jugslavija:
Forum K&nyvkiado, 1961).
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flexibility of definitions has become possible not because of the evolu
tion of the meanings, but because of the evolution of the leadership in
the Soviet Union and the changed nature of the Communist bloc.
While the Soviet Union was the sole Socialist state, the inter
pretation of these terms was relatively s t a b l e . H o w e v e r , with the
expansion of the Communist camp the interpretations became more varied.
For one thing, the right to interpretation now came into dispute.

38

The

demise of Stalin and the emergence of "polycentrism" brought about the
possibility of numerous interpretations .39

Yet, there is still a

surface obeisance to the meanings as presented above--even when local
conditions "demand" alterations.^®
So it is in Transylvania and the Vojvodinal

Now that "national"

Communism has been strengthened by the policies of Gheorghe GheorghiuDej--and more recently by Nicolae Ceausescu--in Rumania, the question

■^Through the Comintern and Cominform the Soviet Union set the
pace which the parties in other countries had to follow.
This way,
these other parties often became nothing more than the willing tools
of "Great Russian" nationalism. This was particularly the case as
Russia was confronted by the possibilities of war with Hitler.
Some
revealing facets of this problem are examined by Ulam, The Unfinished
Revolution, pp. 226-227, 230, 256, 262, 264, and Borkenau, World
Communism, pp. 386-388.
3®Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.) Polycentrism (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), provide a thorough examina
tion of this subject. The chapters written by Melvin Croan, Boris
Levitski, G. R. Urban, and J. F. Brown proved particularly interest
ing.
See especially pp. 13, 15-17.
3 9 I b i d .. p. 16.

^ A z Igaz Sz<5 SzerkeztSsege, "A Szocialista iSpit^s Szolgllataban," p. 892.
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that remains to be answered is whether their policies are motivated by
"socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism," or whether
they have reverted to time tested "bourgeois nationalism" under the
guise of ideological platitudes?

The answer to this question can be

found in the treatment of Transylvania's Hungarian inhabitants and in
the comparison of their treatment to that of the Hungarians living in
Yugoslavia under totally different conditions but accounted for by the
same platitudes.
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CHAPTER I

TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA IN THE
PRE-COMMUNIST SETTING

The treatment of ethnic minorities in Transylvania and the
Vojvodina has a long and varied history.

To understand the present
I
Communist Rumanian and Yugoslavian approaches to this problem, it will

be necessary to examine this background.

We will do just that by

tracing the development of nationality conflicts to the eve of Communist
ascendancy in the two areas.

I.

Political Nature of the Disputes

The nationality conflicts center around areas which, although
inhabited by various nationalities often at odds with one another,^- are—
and were in the past--of great importance economically, geographically,
strategically and industrially.

o

They provide the posessor states with

tangible sources of power, including natural resources, geographic

■^The fact that these nationalities are at odds now (this is
denied by most Communists) and in the recent past does not mean that
this has always been the case. On the contrary, prior to the rise of
modern nationalism, harmony rather than discord characterized relations
among the peoples of Transylvania and the Vojvodina.
Indeed, both areas
encourage harmony and cooperation because of their interdependent geog
raphy within the Carpathian Basin.
For some consideration of this ques
tion see: Paul Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in
Europe," in Louis Craig Cornish, Transylvania, The Land Beyond the
Forest (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), Appendix V,
p. 244; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London:
Oxford
University Press, 1937), pp. 1-3.
^This is less true for the Vojvodina than for Transylvania.
More will be said about these differences in the following description
of the respective areas.
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advantages, some industrial potential and additional population.

3

Since

both Transylvania and the Vojvodina can provide the possessor states
with some of these power sources, Rumania and Hungary vie for Tran
sylvania, and Yugoslavia and Hungary vie for the Vojvodina.^
These sources of power make both areas, but particularly
Transylvania, of utmost importance in the power relationships of Central
Europe and the B a l k a n s . I n the case of Transylvania, both contenders
have viewed it as necessary to their national survival vis-A-vis each
other as well as pan-German and pan-Slav expansion.^

This is why it is

almost impossible to find a "compromise" solution which would satisfy
both of them.^

On the other hand, in the case of the Vojvodina,

competition between Hungary and Yugoslavia never attained such intens
ity, since survival was not in the balance.

Here, it was more a

question of gaining or losing an area which had desirable attributes
and added to the economic wealth of the possessor state.

3

Philip E. Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs,
X IX (Oct., 1940), pp. 237, 241-242, discusses these factors in relation
to the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute.
His observations could also be
applied to the Vojvodinian dispute, with qualifications.
^In the Banat, territorial disputes also arose between Yugo
slavia and Rumania.
For this controversy see: Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors, pp. 279, 355; Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania
and Her Problem (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1932),
p . 141.
-’Zolt&i SzAz, "The Transylvanian Question:
Romania and the
Belligerents July-October 1914," Journal of Central European Affairs,
XXIII (Jan., 1954), 345.
^Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," p. 237.
/This unwillingness to compromise was also accentuated by the
fact that the two countries often received backing from great powers
opposed to one another (e.g., Italy versus France).

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

28

Yet, in the dispute over both areas, the concerned countries
have put forward arguments which ignore power and stress other motives
such as historical ties, justice, economic and geographic realism, or
the desire to liberate fellow countrymen.

While these considerations

m a y also have been important in motivating the respective countries to
compete for these areas, it has been considerations of power that have
determined the outcome between the disputants.

This is demonstrated in

the way Transylvania and the Vojvodina have changed hands among the
nations competing for their possession.
Transylvania's destiny was guided by Hungary from 895 to 1541
and 1867 to 1918.
side of Hungary.

During these periods preponderant power was on the
However, when Turkish (1541-1594, 1610-1698) and

Habsburg (1594-1610, 1699-1867) power invaded the Carpathian Basin,
Transylvania led a more or less independent existence, under Hungarian
leaders, w h o acknowledged the "guardianship" at one time of the Otto
m a n Empire, at another time that of the Habsburgs.®

In 1918 the

Rumanians obtained preponderant power in the form of Entente support.
With this backing they gained control of Transylvania and ruled it
9
until 1940.

Then Hungary gained power (Italian support) and the

O
°The dates given here are not above dispute. However, they do
provide a simplified chronology of the power shifts in the Carpathian
Basin. The nature of Hungarian influence in these periods is skill
fully summarized by Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the
Roumanians (Budapest:
The Sarkdny Printing Company Ltd., 1935), pp.
30-64.
Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case [n.p.;
n.n., 1941], p. 12, disagrees with Horvath's presentation.
^Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard, The Balkan
Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935 (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1936), pp. 36, 126, inadvertantly
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northern two-fifths of Transylvania was r e t u r n e d . A f t e r the collapse
of Hungary's basis of power, Rumania gained possession of Transylvania
through Allied i n t e r c e s s i on.^
In the case of the Vojvodina's ownership, the decisive role of
power is also apparent.

Hungary controlled the destiny of this area

from 895 (when the Magyars entered the Carpathian Basin) until 1526,
whe n the Turks defeated the Hungarians at the Battle of Mohacs.

Hungary

also controlled the area from 1867 (after reaching the Ausgleich with
Austria) until 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed under
the weight of defeat in World War 1 . ^
ruled the area.

From 1526 to 1698 the Turks

They in turn, were replaced as overlords by the Habs-

burgs, who converted the area into a "military frontier" zone, and

disclose the great interest of France in an alliance system which out
flanks German power. This is also evident in the description of the
Treaty of Trianon preparations in Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian
Frontiers Were Drawn," Foreign A f f a i r s , VI (April, 1928), 434.
^•^Kerner, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 193019 3 5 , pp. 130-31, 163; Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 56. Kallay emphatically maintains
that Italian rather than German assistance was responsible for Hungary's
improved power position (in this case referring to the Second Vienna
Award).
•^In this case the support came mainly from the Soviet Union.
See Amelia C. Leiss and Raymond Dennett (Eds.), European Peace Treaties
After World War II (Worcester, Mass.:
The Commonwealth Press, 1954),

p . 102.

(London:

■^Z.A.B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914- 1918
Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 244.
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ruled it directly from 1698 to 1867.

13

In 1918, the birth of the King

dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the intercession of the Entente,
placed the Vojvodina under

"Yugoslav" j u r i s d i c t i o n . ^

In 1941 Hungary

again regained some of the Vojvodina after Yugoslavia suffered defeat
at the hands of the Axis.

However, Hungary had to relinquish these gains

after Russian armies defeated her in turn, in 1945.^
From the foregoing, it is apparent that appeals to justice,
freedom, etc., have been of little consequence in determining the fate
of Transylvania and the Vojvodina.

Power, and power alone, will decide

in the future— as it has in the past— to whom Transylvania and the
Vojvodina will belong.

At present, power is obviously on the side of

Rumania and Yugoslavia.

II.

The Two Disputed Areas

Underlying the changes in ownership which are reflected in the
history— particularly the recent history— of Transylvania and the

•^Actually the military "zone" was not completely dissolved
until 1881. However, after 1867, Hungary dominated the area politi
cally.
See Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border of Croatia 17401881 (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 167-196.
■^Although officially Yugoslavia was called the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929, in this study "Yugoslavia" will
also designate the pre-1929 Kingdom.
•^For this confused period of Hungarian-Yugoslavian relations
the thoroughest and most objective discussions are in C. A. Macartney,
October Fifteenth; A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945 (Second E d . ;
Edinburgh:
The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 344-48,
385-86, 442-75, Vol. II, pp. 4-13.
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Vojvodina, are their geographic location, their economic potential and
their constantly changing ethnic make-up.

Before proceeding to the

discussion of pre-Communist nationalities policies in these areas, a
brief examination devoted to their material and human composition is
in order.
Both Transylvania and the Vojvodina are integral parts of the
Carpathian Basin.

As such, they were outside the Balkans, strictly

speaking, until World War I.

Then, they were both attached to two

Balkan states, thereby also extending the "Balkans" farther northward,
into the Carpathian Basin.

Or, to put it more simply, geographically

both areas still remain outside the Balkans.

Politically, on the other

hand, their destinies, since the end of World War I, have be.en tied to
that of Rumania and Yugoslavia— two Balkan states.

This, of course,

does not change the geographic fact, that both Transylvania and the
Vojvodina are really already part of Central Europe. ^

Nor does it

change the consideration, that as part of Central Europe, their history
and culture has been under different influences from those which molded
the countries of which they have now become extensions.

1fi

°As with other designations like "Central Europe," or "Northern
Europe," there is little agreement over the exact limits of the "Balkans."
Possibly the best way to define its northern limits is to take into
account the designation's historical usage, the approximate boundary
between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic predominance, and the major
geographic features which correspond to these other considerations. This
would place the Balkans south of the Sava and Danube rivers (moving
eastward from the Adriatic Sea) as far as the Iron Gates.
From this
point eastward, the Transylvanian Alps provide the dividing line. For
a discussion of this question also see Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in
Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 7-24.
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Transylvania
As Figure I indicates in the Prologue Transylvania occupies the
eastern end of the Carpathian B a s i n . ^

Both Rumanians and Hungarians

maintain that Transylvania is a geographic entity--a natural fortress—
which played an important part in their respective histories.

18

The

Rumanians, basing their arguments on the "Daco-Roman" presupposition
maintain,

19

that Transylvania was the cradle where the Rumanian people

came into existence and where they were able to grow strong.

20

The

■^Teleli, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe,"
pp. 244-45.
•*-®Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 251, gives a good
description of Transylvania s physical and topographic features.
l^The "Daco-Roman" presupposition provides the basis for the
Rumanian claim to prior settlement of Transylvania.
Briefly, the
Rumanians claim that they are the descendants of Romans and Dacians who
came into contact with one another in the third century after Christ.
At this time Emperor Trajan had successfully subjugated the Dacians. A
hundred years of Roman rule followed, which according to the Rumanians,
also entailed intermixture with the Dacians.
Consequently, when the
Roman legions were withdrawn from the area to defend the Empire against
Barbarian invasions, they left behind many of their progeny. The con
sideration that makes this thesis doubtful--or hypothetical at least— is
that there are no historical records of "Rumanians" (i.e., Wallachians)
living in Transylvania until almost a thousand years later, when they
appear in Hungarian documents. Even the name "Rumanian" is only a 19th
century designation for them.
Prior to the union of Moldavia and
Wallachia in 1859, they were known as Wallachs or Wallachians.
For the
Rumanian side of this controversy see Roucek, Contemporary Rumania and
Her Problems, pp. 3-6; Walter Hoffmann, Rumfinien Von Heute (Leipzig:
Felix Meiner, 1942), pp. 32-35; and the Communist Rumanian reassertion
of this claim by Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Rumania (Bucharest:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp. 92ff.
For the Hungarian
side see Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians,
pp., 5-16.
For more detached opinions consult Macartney, Hungary and Her
Successors, pp. 256ff; Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Rumanian Nationalism," The
A n n a l s , No. 232 (March, 1944), pp. 86-87.
20syivius Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities in Transylvania
(Geneva:
Sonor Printing Co., 1927), p. 18, maintains this also.
The
Hungarians deny that Transylvania was occupied by the "Rumanians" when
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Hungarians maintain that Transylvania has been the keystone of their
own nation's thousand year existence in the Carpathian Basin.

Take away

Transylvania, the Magyars contend, and you destroy the unity and
strength of the Carpathian Basin as a defensive s y s t e m . ^
In the past, considerations of defense and strategy were, perop
haps, most important in the struggle for Transylvania.

More recently,

considerations of the area's topography, its hydrographic network, its
size and its natural resources have become just as important.
Transylvania (including the Crisana, Maramures and part of the
Banat) is 39,903 square miles (102,787 square kilometres) in size.^3
Since this area varies in its topography, historical Transylvania will
be described separately from the other three areas now attached to it.

they settled the area; they do not deny that the Rumanians grew strong
there.
In fact, they stress that it was Hungarian rule that enabled
Rumanians to develop their own culture in Transylvania in safety from
Turkish attacks. Along this line, see Andrew Fall, H u n g a r y 's Right to
Transylvania (Budapest:
Sarkany Printing Company, Ltd., 1941), p. 54.
^ T e l e k i , "Transylvania's situation in Hungary and in Europe,"
pp. 244-45; Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of
Central, Balkan, and Eastern Europe," The Annals, No. 232 (March, 1944),
p. 5.
22

John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (Paper
back ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 96ff., indi
cates some of the reasons for the decline of strategic considerations.
In his chapter entitled "The Decline of the Territorial State," he
maintains that geographic boundaries are no longer as significant as in
the past because they can be bypassed or made useless through air war,
atomic war, ideological-political penetration and economic blockade.
The Territorial state, to use his word, has become "permeable."
2q
Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 44.
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While Transylvania is in many ways a "natural fortress" on its
own (this gave it the ability to preserve a certain amount of local
autonomy in the past), it is still an integral part of the whole
Carpathian system.

This is particularly evident in the watershed line

on the crest of the Carpathians and in the resultant hydrographic net
work of the whole area.

Thus, the Eastern Carpathians separate Tran

sylvania from Moldavia and the Bukovina, while toward the south, the
Transylvanian Alps separate it from Wallachia (today divided into
Muntenia and Oltenia).

Toward the west, its boundary is the less im

posing "Island Mountain District," which separates it from the Crisana
(Partium) and the Hungarian Puszta (lowlands or p l a i n s ) . ^

Within this

mountain enclosed area is the scenic Transylvanian Plateau . ^
Located between Hungary and the "Island Mountain District" are
the areas of the Banat to the southwest (from Transylvania), Crisana to
the west and Maramures to the north.

The Banat and the Crisana are

extensions of the Hungarian Puszta which slowly merge with the mountains
toward the east.

The Maramures is a somewhat more mountainous area

which gives rise to the important river Tisza flowing into Hungary.
Consequently, both the direction of rivers flowing through them and

^^Teleki, "Transylvania’s Situation in Hungary and in Europe,"
pp. 248-49.
oc
J Some good descriptions of Transylvania can be found in
Daicoviciu, Rum a n i a , p. 92ff., and J. Theodore Marriner, "Transylvania
and Its Seven Castles," The National Geographic Ma g a z i n e . XLIX (Mar.,
1926), 319-52.
However, both these sources are biased, and the latter
is also misinformed in the discussion of political questions as well
as the history of the area.
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the absence of insurmountable mountains, gives all three of these areas
easy access w e s t w a r d . ^
The direction of the rivers demonstrates even more forcefully
than the area's mountain ranges why Transylvania has oriented westward
in past history, rather than eastward or southward.

The entire hydro-

graphic network of Transylvania, with the exception of only one river
(the Olt), is directed toward the west, where they empty into the Tisza
in Hungary or the Danube in present-day Yugoslavia.

27

Only the Olt

crosses the Carpathians southward to join the Danube in Muntenia.
has great consequences for any system of communications.

This

For while it

is relatively easy to reach the Hungarian Puszta from Transylvania, it
is more difficult to reach Moldavia or Wallachia because of the immense
geographic barrier of the Carpathians.28

^Teleki,
pp. 248-49.

"Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe,"

^ J e a n Gottmann, "Geography and International Relations," in
Politics and Geographic Relationships, Ed. W. A. Douglas Jackson
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 24-25, indi
cates the conflict causing potential of shared hydrographic networks.
He shows how the conflicting interests of up- versus down-stream
possessors can lead to constant friction.
He observes on p. 25, that:
"The unity of hydrographic basins seems to have been emphasized more
recently in politics. This emphasis may be linked to the greater use
which modern civilization makes of rivers— pumping up more water for
ubran and industrial needs and harnessing streams for power production."
OO
This statement should be qualified, however, by the fact that
the distance between south-eastern Transylvania and Bucharest is shorter
than the distance between Budapest and the same area. Thus, if the
communications systems improve (roads and railroads particularly) this
factor will no longer be of great importance for south-eastern Tran
sylvania.
For western and north-western Transylvania it will still
present a great obstacle.
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Rumania is determined to overcome these geographic obstacles,
since ownership of Transylvania provides it with great economic wealth.
The area is rich in natural resources of all kinds.

It has extensive

timberlands and fine farm-lands for corn and other cereals, as well as
for orchards and vineyards.

It is also rich in grazing lands.

Further

more, it is blessed with a wealth of mineral deposits of all sorts,
OQ
including coal, iron, gold, silver, salt and natural gasses. v

These

minerals plus the potential power of Transylvania's rivers enable the
Of]

possessor state to develop a substantial industry. u

Both Rumania and

Hungary have, therefore, a great interest in the area, as its ownership
confers security, wealth and power.
Until very recently, Transylvania's economic features were more
stable than its ethnic composition.
mercy of historical circumstances.

The latter has always been at the
During Transylvania's long and
O1

colorful past, its demography has undergone great changes.

As had

been mentioned earlier, the Turkish occupation of Hungary, followed by
Austrian hegemony, drastically altered its ethnic composition.

While

at the end of the 15th century the area was overwhelmingly Magyar

^ G e o r g e H. Bossy, "Mining," in Romania, Ed. Stephen FischerGalati (New York;
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 232-47.
■^George H. Bossy,'Industry," Ibid., pp. 280-85.
^^Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of Central,
Balkan and Eastern Europe," pp. 3-4, states that:
"Differential birth
rates have been of extreme importance during the whole course of central
and eastern European history, as they are the fundamental cause of the
incessant change in the power position of nations. We know little about
vital statistics of former times, but it is certain that some eastern
European peoples, such as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians,
once had a 'larger' population than today, comparatively speaking."
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(75-80%) by the end of the 18th, the Magyars composed less than 50% of
the population.32

This radical change was a result of the phenomenal

decimation of the Magyar population in the struggle against the Turks,
as well as of the subsequent Habsburg policy of colonizing the depopulated
OO
and war devastated areas with non-Magyars.

The non-Magyar composition

of certain areas of the country was also enhanced by a less systematic
and artificial process, the great influx of refugees from Turkish
oppression.

Most of these refugees settled in Transylvania and Southern

Hungary (i.e., the present Vojvodina).
Following the Turkish retreat from Central Europe, the most farreaching changes in demographic structure were to be found in Transyl
vania and the

V o j v o d i n a .

34

jn Transylvania the Rumanians now composed

a greater sector of the population than all three of the historic

3^See Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 57; Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors, pp. 9**10; Francis S. Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nation
ality Problem in the Habsburg Empire," Journal of Central European
A ffairs, X X (Oct., 1960), 294, footnote 17. Peter F. Sugar, "The Rise
of Nationalism in the Habsburg Empire," Austrian History Yearbook, III,
Part 1 (1967), p. 112, maintains that in 1787 the proportion of the
Magyars was as low as 29 per cent.
09

JJC. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 3; C. A. Macartney,
National States and National Minorities (London:
Oxford University
Press, 1934), p. 89.
^^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 9-12, indicates
these changes. On p. 9, he states:
"The Turks not only made havoc of
Hungary's civilization; but the brunt of their attack and subsequent
occupation fell full upon the unprotected central plains which were the
stronghold of the Magyar population, the German, Slavonic, and Rou
manian areas of the periphery escaping far more lightly. They thus
altered the balance of the population . . . to the disadvantage of the
Magyars."
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"nationalities" combined.

35

To this day the Rumanians have maintained

their numerical majority in the area.
story.

However, this is only part of the

For even if Rumanians compose the over-all majority, many

geographic subdivisions of Transylvania are in turn overwhelmingly
Magyar or German.

This is the case in the border strip adjacent to

present-day Hungary and the Szdkely districts in the eastern corner of
the p r o v i n c e . ^
For the evaluation of the recent ethnic composition of Tran
sylvania, three important--and a number of lesser--census results are
available.

The three most frequently cited census results are those of

1910, 1930 and 1956.

The first was taken while Transylvania was still

under Hungarian jurisdiction, the second was taken under Rumanian
jurisdiction in the interwar period, and the last was taken under the
present Communist Rumanian regime.

37

While each one of these statis

tical sources is biased in one way or another, it is possible to get a
fairly good idea of the present ethnic composition of Transylvania by
referring to all three of them.

Table I presents the population of

Rumania and Transylvania according to these, as well as some less often
cited, census results.

•^The historic "nationalities" of Transylvania were the Magyars,
Saxons, and Szdkelys (a people akin to the Magyars who occupy the eastern
corner of the a r e a ) .
36]tfacartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 52126; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 353-54.
37Each of these census returns has limitations; that of 1910
because it was carried out under the auspices of a Magyarizing govern
ment; that of 1930 because it was carried out under the auspices of a
Rumanizing government; that of 1956 because it was carried out under a
Communist government.
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TABLE I
THE POPULATION OF RUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA ACCORDING
TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS )3

Nationality^

1910
•

•

1920

1930

. Transylvania0 . .

•

1948
•

1956

1966e

•

201

2,930
1,306
539
181
337

3,208
1,353
544
178
444

3,752
1,482
331
30
197

4,081
1,616
372
30
170

5,260

5,112

5,549

5,792

6,232

6,737*

11,360
1,553
636
260
45
64
43*
42
47
— g
90
141

13,598
1,500
344
139
38
14
29*
35
45
— -g
53
78

15,081
1,654
395
34

16,781*
1,603
377

14,281

15,873

17,489

Rumanians
Hungarians
Germans
Jews
Others

2,830
1,664
565
182

Total

•

•

. . Rumania^.

Rumanians
Hungarians
Germans
Jews
Ukrainians
Bulgarians
Turks
Slovaks & Czechs
Yugoslavs
Tatars
Gypsies
Others

10,524
1,823
829
820
1,032
340

126

133

Total

15,723

17,641

222

25
66

32
___f

13,186
1,362
593
873
576
261
174
32.
53
35
___f

. .

---------------------

•

-----

68

-----

13
35*
25
43
— g
67
74

-----

--------------

-345
19,105

aThis Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from
Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1963, Tables 16 and 17, pp. 88-89; Recensamintul Populatiei Din Zi Februarie 1956; Rezultate Generale. Tables 10,
11, and 12, pp. XlXrXX; The Mid-European Research Institute (ed.)
"Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe:
18671967," [unpublished manuscript]; and Andras Ronai, "Romania Neprajzi
Viszonyai," Foldrajzi Kozlemenyek. LXVIII (1940), 86-109.
bln this Table "nationality" means either the declared nation
ality or the mother tongue of the respondent.
The two have not been
separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared
nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue, and
still others on both.
The census data for 1910, 1930, 1948, and 1956,
used in this Table are based on mother tongue.
cIncluding Maramures, Crisana, and the eastern half of the Banat.
^The statistics for 1910 and 1920 refer to the area of Rumania
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What the data of Table I fails to show is the distribution of
the various nationalities geographically.

To find out where the Magyars

or Germans are strongest it is necessary to examine the area's popula
tion statistics on the regional, or county level.

An examination of this

sort reveals that the western parts of the Crisana, Banat, and Maramures
have a heavy Magyar population.

As has already been noted, this makes

the Rumanian border strip adjacent to Hungary, predominantly Magyar in
population.

in the inter-war years.
The statistics of 1930, 1948, 1956, and 1966,
refer to the reduced area of present-day Rumania.
eComplete data for the 1966 census is not yet available.
The
statistics for 1966 in this Table are based on "Communigue on the
Preliminary Results of the Population and Housing Census of March 15,
1966," Documents, Articles and Information on R omania. No. 18 (Oct.
15, 1966), pp. 15-16.
^In this Table the Gypsies have been placed under the "other"
category for the 1910 and 1920 censuses.
^For the 1930, 1948, and 1956 censuses, this Table enumerates
the Tartars and Turks together.
OQ
JOPro-Rumanian writers try to blur this fact by using only abso
lute figures for entire regions.
They almost never break down the
statistics to the "plasa" level (interwar administrative equivalent of
the "judet" or county).
See for example Roucek, Contemporary Roumania
and Her Problems, pp. 186-97; Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case,
p. 19; Pavel Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris
(London: Love and Malcomson Ltd., 1945), pp. 5-6; Alfred Malaschofsky,
Rum&nien (Berlin: Junker and Dunnhaupt Verlag, 1943), pp. 35-39.
Only
in Roumania at the Peace Conference: Paris 1946 (Switzerland:
Rumanian
Government Publication, 1946), pp. 76-78, are the statistics broken down
to the "plasa" level. However, in this case two misleading factors are
emphasized:
(1) that the Magyars only have a relative majority
(plurality) in the border strip, and (2 ) that the other nationality
groups living there would not favor Magyar rule. The latter contention
ignores the fact that many of these "nationalities" are Magyarized
Swabians and Jews who consider themselves to be Magyars regardless of
how the Rumanians classify them.
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Other areas where the non-Rumanian elements are strong are the
cities, the old "Saxon" and the more recent Swabian settlements, and
the compact Magyar-Szdkely area in the eastern corner of Transylvania.
Until recently, the Jewish settlements in the Maramures were not incon
siderable.

But there are innumerable other settlements of Jews, Germans

and Hungarians scattered throughout the whole of Transylvania.

In the

western Banat, besides Germans and Hungarians there are also many Serbs.
In general, the Hungarians and Germans inhabit the river valleys and
the lowlands, while the Rumanians compose the bulk of the population in
the mountainous a r e a s , and the Jews form an important segment of some
city populations.

OQ
^

Since World War II, some changes have taken place in the ranks
of the non-Rumanian ethnic groups, particularly among the Germans and
the Jews.

40

These changes were due to the dislocations of the war,

including deportations, territorial transfers and exterminations.

The

net result of these changes has been to leave only the Hungarians as a
41
strong minority (although they too have been weakened),
and to accen
tuate the predominant role of the Rumanians.

■^Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities of Transylvania. p. 40;
Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 521-26.
^^Regarding the classification of Jews in the census of 1910,
1930, and 1956, it must be noted that the latter two place them in an
ethnic category.
This was not the case in the census of 1910. Accord
ing to this early census a Jew could designate— on the basis of
preference— what nationality he belonged to; only on religious grounds
was he differentiated in statistics. The Rumanians have placed the Jews
in a separate category in order to weaken the statistics of the Magyars,
for in the past the Jews have on most occasions opted for that nationality.
^ M a c a r t n e y , October Fifteenth, II, pp. 346-47; Reuben H.
Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston; Meador Publishing
Company, 1949), pp. 513-l4.
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The Jewish ethnic group suffered greatly during the war years.
At this time the Iron Guardists and the Antonescu dictatorship carried
to fulfillment the Nazi "solution" of the Jewish p r o b l e m . ^

Besides

outright extermination, the Jews also diminished in proportion to the
other minorities as a result of the cession of Bessarabia and Eukovina
to the U.S.S.R. and Dobruja to Bulgaria.

More recently their numbers

have been further reduced by emigration to Israel.
In terms of percentages, the Germans were the greatest losers.
Their losses came mostly during the closing phase of World War II and
during the early post-war y e a r s . ^

These losses were of various kinds.

War losses took their toll among the male population.

44

Deportations

to Russia were responsible for a further reduction of the G e r m a n s . ^
But, perhaps, the greatest reductions came when Hitler transferred
Rumanian Germans to newly conquered areas in Poland and Czechoslovakia

42por the pre-war development of the problem see Oscar I.
Janowsky, People at B a y ; The Jewish Problem in East-Central Europe
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 68-71. For post-war
changes see sources in Randolph L. Braham, Jews in the Communist W o r l d ;
A Bibliography 1945-1960 (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1961),
pp. 30-32.
^ T h e o d o r Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population
from Hungary and Rumania (A Selection and Translation from Dokumentation
Per Vertreibung Per Deutschen Aus Ost-Mitteleuropa; Bonn: The Federal
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 42.
44

I b i d ., pp, 61-62.

45

Ibid., pp. 78-79, 80-82; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet
Y o k e , p. 410; Cornish, Transylvania, the Land Beyond the Forest,
p . 148.
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as colonists.

Later, these "colonists" suffered immense losses when

the Poles and Czechs re-asserted their rule following the German
collapse
Other ethnic minorities like the Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Tatars
and Turks were also reduced in significance.

These reductions came with

the cessions of Buko v i n a . Bessarabia and Dobruja.

Unlike the Germans

and the Jews, however, these other minority reductions did not greatly
affect the minority situation in Transylvania.
problem posed by these lesser minorities.

But it did eliminate the

Consequently, it left the

Rumanian regime more time to concentrate attention on its greatest

AO

minority problem— the Magyars of Transylvania. °

The Vojvodina
Directly west, south-west, of Transylvania lies the Vojvodina.
The border between these two areas runs from north to south, dividing
into two unequal parts the former Banat.

This is w h y both Transylvania

and the Vojvodina possess parts which are called the Banat.

In

^ M a c a r t n e y , October Fifteenth, II, 347; Schieder, The Expulsion
of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, 49-50, 54-55.
In this same source also see Annex 6 and 7, pp. 136-47.
^ I b i d ., pp. 55, 96.
^ L e s z e k Kosinski, "Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries
of East-Central Europe," A Paper Presented at Louisiana State University,
Feb. 29, 1968, as the first in a series of lectures devoted to EastCentral Europe, sponsored by the Department of Geography and Anthro
pology. In this paper Kosinski indicated that not only in Rumania, but
in all of East-Central Europe, the Hungarians remain as the largest
minority ethnic group.
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Transylvania the Banat refers to its westernmost territories, while in
the Vojvodina it refers to its easternmost t e r r i t o r i e s . ^
Geographically the Vojvodina is an extension of the great Hun
garian puszta (lowlands) which lies at the center of the Carpathian
Basin.

More precisely, it is the southernmost extension of these low

lands.

Because it is part of this greater plain, its history has

usually been determined directly by the people who controlled the
Carpathian Basin as a whole.

Unlike Transylvania, it does not possess

mountain barriers for frontiers.
an open plain.

Both toward Rumania and Hungary it is

It possesses natural frontiers only in the south and

the west, where the Danube performs this role.*’®

Because the Vojvodina

is such an exposed area, it has never had any autonomy that would be
comparable to the past autonomy of Transylvania.^^In every respect, the Vojvodina is characterized more by acces
sibility than by isolation or seclusion.

It is "a region of wide valley

basins, alluvial plains, sandy dune areas and crystalline hills covered
C O

with fertile loess."

The entire region is dominated by the large

rivers which are the most conspicuous features of the landscape.

These

^ S e e maps in Prologue, pp. 5-7.
■*®For a good discussion of this area from a geographic perspec
tive see Jugoslavia; Physical Geography (B. R. 493, Geographical Hand
book Series; Great Britain;
Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), I,
35-42; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81.
^ I b i d . , pp. 382-90, 395-403; Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and
Administration ( B.R. 493A, Geographical Handbook Series; Great Britain:
Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), II, 70-77, 177-79.
52

J George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New
Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 16.
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rivers divide the Vojvodina into its three component parts.

s^

Farthest

to the west, the Darda triangle (Baranya) is wedged in between the Drave
and the Danube.

In the center, the Badka (Bacska) has the Danube as its

western and southern boundry and the Tisza as its eastern boundary.

In

the east, across the Tisza, is the Banat.
The Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area.

In the

Banat a great deal of land has been re-claimed through re-forestation
during the past 150 years.

In the Badka a great deal has been reclaimed

by draining the marshes and by building canals.

As a whole, the area

possesses only limited resources for industrial growth.

ss

Consequently,

the industry that exf.sts is geared to the processing of agricultural
goods.

This includes mills, distilleries and processing plants, which

are concerned primarily with canning, sugar refining, alcohol making
and flour milling.

Maize and wheat are the principal cereals of the

i;q

-'■'Although the present-day administrative area of the Vojvodina
includes the Srem and excludes the Baranya, in the present context the
Baranya will be considered as part of it.
Historical, ethnic and geo
graphic considerations support such an inclusion.
Furthermore, most
past studies of the Vojvodina have included the Baranya in it. Thus,
continuity of scholarship also supports its inclusion. As opposed to
this, past studies have not always considered the Srem as part of the
Vojvodina.
See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81;
Jugoslavia: H istory, Peoples and Administration, pp. 70-77.
-’^ I b i d .; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 16-17.
-’•’Minerals in the strict sense are almost completely non
existent.
In the Fruska Gora mountains there is some low grade coal
and also some quarz sand for glass manufacturing, but aside from some
very limited oil deposits in the Banat near the Rumanian border, there
is nothing else.
Ibid., p. 17.
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area, but sunflower and beets are also important crops.
and fishing is also wide-spread.

Animal husbandry

In short, the Vojvodina has become

Yugoslavia's chief food-producing region, just as it had been Hungary's
prior to World War 1 .-^
Ethnically the Vojvodina has been, and is, even more diverse
than Transylvania, although it is a much smaller area with a much smaller
population.

Table II indicates the ethnic composition of both Yugo

slavia and the Vojvodina.

The diversity presented by this table does

not give a complete picture of the entangled nature of the area's
ethnic settlement.

As Macartney notes:

No words can, unfortunately, do justice to the distribution
of the population. The Rumanians are mostly to be found in the
east, the Magyars are strongest in the north, the Serbs in the
south: but the three intermingle hopelessly, a wedge of Serbian
settlements pushing in one place far northward, while Magyar
advanced posts run to its right and left well to the south, and
outlying Magyar islets are found, even in the countryside, in
the extreme south, as well as in all the towns. The Sokac and
Bunyevac settlements are near the northern frontier, islands in
a non-Slavonic sea, the Slovaks and Ruthenes are rather farther
south. The Germans are everywhere. The distribution can be
appreciated, if at all, only from the map, and the reason for
it can be learnt only from history . ^
Stefan Possony points out that the demographic make-up of EastCentral Europe has reflected the political rise and decline of certain

56Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81; Jugoslavia:
Economic Geography, Ports and Communications (B.R. 493B, Geographical
Handbook Series; Great Britain;
Naval Intelligence Division, 1945),
III, 11-14, 164-67, 202, 212-17.
“^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 381. This quote is
now dated, since the German minority has been almost completely elimi
nated.
Still, it provides some insight into the ethnic mixture of the
area.
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TABLE II
THE POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE VOJVODINA
ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS )3

Nationality^

1910*** 1921***

1931***

1948

1953

1961

841
134

874
128

1,018
145

7
9
31

6
12

• • • • The Vojvodinac . .
Serbs
Croats
Bunjevci & Sokci
Slovenes
Macedonians
Montenegrins
Muslims
Unspecified
Yugoslavs
Germans
Albanians
Hungarians
Turks
Slovaks
Italians
Rumanians
Bulgarians
Czechs
Others
Total
Serbs
Croats
Slovenes
Macedonians
Montenegrins
Muslims
Unspecified
Yugoslavs
Germans
Albanians
Hungarians
Turks
Slovaks
Italians
Rumanians
Bulgarians
Czechs
Others
Total

382)
7)
63)

-----

502

462
16

7

68
8

----

----

--

1

31

--

2

___d
301

___

___

_—mm

11

317

317

32

35

422
---d
58

376
-- ri
65

386
-- d
71

76

70

72

--

--

--

--

--

--

6

15
35
3

--

0

1

2

429

435

443

0

0

1

72

73

74

0

0

0

57
4
3
41

57
4
3
48

12

9

16

59
4
4
40

1,320

1,347

1,416

1,663

1,713

1,855

. Yugoslavia6 . . . •
6,547
4,617
5,267
3,200
3,784
3,529
1,222
1,415
1,025
780
810
750
380
400
426
--809

7,066
3,976
1,487
893
466

7,806
4,294
1,589
1,046
514
973

999
54
754
502
260
85
36
60
62
35
257
16,937

317
53
915
504
183

---

———d

• • •
-- *
------

_at«
----------—— —

---

»__

___

513
442
472
150
81
130.
129
65
34

496
759
466
165
82
150.
135*
64
38

--

12,317

--

13,934

mm'm,—
55
750
496
98
84
80
64
61
39
308
15,772

--

86

26
61
63
30
143
18,549

aThis Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained
from Jugoslavia: H istory, Peoples and Administration, p. 76; Schieder
(ed.), Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation
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nationalities.-*®

This is especially true for the present northern parts

of Yugoslavia, where vast demographic changes have signalled the rise
and fall of peoples.

It can be said that the Vojvodina's present ethnic

composition is the consequence of the dominant role played there by

Per Vertreibung Per Peutschen Aus Ost-Mitteleuropa Band V, p. H E ;
Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Table 3-1, p. 29; Elemer
Homonnay, "A P 6 lmagyarorsz^gi Teriiletek Nemzetisdgi Megoszlasa Az
1948 - As Jugoszlav N^pszamlalas Adatai Szerint," Larmafa, X, No. 3,
(1963), pp. 19-40; The Mid-European Research Institute (ed.),
"Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe:
1867-1967," [unpublished manuscript]; and Jugoslavia 1945-1964:
Statisticki Pregled, Table 3-13, p. 45.
®In this Table "nationality" means either the declared nation
ality or the mother tongue of the respondent.
The two have not been
separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared
nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue.
cThe 1910, 1921, 1931 statistics of the Vojvodina pertain to
the Badka, Banat and Baranya, whereas the post-war statistics of 1948,
1953, 1961, pertain to the Badka, Banat and the Srem.
This different
territorial basis of the pre- and post-war statistics, accounts, in
part, for the doubling of the Serbian population.
^In the 1910, 1921, and 1931 statistics for the Vojvodina,
Czechs and Slovaks were enumerated together. All "unspecified" Slavs
were enumerated together with the Serbs, Croats or the Slovaks.
Under "Other," the present Table includes mainly Gypsies.
e Since Yugoslavia is only a post-World War I creation, it has
not been possible to ascertain its ethnic composition for 1910.
The
data for 1921 and 1931 refer to its inter-war area, while the 1948,
1953, 1961, statistics refer to the enlarged area of present-day
Yugoslavia.
■^In the 1921 and 1931 censuses for Yugoslavia, Rumanians and
Vlachs were enumerated together.
Post-World War II censuses have
enumerated them separately.
CO

J See footnote 31 above.
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Magyars, Turks, Serbs and Austrians during the past three hundred
597
years .J
Until the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, the area's population was
predominantly M a g y a r E v e n

Belgrade (called Nandorfehervcir by the

Magyars) was for a long time a Hungarian fortress.

But the Turkish

victory over the Hungarians at Mohacs led to a drastic ethnic change
in what was then southern Hungary.
depopulated and devastated the area.

Turkish depredations completely
Only after the ascendancy of

Habsburg Austria did the area regain some of its population.

However,

the ethnic make-up of this new population was no longer predominantly
Magyar.

It had become mainly Serbian and German.
The Habsburg policy for this area was motivated by considera

tions of defense as well as empire.

It involved a re-colonization

scheme that would provide an effective defense against the Turks, while
at the same time it would strengthen Austrian hegemony within the
empire.

Habsburg policy favored Serbian and German colonists rather

than Hungarians due to the potentially disruptive capacity of the

-^ J u g o s l a v i a ; H i s tory. Peoples and Administration, pp. 70-77.
Of all the peoples that have made history in this area, only the Turks
failed to leave behind a minority of their own.
6 °Ibid., p. 70.

61

The re-population of the area by "soldier colonists" of Serb
and German ethnic background receives extensive treatment in Rothenberg, The Military Border of Croatia 1740- 1881, pp. 6-17; Wayne S.
Vucinich, "The Serbs in Austria-Hungary," Austrian History Yearbook,
III, part 2 (1967), 8-17.
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latter.

62

Consequently, the population of the present-day Vojvodina

became a patchwork of different nationalities, with the Serbs and
Germans becoming particularly important.

However, by the end of the

18th century the Magyars again began to re-populate the area.

Magyars

filled up especially those areas which had recently been re-claimed
through the drainage of swamps.

Thus, when the Treaty of Trianon dis

membered Hungary, the Vojvodina reflected a rough parity in population
of South Slavs, Germans and Hungarians .^3
This three-way ethnic balance was upset by World War I I . ^

in

the closing year of the war and immediately after the close of hostili
ties, about 445,000 Volksdeutsche were expelled from

Y u g o s l a v i a .65

The majority of these Germans had been living in the Vojvodina.

About

40,000 Magyars were also exchanged at this time for an equal number of
Serbs and Croats living in Hungary.

The expulsion of these minorities

opened the w a y for a new emigration of South Slavs to the Vojvodina.
These changes have led to a completely new ethnic set-up in the area.

62por a time the Magyars were even officially banned from
settling in the Vojvodina.
See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors,
p. 384.
63See Table II.
AA

Actually the ethnic balance was already eroded by Serbian
inter-war policies which encouraged more South Slavs to move to the
Vojvodina.
This earlier shift can be seen in Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors, pp. 435-37.
^Theodor Schieder (ed.) Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in
Jugoslawien (Dokumentation Per Vertreibung Per Deutschen Aus OstMitteleuropa; Bonn:
The Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and
War Victims, 1961), V, 119E-132E: Joseph B. Schechtman, "The Elimination
of German Minorities m Southeastern Europe," Journal of Central
European A f f a i r s , VI (July, 1946), 160-62.
66

ODHoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 42.
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Now the Magyars and the Germans no longer outnumber the Croats and the
Serbs.

The latter now outnumber the Magyars by more than three to one.

However, as in the case of Transylvania, so in the Vojvodina, there are
areas and towns where the Magyars outnumber the South Slavs.

This is

the case in the northern half of the BScka and in a part of the Ddrda
triangle.
Other ethnic changes have also taken place, but these had less
bearing on the Vojvodina.

Almost 150,000 Italians emigrated to Italy

after the Julian March was transferred to Yugoslavia.

The few Jews

(about 8,000) who survived the war emigrated to Israel, and between
1950 and 1959 over 100,000 Turks left for Turkey . ^

III.

Development of the Disputes

The rise of nationalism among these different nationalities
became evident in the early part of the 19th century.

The Hungarians

were now resolved to make the character of the Vojvodina and Transyl
vania even more "Magyar."

The South Slavs and the Rumanians reacted

violently to this policy.

When the Hungarians sought to throw off the

yoke of Habsburg absolutism in 1848-49, most Serbs, Croats and Rumanians
sided with the latter.

This confirmed the Magyarizers in their belief

that Vienna had been successful in playing the game of divide and con£O
quer.

It only inspired them to exert even more time and effort to win

^ I b i d ., p. 41.

68

Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg
Empire," p. 309.
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over the national minorities.

What many of these individuals failed to

realize was that the minorities had by this time also tasted of the
nationalism inspired by the French R e v o l u t i o n . T h i s was particularly
true for the Serbs of southern Hungary and the Rumanians of Transyl• a .'u
70
vani
Since Hungary was unsuccessful in its war for independence,
it was placed under direct Austrian administration.
ended Magyarization efforts.

This temporarily

However, in 1867 Austria and Hungary

buried their differences and the nationalities had to seek a modus
vivendi w ith the Magyars.^-*-

The price of this was a renewal and in

tensification of Magyarization.

Among some nationality groups it met

with little or no r e s i s t a n c e B u t

among the Rumanians, Serbs and

Croats, this policy provoked r e s i s t a n c e T h e

national consciousness

of these ethnic groups had already "crossed the Rubicon."

Many of them

6 9 I b i d ., pp. 289, 307, 309.

^ I b i d .; Rustem Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary," The Annals,
No. 232 (March, 1944), p. 78.
^ R o b e r t Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 76-77; Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolu
tion of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press,
1929), pp. 90-99, 108-18.
^ Maca r t n e y , Hungary and Her Successors. pp. 18ff.
^ M a c a r t n e y , October Fifteenth, I, 8 .
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could no longer look on themselves as "Hungarians of Rumanian or Slavic
ancestry."

At any rate, the First World War interferred with the

realization of the Magyar nation-state within historic boundaries.
The Austro-Hungarian defeat brought about the collapse and disintegra
tion of the e m p i r e . ^

The disintegration, supposedly based on the

principles of self-determination, culminated in the emergence of a
totally fragmented Central Europe.
subsequent political c h a o s . ^

The Treaty of Trianon legalized the

The fragments, the new nation-states,

provided the setting for the next twenty years of Europe's confused and
heated political history.

The Inter-War Years
Transylvania and the Vojvodina became the objects of dispute
between Rumanians, Yugoslavs and Hungarians.

This phase of European

and Rumanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian history reflects best the
"bourgeois nationalism" so frequently denounced by the Communist
ideologues of today.

According to them, this was the age when nation

alism pushed into the background all ideas of "social reform" and
diverted the attention of all, to "narrow and nationalist aims."
The ensuing twenty years did, indeed, see the no-holds-barred

^ F o r a description of this disintegration consult Jaszi, The
Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Part V and VI, pp. 271-429;
Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918.
75Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 4, 5, 21, provides a brief
but concise summary of the loses suffered by Hungary as a result of
this treaty.
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struggle of nationalisms.

The foreign policy of Hungary was carried on

in direct reference to the "injustice" of the Treaty of T r i a n o n . ^

All

Hungarians hoped for the day when this detested treaty would be revised.
Revisionism became, in effect, the outlook and faith of the total
nation.^7

This was opposed by the equally fervently held Rumanian and

Serbian policies, which had as their guiding star the rigid preservation
of the "sacred" status q

u

o

The formation of the Little and the

Balkan Entente are but two manifestations that reflect the approach of
Rumania, Yugoslavia and other "satisfied" powers to perpetuate the
existing state of a f f a i r s . ^

7^R. G. Waldeck, Athene Pa lace (New York;
Robert M. McBride
and Company, 1942), p. 135; Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary," p. 81;
Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 5.
^ G r i g o r e Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, trans. E. FletcherAlien (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 156, 163, 167-68,
and John 0. Crane, The Little Entente (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1931), p. 6 , describe this from a pro-Rumanian perspective. Robert
Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States (London:
Richards, 1937), p. 21, defends the Hungarians.
He maintains that the
". . . difference between the situation of the Hungarian minorities and
that of other minorities is this:
the Hungarian minorities are firmly
convinced that their present situation is due to the errors of a m i s 
guided and ill-conducted Peace Conference, whereas the other minorities
owe their existence to circumstances such as neither human foresight
can avoid nor human skill control."
^ E m i l Ciurea, "The Background," Captive Rumania Ed. Alexandre
Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 9-10;
Roucek, Contemporary Roumainia and Her Problems, p. 214; Macartney,
Independent Eastern Europe, pp. 265-71; Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp.

21 -22 .
? 9Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States,
p. 18; Crane, The Little Entente, pp. 6-7; Temperley, "How the
Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 434.
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In the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and
the greatly enlarged post-World War I Rumania, the position of the
Magyars underwent a drastic change.

From a position of most favored

they were pushed into the position of least favored.

Their treatment

was, of course, tied directly to both domestic and foreign policy
developments.
As part of France's defense structure of the status q u o , the
new South Slav kingdom and the enlarged Rumania were placed in direct
opposition to Hungary and Bulgaria.

This opposition did not have to be

encouraged since Rumania and Yugoslavia had gained territories at the
expense of both Hungary and Bulgaria.
revision of these gains.

The latter countries desired a

In the face of such desires Rumania and Yugo

slavia looked to France and other satisfied countries, like Czecho
slovakia, for assistance.

In this conflict the Magyars of the Vojvodina

and Transylvania— as well as the Bulgars of Dobruja and the pro-Bulgar
Macedonians--became mere driftwood tossed hither and thither in the un
certain stream of East European politics.

World War II and Its Aftermath
Events in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina became entangled
with world events as Europe moved into World War II.

As power relation

ships altered, political changes gained momentum in Eastern Europe.
Hungary saw in these changes the opportunity to regain Transylvania and
the Vojvodina.

As Yugoslavia disintegrated in the wake of Axis aggres

sion, the dissatisfied powers of Europe had their chance to partake of
the spoils.

The country broke into two major parts.

The western part
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became the independent state of Croatia under Italian hegemony, while
the eastern part was German occupied Serbia.

The remainder of the

country was divided among Italy, Italian Albania, Germany, Bulgaria
and Hungary.

Hungary did not regain all of the Vojvodina.

It did re

gain the Medjumurje and the Prekomurje, as well as the Dirda triangle

O ft
and the Bafika regions.

The rest of the Vojvodina came under German

and Croatian jurisdiction.

Germany occupied the Banat while the

Croatians took the Srem (the region between the Danube and Sava rivers
south of Novi Sad [Ujvid4k]).
With the collapse of the Little Entente, Rumania found itself
isolated between unfriendly Bulgaria, Hungary and the U.S.S.R.

From

each of these countries it had gained extensive territories after World
War I.

These countries demanded a restoration of their territories by

Rumania.

Following the outbreak of World War II the U.S.S.R. confronted

it with a demand for the Bukovina and Bessarabia, while Bulgaria
demanded Dobruja, and Hungary the province of Transylvania.

81

The

cessions of Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja went relatively
82
smoothly .0

The cession of the former two to the U.S.S.R., however,

Oft
Jugoslavia:

History. Peoples and Administration, I, 244.

81

Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case, p. 1; Macartney,
October Fifteenth. I, 387-89, 318-24, 429-30.

82

Alexander Cretzianu, "The Soviet Ultimatum to Roumania (26
June, 1940)," Journal of Central European Affairs, IX (Jan., 1950),
396-403.
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drove Rumania into the arms of G e r m a n y . ^
against the demands for Transylvania.

It sought German support

By 1940, war was threatening

between Hungary and Rumania over this question.®^

This, Hitler wanted

to prevent at all cost, since he was just preparing to launch the
attack on the U.S.S.R.

Moreover, for this attack he needed access to
Qr

the Rumanian oil fields as well as peace between his lesser allies. J
He asked Rumania and Hungary to solve their problems peacefully by
negotiating their differences.^^

When these talks broke down, Hungary

threatened military action in spite of Hitler.

At this point, King

Carol II of Rumania asked for an arbitral decision from the Axis
powers.The

result of that decision was the Second Vienna Award.

Although this Award was a compromise, neither Rumania nor
Hungary was completely satisfied.

Hitler used these dissatisfactions

to urge the two countries on to greater efforts in the war against the
U.S.S.R.

He dangled before their eyes the prospects of the loss or

09

Kallay, Hungarian Premier, pp. 58-61; Waldeck, Athene Palace,
pp. 27, 37, 113, 124-25. Grigore Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian
Campaign, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London:
Frederick Muller, Ltd.,
1945), pp. 52, 64.
^^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 389; Markham, Rumania Under
the Soviet Y o k e , pp. 114, 124-25; Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe,
pp. 419-20.
^ I b i d . , pp. 421-22; Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 39; Kallay,
Hungarian Premier. p. 59.
^ W a l d e c k , Athene Palace, p. 131.
87

Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 351; Leiss, European Peace
Treaties After World War II, p. 102.
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gain of more territory according to their performance in the war.®®
This tactic was by no means only confined to Hitler.

Stalin, in

particular, had approached the Hungarians on more than one occasion
before and during the war, to convince them that cooperation would
on
mean territorial gains later. y

The Allies, too, were aware of the

bargaining importance of Transylvania's future.

They succeeded in

approaching Rumania wi t h the promise of this t e r r i t o r y . ^
Rumania did, in fact, switch sides as the armies of Germany
were pressed back on every front.
1944.

The defection came on August 23,

This came after the Allies promised to give Transylvania "or

®®As it has been demonstrated, the purpose of the Second
Vienna Award was not to divide and conquer, but to bring about peace
in the rear of Hitler's armies.
On the other hand, this does not mean
that Transylvania did not remain a potential reward to the state which
performed its wartime duties better.
See Macartney, October Fifteenth,
II, 253, 319; Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 64.
For a Communist
Hungarian interpretation see Miklds Horvath, A. 2. Magyar Hadsereg
Megsemmisuldse A Donndl (Budapest: Zrinyi Kiadd, 1959), pp. 9-10.
For
a Rumanian view see Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of
Paris, p. 37. That war achievements were considered important is also
illuminated from another angle by Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 355-56.
Compensation given on the eastern front (Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transnistria) is here regarded as partial payment from Hitler for losses
sustained in the West (Northern Transylvania and Dobruja).
For a
thorough discussion of the Second Vienna Award see Appendix B.
89Kallay, Hungarian Premier, footnote 27. p. 58; Macartney
October Fifteenth, II, 405. However, Stalin did net forget the
Rumanians either.
For his approaches in this direction, see Alexander
Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations:
Cairo, 1944,"
journal of Central European Affairs, XI (Oct., 1951), 251.
^^Eknil Ciurea, "The Background," Captive Rumania, ed.
Alexandre Cretzianu (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956),
pp. 18-19; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Y o k e , p. 173;. Macartney,
October Fifteenth, II, 191-92, 204-05, 216.
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the greater part thereof" to the R u m a n i a n s . ^

However, this also re

quired that they join the Allies in the expansion of the war against the
German and Hungarian forces still fighting.

This, too, was done.

Thus,

Rumania gained the Allied support which was to mean so much at the
Conference table following World War II.
A great deal of juggling and diplomatic intrigue took place as
the Peace Treaty was being drawn up.

The Rumanians pressed their

claims and backed them up with their prior defection.
attempted to save the un s avable.

Q O

Hungary, too,

It carried on negotiations which had

as their goal the preservation of as much of Transylvania as possible.
The negotiators were especially concerned over the 30-mile Magyarinhabited border strip which had been under Rumanian jurisdiction in
QO

the interwar period. J

But these efforts failed to sway the Allies,

who re-established the Trianon borders of H u n g a r y . ^
In the meantime, vast changes were taking place in Yugoslavia.
After the front against the Axis had collapsed

in 1941, the under

ground began its operations.^5

no room, nor need, to go

Here, there is

^ L e i s s , European Peace Treaties After World War I I , pp. 101102, 299; Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations;
Cairo,
1944," pp. 243-58.
92Roumania at the Peace Conference, pp. 35-41, and Annex I,
pp. 49-78.
^ F e r e n c Nagy, The Struggle Behind the
The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 204, 209-10,

Iron Curtain (New York;
218-19.

^^Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War I I , p. 94.
qc
Schieder, Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in Jugoslawien, V,
59E-64E.
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into the details of the controversy concerning the role of Mihailovic
led Cetniks and Tito led Partisans.

What must be mentioned, however,

is that the success of the Partisans and the failure of the Cetniks
was in large part due to their respective positions on the nationali
ties q u e s t i o n . ^
The Cetniks were, in effect, a continuation of the Serb ideal
of Yugoslavia.

This being the case, they favored a South Slav state

dominated by the Serbs.

They were motivated by a narrow ethnic nation

alism not unlike that which inspired the Croatian Ustasa.

As a conse

quence, their influence was limited both from an ethnic and a territorial
perspective.97
The Partisans followed a different course.
appeal to all the nationalities of

Y u g o s l a v i a . ^

They attempted to
They saw in national

unity the key to successful resistance against the Germans.

Such unity

could be attained only if the program and objectives of the Partisans
was divorced from the narrow ethnic squabbles of the past.

Since Tito

and the Yugoslav Communists dominated the Partisans, the ideological

96

Dinko Tomasic, "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia,"
Journal of Central European A f f airs, VI (July, 1946), 112; Paul Shoup,
"Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII
(Mar., 1963), 64-81.
97This is inadvertantly admitted even by Eric L. Pridonoff, a
Cetnik sympathizer. See his Titov's Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 13-14, 50-57, 129-36, 228-31.
9®Danilo Kecic, "Figyelfi: A JKP Vajdasigban A Felkelds
Elttkdszitese'nek ]fs Megindit^sanak Napjaiban," trans. Jozsef Kollin,
H i d , X X V (Sept., 1961), 784-92.
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orientation of the leaders enabled the movement as a whole to transcend
the ethnic nationalisms of the past.

Liberation from the foreign

German yoke provided the unifying ideal.

Thus, Partisan groups came

into existence in all parts of the country— even the Vojvodina—

QQ

which fought for the common cause of national liberation.
For both Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia, the experiences of
World War II have provided the legitimizing "myths"'*'^ on which they
base their present rule.

More will be said about these "myths" in

QQ

I b i d . The terrain of the Vojvodina is, for the most part,
unsuitable for guerrilla warfare.
During the war the Partisans in this
area were much less successful than in other areas of the country.
^®®In the present context "myth" designates a "world picture"
held by a particular group.
It performs the indispensable role of
expressing and codyfying or stereotyping, the major characteristics of
a particular group's culture by reference to specific formative his
torical events, developments and traditions. This involves the group's
entire value system, including safeguards and enforcements of standards
of social morality, certain rituals and practical rules of guidance.
Myth is less precise and intellectual than an ideology, but as a conse
quence is almost more pervasive.
It is based on traditions, customs,
folk-lore and mores, many of which have a mystical rather than a r a 
tional foundation.
For a more precise definition see Arden R. King,
"Myth," A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 450. The definition of myth is very similar to the
definition of legend (King, "Legend," Ibid., p. 384).
Funk and
Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary differentiates them by stating that:
"Myth is the creation of a fact out of an idea," while legend is "the
seeing of an idea in a fact." Thus, "myth is purely the w ork of
imagination," while "legend has a nucleus of fact." According to this
dichotomy, in the Yugoslavian "Partisan Myth" and in the "August 23
Myth" and "Daco-Roman Myth" of the Rumanians, elements of both myth
and legend are present.
Consequently, in the present context myth
will be given a broader meaning, as a belief including elements of
both fact and imagination. Myth in this sense is what W e b s t e r 's Third
New International Dictionary calls, "a belief given uncritical acceptance
by the members of a group esp. in support of existing or traditional
practices and institutions (e.g., of racial superiority used to justify
discrimination)."
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succeeding chapters.

At present it is enough to note that in Yugo

slavia the Partisan tradition has never been the monopoly of any one
ethnic g r o u p . T h e

August 23rd myth of the Rumanians, on the other

hand, was from the beginning an act of the Rumanian people alone,

i n?

against the imperialist Hungarians and Germans. u

While both myths

have sought their roots in "national" traditions, the Yugoslav varient
has enabled the national minorities to partake of it.

This has not

been possible for the minorities in Rumania, particularly not for the
Hungarians of Transylvania.

Thus, the Rumanian myth has, from the

beginning, developed along exclusivist lines, while its Yugoslavian
counterpart has been inclusivist--at least from an ethnic standpoint.

■*-®^This needs some qualification.
Before his imprisonment
Milovan Djilas had for a long time maintained that the burden of
liberation rested on the shoulders of the Slavic peoples.
See his
"A Szldv Ndpek Harca A B^kddrt ifs A Demokrdci^drt," H i d , XI (Jan.,
1947), 12-20, and "Jugoszl^via Nepeinek Harca l£s A Marxizmus-Leninizmus,"
H i d , XI (Dec., 1947), 873-83.
1 02

Red Army participation in making the coup a success is also
grudgingly admitted.
See "The Great Anniversary," Rumania T o d a y , No.
116 (1964), p. 1. August 23rd was the day when Antonescu was toppled
from power and the Rumanians switched sides.
Since the switch was
against the Germans and the Hungarians, the latter immediately became
the villains in the mythology surrounding the event.
The switch was
seen as a purely Rumanian achievement, eliminating thereby the possi
bility of giving the other nationalities a share in the credit for
liberation.

irnThe

Germans were the only ethnic group that were excluded
from the Partisan myth.
They replaced the Magyars as the scapegoat
minority. The entire success of the Partisan myth has depended on the
unity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia against the threat of a German
political revival.
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IV.

The Changed Nature of the Disputes Under Soviet
Military Occupation

The myths touched on above have been important in the long run.
From a short-term perspective the actual process of liberation was much
more important.

In Yugoslavia this was in all respects--excepting only

parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the Vojvodina— a national achievement.
In Rumania, on the other hand, "liberation" was the result more of the
advancing Red Army than of the belated coup d'etat which toppled
Antonescu.

Thus, Yugoslavia escaped the burden of Red Army occupation.

In fact, Yugoslavia was viewed by all the Allies as part of the anti
fascist coalition.

This was not the case with Rumania.

It fell under

Red Army occupation and was considered and treated as a former enemy
state.

Thus, the end of World War II in Eastern Europe left Rumania

and Hungary under Soviet military occupation and Yugoslavia under the
rule of a government which was then considered the staunchest sup
porter of Soviet policies .^-0^
In these early years Tito's Yugoslavia did not need the Red
Army either to guarantee for itself a Communist government, or to
eradicate the remnants of fascist and collaborationist forces in the
country.

For both tasks the CPY was superbly qualified.

In good

Stalinist fashion, its secret police (UBD) "tried" and exterminated or
imprisoned all "war-criminals."

These included about 150,000

•'•^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 75-80, 81-85,

100- 102.
105Ibid., pp. 91-95.
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Volksdeutsche and 40,000 Hungarians.'*-®^

It also deported the bulk of

the country's German population and some of its Hungarians.
other ethnic groups suffered as well.

But all

It can be said that these

liquidations were--with the exception of the Germans, and possibly the

108

Hungarians-- uo motivated more by considerations of ideology and
power, than by ethnic animosity.

Whatever the motivation, in the case

of the Hungarian liquidations, the result was the minority's decapita
tion.

It deprived the Vojvodinian Magyars of their leaders.
To seme extent, the Hungarians in Transylvania fared much

better, at least in this immediate post-war period.
large part, to Soviet post-war policies.

This was due, in

To be more specific, the

Soviet occupation had different consequences for the various countries
falling within the expanded empire.

Two factors, in particular,

determined the nature of the Soviet occupation.

These were the former

enemy status of conquered Hungary and occupied Rumania, and their nonSlavic ethnic composition.

Being ex-enemy states, both Hungary and

•*-®®Hungaricus, "Az Elrabolt Horvat Vezdr Nyugaton Maradt
Bizonyit^kai Leleplezik Titodk TSmeggyilkossagait," Amerikai Magyar
Jllet, Feb. 9, 1968, p. 2. On the basis of personal interviews with a
number of witnesses of some of these massacres, the extent of the
exterminations quoted above seem not unlikely.
^ ^ H o f f m a n , Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 40-41.
108

The excesses committed against the Hungarians did not have
"official" sanction.
They were carried out mainly by bands of Partisans
which may have committed them out of ethnic animosity.
They were not
reprimanded, because these liquidations also eliminated the poten
tially most anti-Communist elements within the Hungarian community.
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Rumania were under obligation to pay reparations to the Soviet Union
(Hungary also had to pay reparations to Yugoslavia).

Being non-Slavic

states, both Hungary and Rumania lacked the sympathy of the U.S.S.R. in
any claims they might have had against Slavic states.

109

This left the

two countries only the right to make claims against each other.

This

they did by presenting their respective claims to Transylvania.^ ®
The Peace Treaties, as we have seen, transferred Transylvania
in toto to Rumania.

This was, in the main, due to Soviet support.^

However, the Soviet Union did not give something for nothing.

Besides

the reward for past defection, which was now past history and useless
to the Soviets, Stalin seemed to have seen the transfer of northern
Transylvania as the avenue to the rapid communization of Rumania.

In

fact, the country was by this time well on its way to becoming a
satellite, while Hungary was still ruled by a "bourgeois" regime.
Transylvania was a reward for Communization.

Thus,

At the same time, it

conferred popularity to the new Rumanian Communist regime and reduced
the prestige of a still existing bourgeois government in Hungary.

112

■*-^Hungary, for example, had some very legitimate claims to
the purely Hungarian-inhabited Csalokbz Island and some other areas
just north of the Hungarian border.
Yet, because of its defeated and
non-Slavic status, and because its gains would be at the expense of
Slavic Czecho-Slovakia, the Hungarian claims were rejected outright.
See Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War I I , pp. 93-94.
110I b i d . , pp. 101-102.
112

111Ibid.

Hugh Seton-Watson, "The uanubian Satellites,"
Affairs, XXII (Apr., 1946), 250.

International
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National Minorities and Communist Power Consolidation
The attitude of Soviet occupation authorities in Transylvania
seems to support the contention that the transfer was more than mere
gratitude for Rumania's defection.

For one thing, the Red Army held on

to northern Transylvania and administered it until the spring of 1945,
when the Groza government came to power.

113

This lessened the number

of atrocities that took place, since the Soviet troops defended the
Magyar inhabitants of the area against the revenge-seeking Rumanians.
This was done less out of compassion than out of Soviet design to
utilize the Magyar ethnic element as a lever to bring about the more
rapid incorporation of Rumania into the Soviet s p h e r e . T h e

Magyars

had little choice but to acquiesce to such Soviet pressures.

1 -I O

I b i d .; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from
Hungary and Rum a n i a , III, 85.
■^■^Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (Paperback Edi
tion; New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 256-57, gives a
brief discussion of Czech versus Slovak animosities which were utilized
by the Soviet Union and the local Communists.
In a similar way, the
Soviets also used Rumanian-Hungarian discord in Transylvania.
•'•-^Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yo k e , pp. 215-17, blames
the Hungarians for the success of Communism in Rumania. He fails to
mention, however, that the Hungarians had acquiesced to Soviet pressures
only because the bourgeois Rumanian leaders (i.e., Juliu Maniu, H i e
Lazar and their "democratic" followers) were bent on revenge against
the "disloyal" national minorities who had turned toward Hungary during
1941-1944.
The Hungarians had no alternative left but to support the
Soviet-backed Petru Groza, who had promised tolerance and respect for
the national minorities.
See Seton-Watson, "The Danubian Satellites,"
p. 247; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary
and Rumania, III, 84-85.
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Thus, the national minorities were skillfully utilized by Stalin
to weaken the anti-Communist forces in Rumania and to enable his puppets
1 1fl

to seize power. ■LD

Using the policy of divide et impera, playing

nationality against nationality, Stalin attained his aim.

His success

was due in no small measure to the near-sighted and narrow revengeseeking attitude of some democratic Rumanian leaders.

It was their hate

and intolerance that drove the Magyars in desperation to support Groza.
By supporting him, they believed that his "proletarian internationalism"
would defend them against the excesses of "bourgeois nationalism."
In the Vojvodina there was no similar utilization of the minori
ties.

The Partisans in this area relied mainly on the Serbian popula

tion.

For the most part, both the Germans and the Magyars were distrusted.

Their capacity for any resistance was immediately broken after the
Partisans replaced the Soviet troops.

As has already been stated, this

involved deportations, as well as mass executions and terror.

V.

Similarities and Differences in the Two Cases

Certain similarities and differences are evident in the preCommunist nationalities policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

These can

be summarized briefly in relation to three pivotal shifts in the inter
national political positions of the two countries.

The first was the

cession of Transylvania and the Vojvodina to Rumania and Yugoslavia
respectively, following World War I.

This made both countries part of

the East European alliance system constructed by France.

The second

■*--^I b i d .; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Y o k e , pp. 230, 249.
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major shift came with the break-up of the Little Entente and the poli
tical re-allignment of Eastern Europe in the late 1930's and the early
part of World War II.

The last shift was a consequence of the involve

ment of these countries in World War II and the politics of the imme
diate post-war years.
In the first phase, which is the longest, both Rumania and
Yugoslavia subscribed to nationalities policies which were motivated
by the desire to assimilate the minority ethnic groups.
simply, policies of "Serbianization" and "Rumanization."

These were,
In both cases

the Hungarian minorities were subjected to a process which attempted
to deprive them of their own nationality, while substituting for it a
"Serbian" or "Rumanian" allegiance.

The distinctive characteristic of

these policies--as of the dominant form of M a g y a r i z a t i o n , w h i c h they
replaced--was that they were based on a narrow ethnic or "racial"
nationalism.
Serbianization was often more brutal, direct and simple than
its Rumanian counterpart.
of national feeling.

But it was also a less pretentious expression

Rumanization, on the other hand, was based on the

believed lofty affiliations of Rumanians with the Roman Empire.

While

their repression of the Magyars was never as overt as that of the
Serbs, its expression was more prone to irritate and build resentment.
The saving feature in Rumania was the corrupt officialdom, which, when
bribed, would allow some laxity in the application of certain repressive

■^■^For a discussion of different manifestations of Magyarization
see George Barany, "The Awakening of Magyar Nationalism Before 1848,"
Austrian History Yearbook, II (1966), 19-52.
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measures.

Under Serbian jurisdiction such laxity was much less possible

or probable.
With the break-up of the Little Entente and the growth of German
and Italian power in the Balkans, a shift took place in the nationali
ties policies of both Rumania and Yugoslavia.

To placate Germany, both

countries extended the privileges of the German minorities living within
their frontiers.

Toward the Magyar minorities, on the other hand, the

two countries adopted unlike policies.
In Yugoslavia, the government relaxed its repressive policies
and an actual rapprochement was in the making with Hungary, when the
German attack on uhe former shattered this emerging a c c o r d . I n
Rumania, ethnic policies took a different turn.

As Hit l e r ’s pet

satellite, Rumania was intolerant and repressive toward all but its
German minorities.
in severity.

Its persecution of the Jews and Magyars increased

Mu c h "unofficial" persecution, perpetrated by the Iron

Guardists also flourished.

This did not cease until Rumania actually

switched sides in August, 1944.

Only in northern Transylvania, Bessara

bia, Bukovina and Dobruja did the Magyars and Jews gain some relief
when these areas were removed from Rumanian jurisdiction at the
beginning of World War II.
The last year of this war again led to drastic changes in the
nationalities policies of both countries.

In Yugoslavia, the now

politically dominant CPY inspired most of these changes.

In Rumania,

118
J--LOThe most objective discussion of this attempted YugoslavHungarian accord is to be found in Macartney, October Fifteenth, I,
151, 159, 197, 199-200, 318-33, 385-86, 446-50, 470.
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the changes were imposed by the Red Army of occupation.

Both countries

made a complete about-face as far as their formerly favored German
minorities were concerned.
inhabitants.

Yugoslavia expelled almost all of its German

Rumania began a similar course, but did not carry it out

as extensively as Tito's Partisans had.

The latter also made an exten

sive purge among the Magyars of the Vojvodina.

They went from town to

town exterminating or imprisoning the leaders and potential leaders of
this minority.

In contrast to this, in Transylvania, the Red Army kept

the Rumanians from following a similar course of vengence.
It is these war-time experiences, as well as the growing role
of the Communist parties, that have determined the foundations of the
nationalities policies in the "new" post-war Rumania and Yugoslavia.
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CHAPTER II

THE IDEOLOGICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION
OF THE HUNGARIANS
Communist ascendancy in Rumania and Yugoslavia resulted in a
complete re-formulation of the "nationalities question" on the basis
of Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory.^

This changed ideological

context provided Rumania and Yugoslavia with new guidelines for the
treatment of their Hungarian and other minorities.

Henceforth, the

ethnic minorities of both countries were guaranteed an existence which
was "national in form," but "socialist in content."

In this chapter,

we will examine the ideological and constitutional considerations
involved in this formula and its application.

I. The Ideological Position of the National
Minorities
The ideological position of Hungarians in Transylvania and the
Vojvodina has undergone vast changes since the Communists first came
to power.

These changes have been a consequence of altered power

relationships within the Communist bloc, as well as certain develop
ments within the Communist parties of the respective countries.

■*-The "nationalities theory" and "policy" which has been taken
over from the practice and experience of the Soviet Union, has been
variously designated.
Recently, the designation "Marxist-Leninist"
has become more and more popular.
In Yugoslavia this is the most
commonly used.
In Rumania, on the other hand, the designation is simply
"Leninist." Prior to de-Stalinization, in Rumania this policy was
always referred to as "Leninist-Stalinist." In Yugoslavia this was
also the designation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.
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Within the bloc the tendency toward "polycentrism" has provided
the opportunities for differing policies.

Polycentrism designates the

numerous centers of ideological authority which emerged following the
Tito-Stalin split of 1948.

This process of ideological fragmentation

followed the expansion of Communist rule into East-Central Europe and
Asia.

It was a consequence of political developments within the

expanded empire as well as changes within Soviet leadership.
Within the expanded Communist orbit the events most responsible
were the Tito-Stalin split, the death of Stalin in 1953, the riots in
Poland and revolt in Hungary in 1956, the rift between Communist China
and the U.S.S.R., and the more recent Rumanian opposition to economic
integration into COMECON.

These events were closely tied to changes

in the Party leadership of the U.S.S.R.

Stalin's death was followed

by an acceleration of these tendencies.

His successors initiated

policies which allowed more freedom of action to party leaders in the
satellite states.^
Until Stalin's demise, satellite leaders simply mimicked
Soviet nationalities policies as well as constitutional forms.^

Even

^For a good collection of essays dealing with "polycentrism,"
see Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Polycentrism (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).
^The over-all impact of these events will be considered in
more detail in later chapters.
4]Joris Levitski, "Coexistence within the Bloc," Survey, No.
42 (June, 1962), 28-29, 33-34. A good example of such mimickry is I.
Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," under head
ing "Rumania," The Current Digest of the Soviet P r e s s , IV (Feb. 7,
1953), 18.
The original article appeared in the December 27, 1953
issue of Izvestia, p. 3.
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in Yugoslavia, the Soviet pattern was assiduously followed until 1949.^
However, as de-Stalinization unfolded within the bloc, the Soviet
pattern was re-moulded to fit the national peculiarities within each
state.

This process affected both the ideological and the constitu

tional context of nationality policies in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

Soviet Nationalities Policies
Before we examine the application of Soviet nationalities poli
cies in Eastern Europe, a number of its major characteristics will be
noted.

Flexibility is, perhaps, its most obvious feature.

It has

been able to adapt itself to all sorts of political situations, among
various ethnic groups and nationalities, in drastically different
£
economic and geographic settings.

But this adaptability was always

guided by the political interests of the Soviet Union.

As a result,

"proletarian internationalism" meant the subordination of all local and
ethnic "nationalisms" to the interests of Soviet Russia as a whole.^

^George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New
Communism (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 81-85, 91102; Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Paperback Edition; New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 325, 329, 339, 352.
The History of this flexibility is traced sympathetically by
Istvan Dolmanyos, A Nemzetis^gi Politika Tort^nete A Szovjetunloban
(Budapest:
Kossuth Konyvkiadcf, 1964). A more objective analysis of
the early years of Soviet nationalities policies is Richard Pipes'
The Formation of the Soviet U n i o n : Communism and Nationalism (Revised
Edition; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
^For a more precise definition of "proletarian international
ism" and related terms see the Prologue of this study and consult the
Soviet political dictionary Politicheskii Slovar 1 (Russian Series No.
5; Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1948), "bourgeois
nationalists," p. 70; "internationalism," p. 219; "patriotism," p. 410;
"proletariat," pp. 451-52; "socialism," pp. 528-29.
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The theoretical right to "secession" and "self-determination" or the
right to local "autonomy" within a federal constitutional context,
were always contingent on the intra- and international political needs
O
of the Soviet Union.

This was also the case for the Eastern European

Communist states until Stalin's death.®
Since Marx had written very little on the "nationalities ques
tion," Soviet policies in this regard were formulated mainly by Lenin
and Stalin to meet the needs of power seizure and power consolidation.
As such, Soviet nationalities theory incorporated the lessons learned
by the Bolsheviks in the turbulent two decades which followed the
1905 Revolution.

These lessons reflected the particular character

istics and problems of the multi-national Russian Empire, as seen by
revolutionaries who desired to utilize existing contradictions (i.e.,
national conflicts) to further their own quest for power.

O
For some reflections on the opportunism of Soviet nationali
ties policies, see
Alfred D. Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the
New Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The
Russian
R e v i e w , XXII (Jan., 1963), 12.
% n relation to the satellites, this opportunism is reflected
by Stalin's utilization of minority nationalities discontent against
Tito.
See:
"Minorities in Eastern Europe— II," East Eu r o p e , VIII
(April, 1959), 9-11; Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), pp. 342-45; Wolff,
The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 459-61.
■*-®Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New
Communist Party of
the Soviet Union," pp. 10-12.

Program of the

■^Dolmanyos, A Nemzetis^gi Politika Tbrtenete A Szovjstur.ioban,
pp. 5-36, gives a good summary of these early years of development.
However, it is strictly a communist interpretation.
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This utilitarian and even opportunistic development of Soviet
nationalities policy, allowed for theoretical as well as practical in
consistencies and contradictions.

As a consequence, the same ideo

logical precepts were used to justify such vastly different events as
the Soviet acquiescence to Finnish independence and the bloody reincorporation of the Caucasian republics.

1*)

Although present-day

ideologues blame some of these admitted contradictions on the distor
tions caused by the "Stalinist personality cult," in actuality the
inconsistencies were already manifest before Lenin's death in 1924.^
Stalin only exaggerated these contradictions by enabling Russian
nationalism to re-surface in the 1930's, after an ineffective war of
words against "great Russian chauvinism" and "local bourgeois na
tionalisms."^

^ I b i d . , pp. 47-50, 83-104, 118-22; Pipes, The Formation of
the Soviet Union, pp. 43, 56, 93-108, 193-241.
■*-^Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union," pp. 10-12; Dolm^nyos, A
Nemzetis^gi Politika Torte'nete A Szovjetunicfoan, pp. 77-122; Pipes,
The Formation of the Soviet U n i o n .
^Conti n u i t y , rather than change, has characterized Soviet
nationalities policies.
Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New
Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," p. 10, points
out that while de-Stalinization has affected most areas of Soviet
life, it has not altered to an appreciable degree the country's
nationality policy.
For additional observations on this continuity,
see Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1956), Ch. I; Program of the Communist
Party of the Soviet U n i o n : Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the
C.P.S.U. October 31, 1961 (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961),
pp. 114-18; Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective,"
Problems of Communism. IX (May-June, 1960), 25-34; Frederick C.
Barghoorn, "Nationality Doctrine in Soviet Political Strategy," The
Review of Politics. XVI (July, 1954), 283-304.
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Both Rumania and Yugoslavia adopted Soviet nationalities theory
to solve the problems of their own multi-national existence.
case of Rumania this adoption was really Soviet imposed.

In the

But in Yugo

slavia the adoption was a matter of international Communist solidarity
as well as national n e c e s s i t y . ^

In both cases, however, the nation

alities policy so adopted, was fashioned after the prevailing theory in
Stalin's Soviet Russia.

While the Communist parties of both these

countries had paid lip-service to this policy in the interwar years,
their rise to power following W.W. II gave them the opportunity to
practice that which they had been preaching.^
Rumania
In Rumania the Communists immediately applied the "national
form" and "socialist content" of Soviet nationality policy.

As in

the Soviet Union, so in Rumania, the reason for adopting this policy
was closely tied to considerations of power seizure and power^con
solidation.

The policy attempted to popularize the Communist Party,

among the country's national m i n o r i t i e s . ^

Ch. I.

It entailed guaranteeing

15The reasons for these national differences are discussed in
Also see Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 267-74, 278-92.
16

As Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 155, points
out: "Communists . . . [Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and others] are essen
tially theoretical beings.
No greater mistake could be made than to
assume that Communists do not believe their theories. This does not
mean that Communist theories have not originated as little more than
rationalizations.
It does mean, however, that ideology provides a
binding orientation for the direction of society, a view of both
tactical and strategic goals and a guide to the thinking of at least
the leadership."
•^Chapter I discusses this motive in more detail.
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to them the right to use their language in public discourse, in educa
tion and in their relations with the government.

It also guaranteed

for them equality with the Rumanians in political, social and economic
relations.

In fact , in the Sacuesc (Szekely) districts it even provided

for "autonomy" in line with the Soviet example.

18

In the Stalinist years, the ideological justification for these
enlightened policies were simple and straightforward.
internationalism"
1Q
enment. *

"Proletarian

(i.e., Soviet foreign policy) demanded such enlight-

I n the writings of Rumanians dealing with the question of

nationalities policies, this was definitely the central concept.

The

concept of "patriotism" or "socialist patriotism," on the other hand,
was treated only as an afterthought.

It was viewed merely as an

appendage of "proletarian internationalism."

Consequently, pro-Soviet

attitudes, expressions, and actions were both internationalist and
patriotic, while any anti-Soviet manifestation was considered to be
ipso facto "bourgeois nationalism" and "chauvinism.

18

Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light,"
p. 18, enumerates these rights. Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question
of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), pp. 30-35,
points out, however, that for Lenin (and Stalin, we may add) such
"rights" were really secondary. Lenin was
. cool, indifferent,
even hostile to the national state and to nationality.
But, in
general, the proletariat and the Party have the solemn obligation to
support the national liberation movement because democracy and
socialism demand it."
■'•^Hadak Utjdn, "A Nemzeti Kdrdes ifs A Kommunizmus," A H ^ t ,
III (April 7, 1967), p. 1.
20Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light,"
p. 18.
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For this reason inter-war Rumania was condemned for its "mon21

strous antipatriotic, antinational struggle against the Soviet Union.1,4i
It was also described as a cruel oppressor of nationalities which
inflamed "chauvinism and racial hatred" by its "brutal exploitation,"
wherein:
Workers belonging to national minorities were deprived of
political and civil rights. Their native languages were pro
hibited in government institutions.
There were no government
schools in the native languages. The culture of national
minorities was persecuted and suppressed. The bourgeoislandlord government promulgated no fewer than 400 laws and
decrees against the national minorities .22
For all these inequities, the "bourgeois-landlord" class basis of
interwar Rumania was held

r e s p o n s i b l e . ^

In the late 1950's the ideological discussion of the nationali
ties question began to take on added dimensions.

It began first as a

change of emphasis, but ended in making Rumania a new dissident
center within the polycentric Communist camp.

Besides the policies

of de-Stalinization in the CPSU, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, provided the oppor
tunity for asserting more ideological i n d e p e n d e n c e . ^

2 Ijbid.

It is ironic

22j^bid.

23por some Communist Hungarian reflections on the class basis
of such inequalities, see:
Imre Nagy on Communism (New York:
Frederick
A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 233; Maty^s Rakosi, A B^keert Es A
Szocializmus Epite'sde'rt (Budapest: Szikra, 1951), p. 279; Jdnos Kadar,
Socialist Construction in H ungary: Selected Speeches 1957-1961
(Budapest:
Corvina Press, 1962), pp. 107-8.
^ " M a g y a r o k Rom^niaban," L^rmafa, XI, No. 4 (1964), 9, and
Gyula Zathureczky, Transylvania: Citadel of the West trans. and e d .
A. Wass DeCzege (Problems Behind the Iron Curtain Series No. 1;
Gainesville, Florida;
The A.H.L.G, Research Center, n.d.), p. 55,
indicate that Gheorghiu-Dej!s policy statement of Feb. 19, 1959,
inaugurated the change in Rumanian nationality policy.
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that more ideological independence for Rumanian Communists has led to
less ideological and political freedom for the country's ethnic minori
ties.
Recent Rumanian formulations of "proletarian internationalism"
have stressed its inter-state rather than intra-state role.

Thus,

very little is said about the rights of national minorities.^5

Even

when the rights of minorities are mentioned, it is only to show that
their treatment has "cemented the unity of the nation," by "strengthen
ing friendship and brotherhood between the Romanian working people and
those belonging to the coinhabiting nationalities."^

In this way,

the intra-state considerations of proletarian internationalism are
all subsumed under the concept of socialist patriotism.

The latter

has now moved to the center of the Rumanian ideological stage.
Nationalism, defined as the selfish prejudice which leads to imperi
alism and discord, is still decried.

But, it is contrasted against

the positive force of "patriotism" which is the "intimate union of the

^-*Some characteristic indicators of this recent trend include:
V. Iliescu, "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the International
Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," Documents, Articles
and Information on Rom a n i a . XIX (Feb. 10, 1968), 11-14; Nicolae Corbu
and Constantin Mitea, "Development of the Socialist Nation and
Proletarian Internationalism," Documents. Articles and Information on
R omania, X I X (Feb. 1, 1968), 14-17; Miklos Kallos, "A Dolgoz 6 k
Szocialista Politikai Tudatdnak Kialakulasa Es FejlSddse Hazdnkban,"
Igaz S z d , XII (Aug., 1964), 266-77; Zoltan Farkas, "Allam, Nemzet is
Szuverenitds A Szocializmusban," Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai
(Cluj, Rumania:
Series Philosophia, Anul XI, 1966), pp. 19-27.
26

Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian
Internationalism," p. 14.
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ideas of socialism and national consciousness."

27

In recent ideological formulations "socialist patriotism" is
definitely viewed as the constructive national force which animates
Rumanians who follow the leadership of the CPR.^®

It is the element

necessary for achieving an inseparable unity and cohesion within
Rumania.

Such national unity is in turn a prerequisite for unity

within the international communist movement, because concrete "socialist
construction" goes on within national boundaries.29

It is a "national

creation--because socialist revolution can neither be the object of
import or export, a transplanted hybrid . . . [but] can only be an
outcome of the struggle of each people."^®
By making unity within the international communist movement
dependent on unity within each national communist party, the Rumanians
have ventured so far as to say "that there is no national communism
or international communism— but there is a unitary national . . .
and . . . International [task]

. . .

of carrying through socialist

construction in good c o n d i t i o n s . S u c h conditions are available

^®Kallos, "A Dolgozdk Szocialista Politikai Tudatanak
Kialakulasa l£s Fejldddse Hazdnkban," pp. 272-76.
^Farkas,
pp. 22-24.

"Allam, Nemzet ]£s Szuverenitas A Szocializmusban,"

30corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian
Internationalism," p. 16.
31 Ibid.
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only— if all parties within the international communist movement "reso
lutely defend [their]

. . . autonomy."3^

This calls for an "interna

tionalist solidarity" which is based on "the principles of independence,
equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the
right of each party to decide by itself its policy and practical activity."

33

In short, "there cannot be parties

(parties)."

On the international plane th*

centralism is "absolutely inapplicable."

'standing above others'
principle of democratic

It is only meant for "the

inner [national] party plane."3^
For the Hungarians living in Transylvania this means that they
have no alternative but to struggle "shoulder to shoulder" together
with other "coinhabiting nationals" for the "freedom and prosperity
of Romania ."33

They cannot look for assistance from the international

communist movement, since their problems of existence are considered
ideologically to be strictly an internal Rumanian national matter.
If fact, they are not supposed to have interests which conflict
with "the most sacred national interests" of Rumania.

Such a

conflict is theoretically inconceivable, since the unity, cohesion
and solidarity of the entire people is "welded" by "the community of

3 ^Iliescu, "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the Inter
national Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," p. 12.
33 I b i d .
34 I b i d .. pp.

12-13.

33 Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian
Internationalism," p. 15.
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political and economic interests" of the developing socialist system
of Rumania .^6

Yugoslavia
The Yugoslavian re-interpretation of Soviet nationality
policies began m uch earlier than the Rumanian development outlined
above, but it has provided the national minorities of the country
somewhat more tangible safe-guards for their rights.

Like the

Rumanian re-interpretation, it has been developed to provide guidance
in both intra- and inter-state relations.

However, unlike the Rumanian

nationality policy, the Yugoslavian has not become repressive as a
consequence of the country’s greater ideological independence.
The major point of difference between the ideological stance
of these two countries is that the Yugoslavs believe that unity in
both intra- and inter-state relations is best served by a policy of
tolerance for local variations and ethnic differences."^

The

"^ I b i d ., p. 14.
This exaggerated stress on unity, indivisi
bility and sovereignty, is carried one step further by Farkas, "Xllam,
Nemzet ^s Szuverenit^s A Szocializmusban," p. 23, when he states that;
"Szocialista iCllamunk Egysdges Nemzeti Xllam.
Teriileten, Egyetlen
Nemzet ^1: A Romdn Szocialista Nemzet, Amely A Nemzetiscgekkel
Testvdri Egys^gben Fejlodik ffs l£piti A Szocialista Tarsadalmat." (Our
socialist state is a unitary national state.
It is inhabited by one
nation:
the Rumanian socialist nation, which develops and builds a
socialist society in brotherly unity with the coinhabiting nationali
ties.)
"^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 157-60, 162,
168-70; Josip Broz Tito, "Concerning the National Question and
Socialist Patriotism," Selected Speeches and Articles 1941-1961
(Zagreb: Naprijed, 1963), pp. 97, 102-3.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

83

Rumanians, on the other hand, only believe in such tolerance on the
international front.

In intra-state affairs they definitely demand
OQ

unity through uniformity. °
The ideological position of both these countries is very
similar on the international l e v e l . ^

This similarity blurs the fact

that in intra-state relations Yugoslavia and Rumania have vastly
different interpretations of "proletarian internationalism."

Because

both of them now stress that "independent paths to socialism" are
possible, they have changed the meaning of internationalism from a
solidarity based on the leadership of the Soviet Union, to an ideo
logical solidarity with equality among all socialist states and
"progressive movements" in the w o r l d . W h i l e ,

both these states

describe this relationship with similar formulas (e.g., equal rights,
independence, non-interference in internal affairs, etc.), even in
the international field there are some important differences.

The

Yugoslavs stress that their national minorities perform the role of

^ I l i e s c u , "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the Inter
national Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," pp. 12-13;
Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian Inter
nationalism," pp. 16-17.
39"Yugoslav Visit by Romanian Party and State Delegation Led
by Nicolae Ceausescu," Documents, Articles and Information on
R o m a n i a , XI (Jun. 15, 1968), pp. 1, 5.
^^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism,p. 162; Corbu,
"Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian International
ism," pp. 15-17; "Yugoslav Visit by Romanian Party and State Delega
tion Led by Nicolae Ceausescu, p. 5.
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"bridges."4 ^

They link Yugoslavia with neighboring countries.

They pro

mote cooperation rather than discord between the countries of the a r e a .42
Rumanian theorists have also discussed this possibility— but only
rarely in recent years.4^
In Yugoslavia the discussion of nationalities problems is
frequent and c a n d i d .44

The same is not true cf Rumania.

In the latter,

it is assumed that the nationalities question has been s o l v e d . ^

The

Yugoslavs, on the other hand, openly admit that there are many problems
in this area that require special attention and a great deal of effort

4 % a u l Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Commun
ism," Slavic R e v i e w , XXII (March, 1963), 79; Floriin Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi Kdrddsekben," Magyar Kepes U i sdg, XV (July 1, 1966), 3.
42Ibid.

43ln Rumania this ideal was chiefly espoused by Petru Groza.
Since his death in 1958, only some writers rave paid lip-service to
it. An example of this is Veronica Porumbacu, "Aranyhid," Igaz Sz6 ,
VII (Oct., 1959), 641.
44Some examples of this include: Kis, "Uj Szempontok A
Nemzetisdgi Kdrd^sekben," p. 3; Tito, "Concerning the National Ques
tion and Socialist Patriotism," pp. 96-105; Tibor Minda, "A Nemzeti
Kisebbsdgek Helyzete Vajdasdgban," H i d , XXVII (Jan., 1963), 102-7;
Dobrica Cosid, "A Korszeru Korszeriitlen Nacionalizmusrdl," H i d , XXVI
(Jan., 1962), 21-31; L^szld Varga, "Figyeib: Kdtnyelvu Oktatas
Vajdasdgban," H i d . X X V (Feb., 1961), 157-65; Olga Pennavin, "A Magyar
Tanszek," H i d . XXI V (July-Aug., 1960), 595-96; jdnos Kossa, "Az
Anyanyelv Kdrddse Napjainkban," H i d . X X (Jan., 1956), 26-35; Edvard
Kardelj, "A Nemzeti KdrddsrSl," Hid, XVIII (Jan., 1954), 31-40;
Edvard Kardelj-Sperans, A Szlovdn Nemzeti Kdrd^s Fej16ddse trans.
Istvin Bodrits, et al. (Novi Sad:
Forum K 8 nyvkiado, 1961).
4 ^Igaz Szd Szerkeztosdge, "^letdnk Alaptttrvdnye," Igaz S z d ,
XIII (Sept., 1965), 315-17; "Speech by Emil Bodnaras," Documents,
Articles and Information on R u m ania, XVI (Aug. 10, 1965), 34; Nicolae
Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administrative
Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania;
Special Session of the Grand National Assembly, February 15-16, 1968,"
Documents. Articles and Information on Romania, Supplement No. 2
(Feb. 17, 1968), pp. 13-15.
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L.fk

and understanding. °
in detail.

So they discuss these problems frequently and

There is usually no attempt made to hide existing con

flicts behind a facade of slogans.

Instead, it is stressed that words

are worthless even if written into the constitution, if they are not
backed up with action.

A n every-day effort must be made to transform

ideals into reality .47
According to the Yugoslavs this effort must be guided by
national unity based on the free development of each and every nation
ality living in the country.

Real unity is unachievable unless the

"individuality" of each nationality within the country is safe-guarded.
"Yugoslavism" pre-supposes a diversity of national languages and cultures.

In present-day Rumania there is little talk of individual

national developments.

Instead, emphasis is always placed on common

struggles and a "unitary" Rumanian national development.

49

In the

latter context there is no room for the type of statement, made by a
Hungarian recently, in a Yugoslavian publication, that the Yugoslavian
Hungarians support the present regime, because of its humane nation
ality policy.

In fact, that support of the government is contingent

4 ^Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi K^rdesekben," p. 3.
4 7I b i d .

^ Y u g o s l a v i a 's W a y ; The Program of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia trans. Stoyan Pribechevich (New York; All Nations
Press, 1958), p. 193.
49parkas, "Allam, Nemzet ifs Szuverenitds A Szocializmusban,"
p. 23.
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on its correct treatment of such national groups."*®
The Yugoslav nationality policy, like its Rumanian counterpart,
has as its goal greater unity within the country.

In both cases,

nationalism is viewed as the greatest threat to such u n i t y . H o w e v e r ,
the two countries have adopted different policies to combat this
threat.

In Yugoslavia the government sees nationalism as basically

of two sorts.

One is local or ethnic nationalism while the other is

the nationalism of "bureaucratic centralism and h ege m o n y .

Both

these forms are considered detrimental to the development of a truly
unified Yugoslavia.

"Bureaucratic centralism" or "superstate hege

mony" harks back to the Serbian dominated Yugoslavia of inter-war
days.

Local nationalism, on the other hand, represents the disinte

grative force which destroyed Yugoslavia on the eve of World War II.
These two forms of nationalism feed upon one another.

Consequently,

the Communist League of Yugoslavia combats b o t h .33
In Rumania no such distinction is made.

Majority and minority

nationalisms are not combatted equally, because "nationalism" per se
is the e n e m y . T h u s ,

while theoretically nationalism is always

"*®Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi Kdrdesekben," p. 3.
3 1Yugoslavia's W a y , pp. 195-96; Kallos, "A Dolgozok Szocialista Politikai Tudatdnak Kialakuldsa ifs Fejloddse Hazdnkban," p. 270.

■^Yugoslavia's W a y , p. 195.
53I b i d .
3 ^Kallos, "A Dolgozdk Szocialista Politikai Tudatdnak
Kialakuldsa ^s Fejldddse Hazankban," p. 270.
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decried, the socialist patriotism of the majority is never viewed as
nationalism.

A n y sign of localism or "isolationism 11 among ethnic m i 

norities, on the other hand, is immediately labelled as nationalistic.^^
Thus, the Rumanians lack the theoretical safe-guard of the Yugoslavs,
which condemns both minority and majority nationalism, rather than
just nationalism in the abstract.

Yugoslav and Rumanian Self-Images
Theoretical differences between communist states often do not
indicate the actual nature of their policies.

It is, therefore, neces

sary to consider the "self-image" of the respective communist states
to ascertain what is and what is not "nationalistic."

These self-

images are a consequence of the national setting, the party develop
ments, and the ideological heritage.
We have already examined the ideological development of both
Yugoslavian and Rumanian nationalities policies.

Parallel to this,

the "national image" in both these societies also underwent change.
In the immediate post-war years both countries drew on the experiences
of the war and the process of "liberation" as their source of
historical self-interpretation and legitimacy.

The Yugoslavs still

55Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," East Central Europe and
the W o r l d , ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 164-65,
It is, of course, impossible to say which came first.
How
ever, it was the power seizure by the respective Communist parties
that made such a cultural-ideological transformation possible. For
a general consideration of this East European development, see:
Francis S. Wagner, Cultural Revolution in East Europe (New York:
Danubian Research Service, 1955), pp. III-XII.
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use this event as their point of reference in defining their histori
cal r o l e T h e

Rumanians, on the other hand, have recently reinter

preted their own role in World War II and have drawn on pre-communist
CO

historical events to define their present self-image. °
Yugoslavia's self-image is based on what we have described in
the preceding chapter as the "Partisan Myth."-^
fold.

Its purpose is two

First, to ensure the leading role of the Communists in the

country.

Secondly, it provides the country's numerous nationalities

with a sense of common destiny.
everyday existence.

The "Partisan Myth" pervades their

It is the criterion of both leadership and

"Yugoslavism."^®

^ D a n i l o Kedid, "Figyeld: A JKp Vaj.dasagban A Felkelds
Elokdszitdsenek Es Meginditdsdnak Napjaiban," trans. Jozsef Kollin
in H i d . X X V (Sept., 1961), 784-92; Danilo Kedid, "Emldkalbum A
Forradalom 20. Evforduldjdra: A Hdboru Es A Jugoszlav Nepek
Forradalma 1941-Tol 1945-Ig," trans. Jozsef Kollin in H i d , XXV (Nov.,
1961), 981-83.
-^Constantin Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania (Bucharest: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1959), p. 92f.; Keith Hitchins, "Book
Review:
Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," Balkan Studies, IV (1963), 181-83;
G. Unc, "Book Review; E. I. Rubinshteyn:
The Downfall of the AustroHungarian Monarchy," and T. Lungu, "Book Review: History of Rumania,
Vol. 4," Analele Institutului De Istoria A Partidului De Pe Langa CC
A L P M R . Vol. 10 (1964), trans. in Rumanian Press Survey N o . 451
(Radio Free Europe, Sept. 26, 1964), pp. 2-8; "New Books:
'Transyl
vania in the History of the Romanian People'— C. C. Giurescu,"
Documents. Articles and Information on Romania, XIX (Jun. 30, 1968),
14-15.
-^See chapter I.
^ ^Yugoslavia's W a y , pp. 188-89, 192-93; Dennison I. Rusinow,
"A note on Yugoslavia," American University Field Staff Reports
Service. Southeast Europe Series, XI, No. 5 (DIR-5-64), pp. 558-60;
Bogdan Smiljevid and Horde Knezevid, A Legujabb Kor Tortdnete trans.
Kdlmdn Csehdk (Subotica, Yugoslavia; Minerva Konyvkiadd Vdllalat,
1965), pp. 221-24.
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The myth is based on the national liberation struggles of
World War II.

This concrete historical experience consecrates the

Partisan leaders of the time as the saviors of national independence
and honor.

61

It provides, at the same time, a common enemy, a common

danger, against which all Yugoslavs must unite.
is German imperialism.

This outside threat

Even in present-day Yugoslavia it is viewed

as the foremost outside threat to the independence of the country.

62

It is played up in the press and in formal government foreign policy
pronouncements.

The persistence of anti-German sentiment, is one

of the most effective means of uniting the country internally.
After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the danger of Comiformist
intervention was also utilized in a similar

w a y .

63

But, the "German

threat" is more effective because it is based on a bloodier histori
cal experience and at the same time is more easily fitted into the

6 -^lbid., Ch. V, particularly pp. 206-16; Kedid, "Figyeld:
JKP Vajdasagban A Felkelds ElSkdszitdsdnek Efs Meginditdsdnak
Napjaiban," pp. 786-92.

62

A

See particularly Jcsip Broz Tito, "What We Need is Peace,"
Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-Jun., 1966), p. 51.
Also see Punisa Perovic, "Twenty-five Years of the Yugoslav Revolu
tion," Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-Jun., 1966),
pp. 3-28; Koca Popovic, "Power-Politics--The Greatest Danger,"
Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 18 (Apr.-Jun., 1965), pp. 32-44.
^^smiljevid, A Legujabb Kor Tdrtdnete, pp. 244-48; Hoffman,
Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 128-51; Wolff, The Balkans in
Our T i m e , pp. 352-77.
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ideological prerequisites of Yugoslavia. ®‘+
The "Partisan Myth" is not just based on antagonism to Germany,
but also contains a sense of mission, which gives the myth its supra
national appeal.

The Partisans in World War II had been fighting not

just against Germany, but also against world reaction and racism.®®
The legacy of fighting both these retrogade tendencies, has given the
present-day leaders of the country the reputation of being true
internationalists.

As leaders of the "progressive forces ?1of history,

they have depended on the unity and solidatiry of all nationalities
within the country.

Partisans were not just Serbs, Croatians, or

Macedonians, but primarily Yugoslavs.

They wanted to rid the whole

country of German occupation and not just certain parts of it.®®
One has to be in Yugoslavia only a few days to see and feel
the everyday role of the Partisan myth.

This distinctly Communist

Yugoslavian "political culture" is manifest everywhere.

One encoun

ters this supra-ethnic glue not only in the Partisan dominance of the
Government, but also in the everyday existence of the people.
programs devote a great deal of attention to it.

Radio

For example, programs

®^"Proletarian internationalism" as such demands more under
standing of Soviet errors than of the errors of "capitalist" West
Germany.
See Yugoslavia’s W a y , pp. 65-67, 72-74, 76-79.
®®Ibid., pp. xviii-xix, 18-19; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the
New Communism, pp. 69-80.
® 6 I b i d .. pp. 71-77.
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called "Partisan Songs" are a part of the weekly schedule of most
Yugoslav radio stations. 6 7

Besides radio and television, the myth is

propagated in the history books, schools, journals, and periodicals
of Yugoslavia .68
In Rumania, the country's political-cultural self-image is
similarly disseminated by the ruling elite.

However, the self-image

of Rumania lacks the supra-national appeal of the "Partisan Myth."
is much more ethnocentric in its emphasis.

It

However, even if it is

more narrowly "socialist patriotic," it does not possess the coherence
of its Yugoslavian counterpart.

In Rumania, we encounter two, rather

than just one, self-image myth.

For the sake of brevity, we have

called them the "August 23rd Myth" and the "Daco-Roman Myth" respec
tively. 69
As we had occasion to indicate in Chapter I, the "August 23rd
Myth" is based on the Rumanian switch from the Axis to the Allied
camp.7 ®

To the early 1960's this "heroic act" of the Rumanian people--

led by the Communist Party--was not used to belittle the role of other

6 ?Radio Belgrade has had "Partisan Songs" as a regular pro
gram on Saturday mornings at 10:15 A.M.
See "Belgradi Musor,"
D olg o z d k . X I X (July 22, 1966), p. 14,
6 8 smiljevid, A Legujabb Kor TSrtdnete, Ch. V, pp. 146-224;
Kedic, "Figyelfi: A JKP Vajdasrfgban A Felkelds Eldkdszitesenek ^s
Meginditds^nak Napjaiban," pp. 784-92; Kedid, "Emldkalbum A
Forradalom 20 Evforduldjdra: A Haboru tfs A Jugoszldv Ndpek
Forradalma 1941-Tdl 1945-Ig," pp. 981-83.

*For a definition of these myths, see Chapter I.
70 Ibid.
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national groups in the country.

But, it always had the potential of

becoming the "progressive tradition" only of ethnic Rumanians.
reason for this was twofold.

The

First, Rumania had been an active, and

in some ways the most enthusiastic, supporter of the Nazi onslaught
against the U.S.S.R.
enemy."

Thus, the Germans were never looked upon as "the

In this way, the overthrow of Antonescu and the desertion of

the German cause, became an indication of repentence rather than the
unfolding of a great "national liberation struggle" as was the case in
Yugoslavia.^

This made a scapegoat of Rumania's past rather than of

German imperialism.

The "August 23rd Myth" was, therefore, rooted in

an intra-national purgation, a national "desire" for repentence.
This made it a distinctly Rumanian experience, since the nationali
ties in Transylvania did not partake of this historic e v e n t . ^
The second reason why the August event was more narrowly
Rumanian,

was its motivation.

The realization that Germany was losing

the war and that the Red Army was already on the country’s eastern
borders, made it evident that only a switch would give Rumania the
opportunity to diminish its territorial losses.

As we pointed out in

^■*\An example of this "guilt complex" is Nistor, "Example of
the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.
72while the switch as a whole was primarily a Rumanian under
taking the nationalities were strongly represented in the Rumanian
Communist Party.
The latter, in turn, played an important role in
engineering Antonescu's overthrow.
See Wolff, The Balkans in Our
T i m e , pp. 278-92.
For an overstatement of this role also consult
"Celebration of August 23," Documents, Articles and Information on
Romania. XVIII (Sept. 5, 1967), 1.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

93

the preceding chapter, the ownership of Transylvania hung in the
balance.^3

The switch, therefore, became symbolic of the Rumanian

campaign to make territorial gains in Transylvania.

This campaign was,

of course, the exact opposite of what the Hungarians in Northern
Transylvania desired.^
The only consideration that kept the "August 23rd Myth" from
becoming a purely Rumanian tradition, was the role of the Red A m y .
Its advance was the most direct reason for the overthrow of Antonescu
and the re-deployment of the Rumanian army against the Germans and
Hungarians in Transylvania.

Furthermore, the Red Army carried the

brunt of the fighting against both the Germans and the Hungarians.
It also kept the Rumanians from carrying out atrocities against the
nationalities of Transylvania.

Thus, the process of "liberation"

was not a purely Rumanian achievement, but more a consequence of
Soviet military m i g h t . ^
More recent Rumanian interpretations of this event bear this
out.

While in the past the assistance of the Red Army was always

^ S e e Chapter I.
^^This fear of Rumanian rule led many to welcome the Soviet
occupation of the area, as well as to support the Communists.
See
Theodor Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population from
Hungary and Rumania (A selection and translation from Dokumentation
Per Vertreibung Per Peutschen Aus Ost-Mitte1-Europa: Bonn:
The
Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III,
85; Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston; Meador
Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 215-17.
7 5

Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from
Hungary and Rumania, III, 63-68, 77-78; Wolff, The Balkans in Our
T i m e , pp. 239-42.
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acknowledged, recent statements on the significance of this event have
de-emphasized the Soviet role.

They have attempted to judge the event

as a great national act of emancipation.76
Apparently this "myth" has not been enough to provide presentday Rumania w i t h an adequate historical foundation.

To make up for

its deficiencies, it has been supplemented with the "Daco-Roman

M y t h .

"77

The latter had provided the foundations for the pre-Communist Rumanian
self-image.
country.

This does not seem to disturb the present leaders of the

While the re-adoption of this national myth was gradual, it

is at present at least as important as the "August 23rd Myth."

Al

ready in the middle of the 1950's there were indications that this
myth would be re-suscitated, but it was only in the early 1960's that
its re-adoption was complete.78

Ever since, it has been incorporated

7 % h i l e in 1959, Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania, p. 143, praised
the role of the "glorious Soviet Armies" in the liberation of the coun
try, by the summer of 1964— on the occasion of the 20th anniversary
of Rumania's "liberation"— the role of the Red Army was ignored or
merely mentioned.
See for example, "The Great Anniversary" and "It
Happened in August 1944," Rumania T o d a y , 116 (1964), pp. 1-5; David
Binder, "Bucharest Plays Down Arrival of Mikoyan for Liberation Fete,"
New York Times (Aug..21, 1964), p. 2; David Binder, "Rumania Enjoys
Being Red Mecca," New York Times (Aug. 24, 1964); George Bailey,
"Trouble Over Transylvania," The Reporter. XXXI (Nov. 19, 1964), 27.
^7por a definition, see Chapter I.
78paicoviciu, et al., Rumania, pp. 92ff., presents one of the
earlier reiterations of the Daco-Roman pre-supposition.
Since 1959,
the theme has become more and more popular in historical interpreta
tions.
See Hitchins, "Book Review:
Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," pp.
181-83; "New Books:
'Transylvania in the History of the Romanian
People'— C.C. Giurescu," pp. 14-15; "Party and State Leaders in
Hunedoara Region," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVII
(Nov. 5, 1966), 6 ; Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest: Agerpres,
1964), pp. 7-8.
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into Party statements, university studies, historical education, and
every other phase of Rumanian life where self-consciousness is
79

developed and inculcated. 7

This has gone so far that Party leaders

tdking about agricultural development, for example, will refer to the
"flourishing agriculture" of "our ancestors, the Dacians."®®
The growing importance of the "Daco-Roman" myth is particu
larly menacing for the non-Rumanian inhabitants of Transylvania,
because it is based on purely ethnic Rumanian beliefs and traditions.
At least in the case of the "August 23rd" myth, the role of Communist
solidarity was not completely lost from sight.

This, however, is

completely missing from the "Daco-Roman" myth.

Thus, the non-

Rumanians become, in effect, "foreigners" in the land.®-*National self-images in both Rumania and Yugoslavia, provide
the citizens with a simplified and symbolic definition of their
origins, their present state of development, and their glorious

79

/7As an example see "Culture, Art, Science: Premiere of the
Film 'The Dacians,'" Documents, Articles and Information on R o m a n i a ,
XVIII (Feb. 20, 1967), 8-9.
on

"Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (March 15, 1966), 2.
81
Oi 0 fficially they are designated as "co-inhabiting nationali
ties." While this designation is neutral enough in meaning, the
context in which it is frequently used gives the impression that these
non-Rumanians were late-comers in Transylvania.
In actuality both
the Magyars and Saxons have a longer recorded history in the area than
the Rumanians.
This "mistake" is inadvertantly picked up and per
petuated by some Western reports.
See for example Kenneth Ames,
"Rumania is Home for 15 Different 'Nationalities,'" The Washington
Post, Nov. 26, 1967, p. H5.
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future.

These self-images are less precise than the ideological basis

of the two countries.

But, at the same time these "myths" orient the

everyday behavior of the man in the street.

This has far-reaching im 

plications for the national minorities of both countries.

In Yugo

slavia, the "Partisan" myth guarantees for the Vojvodinian Hungarians
a part of the past, present, and future of the country.

In Rumania,

on the other hand, both the "Daco-Roman" and the "August 23rd" myths
op
deny them a part of the past.

This means, in effect, that they will

have a present and a future only insofar as they assimilate them
selves into the traditions of the "indivisible" and "unitary"
Rumanian nation-state.
Up to this point we have pointed out some of the major differ
ences in the ideological and political-cultural self-images of both
Rumania and Yugoslavia.

Similarities have also been indicated.

But,

perhaps, the most important similarity has not been adequately
stressed.

This is, the dependence of both countries on an ideology,

which when translated into practice, always demands centralization;
a centralization, which is based on the respective Communist parties'

82to be fair, the nationalities are given a place in Rumania's
history. Whenever "class unity" is stressed, the role of the nationalities--"fighting shoulder to shoulder" with their Rumanian brothers-is always mentioned in peasant uprisings as well as in the revolutions
of 1848. Along this line see Pdl Binder, "Avram Lancu Levelezdse,"
Korunk, XXIII (Mar., 1964), 425-27; Tibor OlAh, "Moldva is Kavasalfbld
Egyesul^s^nek Centen^riuma," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan., 1959), 7; "Party and
State Leaders' Visit to the Mures Magyar Autonomous Region," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (Sept. 6 , 1966), 13.
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monopolies of interpretation regarding the "true faith.

II.

The Constitutional Position of the
National Minorities

In the case of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, the constitutions
concretely reflect these ideological, political-cultural similarities
and differences.

For the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina

it is these overt constitutional statements, that define both their
obligations and rights.

In Rumania
As changes have taken place in the interpretation of "prole
tarian internationalism" and "bourgeois nationalism," the government
has been quick to register these changes in its p o l i c i e s . T h i s

is,

perhaps, best illustrated by the constitutional evolution of Rumania
since World War II.

All three postwar constitutions (1948, 1952, 1965)

and their major revisions, demonstrate how political re-interpretations

^ F o r this ideological centralization see Seton-Watson, The
East European Revolution, pp. 339-40.
OA

OHIn examining the "legal" basis of modern Rumania one should
keep in mind Randolph L. Braham's statement in "The Rumanian Constitu
tion of 1952," Journal of Central European A f f a i r s , XVIII (July,
1958), 178, that the Rumanian state "like the Soviet state, is not a
juridical state in the true sense of the word.
Its government is not
based upon a compromise of rules of law to which all citizens, irrespec
tive of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are
equally submitted.
In Marxist terminology the Soviet state, like the
state of P e o p l e ’s Democracy, is a 'class state ,1 a state of class
dictatorship.
Since in such a state, the people as a whole are iden
tified with the Party, if not with its leading hierarchy, the consti
tution of the People's Republic must be considered primarily from
its political and propaganda aspect rather than from a strictly
formalistic or legalistic point of view."
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have altered the legal obligations and rights of the Hungarians in
Transylvania.
Two major kinds of rights have been guaranteed to the inhabitants of Rumania by their constitutions .00
and group r i g h t s . T h e

These have been individual

guarantees provided for individuals, affect

all inhabitants of Rumania.

These include certain civil, social and

political rights.
All three constitutions provide Rumanian citizens, "irrespec
tive of nationality or race,

. . . equal rights in all fields of

QC

JThe evolution of the Rumanian Constitution can be traced
through four major documents.
These include:
The Constitution of the
People's Republic of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Rumanian Legation,
1948); "Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic 1952" in
Constitutions of Nat i o n s , ed. Amos J. Peaslee (Second Edition; Hague,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 1956), III; Constitution of the
Rumanian P e o p l e 's R e p u b l i c , As Amended Up to 1958 (Bucharest:
Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1958); "Draft Constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Rumania" (A Supplement to Documents, Articles and Informatii-i on Romania; [Bucharest:
"Agerpres," 1965]).
Regarding early
post-war constitutional developments also see Braham, "The Rumanian
Constitution of 1952," pp. 160-62; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The
Constitutional System," Romania (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1957), pp. 106-8; Short Document on R omania, pp. 12, 15-16.
Preceding any Constitutional guarantees, the Peace Treaty
of 1947, demanded that the rights of the minorities be respected by
Rumania. Regarding this, see Amelia C. Leiss and Raymond Dennett
(eds.) European Peace Treaties After World War II (Worcester, Mass.:
The Commonwealth Press, 1954), p. 299; "The Hungarian Minority
Problem in Rumanis," Bulletin of the International Commission of
Jurists, No. 17 (Dec., 1963), p. 73.
87since special privileges are not to be tolerated for any
group, "group rights" are not specifically designated in the Consti
tution.
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QO
economic, political and cultural activity ."00

This includes the

right to work, "that is, the right to guaranteed employment and pay
ment for their work in accordance with the quantity and quality."®^
It also includes the right "to rest and leisure"; " . . .

the right to

maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability";
. the right to education"; and the right of "freedom of con..90
science."
Besides these social and economic rights, citizens are also
guaranteed certain civil rights which are familiar in Western democracies.

These include:

freedom of speech, press, and assembly.

Q1

Not only are they guaranteed, but they are also "ensured by placing
at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations,
printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets

^ " C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1952," Art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution
of 1965," Art. 17, p. 7.
(Note: In the discussion that follows, most
citations will be based on the Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 respec
tively.
Reference to the Constitution of 1948 or the Constitution as
amended to 1958, will be made only when there are important or inter
esting changes to be taken into account.)
®^Ibid., Art.

18, pp. 7-8; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 77,

p. 249.
^®For these rights see:
Ibid., Arts. 78. 79 and 84, pp. 24950; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 19, 20, 21 and 30, pp. 8 , 11;
Short Document on Rumania, p. 15.
^ B r a h a m , "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," pp. 173-74;
"Constitution of 1952," Art. 85, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965,"
Art. 28, p. 11.
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Q2
communications facilities and other material requisites
this way, Rumanians are able to organize,

. . .113

In

they have "the right to

unite in public organizations, trade unions, cooperative societies,
women and youth organizations, sports organizations and cultural,
technical and scientific societies."

Furthermore, they are guaranteed

inviolability of person; and their homes and "privacy of correspond
ence are protected by law,,"^

Closely related are their right to the
Q A

ballot, their right to public trial and equality before the law.
In practice these rights are more illusory than real.

Their

existence extends only a paper guarantee to the Rumanians of the
Regat and nationalities of Transylvania.

Their constant viola

tion weighs heavily on majority and minority nationalities alike.
However, while both suffer, the minorities usually bear the brunt of
these violations.

Not only are these paper guarantees frequently

violated, but they are qualified and hedged in by <te jure stipulations
as well.

These we will consider later.

^ "Constitution of 1952," Art. 85, p. 250.
This is missing
from later documents. As Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952,"
p. 174, points out, "Freedom of the press, of speech, and the like,
is consequently conceived no longer as a right of the citizen, but
as a purveyance of the state.
The right and freedom of the citizen
to write, to publish, or otherwise express his views— as conceived
in the classical theory— has now been reduced to the right to express
views that are in line wi t h the propaganda, or tactical needs of the
Party."
^ I b i d .; "Constitution of 1952," Arts. 86-88, pp. 250-51;
"Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 25, 27, 31-36, pp. 9-12.
^ I b i d .; "Constitution of 1952," Arts. 65, 69, 81, 93, pp.
248-51.
The Constitution of 1948, Art. 16, p. 5, expressed these
rights in clearer language than the later documents.
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Rumania.

Theoretically, there are no privileged elements; and all are,

therefore, under the auspices of the same socialist legality.
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Yet

in spite of this contention, many of the laws and constitutional
guarantees are aimed at the enhancement or restriction of certain
gr o u p s .

One need only refer to the special position of the CPR to

appreciate this p o i n t . ^
Besides the CPR and its satellite organizations, the post-war
constitutions have all recognized the existence of churches and
"cults."97

However, this recognition has involved less rights and

more restrictions.

The only concrete guarantees are two.

We have

already mentioned one, the "freedom of conscience" statement, which
is listed among social rights.

The only further concession in this

area, relates to the right of churches to "special schools for train
ing the personnel of the cult."^®

While these "rights" are meager,

95"(jonstituti&.i of 1952," Arts. 65, 81, pp. 248-50; "Draft
Constitution of 1965," Arts. 13, 17, pp. 6-7.
^ I b i d ., Art. 26, p. 10, states that;
"The Rumanian Communist
Party expresses and loyally serves the aspirations and vital interests
of the people, implements the role of leader in all fields of socialist
construction, and directs the activity of the mass and public
organizations and of the state bodies."
"Constitution of 1952," Art.
8 6 , p. 251, stated almost exactly the same thing.
97The guarantees to women may also be viewed as "group"
rights, although in this case, as in the case of the nationalities,
the rights are given not to set them off with special privileges,
but to equalize their position with that of the rest of the popula
tion.
Ibid., Art. 83, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 23,
p. 9
^ I b i d ., Art. 30, p. 11; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 84, p.
250.
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by defining the position of the churches they indirectly also define
the restrictions placed on the spiritual life of the nationalities in
T r a n s y l v a n i a .

^^

Aside from religious services in their own language,

the Hungarians can no longer rely on their churches for the protec
tion of their national culture.
The development of the national cultures of the respective
minorities is, however, guaranteed.

This "right" of nationality

groups is sanctioned as long as it is provided with a "socialist
content."

To this end, the constitution provides the national minori

ties with the guarantee of "the free use of their own language, tui
tion of all categories in their own language, and books, newspapers,
and theatres in their own language."

XCO

It also obligates the

Rumanian state to ensure "the development of the culture of the
Rumanian people and of . . . the national minorities

. . ."101

While

these guarantees are supposed to apply throughout Transylvania
(throughout Rumania for that matter), they have been applied in prac
tice mainly in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region (prior to 1960
called Magyar Autonomous Region and since January 1968 called

^ W o l f f , The Balkans in Our T i m e . pp. 550, 559-63, describes
briefly the significance of the interrelationships between church
membership and nationality, and their affect on Communist antireligious campaigns.
^^''Constitution Df 1 9 5 2 ," Art. 82, p. 250; "Draft Constitu
tion of 1965," Art. 22, p. 9.
l^lBraham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 176;
"Constitution of 1952," Art. 17, paragraph j, p. 242.
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Hargita and Covasna Counties.1^2
Parallel to these cultural rights, the Hungarians are also
guaranteed equal treatment before the law irrespective of "national1 A O

ity or race."

This is underscored by the stipulation that judi

cial procedure "in the regions and districts inhabited by a
population of another nationality than Rumanian, the use of the mother
tongue of that population is a s s u r e d . T h o s e

unfamiliar with the

language of the judicial proceedings are guaranteed an interpretation
and a summary in their own language.
In the former Magyar Autonomous Region, these rights were for
a time put into practice.

The special character and unique constitu

tional position of this area, made the practical application of
these rights possible.

The Rumanian Constitution of 1952, attempted

to make this region the model of Leninist-Stalinist "proletarian

•^^I b i d ., Preamble, p. 239; Arts. 58, 82, pp. 247, 250.
Later documents skirt the question of local "autonomy."
In this they
are reverting to the position of the earliest post-war Constitution.
See Constitution of 19 4 8 , Arts. 75-85, p. 20. For the territorial
alterations of the Magyar Autonomous Region, see; Gyula Miklds, "A
Roman Nepkdztdrsasagban 1950 6ta Vdgrehajtott KozigarzgatdsiGazdasdgi Kdrzetbeosztdsok Ndhdny Tapasztalata," Fdldrajzi KOzlemdnyek,
IX [LXXXV] (1961), 307-25; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement
of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist
Republic of Romania," pp. 1-30.
•'•^ S h o r t Document on R u m ania, p. 4; "Constitution of 1952,"
Art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 17, 102, pp. 7-30.
^ ^ T b i d . , Art. 102, p. 30; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 6 8 , p.
248.
•*~^ I b i d .; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 102, p. 30.
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internationalism ,"*-®8

It stipulated that:

"In the Rumanian People's

Republic, administrative territorial autonomy is ensured to the
Magyar population of the Szekely districts, where it forms a compact
mass."*-®^

Herein, the "compact Magyar Szdkely population . . . has

its autonomous administrative body elected by the population of the
Autonomous Region."-*-®®

This had ensured the local population "self-

government," at least to the extent that they were governed by in
dividuals of their own nationality, or individuals who could speak
109
their language.
This, of course, is no longer the case today.

The administra

tive "reforms" of 1960 and 1968, as well as the Constitution of 1965,
have ended all local "autonomy" in the area.

The administrative re

organization of 1960, re-drew the boundaries of this compact Magyar
settled area in such a w a y that it became ethnically more d iverse.*-*-®
Its new name--Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region--signified this as well.
The crowning blow to Magyar "self-rule" came with the adoption of the
Constitution of 1965.

This document no longer even mentions the

*-®8 Daicoviciu, et a l . , Rumania, pp. 149-50, 859; Braham, "The
Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 164; Nistor, "Example of the Soviet
Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.
-'-^"Constitution of 1952," Preamble, p. 239.
108 I b i d .. Art. 58, p. 247.
109 Ib i d .. Art. 82, p. 250.

-*"-*-®J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The
World T o d a y . XIX (Nov., 1963), 506.
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existence of an "autonomous" or a "Magyar inhabited" region.

111

Yet,

the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region continued to exist for three more
years, whe n the administrative re-organization of January 1968, swept
it out of existence.

112

In reality, this abolition of "Magyar autonomy," was more
important symbolically than in terms of practice.

From its beginnings

the "autonomy" of the area had meant very little aside from propaganda
value.

The very idea of "autonomy" within the "unitary" and "indivis-

able" Rumanian People's Republic, seemed a contradiction.

113

Had

Rumania been a federal state (even a pseudo federal state like the
U.S.S.R.), the "autonomous" label would have caused much less m i s 
understanding.

But, in the context of the country's avowed unitary

organization, it was no more than a label which did confuse and mis-

■*-^0nly Art. 15 admits, that one of the regions composing the
territory of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is called the "MuresMagyar Autonomous" region.
See "Draft Constitution of 1965," p. 7.
Aside from this one mention nothing else is said about this region,
its powers, or its purpose. As opposed to this, the 1952 document
devoted Arts. 18-21 and 57-58, to an elaborate, even propagandistic,
description of this region.
See "Constitution of 1952," pp. 242, 247.
112"Qrand National Assembly Session:
New AdministrativeTerritorial Organization of Romania," Documents, Articles and Informa
tion on Ro m a n i a , X I X (Feb. 24, 1968), 3-4, and map of new subdivisions
on pp. 8-9; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Admin
istrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of
Romania," pp. 1-30.
^-^"Constitution of 1952," Art. 17, p. 241; Fischer-Galati,
"The Constitutional System," Romania, p. 108; Daicoviciu, et al,,
Rumania, p. 85.
^Daicoviciu, Ibi d., p. 860, reflects this confusion of terms
when he states that:
"The special feature of the Magyar Autonomous
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The deceiving nature of the autonomy was evident from the
R e g i o n ’s powers and from its relations with the central authority.
Like its Soviet counterparts, it was completely dependent on the cen
tral authority.

The autonomous region's position was the same vis-a-

vis Bucharest as that of any other r e g i o n . i t s

only claim to

distinction was that both Rumanian and Hungarian were official
languages.
language.

In the other regions Rumanian was the only official
Otherwise, the autonomous region's grant of powers and

form of government was identical with the other regions of the country.
Its People's Council was responsible for the local administration of
economic and cultural matters and it ensured "the maintenance of
public order, the observance of the law and the protection of the
rights of citizens

it also drew up the local budget and

Region— which is an integral part of the Rumanian People's Republic—
is its autonomous administration, whose official languages are the
Hungarian and the Rumanian and which is elected by the people of the
region." But this description is only as misleading as the constitu
tional provisions for its existence.
As the article "ErddlyTransylv^nia IX." Szabad M agyarsag. IV (Aug. 16, 1959), 1, maintains:
"The so-called 'Hungarian Autonomous Territory . . . (is) but a mis
leading name designed for foreign consumption."
■^■’"Constitution of 1953," Arts. 18-21, 51-63, pp. 242, 24748; A Former Member of the Bucharest Bar, "The R.P.R. Constitution,"
Captive Ru m a n i a , ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New York:
Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 292, gives the official definition of a
region as an "administrative and economic unit, circumscribed terri
torially, that carries out the policy of the party and government."
Compare these statements and articles wi t h Constitution (Fundamental
L a w ) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; As Amended and Added
to at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.j>.j3 .R. Fifth
Convocation (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), Arts.
13-28, 79 -88 a, 89-101, pp. 23-33, 73-90.
^--^"Constitution of 1952," Arts. 53, 57, 58, p. 247.
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organized "the active participation of the working people in the
management of state and public affairs, and in the building of
Socialism. " H ?
While these powers seem to be far-reaching, it should not be
forgotten that the People's Councils have never had an independent
basis of power.

They are merely the organs of state power in the

I IQ

regions.

Furthermore, the Rumanian Constitution states that de 

cisions and orders of the People's Councils are limited by the rights
vested in them by it and the central government.

In the case of

the autonomous region, this restriction was carried even further by
the demand that statutes, "drawn up by the People's Council of the
Autonomous Region," must be submitted to and approved by the Grand
National Assembly of the R.P.R.

120

It was also stated that:

"The

I b i d ., Arts. 53, 54, p. 247. According to Endre Istv^nfy,
"Asszimilalddas Erd^lyben," L i r mafa, III (Oct.-Dec., 1956), 11,
"building socialism" was (and is), the major function of the "autonomy"
of the Magyar region and of the educational-cultural concessions to
the mi n o r i t i e s .
U S s r a h a m , "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 170, seems
to imply in his reference to Soviet constitutional theory, that the
People's Councils have directive power. While Braham does not clarify
the nature of this "directive power," it is clear that all such power
is derived from the central authority, the Party, rather than the
local constituency.
H 9"Con s t i t u t i o n of 1952," Art. 55, p. 247; "Draft Constitu
tion of 1965," Art. 70 paragraph 10 and 11, Art. 92, pp. 23, 28.
^ ^ " C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1952," Art. 21, p. 242, presents a sig
nificantly different wording from the newer version of Art. 21 to be
found in Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958, p. 22. The latter
document presents the wording above, using the word "statutes" to
designate legislative enactments of the local People's Council.
The
old version, as presented in the former document, refers to "Statute"

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

108

laws of the R.P.R. and the decisions and orders of the central organs
of the state are compulsory on the territory of the Magyar Autonomous
Region."
The extent of the region's "autonomy" was, perhaps, most
dramatically demonstrated by the recent alterations (December, 1960
and January,

1968) of its borders and composition.
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Unlike the

States of the federal United States system, the Magyar Autonomous
Region had no right to any specific border.
regions are determined in Bucharest.

The boundaries of all

The Constitution states, that

the Grand National Assembly (which is the supreme organ of state
power)

has direct competence "to amend the division into regions

in capital letters, implying that theMagyar Autonomous Region had a
sort of "constitution" which was to be drawn-up locally and to be
approved later by the Grand National Assembly. As the amended version
indicates, however, by 1958, any such plan for a separate "Statute"
had been a b a n d o n e d .
^-"Constitution of 1952," Arts. 20, 46, pp. 242, 245-46.
^•^Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," p. 506;
Ceausescu,"Exposition on the improvement of the Administrative
Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania,"
pp. 1-30; "Grand National Assembly Session;
New AdministrativeTerritorial Organization of Romania," pp. 3-4, 8-9.
123iiQonstjLtution of 1952," Art. 22, p. 243; "Draft Constitu
tion of 1965," Arts. 42, 43, pp. 13-15; Short Document on Ru m ania, p.
15. This "supremacy," however, should be accepted w ith a grain of
salt, for as Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 167,
points o u t , the Party alone is supreme. This is demonstrated by the
Party's complete control over the nomination of candidates to the
Grand National Assembly.
As Braham states, ", . . i n spite of the
constitutional primacy of the Assembly in legislative matters, its
main function, like that of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., is
the ratification of governmental decrees.
It is also the forum
through which governmental policies are publicized and rubber-stamped
for public approval,"
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of the territory of the Rumanian People's R e p u b l i c T h i s

leaves

very little substance either to autonomy or to self-government.
The powers of the Presidium (now called State Council) of the
Grand National Assembly and those of the Prosecutor-General, also
circumscribe local rule.

The powers of the Presidium or State Council,

"to proclaim a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout
the country in order to maintain public order and state s e c u r i t y , " ^ 5
certainly indicates the insignificance of the former regional autonomy.
The provisions which delineate the powers of the Prosecutor-General,
do likewise.

As Art. 76 of the amended 1952 Constitution stated:

"The organs of the Prosecutor's Office carry out their functions
independently of any local body and are subordinate only to the
Prosecutor-General of the Rumanian People's Republic."126
Besides these de jure restrictions on regional governments,
there are also constitutional restrictions on individuals, private
groups and religious institutions.

Individual rights are circumscribed

by obligations as well as outright restrictions.

The obligation to

obey the laws passed by the Grand National Assembly, or decreed by the
Presidium (State Council), or by the Council of Ministers--is

^^■"Constitution of 1952," Art. 24, paragraph h, p. 243;
"Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 43, paragraph 7, p. 14.
^ ^ I b i d . , Art. 64, paragraph g, p. 21; "Constitution of 1952,"
Art. 37, p. 245.
Emphasis not in original.
^ ^Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958, p. 52. More recent
statements of these powers are less specific. See "Draft Constitution
of 1965," Arts. 106-109, pp. 31-32.
Emphasis not in original.
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compulsory for everyone throughout the country.

127

'

Military obliga

tions and loyalty to the state are also stated unequivocally.

But

even the guaranteed rights of free organization, assembly, speech and
press are qualified.

Breaches of socialist legality through the abuse

of these rights are provided for.

An example of this is the restric

tion regarding membership in "any association of a fascist or anti
democratic character."129

party interpretation determines when such

a breach of socialist legality has taken place.
Individual rights are inadequately defended by the Rumanian
constitutional order for a number of reasons.
judiciary is not independent.

One is that the

Furthermore,an individual can be

easily arrested "upon the decision of [any] Court or Prosecutor."
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Decisions to arrest or to try individuals are based on "the Courts'

127"constitution of 1952," Arts. 27, 37 paragraph b, 46, pp.
243-46; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 39, pp. 12-13.
^ ^ I b i d ., Art. 40, p. 13; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 91, p.
251.
•*~^ I b i d .. Art. 86, p. 251; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art.
29, p. 11; Short Document on Rumania, p. 15, points out that the
advocacy of war is also punishable by law.
Q f 1 9 5 2 ," Art. 87, p. 251; "Draft Constitu
tion of 1965," Art. 31, p. 11; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of
1952," p. 177, maintains that:
"The constitutional provisions re
garding the inviolability of the person are rendered meaningless by
virtue of two legal stipulations. They are the exclusive privilege
of the Communist Party or its affiliated organizations to nominate
candidates in the election of judges, and the extra-judicial power of
the Prosecutor-General to order arrests.
Since there can be no writ
of habeas corpus against the Prosecutor-General--always a loyal
servant of the Party— it evidently follows that the arrest of any
individual is left to the Prosecutor's discretion.
^ ^ " C o n s t i t u t i o n
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role as defender of the people's democratic system and the conquests
of the working people."-*-^

In the case of the rights of individuals

belonging to minority nationalities, such a base for interpretation
means that any guarantee of rights is at the same time also a restric
tion.

For example, one constitutional provision states that any dis

crimination on the basis of "race or national membership, as well as
any demonstration of chauvinism, race hatred, national hatred or
nationalist chauvinist propaganda is punishable by laws."-*-^
provision has a double edge.

This

But, since Rumania no longer combats

majority nationalism with the same vigor as minority nationalism, the
provision acts adversely only on the latter.

Thus, a provision

originally intended for the defense of minorities, has now become a
tool for their oppression.

1^

On the group level a similar use has been made of the restric
tion against associating with a group that is "fascist or anti
democratic ."134

xhis has placed the churches of the Hungarians into

■^--^"Constitution of 1952," Preamble, p. 239; Art. 65, p. 248;
A Former Member of the Bucharest Bar, "The R.P.R. Constitution,"
p. 289; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 95, p. 29.
•'••^I b i d ., Art. 17, p. 7; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 81, pp.
249-50.
Another limitation affecting both groups (e.g., German
minority) and individuals, is the one placed on voting rights.
See
Ibid., Art. 94, pp. 251-52; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 25,
pp. 9-10; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 165, foot
note 28.
134"Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 29, p. 11; "Constitution
of 1952," Art. 8 6 , p. 251.
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a particularly adverse position, since their contacts are mainly with
the "reactionary and imperialist anti-democratic" West.
have, therefore, become the object of persecution.

The churches

They have been

denied any role in education as well as in social work.

135

Only in

the training of their own "religious staff," m ay the churches partici
pate in education.

Their remaining denominational organizations and

functions are also strictly regulated. ^ 6

This spells the end of the

churches as effective breaks on the totalitarian nature of the regime.
This also destroys them as independent sources of cultural support
for the nationalities of Transylvania.
Rumania's legal definition of the place of minorities is any
thing but clear.

Nonetheless, certain tendencies are apparent in its

constitutional development.

They parallel the ideological and cul

tural-political evolution of the country's self-image.

In the legal

position, too, it is possible to discern the drive toward a more
unitary and centralized conception of Rumanian statehood.
integral conception,

This more

leaves less opportunities to the nationalities of

Transylvania to develop their respective cultures unhindered.
Communist Rumanians contend that each one of their post-war

^ ^ I b i d . , Art. 84, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art.
30, p. 11.
^^Ibid.,

"Constitution of 1952," Art. 84, p. 250.
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To project a better image of Rumania, some of the pressure
has been removed from the churches.
For a limited indication of this,
see "State Council President Nicolae Ceausescu Receives Chiefs of
Cults of Romania," D o c uments, Articles and Information on Romania,
XIX (Mar. 15, 1968), 6-10.
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constitutions reflects a higher stage of development on the road to a
communist society.

Thus, the constitution of April 13, 1948, is

viewed as corresponding to the needs of the nation in "the stage of
formation . . .

of the socialist system."

foundations for the new Rumania.

138

It, in effect, laid the

However, the growth of socialist

state property and the "consciousness of the working people" made it
necessary to adopt in September 24, 1952, "the second constitution of
people's p o w e r ."139

document reflected the stage of the expanding

"building of s o c i a l i s m . " ^ ®
The latest Rumanian constitution goes even further.
socialist constitution.

It is a

While its two predecessors had made the

country into a people's-democratic state, it has gone one giant step
forward to "establish . . .

a higher stage, of the process of complet

ing the building of socialism . . . the preparation of the prerequisites
for the transition to c o m m u n i s m . I t

has transformed Rumania from a

People's Republic into a Socialist Republic.
For the Hungarians of Transylvania this constitutional

1-^Traian Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist Republic
of Rumania," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (Sept.
15, 1965), 7.
•*~^ I b i d .; "The Fundamental Law of Socialist Rumania," Docu
ments , Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (July 10, 1965), 4.
^ ^ T b i d . , p. 5; Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Rumania," p. 7; Nistor Prisca, "The Basic Law of Socialist
Rumania," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (Aug.
20, 1965), 5.
^■^Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of
Rumania," p. 7.
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metamorphosis represents a more thorough integration of their existence
into the life of the country as a whole.

It also represents a

diminution of their ability to defend their cultural heritage by re
ferring to constitutional guarantees.

The Socialist Constitution of

1965, provides them with no "autonomy" and negligible "self-govern
ment."

It places them within the framework of a "unitary" and

"indivisible" state, which provides them with some generalized guarantees
of nationality rights.

These rights, in turn, are counterbalanced with

restrictions and obligations that make the original guarantees almost
meaningless.
In Yugoslavia
A comparison of the constitutional developments of the two
countries presents an interesting contrast.

While both countries

claim that their successive constitutions indicate higher and higher
levels of socialist development toward communism, they are heading for
this goal in opposed directions.

In Rumania each successive constitu

tion has led to more and more centralization.

In Yugoslavia it has

led to more and more de-centralization.
The Yugoslavian constitution has stressed decentralization,
in large part, as a means of minimizing the recurrence of "super-state
hegemony" and "bureaucratic c e n t r a l i s m . j n

it represents a

reaction against both inter-war nationalism and post-war Stalinism.
While the Constitution of 1946 laid the foundations for a Stalinisttype state, its two successors, have been uniquely Yugoslavian.

• ^ Yugoslavia’s W a y , pp. 193, 195.
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document of 1946, made of Yugoslavia a People's Republic not unlike
the emerging people's republics of satellite Eastern Europe.

The one

important difference was that it was a federal, rather than a unitary
state system.
The 1953 Constitutional Law, although officially only a modi
fication of the earlier document, was in actuality a completely new
constitution.

It aimed to create a "socialist democracy."144

jts

interesting deviation from the 1946 constitution was that it did not
guarantee either "sovereignty" or the "right of secession" to any of
the Republic governments of the f e d e r a t i o n . A t

the same time, it

increased the importance of the lowest levels of government
the commune level).

(i.e.,

For all the nationalities of the country this

^^ H o f f m a n , Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 211-13;
"Edvard Kardelj's Report on the Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia," Documents: The Constitutional System of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Beograd; Review of Inter
national Affairs, 1963), pp. 29-30.
The evolution of the modern
Yugoslavian Constitution can be traced through three major documents.
These are:
"Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo
slavia [of Jan. 30, 1946]," Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J.
Peaslee (Concord, New Hampshire: The Rumford Press, 1950), III,
522-41; "Fundamental Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and
Political Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
and of the Federal Organs of State Authority [of Jan. 13, 1953],
Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J. Peaslee (Second Edition; The
Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 111,766-90; "Consti
tution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Collection
of Yugoslav L a w s , ed. Borislav T. Blagojevic (Beograd:
Institut of
Comparative Law, 1963).
■'•^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 213.
■*^Compare "Constitution of 1946," Art. I, p. 522, with "Funda
mental Law of 1953," Art. I, p. 766.
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meant more self-government on the local level, yet less self-government
as corporate entities, or as distinct nationalities.
The Constitution of 1963, has continued to extend decentraliza
tion.

It, too, provides more "self-government" on the local level,

while restricting the possibility of ethnic groups acting in concert
against the interests of the federation as a w h o l e .

This makes the

new document a "unifying" instrument, without making a "unitary" solu
tion necessary.
According to Yugoslav legal experts, the Constitution of 1963,
"is the expression of a socialist society which is a humane democratic
community."

14.8

It has transformed the Federal People's Republic of

Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

149

The

meaning of this change is considered as part of "the withering away of
statehood."

1 SO

The two earlier constitutions had been merely "state

146

Compare "Constitution of 1946," Arts. 90-114, pp. 535-38,
with "Fundamental Law of 1953," Arts. 3, 4, 6 , 7, 100-114, pp. 767-68,
788-90. Also see Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 211-14.
■^^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 1, 6-9, 71-112, pp.
12-14, 32-45.
The result of this excessive decentralization has been
to reduce the importance of Republican and Provincial governments.
These levels had given the nationalities (i.e., the Slavic "majority"
nationalities) the possibility to act as corporate entities within
the federation.
For the non-Slavic nationalities this possibility
had never really existed.
•^^Jovan Djordjevic, "Preface" to "Socialist Constitution of
1963," p. IV.
^ ^ C o m p a r e "Fundamental Law of 1953," Art.

1, p. 766, with

"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 1, p. 12.
•^^Djordjevid, "Preface," p. IV.
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Law."

The new constitution, on the other hand, reduces the contradic

tions existing between state and society.

It "establishes a society"

which is not separated according to social and political functions,
but is instead founded on "the whole social-political system of the
country."1.151
For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, these changes indicate
increased opportunities to participate in the social and political life
of the country.

However, such participation is open to them as indi

viduals rather than as a group.

This is born out by the specific

parts of the present Constitution which discuss nationality rights.
Unlike the Rumanian constitution of 1965, the Yugoslav document goes
into a great deal of detail in its discussion of purpose, rights and
governmental institutions in general, as well as in relation to
nationality rights and obligations.
Already in the introductory part of the document, certain
1 52

"Basic Principles" are enumerated. J

Incorporating the Partisan

tradition and some of Yugoslavia's own ideological innovations, the
first such "principle" s tates:
The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of
every people to self-determination, including the right to
secession, on the basis of their common struggle and their will
freely declared in the People's Liberation W ar and Socialist
Revolution, and in accord with their historical aspirations
. . . have united in a federal republic of free and equal

•^ I b i d .
•'•■^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," pp. 3-11.
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peoples and nationalities

. . .^-*3

The substance of this statement goes far beyond anything in the present
Rumanian constitution.

To be fair, it goes beyond anything that the

Yugoslavs themselves consider feasible or desirable.

For this reason,

both the right to secession and the right to self-determination, are
avoided in the body of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . S t i l l ,
ts

their propagandis

use in the introduction, indicates confidence in the durability of

Yugoslavia's unity.

This type of confidence is nowhere evident in

Rumania, where "indivisability" is tirelessly inveighed.
Article 1, stresses that the federation is based on the volun
tary unity of "equal peoples."155

This unity involves the socialist

republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia and S l o v e n i a .-*-56

While no mention is made, at this point, of

the Vojvodina, Chapter V, Article III, states that; "A republic may
found autonomous provinces in accordance with the constitution in
areas with distinctive national characteristics or in areas with other
distinguishing features, on the basis of the express will of the
population of these areas."157

• ^ I b i d ., pp. 3-4.
■*--^See footnote 145 above.
■^-’-’"Socialist Constitution of 1963," p. 12.
• ^ I b i d ., Art. 2, p. 12.
^ ^ I b i d .. p. 45. Earlier discussions of "autonomy" in the
Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija, contained somewhat more extensive
guarantees.
See "Constitution of 1946," Arts. 2, 103-106, pp. 522,
536-37; "Fundamental Law of 1953," Arts. 44-49, 113-114, pp. 776-77,
790.
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The Republic of Serbia has founded two such autonomous prov
inces.

Both the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous

Province of Kosovo and Metohija were established in 1 9 4 5 . The
existence of these "autonomous" provinces does not mean that either
the Albanians or the Hungarians possess self-government as national
groups.

It means merely, that in the areas in which they live as com

pact groups, the Serbian republican government has seen fit to meet
local peculiarities and needs through the delegation of some of its
administrative p o w e r s . T h i s

delegation or sharing of powers is not

a federal, but a republican matter. -^0

xhe autonomous provinces are

not parts of the federation, but only of one of its republics.

It is

the republican constitution that determines the "rights and duties
and the basic principles of organization in the autonomous provinces
•

•

•

,.161
The rights of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are, therefore,

more explicitly spelled out in the Constitution of the Serbian Social
ist Republic and the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
These two documents were adopted only a few days after the federal
constitution went into effect.^ 2

jn Articles 41, 42, and 43, the

•*--^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. Ill, p. 45.
■*"^L£szlo Rehak, "A Vajdas^gi Nemzetis^gek Helyzete Jugoszl^via
Uj Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," Hid, XXVII (May, 1963), 572-75.
160"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 112, p. 45.
161lbid.
l ^ R e h d k , "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszldvia Uj
Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," p. 567.
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federal constitution guarantees citizens "the freedom to express
[their]

. . . nationality and culture . .

through their own lan

guages and scripts, and to develop them in schools where instruction
is carried on in their own language.

The Serbian republican consti

tution elaborates on these rights in Article 82, emphasizing the
equality of all nationalities in regard to rights as well as obligations.

1 (\Ll

The statute of the autonomous Vojvodina, goes even further

by naming explicitly the Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumanians and Ruthenians.
These nationalities, according to Article 32 of the statute, are
guaranteed the right to use all modern means of communication to express their thoughts and desires in their own languages.

1fis

Article 83 of the republican constitution also guarantees that
in areas where any nationality is represented in substantial numbers,
instruction in elementary schools will be carried on in the language
of “that nationality.

Where two nationalities live together in sub-

stantial numbers instruction is to be bi-lingual.

1fifi

While the

Statute of the Autonomous Province fails to mention this right, it
does direct the provincial administrative organs to support and develop
institutions of learning among the nationalities (Article 37).

163"Socialist Constitution of 1963," p. 25.
^^Reh^tk, "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszlavia Uj
Alkotmdnyos Rendj^ben," p. 573.
165 Ibid.

167

166 I b i d .

I b i d ., pp. 573-74.
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One of the most interesting innovations on the federal level,
which has had far-reaching repercussions on the republic and local
level, has been a change in constitutional terminology.

The ethnic

minorities are no longer officially called "national minorities," but
are designated simply "nationalities."
symbolic elimination of inequality.

This change represents a

There are officially no longer

any "minorities" or "majorities ,!1 all nationalities are now equal. 00
In concrete terms, this equality means that in the Vojvodina
government agencies and administrators must be able to communicate in
the languages of the nationalities.169

a ],so me ans that in workers'

councils and other self-governing bodies the language of the minority
ethnic groups is to be used in deliberations wh e n they are represented
in substantial numbers.^70

Furthermore, translations, in the lan

guages of the nationalities, are to be provided of such deliberations,
as well as of all important government directives which affect the
Vojvodina.^71

These guarantees are incorporated in Articles 84, 85,

and 8 6 , of the Serb Socialist Republican Constitution and Articles
33, 34, 35, and 36, of the Statute of the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina.^72

^ ® I b i d . , p. 571; Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisegi Kerdesekben,"
p . 3.
169Rehak, "A Vajdasagi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszlavia Uj
Alkotmanyos Rendjeben," pp. 574-75.
170Ibid., p. 575.
171Ibid.

172Ibid.
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Up to this point, we have discussed "group" rights enjoyed by
ethnic minorities.

However, as in the case of Rumania, so in Yugo

slavia, these rights have been conferred not to make of the minori
ties a privileged part of the population, but in order to give them
equal opportunities and rights with the rest of the inhabitants.

This

is reflected in the statement that all nationalities are guaranteed the
same rights and obligations, regardless of their place of domicile.
In other words, they need not reside in an "autonomous" province in
order to develop and live their own cultures.

The nature of Yugo

slavian federalism, as well as the rights and duties of individuals
as "humans" and "citizens," places all people on an equal footing "re
gardless of differences in nationality, race, religion, sex, language,
education or social position."174
This equality is in reality undercut by the fact that some
nationalities are "more equal" than others.

While the "minority-

majority" dichotomy no longer accentuates this inequality, the consti
tuent republics of the federation reflect it.

The Yugoslav (i.e.,

South Slav) nationalities, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins,
etc., are each allotted a republic of their own.-*-^

xhe non-South

■*-^Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi K^rd^sekben," p. 3;
Reh^k, "A Vajdasagi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszl^via Uj Alkotminyos
Rendj^ben," p. 567; "Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 41, 42,
43, pp. 25-26.
174 Ibid., Art. 33, p. 22.
175 I b i d ., Art. 2, p. 12.
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Slav nationalities, Turks, Albanians, Hungarians, etc., are at the
same time lucky if they fall within the borders of one or other of
the autonomous provinces.

Thus, while the half-million Montenegrins

of the country have a republic of their own, the half-million Hunga
rians and the one-million Albanians must be content with "autonomous"
provinces within the Republic of Serbia.

The meaning of this differ

ence is forcefully expressed by Articles 108, 109, 111, and 112,
which define the basis of republican and provincial governments.176
Article 108 states that:

"The rights and duties of the repub

lic shall be determined by the republican constitution in accordance
w ith the principles of . . .[the federal] Constitution."'*'^
Furthermore, the " . . .

territory of a republic shall not be altered

without the consent of the republic concerned."^78

leaves the

largest political subdivisions of the country, with sane sovereignty.
Like the states of the United States, and unlike the regions (or
counties) of Rumania, the republics of Yugoslavia are members of a real
federation.
The autonomous provinces of the Serbian republic, lack such
features of sovereignty.

The Constitution of Yugoslavia makes their

existence an optional matter that is totally within the powers of the
republics, to grant or to deny.

As Article III states a ".

. . republic

•*~^I b i d ., pp. 44-45.
^ ^Ibid., p. 44.
^Ibid.
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m a y found autonomous provinces."179

not obligated to do so.

If it deigns to do so, the republic still controls every aspect of the
province's autonomy.

Article 112 defines autonomous provinces as

"social-political communities within the republic."

As such, their

rights and duties, as well as "the basic principles of organization in
the autonomous provinces shall be determined by republican constitution."

isn

This consideration determines that the basic law of the

Vojvodina is only a "Statute," while for the Republic of Serbia it is
a "Constitution."
In the area of "human" and "citizen" rights and obligations,
the Yugoslavian Constitution differs from the Rumanian in a number of
ways.

The former devotes thirty-nine Articles on ten pages to the

enumeration of such rights, while the latter accomplishes the same
task with twenty-five Articles on six pages.

The lengthier Yugo

slavian treatment, differs from the Rumanian guarantees in at least two
ways.

First, it puts a great deal of emphasis on the "right of

citizens to social self-government."^8^
in the statement of rights.

Second, it is less equivocal

The adjectives "inalienable" and "invio

lable" are frequently appended to such rights.

In the Rumanian Consti

tution this is not the case.

■*-^Ibid., p. 4 5 .

Emphasis added.

180 Ibid.

•*~8 ~*~Ibid. , Arts. 32-70, pp. 22-32; "Rumanian Draft Constitution
of 1965," Arts. 17-41, pp. 7-13.
■^"Socialist

Constitution of 1963," Arts. 34, 73-76, 96, pp.

22, 32, 41.
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In most other respects, the listing of rights and duties is
very much alike in both documents.

Like its Rumanian counterpart, the

Yugoslavian Constitution lists economic and social rights as well as
political ones.

This encompasses such traditionally democratic

rights as freedom of speech, association and assembly, as well as the
"right and freedom . . .

to work," "freedom of movement," "protection

of health," "protection of mother and child," "protection of the
family," and "the right of inheritance."^-83

It also includes certain

guarantees against arbitrary treatment in the courts and excessive
interference in people's personal lives.

1 ftA

Accordingly, "religious

confession shall not be restricted," while scientific and artistic
creativity are encouraged.^83
Equality before the law and the right to vote, are two guarantees which the constitution also contains.

186

The right to suffrage

enables the voters of the Vojvodina, as those of all Yugoslavia, to
send representatives of their own nationality to the Chamber of Nation
alities.'*'^

This right ensures them of the representation of their

interests and needs in the Federal Assembly.

188

Since this body is

183 Ibid., Arts. 36, 51, 55-58, pp. 23, 29-30.
184 I b i d . , Arts. 47-50, 52-53, 66-69, pp. 27-29, 31-32.

•*~83 I b i d ., Arts. 45-46, p. 26.
186 I b i d ., Arts. 35, 67, 157, pp. 23, 31, 56-57.
187 Ibid., Arts. 34-35, 82,
188 Ibid., Arts.

165-166, pp. 22-23, 35, 61-62.

190-191, pp. 68-69.
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considered "the supreme organ of power . . . and social self-govern
ment,"^®^ the respective nationalities theoretically have a voice in
the policy-making of the country.
Their rights to participate in government, as well as all
their other rights, are counter-balanced by certain obligations and
restrictions.

Not only are they commended to "abide by the Constitu

tion and law,"^9® but they must also participate in the defense of
their c o u n t r y . N u m e r o u s
slav Constitution.

other such obligations exist in the Yugo

In this respect as well, it is very similar to

the Rumanian Constitution.

Another similarity can be found in the

paragraph of Article 40 which states that:
These freedoms and rights shall not be used by anyone to
overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order
determined by the Constitution, to endanger the peace, inter
national cooperation on terms of equality, or the independence
of the country, to disseminate national, racial, or religious
hatred or intolerance, or to incite to crime, or in any manner
that offends public decency. -^2
This statement delineates the limits of "rights" and "free
doms."

At the same time, it contains an admonition against ethnic

strife and national hatreds.

While such admonitions also appear in

the Rumanian Constitution, they seem to serve somewhat different
purposes from their Yugoslavian counterparts.

In Rumania the

•*~®9I b i d ., Art. 163, p. 60.
190I b i d .. Arts. 61-63, pp. 30-31.
19 1I b i d .. Arts. 60, 252-253, pp. 30, 88-89.
192 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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de-emphasis of diversity is the end, while in Yugoslavia it is the
toleration of such diversity.

*

*

*

The divergent purposes of these two constitutions is much more
apparent in their application than in their wording.

Yet, in the

foregoing comparison even the wording of the two documents pointed to
differences in the treatment of their respective national minorities.
In conclusion, the comparison can be carried one step further by
quoting Article 1 of the respective constitutions.

The Rumanian

Constitution states:
The Socialist Republic of Rumania is a sovereign, inde
pendent and unitary state of the working people of the towns
and villages.
Its territory is inalienable and indivisible.-*-93
In the Yugoslavian Constitution, the corresponding Article maintains:
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal
state of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist
democratic community based on the powers of the working people
and on self-government.194
True, these self-definitions are to a great degree propaganda.
But, not completely so.

They are also statements of certain ideals

toward which the two countries are striving.

Considered in this

light, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina possess greater constitutional
defense of their national culture than the Hungarians of Transylvania.

^•^"Rumanian Draft Constitution of 1965," p. 3.

Emphasis

added.
194 m socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 1, p. 12.

Emphasis

added.
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Although neither Yugoslavia nor Rumania give their Hungarian inhabi
tants "group"

or "corporate" recognition and rights, the tendency

toward decentralization and self-government in Yugoslavia provides
those of the Vojvodina with more opportunities and less restrictions
than those of Transylvania.

The following chapters will discuss how

these theoretical and legal differences correspond to the everyday
practical existence and treatment of the Hungarians in both countries.
Before turning to these practical considerations, some addi
tional observations are in order.

As in the case of ideology, so in

the constitutions of the two countries, it is possible to discern
distinctive and different approaches to the nationality question.
While both documents are based on the understanding that nationalism
is the greatest threat to the cohesion and unity of the country, they
have developed in different directions to meet this threat.

These

different directions are a consequence of three major changes in the
constitutional structure of both countries.

These changes, in turn,

reflect changes in the political balances within and without the two
countries.
In Yugoslavia, the intra-national heterogeneity makes no one
nationality a majority of the population.

Consequently, the interests

and needs of all nationalities have been balanced against one another.
This has been achieved by granting self-government on the local level,
without

tying it to "national self-government."
In Rumania, the exact opposite has happened.

While the 1948

and 1953 constitutions had guaranteed many Hungarians self-government
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as a group in the "Autonomous Magyar Region," the 1965 constitution
has taken from them all such self-government.

It has placed them

directly under the central government of the unitary Rumanian state.
Thus, the inbalance of R u m ania’s ethnic make-up, has led to the sub
jugation of the minority to the majority.

The balance of nationali

ties in Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has tried to keep them from
becoming subject to one another--at least in theory.
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CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE HUNGARIANS
The most direct way to examine the position of the Hungarians
in Yugoslavia and Romania is to consider their respective "power
positions" within the two countries.

This requires an evaluation of

their potential power (economic strength, social prestige, etc.), their
access to positions of power (Party and Government leaders), and their
actual policy-making influence.

This is the main concern of the

present chapter.

I
In both Rumania and Yugoslavia the Communist Party is the core
of the power structure.

By examining these respective centers of power,

it will be possible to ascertain the relative strength of the Hungarians
vis-h-vis the majority nationalities of the two political systems.

The

major assumption underlying this approach is that the distribution of
political influence within these Communist parties reflects, in part,
the treatment of ethnic minorities.

By examining the evolution,

organization and membership of both the Rumanian and Yugoslavian
Communist parties it will be possible to confirm the above assumption
and to shed light on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities.
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In Rumania and Transylvania

Background and Evolution
From its beginnings the Rumanian Communist Party has had the
problem of adapting to and overcoming both material and mental
obstacles.

The material obstacles are tied directly to the political,

economic and social structure of the country.
Rumania can be described as a "new" nation.

As a political entity
It received statehood

only because some of the great powers— particularly Russia— saw it to
their advantage to weaken an already disintegrating Ottoman Empire.^
Thus, the Treaty of St. Stefano in 1877 and the following Congress of
Berlin, enabled Rumania to take its place among the "independent"
nation-states of Europe.
The political legacy of the country was, however, reflected in
both its economic and social development.

Turkish subjugation,

Phanariot exploitation, and the Boyar dominated feudal structure of
former Wallachia and Moldavia, bequeathed to the new kingdom serious
O
social and economic, as well as political problems.
At first glance this would indicate that the precursors of
Communism would have a fertile field to exploit in Rumania.

This,

lAs opposed to Russia, Great Britain attempted to bolster the
Ottoman Empire. The English saw more danger in the aggressive Russian
attempts to expand toward the Mediterranean, than in the tottering
empire of the Turks which was hard-pressed even to maintain the status
quo as the nationalism of its subject peoples grew in intensity.
O
Stephen Fischer-Galati (ed .) , Rumania (New York:
Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 3-9.

Frederick A.
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however, is misleading.

The stark fact that they had to face, was

Rumania's backward and overwhelmingly agricultural make-up, which was

3
weighed down by a semi-feudal social structure.

The country lacked

industry and an "industrial proletariat" from which the Party could
recruit adherents.

Thus, most Rumanian problems were agrarian and the

Party or its forerunners had to take this into account in the face of
Marxist orthodoxy.
Though these material obstacles were great in themselves for
early "left" political movements, the political and social attitudes of
the land were no more hospitable.

In this realm, Socialist and other

radical-left elements had to contend with the country's dual intellectual development, i.e., an Eastern versus a Western orientation.

4

^The agrarian setting of Rumania has been described in numerous
ways.
Dobrogea-Gherea termed it "neo-serfdom," while Virgil Madgearu,
the theoretician of the National Peasant Party, described the country
as "a semi-capitalist state with a peasant economic structure." Even
with the annexation of the more industrialized provinces (e.g., Tran
sylvania, Banat) in 1919, workers represented only 107o of the total
population.
See Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania 1944-1962 (London;
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 3, 29.
^By dividing intellectual development into two major schools
(i.e., Western and Eastern) the study engenders some over-simplification.
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that these major schools contain
within themselves lesser "schools" and intellectual groupings.
The
Eastern outlook may be said to have been predominant until the nine
teenth century.
Since then it has had to contend with influences
which have their origins in Western Europe.
The Eastern orientation
was determined by the Balkan location of Wallachia and Moldavia in
close proximity to the Byzantine world.
These principalities were,
furthermore, subject either to Russian or Turkish hegemony throughout
most of their existence.
In addition, the religious ties of the people
were either with Greece or Russia due to their allegiance to the Eastern
(Rumanian) Orthodox Church. The Eastern orientation was also reinforced
by two political events; (1) the country's liberation from Turkish rule
by Russia (rather than a Western Power) and (2) Rumanian annexation of
Bessarabia following World War I. For a discussion of the development
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This factor entailed problems of approach vis-&-vis the populace, as
well as problems of internal organizational cohesion.

Since two major

intellectual tendencies prevailed in the country, these divisions were
also mirrored in the development of early left-radical movements.

Pre-World War I Beginnings
Early "left-democratic," Socialist and Communist groups re
flected this dual intellectual orientation.

The "old" kingdom, also

known as the Regat, developed separately its subversive "left" groups
from similar organizations in Transylvania or Bessarabia.

Socialist and

Communist groups in the latter two areas were directly tied to the
earlier "left" developments in Hungary and Russia respectively.^

The

origins of the Rumanian or Regat wing of Communism can be traced back
to 1875 and the activities of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea

(alias

Nathan Katz of Cass), w h o had fled to Rumania from Bessarabia to avoid
the Czarist police.^
Dobrogeanu-Gherea provided the precursors of Rumanian Communism
with its first leadership.

He was soon joined in this undertaking by

another ethnically non-Rumanian, the Bulgarian Christian Rakovsky.^

of these differing schools of thought see Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp.
3-10, and D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," Slavic
Review, XX (October, 1961), 477.
^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 4-10.
£L

Ibid., p. 3; Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p.
477; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve of Its Third Congress
(Special Report; Radio Free Europe, Munich, Germany, May, 1960), p. 1.
^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 2-5.
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Under the direction of these two as well as some lesser "socialist
lights," the Social Democratic Party was formed in 1893.®

From the

beginning this party suffered dissentions and factions which were based
on social, geographic and ideological differences.

There evolved for

example, such factions as "the maximalists," "the generous" and the
Odessa group under Rakovsky.^

The Odessa group and "the maximalists"

were to provide the organizational core for the Communist Party follow
ing World War I.
In the pre-war setting, however, the dissention within the
Social Democratic Party and its lack of appeal for the population in
general, kept it impotent and uninfluential.

The reasons for this

weakness can be attributed to external as well as internal factors.
Internally the Party was made up of "foreigners" and ethnic minorities
rather than "native" R u m a n i a n s . ^

Furthermore, the internationalist

doctrines of the Party were in complete disharmony with the rise of a
fanatical Rumanian nationalism which accompanied the independence of
Rumania in 1877.

In addition, the country's social setting was in no

way conducive to such a "left-radical" movement based on the "proletar
iat" and the "progressive intellectuals

World War I, the Comintern and the Inter-War Years
The world conflagration that broke out in 1914 in no way

®Ibid., pp. 1 -2 .
Q
I b i d ., pp. 2-10; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the E v e , p. 1.
•^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 477.

•^Ibid .
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enhanced the political position of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party.
Throughout the war the Party was torn asunder by disagreements over
participation in this "imperialist" stru g g l e . ^

The Party's equivocal

stance regarding participation widened even further the gulf between it
and the population in general.

Thus, the war and the outbreak of the

cataclysmic Soviet Revolution only strengthened the Rumanian Social
Democratic party's sense of urgency for action, but not its power to
act.
In the closing years of World War I and the immediate post-war
reordering, the Party too underwent portentious changes.

The events

that make these changes inevitable were the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia, the Communist Revolution of Bela Kun in Hungary, the creation
of the Comintern, the annexation of Bessarabia and Transylvania by
Rumania and the popularization of the dictum of "self-determination of
peoples."

These events not only caused the further fragmentation of

the Rumanian Social Democratic Party, but they were in large part
responsible for the birth and early development of the Rumanian Commu
nist Party which rules Rumania today.
Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 inspired the
"maximalist" faction to exert every effort to seize control of the
Rumanian Social Democratic Party.

13

Its inability to attain this end

was in large part due to the Bolshevik interpretation of the principle
of "self-determination" and the faction's failure to gain the support

io

Ionescu, Communism in R u m ania, pp. 4-9.
~T b i d ., pp. 12-18; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the E v e ,
pp. 1-2.
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of the w o r k e r s . ^

These two reasons are inter-related insofar that the

policy demanded by the Bolsheviks through "self-determination" offended
the nationalist pride of most segments of the Rumanian population,
including the workers.
The two specific developments which point out the faction's
alienation from the population were directly tied to the question of
Rumanian expansionism and its conflict with Bolshevik interests in
Bessarabia and the Communist International's interests in Transylvania.
The Comintern--which had come into existence shortly after the Soviet
October Revolution— demanded that the Rumanian Communists oppose the
annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania.^

It also demanded that they

oppose and sabotage in every possible manner the Rumanian military
moves of General Averescu that were being directed against Bela Kun
and the Communist regime in Budapest.

16

Since both these moves would

have demanded the denial of the greatest of nationalist gratifications
in an era of rampant nationalism, the "maximalists" lost all touch
with the Rumanian ethnic element.
The formalization of the successful annexations and the ful
fillment of "Great Rumanian" expansionism, released an even more fervent
and fanatical nationalism among the "successors of the Roman

■*-^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 478; Ionescu,
Communism in Rumania, pp. 24-25.
15Ibid., pp. 12, 22-25.
^ I b i d ., pp. 14-17.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

137

Empire.This
out in the cold.

attitude among the populace left the "maximalists"
However, the Comintern gave its "Rumanian" lackeys

no respite and demanded a purge of unreliable members in the ranks, r e 
organization and strict discipline, as well as unflinching allegiance
to the International.

To further these ends, the "maximalists" brought

into existence the CPR in 1 9 2 1 . But a second Party Congress in 1922
was required in order to breathe life into the organization.

In spite

of this, the CPR remained weak and ineffective in the inhospitable
atmosphere of Rumanian chauvinism.

19

^

Comintern directives contributed to this continued weakness of
the CPR.

They demanded the utilization of the "self-determination"

principle in the newly acquired areas of Rumania and the exploitation
of ethnic and economic discord to the fullest.

20

These demands were

carried out with some success in Bessarabia during 1924.

However, the

only real result of these efforts was to put the CPR under government

■^The Rumanians claim to be the descendants of Trajan's Roman
legions which conquered Dacia in the second century after Christ.
While this claim has often been called into question, the present-day
Rumanians do speak a Romance language--although somewhat Slavicized.
However, it must be emphasized that the name "Rumanian" is only of
recent vintage.
No state or people existed under that name prior to
1859 when the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united to
form the country of "Rumania."
■^Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 68; Ionescu, Communism in
R u m a n i a , pp. 18-19.
^ I b i d . , p. 19.
^®Ibid., pp. 24-25.
It should be noted, however, that "selfdetermination" was never considered an end in itself.
During these
early years as the real answer to the problem of ethnic minorities.
See Evangelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes,"
Balkan Studies, II (1961), 29.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

138

O *1

ban in that same year.

Henceforth, the Party had to resort to more

subtle tactics, dividing its activities between an underground as well
as "legal" apparatus.
Succeeding years of Party activity revealed its weakness and in
ability to reach the masses.

Only among the national minorities did

the Party register some "successes," but here too the depth and significance of these successes could be called into question.

22

Nevertheless,

the relative successes among the minorities and the Party's failure
among the ethnic Rumanians, determined the policies which it was to
follow.

The "legal" and "front" organizations of the party became

particularly active among the nationality groups, while the "under
ground" or "illegal" apparatus tried to infiltrate the labor movement
and to foster economic discontent.

23

This dual tactical approach of

the CPR reflected also the dual ethnic make-up of the Party.
The "legal" and "front" organizations of the Party prospered

21

Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 68; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania,

p. 23.
^ T h e major reason w hy these Communist "successes" among the
minority nationalities--particularly among the Hungarians--should be
viewed with skepticism, is that the Rumanian "bourgeois" government of
the inter-war years maintained a double-standard regarding Communist
activity. While it severly repressed Communist activity among ethnic
Rumanians, it allowed the Party a great deal of freedom among the
ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . The reason for this was that the "bourgeois"
government wanted to destroy the national unity and solidarity of the
respective minorities through class antagonism--which was fostered by
the CPR--thereby to make them more susceptible to "Rumanization" and
assimilation.
9o

The Rumanian W o r k e r s ' Party on the E v e , pp. 3-5; Ionescu,
Communism in R umania, pp. 24-25, 44-45.
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particularly in the newly annexed areas of the country.

In these areas

the Party enlisted many individuals from the national minorities who
saw their salvation in the right of "self-determination" and the policy
of mutual national respect under "proletarian internationalism."

24

These recruits came to play important roles in the early inter-war
years and remained an important force in the Party at least until 1952.
They were in fact the dominant segment of the CPR until the Fifth Party
Congress of 1932.

Through front organizations like Madosz and periodi-

cals like K o r u n k . they provided the CPR with its "legal" apparatus.

25

On the "underground" level, Party work took on a more conspira
torial character than the "propaganda" activities among the minority
nationalities.

In the "underground" the stress was on action rather

than on "recruitment."
action.

The labor field was the major target of this

The Grivita Railroad Strike of 1933 was its greatest success.

2 fi

^ F o r the nature and extent of this minority adhesion to the
CPR, see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe
(Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 154-155;
Istvdn Nagy, "Forum:
Tiz ^ves Az R NK Iroszovetsege," Igaz S z o , vll
(March, 1959), 415-416; Nicolae Kallos, "The Journal 'Korunk* and Its
Animator, G^bor Gaal," Lupta De Clasa (June, 1964) trans. in Rumanian
Press Surv e y , N o . 447 (Radio Free Europe, July 15, 1964), pp. 2-11.
oc

-’Korunk was a left-wing Marxist oriented Hungarian-language
periodical which opposed the efforts of minority nationality publica
tions and organizations, calling for boundary revisions.
The latter in
cluded such publications as Hitel, Zord I d 6 k . Napkelet Pdsztortuz, and
such cultural societies and publishers as Erddlyi Helikon, Minerva, and
Erddlyi Szdpmives Cdh.
In contrast to this latter group, the intellec
tuals who supported Korunk asked for no revisions in frontiers.
They
took the view that social, rather than national solutions, were needed.
They emphasized the solidarity of Rumanians and Hungarians alike, along
class rather than national lines.
"Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 45-46; Tomasic, "The
Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 480.
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However, the Party's range of activities also included
during the Second World War, even guerrilla warfare.

sabotage and
In these activi

ties, it is interesting to note that the ethnic Rumanian "worker"
elements were more active than the ethnic minority "intellectuals."
The Party Congress of 1932 was in many ways a watershed in the
history of the CPR.

It switched the emphasis from "self-determ ination"
on

to social problems and the need to exploit economic unrest.

This

switch in emphasis laid the foundations for strengthening the ethnic
Rumanian wing of the Party.
place at this time.

Yet, growth in the Party did not take

The Rumanian population in general, turned with

more enthusiasm to the extreme nationalist anti-Hungarian, anti-Jewish,
anti-Russian "Iron Guard" movement of Cornelius Zelea Codreanu.

28

In

the face of this development, all the Party could do was to cooperate
with other "left" elements to forestall a fascist regime.
CPR followed the
"social

In this the

general directive of the Comintern to abandon the

fascist" outlook vis-a-vis the Social Democrats and thereby to

join the "Popular Front" tactics of other Communist parties in E u r o p e . ^

07

'One of the major reasons for this switch was of course the
growing
power of fascist movements in Central Europe, which were also
emphasizing the need for territorial revisions and readjustments.
In
order to better cope with this threat from the "right" the CPR now toned
down its "self-determination" doctrines and stressed that the problems
of the area demanded economic and social solutions along the Soviet
pattern.
28Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston:
Meador Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 95-111; Ionescu, Communism in
R u m a n i a , pp. 37-38, 49-50.
^ I b i d ., pp. 50-51; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the E v e , p. 5.
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The outbreak of World War II saw the disruption of this tactic
as Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Non-Aggression Pact.

This

move caused great confusion within Party ranks and added to the disunity which characterized the organization until April 1944.

3 0

Dis

array and complete impotence best characterize the CPR during these
early war years.

The most militant and talented Party members were

either in prison or in exile.

31

The remaining members of the Party

lacked cohesion and their leadership was completely shaken and shattered
by the fast flow of events and the contrary and mutually exclusive
demands placed on them.
With the assistance of the Soviet Union, however, the Party was
able to purge and re-build its shattered organization.

The ex-

Comintern agent, Emil Bodnaras, was instrumental in this Party re 
organization. 32

Holding a secret Party purge in April 1944, he,

Parvulescu and some other Rumanian Communists prepared the CPR for the
important role it was to take in the Soviet War effort.

Unity and

cohesion were attained, plans coordinated, and the Party was made ready
for its part in the overthrow of the Antonescu r e g i m e . ^
As the Red Army advanced into Rumania the Coup d'etat of

30
31

I b i d ., p. 6 ; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 58-66.
The Rumanian Workers' Party on the E v e , p. 6.

•^I b i d ., pp. 6 , 18-21; Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 344-345;
Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 78-81, 351.
33

I b i d ., pp. 78-86; Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European
Revolution (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), pp. 89-90.
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August 23, 1944 toppled from power the Antonescu dictatorship.

This

m o v e — carried out by a "democratic Front" composed of Liberals,
National Feasants, Social Democrats, Communists and other "left"
elements— paved the w a y for the Rumanian switch.

It made inevitable

the Rumanian participation along-side the "Glorious Soviet Armies" in
the "liberation" of Transylvania, Hungary and C z e choslovakia.^
As the leading force in the "Democratic Front" the Party moved
to seize the reins of power.

Throughout the countryside it agitated

the people against the "democratic Bourgeois" parties and everywhere
provoked unrest, discontent and disorder.

35

This policy— supported

by the Red Army--enabled the CPR to topple two Sanatescu governments,
the Radescu government, and then to install its own puppet regime under
Petru Groza on March 5, 1945.

36

Organization and Membership

The Nature of Party Growth
The most dramatic development having long-range effects on the
position of the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of
nationalism, was the rapid growth of the CPR following the seizure of
power.

Figure 4 shows the nature of this Party growth from April 1944

■^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 83-91.
^ % a r k h a m , Rumania under the Soviet Y o k e , pp. 191-216, 228-229;
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard
University Press, 1956), pp. 279-282.
36Ib i d .. pp. 278-283.
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to 1 9 7 1 . ^

The rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the years up

to 1948 drastically altered its ethnic make-up.

This growth relegated

the ethnic minority Party members— who in the past composed the bulk of
the CPR--into a secondary position, as Party ranks were swelled by
ethnic Rumanians who had seen "the handwriting on the wall."^®
This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major
step toward its "nationalization."

After 1948, however, the CPR

stabilized its membership and carried out purges among elements which
it regarded as "unhealthy."

Even these purges, however, caused greatest

damage not in the ranks of the newly recruited ethnic Rumanians, but in
the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority C o m m u n i s t s T h u s ,

both the

growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the strengthening
of the ethnic Rumanian sectors of the CPR.

The most recent increases

in Party membership have even further accentuated this t r e n d . A t

■^Figure 4 has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from:
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Revised Paperback Edition; New
York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp. 85-91; Ionescu, Communism
in R u m a n i a , pp. 149-151, 204-215, 241-244, 318-321; Randolph L. Braham,
"Rumania:
Onto the Separate Path," Problems of Communism, XIII (MayJune, 1964), footnote 5, pp. 16-17; The Rumanian W o r k e r s 1 Party on the
E v e , pp. 8-10; "Communist Party Rolls Increase Around World," The Blade
(Toledo), June 10, 1970, p. 7.
90

Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 69-71; Ionescu, Communism in
Rumania, pp. 204-208.
^ T h i s is verified by the fact that in December, 1955, 79.2%
of the members were ethnic Rumanians in the CPR.
By 1968, 88.43% were
ethnic Rumanians.
Compare Ibid., p. 243, with "Report by Nicolae
Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of
the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles
and Information on R omania, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30.
^®Braham, "Rumania:
pp. 16-17.

Onto the Separate Path," footnote 5,
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present, the regime's search for popularity among the masses has
allowed it to lower its standards for membership.

This has enabled

many to join who are ignorant of, if not hostile to the tenets of "pro
letarian internationalism" and the traditional policies of "minority
tolerance" which had prevailed prior to this growth in Party membership.

The CPR Before August 1944
The resurgence of nationalism can be explained partly by the
decimation of the de-nationalized elements which had composed the bulk
of the CPR before 1944.

Membership in the Party prior to the seizure

of power was predominantly "internationalist," composed of individuals
who were for the most part non-Rumanians e t h n i c a l l y H i s t o r i c a l
reasons determined this adhesion of minorities to the CPR, some of
which have already been touched on above.

We will examine briefly the

composition of the CPR prior to the seizure of power, as well as after
its "nationalization."
Before the seizure of power the growth and composition of the
Party can be divided by the historic Fifth Party Congress of 1932.
Up to this Congress, the national minorities dominated the CPR.

42

Jews

and Ukrainians from Bessarabia, Bulgarians from Dobrogea and Jews and
Hungarians from Transylvania outnumbered at this stage the ethnic

^■*-Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes," pp.
25-26; Hans Hartl, "Die Nationalit&ten-Politik Des Kreml in Rum&nien,"
Zeitschrift Ftir Geopolitik, XXIV (July-August, 1953), 383.
^ T h e importance of this Fifth Party Congress on the future
development of the CPR cannot be over-emphasized.
See:
Ionescu,
Communism in R umania, pp. 40-46; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the
E v e , pp. 3-4.
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Rumanians in the positions of leadership as well as in the number of
/ *3
Party members.

From 1932 onwards, however, the ethnic Rumanians began

to play a prominent part in the Party's leadership although they were
still not the dominant sector of the party membership.
The Party of the inter-war years was made up of roughly two
groups.

One group was composed of national minority intellectuals.

The other group was composed of ethnic Rumanian l a b o r e r s . ^

Of the two

groups the former seems to have been more important until the Party
Congress of 1932.

They were a heterogeneous lot made up of a variety

of nationalities drawn from all classes and practically all professions.
As opposed to this, the ethnic Rumanian sector of the Party was in all
ways more homogeneous.

Not only were they similar in national origin,

but their class and labor background gave them more social solidarity
and political cohesion.

Their role became more important following

the Fifth Party Congress, the Grivita Strike of 1933 and the emergence
of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary-general of the C P R . ^

^ E v e n the Secretary-Generalship of the Party was held by the
non-Rumanian Rlek Koblos (alias Badulescu) between 1924-1928. Prior
to that, the non-Rumanians C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Christian Rakovsky
had played pre-eminent Party roles.
For more on the role of Koblos,
see: Ionescu, Communism inRumania« pp. 25-28.
^ T b i d ., pp. 20-28; 40-46; Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist
Leadership," pp. 479-480.
^ A n o t h e r similarity to be noted among the ethnic Rumanian
"workers" of the Party is their "religious" background— Eastern
(Rumanian) Orthodox.
Ibid., pp. 480-485.
Though this factor is not
decisive in a Communist setting, it should be mentioned because it
points out that these leaders had similar childhood experiences and
education.
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The CPR Since the Seizure of Power
Since August 1944 the CPR has undergone a vast change in composi
tion.

This change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy from

the Politburo down to the local cell organizations.

This change has

brought about a real "nationalization" of the Party along ethnic
Rumanian lines. °

To understand this "nationalization" it will be

necessary to examine not only all levels of the Party hierarchy, but
also the fragmentation of the Party leadership following the seizure of
power.

This fragmentation of the leadership followed the general

pattern of other East European satellites, and reflects the division
of the Party into "Muscovites," "westerners" and "home" Communists.
The "Muscovites" composed perhaps the most "alien" (i.e., nonRumanian) segment of the CPR not only because of their heterogeneous
national background, but also because their first loyalty was always
to the Kremlin center and the International at the expense of Rumanian
needs or capabilities.

47

This group was represented by such well-known

individuals as Ana Pauker, Leonte Rautu, Vasile Luka, Dumitru Coliu and
Emil Bodnaras.

They were a "rootless" group who were often at odds

with one another as well as with the "home" and "western" Communists.
What gave them their uniting label was that they had spent most of

^ I b i d ., pp. 482, 492-494; The Rumanian W o r k e r s 1 Party on the
E v e , p. 8 ; Ionescu, Communism in R umania, pp. 204-215, 241-245,
316-321.
^ I b i d . , pp. 78-79, 118, 350-356; Fischer-Galati, R o m a n i a ,
pp. 344-350.
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World War II, as well as some of the inter-war years, in the Soviet
Union under the tutorship of Stalin.

They returned to Rumania on the

coat-tails of the Red Army to assist and carry to fulfillment the
AO

Communization of the country. °
The "westerners" were the smallest of the three above groups and
also the least significant.

They resembled the "Muscovites" in a number

of ways, yet they were distrusted by Stalin.

Like the "Muscovites"

they were also recruited predominantly from among the national minori
ties.

Such individuals as Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and Petre Borila

represent this g r o u p . ^

Their major— perhaps only--unifying charac

teristic is that they had spent the war years or part of the 1930's in
the West, taking part in the Spanish Civil War or in the later resis
tance movement in France.

Like the "Muscovites" they too returned to

Rumania at the close of hostilities to take part in the Communization
of the country.
Unlike the above two groups, the "home" Communists in Rumania
were predominantly (on the leadership level) of Rumanian ethnic stock.
They had spent the war years as well as most of the inter-war years in
Rumanian prisons.

Although they were relatively a more homogeneous

lot than the former two groups, they were by no means united in outlook.
Individuals like Gheorghiu-Dej, Apostol, Patrascanu, Ceausescu, Maurer,

^ I b i d . , pp. 64-67; Ionescu, Communism in R u m a n i a , pp. 78-79,
94-106.
^ " R u m a n i a n Planner: Gheorghe Gaston-Marin," New York Times,
June 2, 1964, p. 12; The Rumanian W o r k e r s 1 Party on the E v e , pp. 21-23.
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Dalea, Moghioros and Draghici made up this group.3 ®

While most of them

had similar social origins and "religious" backgrounds, their unifying
characteristic was that they had spent the inhospitable inter-war
years, as well as World War II, in the c o u n t r y . T h e y were, in this
sense, the group which was welded together most through a common past
of travail and persecution at the hands of the "bourgeois" and "fascist"
authorities.
From these various elements--"Muscovites," "westerners," and
"home"— the leadership of the CPR was forged in the immediate post-war
years.

However, the amalgamation of such diverse elements was bound

not to last.

Even during Stalin’s lifetime--who had imposed unity on
CO

these elements in the first place— J the instability of the Party's
composition demanded internal alterations.

These alterations were pro

vided by a number of purges, of which the Patrascanu purge of 1948 and
the Pauker-Luka-Georgescu purge of 1952, stand out as the most impor
tant.-^

These early purges were later (1957) augmented by the

Constantinescu-Chisinevschi purge which followed close on the deStalinization policies of the bloc, though ideologically not directly
related to them.3^

3 ® I b i d ., pp. 15-18, 23-31, 34-38; An A nalysis of the Elections
at the Third Rumanian Party Congress (Radio Free Europe, Munich,
Germany, July, 1960), pp. 23-25; "Rumania’s Strongman: Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej," New York T imes, January 20, 1964, p. 8.
-^Ionescu, Communism in Ruma n i a . pp. 78-79.
52Ibid., pp. 117-118.
5 3I b i d ., pp. 151-156, 208-215.
54ibid., pp. 284-287.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

150

The present composition of the CPR reflects the change wrought
by these past purges.

The change has "Rumanized" the Party in the true

sense of the word on the top levels of power.

It has eliminated the

most "foreign" members from the Party power-structure.

Thus, the

"aliens" Pauker, Luka, Georgescu, Chisinevschi, Foris, Koffler and
numerous lesser figures received the ax together with a few "natives"
like Patrascanu and Constantinescu.

The net result has been to con

solidate within the Politburo and the Secretariat the position of the
ethnic Rumanian Party leaders who had grouped themselves around
G h e o r g h i u - D e j T h i s does not mean, however, that all ethnically nonRumanians have been eliminated from the top levels of the Party.

It

merely means that they have been relegated to fringe positions and
reduced in numbers, while the Gheorghiu-Dej--today, Ceausescu— faction
of ethnic Rumanians has come to occupy all the centers of significant
Party power.
The present power "core" of the CPR is thus built around the
former followers of Gheorghiu-Dej, which included Apostol, Stoica,
Ceausescu, Draghici, Dalea and M a u r e r . A r o u n d

this ethnic Rumanian

"core" two less significant groups may be distinguished.

One group

has been described as the Party leaders with military backgrounds and
close personal ties to the Kremlin.

Some have referred to them as the

"generals" or as the "Kremlin watch-dogs."

The group included Bodnaras,

■^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 482.
5 6 0f these leaders two have since died and Draghici has been
purged by Ceausescu and his followers.
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Borila, Salajan and Coliu.

57

Following this grouping, the outer fringe

of the Party power core is composed of such m en as Rautu, Gaston-Marin,
Voitec, Fazekas and Moghioros

Those in this last named group,

though individually influential, are in many ways subject to the cohe
sive ethnic Rumanian "core" of the Party leadership.
As the above shows, the ethnic Rumanian segment has become

the

axle of the Party wheel which determines the policies of Communism in
the country.

The formerly dominant ethnic minorities,

(Ukranians,

Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, etc.) have in this way been pushed to
secondary positions.

This pattern has been even more extensively fol

lowed in the middle levels of the Party structure.

The Party officials

of ethnic minority background have been reduced in such areas as the
CQ
Party Central Committee and among the Regiune Secretaries.

This re

duction has often paralleled the purges at the top levels of power
(i.e., Politburo, Secretariat and Party Control Commission), but more
recently have also been carried out independently of general Party
purges and related more closely to local "demands" for Rumanization.^®

-^Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 344-345, 349-350; Tomasic, "The
Rumanian Communist Leadership," pp. 485-487.
~^ I b i d ., pp. 487-489; "Rumanian Planner: Gheorghe GastonMarin," p. 12; The Rumanian Workers1 Party on the E v e , pp. 31-35, 39-46.
CQ

Ibid., Appendix II, p. 52, Appendix V, pp. 55-61; Tomasic,
"The Rumanian Communist Leadership," pp. 490-493.
G^The "Rumanization" of the top Party and administrative leader
ship of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1962 may be viewed as
such an "independent" purge. As a consequence of this "re-shuffling"
the predominantly Hungarian area is now "blessed" with a Rumanian,
Dimitru Puni, as chairman of the regional people's council.
See:
George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," The Reporter, XXXI (November
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The reduction of minority representation in Party affairs has
also taken place at the base of the Party hierarchy.

However, at this

level it is much harder to ascertain the extent and nature of the r e 
ductions.

Yet, there are certain indications on the Regiune, commune,

factory and collective farm level, that there exists a similar trend
regarding the "Rumanization" of the Party.

Aside from some limited

data, it is possible to conjecture on the basis of the rapid growth of
the Party— immediately after power seizure as well as in the early
1960's

62

— that the rank and file as well as the leadership is now pre

dominantly ethnic Rumanian.
As Table III indicates, the over-all composition of the Party
has become more and more Rumanian.

Just in the three years between

1965 and 1968, the percentage of Hungarian Party members has been
reduced from 9.5% to 8.67%, while the representation of the Germans
and other nationalities from 3.5% to 2.9%.

This trend is, perhaps,

not so much due to a reduction in the actual number of Hungarian m e m 
bers as to the rapid growth of the Rumanian membership during the
1960's (See Figure 4).
Hungarian influence in the Party is of a limited nature for yet
another reason.

While in the highest level in the Party there are

19, 1964), 27. A name analysis of the region's intellectual leadership
reveals a similar "Rumanizingf trend.
The article which makes such an
analysis possible is that by L. Deaky and N. Radulescu on "Fighters of
the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia (March 6 , 1964) trans. in Rumanian
Press Survey. N o . 426 (Radio Free Europe, March 18, 1964), pp. 2-8.
6 1I b i d .
^ S e e Figure 4.
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TABLE I I I

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPR ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY
1965-1968 (IN PERCENTAGES)*

Year

Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Other
Nationalities

1965

87.0

9.5

-- **

3.5

1967

88.16

8.82

1.29

1.73

1968

88.43

8.67

1.24

1.66

*This Table is based on Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report of the
Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party on the Activity of
the Party in the Period Between the Eight Congress and the Ninth
Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party," Documents, Articles and
Information on Rumania (July 19, 1965), p. 79; "Report by Nicolae
Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of
the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles
and Information on R o m a n i a, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30; Nicolae
Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Period of Completing
Socialist Construction," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
No. 6 (May 8 , 1967), p. 22; "Proceedings of the Plenary Meeting of the
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party," Documents, Articles
and Information on Ro m a n i a , No. 9 (May 15, 1968), p. 2.
**For 1965 the percentage of German Party members is included
under "other nationalities."
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still some Hungarians, they are denationalized representatives of their
people.

In other words, they are Hungarians in name and language only,

but not in their values and in their concern for their fellow nationals.
Four outstanding examples are Alexandru Moghioros, Josif Banc, Janos
Fazekas, and Mihai Gere.

These four individuals have succeeded in

making it into the highest Party offices, yet none of them count as
significant policy-makers.

Their role seems to serve two purposes:

first, to convince the Hungarians that they are not completely without
"representatives," and second, to make outside observers believe that
Rumanian nationality policy is a sweeping success.
In Rumania today this "window dressing role" can be seen in
that almost every important organ of the Party
representative.

has on it a Hungarian

However, what the superficial observer fails to note

is that this representative is invariably one of the four repeaters
(Moghioros, Banc, Fazekas, or Gere).

Thus, while it is true that in

1965 one Hungarian actually became one of the fifteen members of the
Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. and one made
it into the nine man secretariat, the one man was on both occasions
Alexandru Moghioros.
the 121

It is also true that ten Hungarians made it into

member Central Committee of the R.C.P. and three became alternate

^ A l o n g this line, see the text of the speech at Odorhei
(Szdkelyudvarhely) in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna
and Harghita Counties," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
No. 13 (August 27, 1968), pp. 36-38.
^^Michel Tatu, "A Rom^nositds (Tteme Erddlyben,"
(February, 1968), p. 20.

Eurdpa VII
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members of the Executive Committee, but again, these included the four
denationalized Party leaders mentioned a b o v e . ^
The Party's "Rumanization" is evident in yet one more develop
ment, the rehabilitation of Lucretiu Patrascanu.

Following the direc

tives of the Ninth Party Congress an investigation was begun in November
1965 into the activities of the security forces (Internal Affairs
Ministry), particularly in reference to the Patrascanu case.

While

the investigation had a very personal and political reason (i.e., the
purge of Alexandru Draghici), the result was the rehabilitation of
Patrascanu in April 1968.

As we had occasion to note earlier,

Patrascanu had been one of the few ethnic Rumanians who had been
purged.

In fact, he had been accused of wrong attitudes on the nation

ality problem.

It seems that his stance had been too nationalistic for

the Party in 1 9 4 8 . ^

At any rate, the rehabilitation of this national

Communist in 1968 indicates that the Party no longer considers his
type of "nationalism" unreconcilable with the Party's nationality
policy.

Thus, we can see that not only in its organization, but also

in its ideological stance, the Party has become "Rumanized."

^ " P l e n a r y Meeting of the Central Committee of the Rumanian
Communist Party," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No.
13 (August 10, 1965), pp. 3-7.
^ 6 "0 n the Rehabilitation of Some Party Activists," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, No. 8 (April 26, 1968), 9-25.
^ I o n e s c u , Communism in Rumania, p. 154; Wolff, The Balkans
in Our T i m e , pp. 291-292, 377-378.
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Party Control and "Democratic Centralism"
The factor that has inadvertantly facilitated the "nationaliza
tion" or "Rumanization" of the CPR has been its organizational structure
and its adherence to the principle of "democratic centralism."

68

This

factor has played a part in both government and Party since the over
lapping and intermeshing of the two hierarchies is ever present.

The

centralization of the Party-State and the Party's monopoly over the
coercive powers of the state, has enabled the "Rumanization" process
to proceed unobstructed.
Party organization, through its centralization has enabled the
majority nationality to assert its pre-eminence.

The numbers of the

Rumanian ethnic element have enabled it to utilize the centripetal
force of the Party organization to submerge the less numerous ethnic
minority Communists.

The latter, since their numerical eclipse follow

ing World War II, have been relegated to the fringes of the Party powerstructure by the ethnic Rumanians.

Only the completely de-nationalized

or Rumanized national minority Communists have been able to remain on
top in the face of this process.

’Democratic Centralism1 . . . implies a downward flow of
directives emanating from the apex of the Party or Government, limiting
the initiative of the subordinate people's councils to matters strictly
local in nature and extent." Randolph Braham, "The Government,"
Romania, ed. Fischer-Galati, p. 93. The "nationalizing" impact of
this centralization is perhaps most succinctly described by Robert
Magidoff in relation to "Russification" in the U.S.S.R.
See his
book, The Kremlin vs. The People (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 107-110.
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In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina

Background and Evolution
Unlike its Rumanian counterpart, the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) has always been able to secure some support at the
fiQ
grass roots level. 3

However, in tracing its origins we are confronted

by an even more confusing and fragmented organizational background.
The Party's roots go back to the Social Democratic movements of the
1870's.^®

However, those early roots of Yugoslav "Socialism"

developed in the shadow of the Italian, Austrian-German and Hungarian
Social Democratic movements as well as the influence of the 19th
century Russian narodniki.^ T h u s ,

until December 1918, one cannot

really speak of a unified South Slav Socialism.
When in the aftermath of World War I the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes was established, it became possible for the

^ S i n c e the Sixth Congress of the CPY (Communist Party of
Yugoslavia) in 1952, the official name of the Party has been changed to
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) . This change was supposed to
indicate the Party's development parallel to the policy of decentraliza
tion and self-government in the economy.
It was to differentiate it
from other Communist Parties, demonstrating that it had attained a
higher stage of development.
In the subsequent discussion of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, this study will refer to it as CPY when the
party of the pre-Sixth Congress period is considered.
It will refer
to it as the LCY when the period after 1952 is being discussed.
^^Rodoljub Colakovid, nt al. A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szbvetseg
Rttvid TOrtdnete, trans. Jdzsef Kollin, e£ al. (Novi Sad;
Forum
KOnyvkiadd, 1963), pp. 18-21.
^•*Tbid., pp. 18-24; Bikar Fedora, "Szabd Ervin Szerepe
Magyarorszdg Magyar ds Nem Magyar Ndpei Munkdsmozgalmaban 1900-t81
1918-ig," H i d , No. 12 (December, 1964), pp. 1390-1410.
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disparate Socialist movements to attempt unification.
unification was attained only with great difficulty.

However,
The regional and

ethnic basis of existing socialist groups and labor unions made an
over-all South Slav Socialist organization difficult to attain.

Ideo

logical and personal differences among the leaders of these groups
conspired to thwart the creation of a "national" organization.

72

The differences between labor unions and socialist parties
were further accentuated by the different national affiliation of
local organizations.

In the Vojvodina this was particularly vexing

because the region's majority population was not South Slav but pre
dominantly Hungarian and German (see Column I, Table II in Chapter I).
In spite of all these obstacles, the Yugoslav Communists were
successful in producing a viable "national" political organization by
the end of the 1930's.
The reason w h y they succeeded was in large part due to the
character of the South Slav Socialist movements prior to and during
World War I.

Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they developed in

settings which were--for the most part--under "foreign" dominion.

The

rule of the Turks in Macedonia and the rule of Austria-Hungary in
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Vojvodina forced the
Socialist movements to become also nationalist m o v e m e n t s . ^

Since

72Colakovid, et jU.. ,_A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szflvetseg ROvid
TOrtdnete, pp. 27-47; Charles Zalar, Yugoslav Communism (Printed for
the Committee on the Judiciary; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), pp. 23-36.
^^Ibid., pp. 29-36.
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in Rumania national independence was already a reality when the
socialist movements began to organize, they did not feel the need to
be "independence" movements as well.

In the lands that were to become

Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the national independence movement was
from the beginning closely allied to the socialist movements.

The

ideals of a "Balkan Federation" were always closely related to social
reform.

This was in large part the consequence of a close correlation

between "foreign" dominance and "social e x p l oitation."^

In other

words, the struggles for social reform were unimaginable without a
struggle for South Slavic independence and federation.
The close alliance between "national" and "socialist" aspira
tions provided a much firmer foundation for organization than was the
case in Rumania where the Social Democrats were only (or primarily)
concerned with "social reform."

Thus, while in Rumania most Social

Democrats were not ethnically members of the majority population, in
Croatia, Slovenia, and the other South Slav areas, the major nation
ality usually contributed the majority of the members for the local
socialist o r g a n izations.^

Thus, in the South Slavic lands--unlike

I b i d * , P* 34, presents an excellent example of this conver
gence of "foreign" and "Social" exploitation in Bosnia.
He points out
that:
"In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the medieval agrarian relations re
mained unchanged. The Austro-Hungarian administration relied on the
Moslem feudal lords, begs and agas, against Christian rajas. Moslem
agas and begs possessed all the land, although the Christian agricul
tural laborers comprised the majority of the population.
The problem
of solving the agrarian question in Bosnia and Hercegovina was never
even raised by the Austro-Hungarian regime."
^ W h i l e no data has been compiled to show this, a name analyse
of the
leaders of the early Socialist movements supports this generaliza
tion.
See I b i d ., pp. 23-43; Colakovid', et aj.., A Jugoslav Kommunista
SzSvetsdg RSvid Tbrtdnete, pp. 31-66.
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Rumania--Socialism (later Communism) could not be accused of being an
"alien" growth.

It

was rooted in both the national and social aspira

tions of many South Slavs.
It should be remembered, however, that this national appeal of
these socialist movements also had a divisive consequence as far as
the Vojvodina was concerned.

In this area, the predominantly non-

Slavic population did not sympathize with the "national" goals of these
movements, although a large section of the impoverished Hungarian
peasantry probably favored the social reform side of their programs.
Until World War I, however, this question was not really consequential
for the Vojvodina since its Social Democratic Party as well as its
general political existence, was integrally tied to the Hungarian
state.^

Only the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the

dismemberment of Hungary in the fall of 1918, shifts the fate of the
area into the sphere of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes.

In the Interwar Period
The Social Democrats of the Vojvodina, as of all Yugoslavia,
underwent numerous external and internal struggles before they finally
united into one nationwide party.

This was followed by innumerable

internal conflicts until the Party eliminated from its ranks the
Socialists to become a Communist Party like its Soviet ideal. Joship
Broz Tito contended (1940) that this process of Party unification and
purification required a four-stage development.

Accordingly, the first

^ I b i d ., p. 2 2 .
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stage followed immediately after the First World War and lasted until
the Party's prohibition in 1921.

The second stage lasted from the

prohibition to the Party's Fourth Congress in 1928.

This was followed

by the third stage which lasted to the uomintern's purge of the Party
in 1937.

Finally, the fourth stage began with the purge and lasted

until the Fifth Conference of the Party in 1 9 4 0 . ^
In the present context it is not necessary to dwell on the
intricacies of these separate stages of development.

However, these

stages of Party growth indicate some of the major shifts in both its
internal organization and its policies concerning the national minori
ties.

These latter considerations call for more attention.
Following World War I the Social Democratic Parties of the

South Slavic areas were immediately confronted by the nationality
question.

At their unification meeting in Belgrade (April 1919), the

old Social Democratic parties united with the new Communist groups to
form the Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communist).

This

unification was possible only by avoiding the nationality question.
program adopted by the new unified party avoided all mention of the
national q u e s t i o n . ^

However, thfs refusal to come to grips with the

major problem of the land only delayed the inevitable rift between
"left" and "right" factions of the Party.

^ Z a l a r , Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.

70

/

I b i d ., p. 36-37; Colakovid, et aj.., A Jugoslav Kommunista
SzBvetsdg ROvid Tdrtdnete, pp. 43-47.
^ I b i d . , p. 46.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

The

162

The Second Congress of the Party held at Vukovar (June 20-25,
1920) faced this same dilemma.

However, at this gathering the adoption

of a more explicit program— declaring among other goals the creation of
a Soviet federation of the Balkan and Danubian countries— led to even
more discord between "left" and "right" factions.

At the same time,

the adoption--on this occasion— of the name Communist Party of Yugoslavia
also indicated that the Socialists ("Social patriots") were being
squeezed out of the Party.

80

Yet, the Socialists' formal ouster in

December 1920 did not end factionalism in the Party.
Factional strife continued, even in the face of governmental
persecution.

The Prohibition of Party activities and propaganda by the

OBZNANA (Notification) of December 29, 1920, and the divesting of the
mandates of Communist deputies to the Narodna Skupshina (August 2, 1921)
weakened and furthered the internal dissention within the Party.

81

The

first, second and third Party Conferences (1922 July, 1923 May and
December) as well as the III and IV Party Congresses

(1926 and 1928)

continued to reflect conflict between "left" and "right" factions.

In

fact, this internal strife was so detrimental to the Party's cohesion
and effectiveness, that the Comintern felt compelled to interfere with
the Yugoslav Party's organization and policies.

r% a

o uI b i d ., pp. 62-66; Bogdan Smiljevic and Dorde Knezevid, A
Legujabb Kor Tflrtdnete, trans. Kalman Csehcik (Subotica; Minerva
Konyvkiadd Vdllalat, 1965), pp. 75-76.
8 1I b i d .. pp. 76-77.

82
Wolff, The Balkans, in Our T i m e , pp. 109-111; Zalar, Yugoslav
Communism, pp. 40-43.
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As Zalar points out:

"The major point of disagreement among

the factions was the national p r o b l e m . " ^

The "right" faction led by

Sima Markovic contended that the "national question" was basically a
constitutional problem.

The "left" faction, on the other hand,

rejected this position.

It maintained that "self-determination," even

to the extent of secession, must be part of the Party's revolutionary
program.®^- At the first and second Party Congress and the first Party
Conference the "right" faction prevailed.

This is evident in the selec

tion of Party leaders and the omission of the national question from
the Party programs.

However, the intervention of the Comintern in

1924-25 and 1928, turned the tide in favor of the "left" factions.
Stalin himself dictated the policy to be followed by the CPY.

He said

the following:
If you are drawing up a national programme for the Yugoslavian
Party (and this is precisely what we are now dealing with), you
must remember that his programme must be based not only on what
exists at present, but also on what will inevitably occur by
virtue of international relations.
That is why I think that the
question of the right of nations to self-determination should be
regarded as an immediate and burning question. . . .
The postulate of a revolution must be the starting point of
the national programme.
Further, it is imperative to include in the national programme
a special point on the right of nations to self-determination,
including the right to secession. . . .
Finally, the programme should include a special point provid
ing for these nationalities in Yugoslavia which do not find it
necessary to secede from that country. . . .
It is there
fore . . . necessary to . . . have in the programme a point on
autonomy, with a view to the transformation of the state of
Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based
on the Soviet system.85

^ ^Ibid., p. 40.

^ I b i d . , p. 41.

®^As quoted by Zalar, Ibid., p. 41. The original passage is
in Stalin's Marxism and the National and Colonial Question.
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This policy remained the Party's program until August 1935 when
the Seventh Congress of the Comintern called for the creation of
Communist led People's Fronts to ward off the rising danger of fascism
and naziism.

At this time, the CPY— like its Rumanian counterpart— made

a tactical volte-face.

It began to stress the need for national unity

and de-emphasized "self-determination."

This changed policy lasted to

the beginning of World War 11.®^
Tracing the evolution of the nationality policy of the CPY
reveals a great deal about the composition of the Party as a whole.

In

its early years, the dominance of Markovic and the "right" faction
indicates the South Slavic dominance in Party leadership.

Unlike its

Rumanian counterpart, the CPY was not a predominantly "ethnic minority"
organization.

As late as the Third Conference of the Party held in

1923, only the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized as having
"national i n d i v iduality."^

It was not until the Fifth Conference of

October 1940 that the "national identity" of the Macedonian and
Montenegrin peoples were recognized.

It was also only at this latter

Conference that "the right to freedom and equality" was stated for
"German, Hungarian, Rumanian and other minorities in (the) Vojvodina ."88
Throughout the interwar years the CPY remained a South Slav

®^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 44-45, 50-51; Colakovid, £t
aJL =, A Jugoslav Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rdvid Tbrtdnete, pp. 207-296.
Q7
'Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.
^ I b i d ., Colakovid, et a l . , A Jugoslav Kommunista Sz6vetsdg
Rdvid Tflrtdnete, pp. 293-296.
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dominated Party. 7

The efforts of the Comintern to mitigate some of

the adverse effects of this dominance proved effective only in the
second half of the 1930's when Josip Broz Tito became secretary
general of the Central Committee of the CPY.
terminate South Slav dominance.

Tito's leadership did not

It did, however, bring to an end much

of the factionalism and it allowed the other nationalities (besides
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to participate more actively in Party
affairs
In the Vojvodina it is just around this time (1934-1937) that
Communists achieve organizational successes among the Hungarians.

The

Hungarian language journal HID (Bridge), which was founded in 1934,
is infiltrated by the Communists and taken over by them in 1 9 3 6 . ^
This journal provides the intellectual leadership for Hungarian Com
munists in the Vojvodina.

As its title indicates, the journal saw (and

QQ

*This is indicated most clearly by the program and internal
organization of the Party.
Both the Slovenes and the Croatians had
separate Party organizations which affiliated with the nationwide
Yugoslav organization.
None of the other nationalities were given such
privileges.
In all the interwar period, the Party Secretary— with one
outstanding exception--was always a South Slav.
The exception was
Milan Gorkic who became Party head in 1934 as a result of Comintern
intervention.
Gorkic (original name Josip Cizinski) was Ruthenian in
background.
See I b i d ., pp. 203-207, 238-246; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism,
pp. 43-44.
For an exposition of this Slavic dominance also see Milovdn
Gyilasz, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bdkdert 6s a Demokrdciadrt," H i d . No.
1 (January, 1947), pp. 12-20.
^C o l a k o v i d , et s i . , A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rovid
T5rtdhete. pp. 253-255, 261-269.
^ I s t v d n Latdk, "Utoszo: A Szervezo 6s Harcra Mozgositd Hid,"
in Hid 1934-1941 ed. Janos Kov J c s , £t a l . (Novi Sad:
Forum Kbnyvkiadd,
1964), pp. 443-444.
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sees even today) as its major task the construction of "bridges"
between the Hungarians and the other nationalities of the Vojvodina
and all Yugoslavia.

The editors and staff of this journal were well

qualified for this task.

They were Serbs, Croats, Jews and Hungarians

who used the Hungarian language to further Party p o l i c i e s . ^
As the foregoing shows, the Hungarians had a much more limited
role in the national Party leadership of Yugoslavia during the inter
war years than their fellow nationals had in Rumania.

However, on the

local level in the Vojvodina, they did wield some influence in Party
mat t e r s .
The involvement of Yugoslavia in World War II, reduced this
influence considerably.

This was a consequence of two developments:

the re-annexation of the Vojvodina by Hungary and the imprisonment and
execution of many Vojvodina Communists (Hungarians, Serbs and Jews)
by the occupying forces.

The re-annexation of the Vojvodina to Hungary

convinced many Party leaders that many Hungarian Communists were Party
members only to demonstrate their opposition to the Yugoslav Govern
ment.

Once that government had been replaced, they lost their ardour

for the Party.

Furthermore, many of those who had remained loyal to

the Party— including Mayer Ottmar, the editor of H i d — were either
imprisoned or executed. ^

Thus, the CPY's leadership tended to view

^ " S z e r z d k Betfirendes Jegyzdke," Ibid., pp. 478-481, provides
a listing of the former staff of the periodical.
The names of this
listing indicate that at least four nationalities w ere represented on
its staff.
^Lat^k,

"Utoszo':

A Szervezd ds Harcra Mozgosito Hid,"

P= 451.
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the Hungarians in the Vojvodina with suspicion.

Organization and Membership
Hungarians continued to be relegated to an insignificant posi
tion in the Yugoslav Communist (or even Serbian) Party throughout
World War II and the immediate postwar period.

This was due to the

contradiction they posed to the CPY theory of "national-revolutionary
war."

As first stated in 1928, the theory maintains that:

The problem of national-revolutionary war in Yugoslavia,
where a number of oppressed nationalities and national
minorities exist, will play an important role, particularly
in the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war.
The Party has therefore the duty to aid the liberation move
ments of the oppressed nationalities and national minorities,
to lead their fight against imperialism, and to defend without
any reserve their right of self-determination, even to
secession. Adopting this policy, the Party has consequently
the duty to prepare itself and the oppressed masses for the
organization of the insurrection against the oppressing
bourgeoisie.^5
As opposed to this theory, the oppressed Hungarian minority— like the
Bulgarian, German and Albanian minorities--turned for assistance to
their fellow nationals outside Yugoslavia rather than to the CPY.
Only when that outside help had failed did they try to make amends with
the CPY.
By seeking outside help for their disadvantaged position, the
Hungarians found themselves aligned with the Axis forces bent on

^ G y i l a s z , "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bekee'rt e's a Demokrdciaert,"
pp. 12 -2 0 .
•^As quoted by Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 43.
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destroying Yugoslavia.

Thus, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina actually

became an obstacle to the unfolding of the CPY's "national-revolu
tionary war."

In other words, the Hungarians remained outside the

"nation-making process" that has produced modern Yugoslavia and its
Of.
ruling Communist Party. u
It was the military and political struggle of World War II that
moulded the CPY and its affiliation with all the nationalities of the
country, including the Vojvodina's Hungarians.

Unlike the Rumanian

Communist Party, the CPY did not attain power on the coat-tails of
the Soviet Red Army.

The CPY was the major organizer of efforts to

liberate the country from foreign control.

It provided the leadership

for the Partisan struggle against the Axis armies.

97

The CPY's World War II experience as a national liberation
movement, put its imprint on the evolution of both its organization
and membership.

The struggle against the Axis was a "national" effort

on the part of the South Slav p e o p l e s . A s

such, the liberation

^ G y i l a s z , "A Szlav Nepek Harca a Bekedrt ds a Demokrdcidert,"
pp. 12-20; Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under
Communism," Slavic R e v i e w . XXII (March, 1963), pp. 68-70.
^ G e o r g e W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the
New Communism (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 69-80.
^ T h e adjective "national" means in this case Yugoslav. Many,
perhaps most, Croatians would have found themselves more in sympathy
with the UstaSe than w i t h the Partisans.
The Serbs, in turn, probably
felt themselves closer to the Cetnici than to the Partisans.
But the
fietnici and the UstaSe were never able to transcend their narrow Serb
and Croatian appeals.
Thus, only the CPY led Partisans can claim to be
the national liberation movement of all the South Slavs.
I b i d ., pp.
69-77; George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 44-46.
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movement was composed mainly of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Monte
negrins.

The Partisans drew their recruits from these peoples.

Only

toward the end of the war were they able to "enlist" the support of
non-Slavic groups.

QQ
7

Thus, with the exception of one or two outstand-

ing individuals--e,g., Moshe Pijade— the CPY leadership was drawn
almost entirely from the South Slavic nationalities.

The national

background of the most important Party leaders of this period reflects
closely the over-all makeup of the Party.

Tito is of Croatian and

Slovenian background, Rankovid is Serbian, Kardelj is Slovenian and
Djilas is Montenegrin.
The CPY's leadership of the Partisan struggle also ensured it
of reliable members and leaders.

The war tested the loyalty and re 

vealed the organizational ability of Party members.

It. also provided

the Party wi t h the opportunity to expand membership without risking
the adhesion of opportunists.

As Figure 5 indicates, the CPY's most

dramatic growth took place in the years between 1937 and 1945, when the
most risk and the most sacrifice was demanded of Party members.
This is exactly the opposite of the Rumanian Party's growth.

As

Figure 4 indicates, the CPR had its most phenomenal growth between 1944
and 1947, after the Communist fate of Rumania had already been decided

99shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism,"
pp. 68-69; Kdroly Brindza, "Adatok a Jugoszl^viai Magyars^g Rdsztv^telerdl a N^pfelszabadito Haboruban," H i d , No. 5 (May, 1951), pp.
323-336.
lOOFigure 5 is based on Neal, Titoism in A c t i o n , p. 55; Zalar,
Yugoslav Communism, pp. 50-51; "Communist Party Rolls Increase Around
World," The Blade (Toledo), June 10, 1970, p. 7; Hoffman and Neal,
Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 197.
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1968-Aug.Warsaw Pact in
vasion of Czechoslovakia
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(i.e., when under the protective wings of the Red Army it was no longer
"risky" to be a Communist).
Both the growth of the Party under wartime circumstances and
its role as the guiding element of Partisan resistance, enabled it to
become the dominant force in the chaotic setting of Yugoslavia.

Unlike

all the other Communist Parties of East Central Europe— including the
Rumanian— the Yugoslav Communists came to power without the outside
assistance of the Red Army.'*'^'*'

This meant that the CPY was never in a

dependent status vis-k-vis the Soviet Union.

It also meant, that the

leaders of the Party were not mere puppets of Moscow but leaders who
ruled in their own right.

Thus, the CPY was never really fragmented

into three identifiable factions (i.e., Muscovites, Westerners and
"home" Communists) as was the case with most of the other Communist
parties of East-Central Europe.
This is not to say that there was no diversity in the CPY.
Many of its leaders had been in the Soviet Union for extended periods
of time.

Man y others had been

the Spanish Civil W a r . ^ ^

in the West--participating actively in

But very few of them came back to Yugoslavia

with a "Muscovite" or "Western" orientation.

Or, at any rate, the

guerrilla struggle in Yugoslavia re-nationalized them.

In this way

1 01

XUAThe Red Army assisted only in the liberation of Belgrade and
the Vojvodina.
For the liberation of the major part of Yugoslavia the
Partisans deserve credit.
See Colakovid, et al., A Jugoslav Kommunista
Szftvetsdg Rdvid Tflrtdnete, pp. 427-430 and Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia
and the New Communism, p. 79.
1 02

J-UAZalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 51-52; Colakovid, et al., A
Jugoszldv Kommunista Szovetsdg Rovid Tbrtdnete. pp. 249-252.
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we can conclude that the CPY was composed predominantly of "home"
Communists, both on the membership and leadership levels.
the Party was predominantly South Slav in composition.

Furthermore,

In the latter

respect, we can say that all of the major Slavic groups were represented,
1 no

with no one group having a dominant position.

With slight qualifica

tion this characterization of the CPY is still applicable at the present
time (1970).
Since the end of the Second World War the Hungarians have
gained some access into the CPY.

This access is limited mainly to the

P a r t y ’s organization in the Vojvodina.

On the Federation level, they

have only token representation, i.e., one Hungarian in the Central
C o m m i t t e e . E v e n in the Vojvodina they are somewhat underrepresented.
In the area as a whole the Hungarians make-up about 2570 of the popula
tion, yet they only composed about 8.4% of the Party membership in
1 9 5 8 . Supposedly, their percentage of membership has increased since
1958.

As yet, however, none

of the statistics indicating this

change

have been made available.

•*-^Croatians frequently charge--particularly in emigre circles—
that the LCY/CPY is Serb dominated.
Serbs, on the other hand, say
that the Croatians and Slovenes dominate the Party. These charges and
counter-charges hold no water in actual practice.
No one nationality
has a majority of the Party membership.
For the South Slavs propor
tionality in membership prevails.
The representative nature of the
Party is reflected in the data provided by Neal, Titoism in Action
p. 55.
104The Hungarians also have five representatives in the Central
Committee of the Serbian party. See Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National
Minorities Under Communism,"
p. 76, footnote 50.
105 Ibid.
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Access to Party membership has been hindered by reciprocal
suspicion.

The Hungarians have shied away from Party membership because

they have equated the CPY with the national aspirations of only the
South Slavs, perhaps with reason.

The CPY leadership on the other hand,

has distrusted the Hungarians and considered them not completely
Yugoslavs, perhaps with reason.

At any rate, the Hungarians for the

most part have not been anxious to join the Party and the dominant
nationalities "have not been eager to promote Communists from the
minorities

(including the Hungarians) to positions of real responsi

bility ."106
Unlike the Rumanian Communist Party, the CPY has not had to
undertake numerous purges to gain a national identity.

From the

beginning it has been the national Party of the South Slavs.

In fact,

a good case could be made for the observation that each major purge
that has swept through the CPY has democratized the Party internally,
and thereby also increased the role of the Communists of minority back
ground.

Perhaps only the purge of Djilas in 1954 can be considered a

setback to democratization.10^

This purge, however, was not really

detrimental to the position of the non-Slavic Party members, since
Djilas had been one of their major critics in the immediate postwar
• j 108
period.

106 I b i d .. p. 76.
10 7wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 402-403; Neal, Titoism
in A c t i o n , pp. 67-77.

106See Gyilasz, "A Szl^v Ndpek Harca a Bdkddrt ^s a Demokraciddrt," pp. 12-20; Milovin Gyilasz, "JugoszlAvia Ndpeinek Harca 6s a
Marxismus-Leninizmus," Hid, No. 12 (December, 1947), pp. 873-883.
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Besides the Djilas purge of 1954, two others have had far
reaching consequences for the Party and its relationship to the "nation
alities."

One swept the Party in the wake of the Comintern dispute of

1948, while the other came as late as 1966 with the removal of
Rankovid.

The purge of 1948 removed at the top levels Andriya Hebrang

(Croatian), Sreten Zujovic-Tsrni (Serb), and Arso Jovanovid (Serb).
All three were Stalinists.

Although this purge also eliminated two

Hungarian Communists in the V o j v o d i n a , i t s

overall impact--from a

long-range perspective— was to strengthen the "pluralistic" nature of
the CPY.

A n indication of this was that Hebrang was accused of main

taining an "incorrect attitude toward the Serbs in Croatia

^

An

even more important indication was that all the non-Slavic nationali
ties and their Communist leaders remained loyal to T i t o . * ^

This

eliminated some of the suspicion that had carried over from World War
II experience.
Like the purge of 1948, that of 1966 was not primarily concerned
with nationality policy.

Still, its consequences increased, rather

than diminished the opportunities of all nationalities to participate
in the policy-making process of the country.

The purge eliminated

A l e x an d e r ,Rankovid and Svetislav Stefanovid from the League of

109 Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 353-366.

■'•'^Shoup, "Yugoslavia’s National Minorities Under Communism,"
p. 73, footnote 36.
^■■^Wolff, The Balkans in Our Ti m e , p. 354.
1-^Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism,"
p. 73, footnote 36.
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C o m m u n i s t s . B o t h men stood for the "hard line."

As responsible

for internal security, they opposed the processes of decentralization
and "democratization" which were taking place in the Party, the
economy and administration in general.

Their conservatism, plus their

Serbian background, made them also less sympathetic toward "selfmanagement" in the area of nationality policy.

At least, this is one

of the points on which they were accused of maintaining incorrect
attitudes.
Rankovic and
defining the role of

his followers
the

resisted

Party and

the changes which were re

its internal organization.*'*'"'

saw the Party, very much like Party leaders in other East European
states, as the director of national affairs, highly disciplined,
centralized, and directly involved in decision-making for society.
As opposed to this position, the official self-definition of the Party,
given one year after

the

Rankovic purge was that:

. . . the League of Communists is not a kind of general repre
sentative of society which decides on matters on behalf of the
working people, or rather it is less and less this.
On the
contrary, the League is and must increasingly become the inner
motive force of self-management by the working people, that is,
the organizer and initiator of the working class and working
masses in their efforts to get organized, develop and work as a
socialist society based on seIf-management, and to mobilize in

113

Ernest Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," Central
Europe J o u r n a l , X V (April, 1967), 123-126; "Az Xllambiztonsdgi
Szervek Munkdjanak Eltorzuldsarol Tdrgyal a JKSZ KSzponti Vezetosdge,"
Magyar Sz 6 (July 2, 1966), pp. 1,3.
11^Ibid.; Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 125-126.
**~*Ibid., pp. 123-127; Bernard Gwertzman, "Unprecedented
Reforms: A n Upheaval in Yugoslavia," The (Washington) Evening S t a r ,
December 4, 1967, pp. 1,6.
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this struggle for progressive aims and interests the entire social
labour and creative potential--from material production to science
and cul t u r e .
As the above quote indicates, the League of Communists is still
the directing force in Yugoslavia.

For those who doubt this, the

Mihailov case is a sobering antidote.

Yet, as Kardelj points out,

the League wants to achieve its leadership through more indirect methods
than previously.

Among others, it allows its front organization, the

Socialist Alliance of Working People, to take a more active part in
d ecisi o n m a k i n g .

This loosened framework, this general decentrali

zation even in the core of the power structure, gives the nationali
ties— among them the Hungarians in the Vojvodina--more opportunity to
participate in the political life of the country.

This, as everything

else in Yugoslavia, is guaranteed only while Tito remains at the helm.

II

While ultimate decision-making power in both Rumania and Yugo
slavia resides within the Communist Parties, the governmental apparatus
of both states also perform important policy-making, administrative
and control functions.

This pervasive role of the governments is, of

course, guided by the Communist parties.

None the less, the scope of

government involvement is so vast, that it has more direct and more

■'■■^Edvard Kardelj, "Some Questions Relating to the Further
Development of the Assembly and Political System,” Federal Assembly
Series (Belgrade:
Prosveta, 1968), pp. 19-20.
■ ^ B u r a n u s , "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 126-128.
118

Kardelj, "Some Questions Relating to the Further Develop
ment of the Assembly and Political System," pp. 18-20.
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frequent contact wit h the population than does the Party.

Consequently,

the nature of access to government at all levels and the actual par
ticipation in governmental activities by Hungarians, also provides an
indication of their treatment.

This treatment will be evaluated by

examining the governmental organization and personnel of Yugoslavia and
R umania.

In Rumania
As the analysis of Rumania's constitutional set-up indicated,
the government is unitary and also highly centralized.

As the examina

tion of the membership and organization of the CPR indicated, the nonRumanian elements are much less influential in policy making.

These

considerations might lead us to the conclusion, that in the government
the non-Rumanian inhabitants have only a very limited role.

This con

clusion is valid as far as actual policy-making is concerned.

However,

such a conclusion does not take into account the symbolic and the
administrative role of government.

In both these latter areas, the

Hungarians and the other minorities have a highly visible even if not
a very influential role.
The Grand National Assembly and the National Council of the
Socialist Unity Front are two "institutions" of the modern Rumanian
political scene which perform mainly symbolic roles.
minorities are proportionally represented.

In both, the

In the Grand National

Assembly— the supreme legislative body, which (theoretically) has vast
powers, but in reality is merely a rubber stamp for CPR policies--the
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Hungarian inhabitants have had their fair share of representatives.

119

While the Rumanians have not issued exact statistics on the ethnic com
position of their national legislature, as the Yugoslavs have done, they
have pointed out on numerous occasions that in the Grand National
Assembly the minority nationalities are represented in proportion to
their percentage of the population.

Thus, in 1964, out of 465 deputies

61 belonged to the various national m i n o r i t i e s . ^ ®

In 1969, out of 465

deputies 67 belonged to the various national minorities.

121

While the

complete name listings for these latter two assemblies have not been
available for examination, the name analysis of the members of the 1957
Grand National Assembly shows that the Hungarians, at that time, had
representation in proportion to their number of the p o p u l a t i o n . A l l
available data seems to indicate that this is also the case today (1970).
In the Socialist Unity Front a similar situation prevails.

This

organization is a link between the government and the people according
to a Party theory.

In actuality it is the Party's vehicle for acti1o o

vating the masses in elections for the Grand National Assembly.

J

As

H ^ p o r the powers of the Grand National Assembly see Chapter II.
•^®Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest:

Agerpres, 1964), p. 15.
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L. Banyai, "Councils of Working People Belonging to the
Coinhabiting Nationalities of Romania," Documents, Articles and Informa
tion on R o m a n i a . No. 2 (January 31, 1969), p. 4.
122

■L See Andrew J. Caranfil, "Biographical Information of
Members of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly," Report N o . 26 (New
York: U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1957).
12*3
•‘•■^"Founding of the National Council of the Socialist Unity
Front," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 22-23
(December 5, 1968), p. 1.
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a mass organization it has really become a successor to the National
Democratic Front, which had played an important role in the Communist
seizure of power following World War II and the People's Democratic
Front which
The

came into existence after the Communists came to power.
Socialist Unity Front was brought into existence only very

recently in November 1968.^24

For the Hungarians and the other nation

alities it has been significant, because it has been one of the few
nation-wide organizations to which they could affiliate as "national"
groups.

In the fifteen counties of Transylvania where Hungarians

reside in large numbers, they have been allowed to elect councils of
Magyar working people.

These county councils, in turn, send represen

tatives to a central "Council of the working people of Magyar nation
ality of the Socialist Republic of Romania."

The latter in turn,

exists solely to affiliate with the Socialist Unity Front.

The same

holds true for the German, Serbian and other nationality councils
which have come into existence since October 1968.
The leadership, or the "National Council," of the Socialist
Unity Front

is firmly in the hands of the Rumanian Communist Party.

It is, at the same time, a nationally representative body, including
prominent individuals from the labor field, from women's, youth and
student unions, cultural and artistic societies, professional associa
tions and the inclusive councils of working people of the nationalities!2®

124 I b i d .

l23Banyai, "Councils of Working People Belonging to the
Coinhabiting Nationalities of Romania," p. 5.
126 I b i d .
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Thus, of the seven Vice-Chairmen of the National Council one is Hun
garian.

Of the remaining twenty-eight members, three are also Hun

garian.^^

This would indicate that, if anything, the Hungarians are

over-represented on the National Council.

However, it would be naive

to consider this as a sign of actual decision-making power.

Rather,

the Hungarian representation in the Grand National Assembly as well as
in the Socialist Unity Front is window-dressing for both "home" and
"foreign" consumption.
of the CPR.

It visibly demonstrates the nationality policy

For example, in the Grand National Assembly, according to

Nicolae Ceausescu, in February 1968, 86.1% of the deputies were
Rumanian, 8 .6 % were Magyars, 2.1% were Germans and 3.2% were people of
1O Q

other nationalities.

The deceptive nature of this policy is re 

vealed by the relationship and the functions of both the Grand National
Assembly and the Socialist Unity Front.

The main task of the latter

was to organize the March 2, 1969 (and all subsequent) elections to the
Grand National Assembly, "under the leadership of the Romanian Communist
P a r t y ."

129

ihe results of that election--99.75% for the candidates of

the Socialist Unity Front and 0.23%, against— bear further testimony to
the merely legitimizing, or symbolic, nature of participation in

127"Founding of the National Council of the Socialist Unity
F r o n t ," p . 1.
1p Q

°Nicolae Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic
of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 2
(February 17, 1968), p. 14.
129npoun(jjLng 0f fhe National Council . . .," p. 1.
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either of these two "political" institutions,^®
Of a somewhat more meaningful nature is the role of Hungarians
in the governmental administration of the country.

On the highest

levels, this entails membership in the'State Council" and the "Council
of Ministers" of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

In the State

Council in 1969 three members out of 28 were Hungarians.

Included

among these was one of the four Vice-Presidents of the State Council.
Among the members of the Council of Ministers a less encouraging
situation prevailed.

There were only two Hungarians among the 43 m e m 

bers of this body and to make matters worse, they were not ministers to
specific departments.

They were both Vice-Chairmen (two out of eight)
1 Ol

of the Council of Ministers.

While these latter posts are more

prestigious, they have less impact on actual administration.

The

general result is that the Hungarians are placed into highly visible
positions, which have little influence on actual administration.
The limited nature of Hungarian influence is conditioned by
yet two other factors.

One is that their representatives on both these

bodies are individuals who have little sympathy for their fellow
nationals.

They are frequently the same individuals who also hold

prominent Party posts, such as jAnos Fazekas and Josif B a n c . ^ ^

A

• ^ ( ^ ' S i g n i f i c a n c e
0 f
March 2 Ballot," Documents, Articles,
and Information on R o m ania, No. 4-5 (March 10, 1969), pp. 1-5.

131"After the March 2 Elections," Documents, Articles and
Information on R o m a n i a , No. 6 (March 31, 1969), pp. 4-6.
1 *32

Compare I b i d . and "The Council of Ministers of the Socialist
Republic of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on R omania,
No. 24 (December 25, 1967), pp. 3-4.
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second reason is that the actual role of Hungarians in state administra
tion is being reduced.

This can be ascertained by comparing the n a 

tional composition of the State Council and the Council of Ministers
of 1969 with the composition of the same bodies in 1967.

The propor

tion of Hungarians in the State Council --the more symbolic agency-has remained about the same.
Hungarian.

In 1967 among its 19 members two were

In 1969 this changed to three Hungarians out of 28 members.

In the Council of Ministers--the more administrative agency— on the
other hand, the number of four Hungarians out of 42 members in 1967,
I0 9
has been reduced to only two Hungarians out of 43 members in 1969.
On lower levels of administration this cut-back in Hungarian
influence can be examined over a longer period of time.

As Chapter II

indicated, the Rumanian Constitutional system initially granted the
Hungarians a certain amount of self-administration in those areas of
the country in which they composed the majority of the

population.

134

Thus, in the Eastern-most part of Transylvania the Hungarians were
given the Magyar-Autonomous Region in 1952.

For some years the Hun

garians— or at least those in the "autonomous" region--enjoyed limited
self-administration in relation to local needs and problems.

However,

the revolt in Hungary in 1956, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Rumania in 1958, and the general revival of Rumanian nationalism, e n 
abled Party leaders to re-consider their grant of self-administration

^ ^ I b i d . , pp. 2-4; "After the March 2 Elections," pp. 4-6.
134

See part II of Chapter I I .
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in the Magyar-Autonomous Region.
In 1960, in the course of an over-all administrative re 
organization of Rumania, the "autonomous region" was drastically alter
ed.

The redistricting of that year— more correctly, gerrymandering--

replaced the Magyar Autonomous Region with the Mures-Magyar Autonomous
Region.The
changes.

maps of Figure 6 indicate the extent of the territorial

What the maps fail to show, however, is that the areas taken

away from the region were predominantly Magyar in population, while
the areas received in exchange were inhabited predominantly by
Rumanians . ^ 6

Table IV provides a breakdown of the changed proportions

of the region's ethnic make-up.

As this shows, and as the revised name

of the region indicates, the region has been diluted and robbed of its
former "compact" Magyar character.

The region's formerly 78%

Hungarian population was thus reduced to 65%,.

This has naturally

^■*Gyula M i k l o s , "A RomAn NdpkcJztArsasAgban 1950 6ta
Vdgrehajtott KttzigazgatAsi-GazdasAgi Ktirzetbeosztasok NAhAny
Tapasztalata," Fttldrajzi Kdzlemdnyek, IX (LXXV), 4 (1961), 317-320;
International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority Problem
in Rumania," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists,
Mo. 17 (December, 1963), 77; TamAs Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbsdg
Helyzete Romaniaban," Irodalmi Ujsag (July 15, 1964), p. 1.
^■■^International Commission of Jurists, p. 77} J. F. Brown,
"The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World T o day, XIX
(November, 1963), pp. 505-506.
■^^The Rumanization of names has swept all of the country.
Streets, theaters or public buildings which had a Russian or nonRumanian name, have now been renamed.
See George Bailey, "Trouble
Over Transylvania," The Reporter (November 19, 1964), p. 25;
"LevAl Erddlybbl," Irodalmi UjsAg (August 1, 1964), p. 1.
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RUMANIA BEFORE AND AFTER THE ADMINISTRATIVE REDISTRICTING OF DECEMBER
1960, WITH EMPHASIS ON TRANSYLVANIA AND THE MAGYAR AUTONOMOUS REGION
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TABLE I V

THE 1960 REDISTRICTING AND REGIONAL POPULATION
CHANGES IN TRANSYLVANIA

Regions
Concerned

Before Dec. 24, 1960
Rumanians
Magyars

After Dec. 24, 1960
Rumanians
Magyars

Mures-Magyar
Autonomous
Region

146,830

565,510

266,403

473,154

■
n ---- n/v/v;
.SZw-owv
ixcgjLuu

U iU

OOft
«•£
\J

i
la
JLno
KJ\J j / J X

587,628

222,248

Cluj Region

963,748

257,974

883,172

236,858

y

*This Table has been adopted with minor changes from J. F.
Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World T o d a y , XIX
(November, 1963), 506.
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resulted in reducing the political influence of the Hungarians as
v e i l .138
Since 1960, self-administration no longer necessarily means that
Hungarians rule Hungarians.

It is hard to substantiate this while the

Rumanians do not follow the Yugoslav example of releasing statistics
on the composition of local governments.

Occasionally, it is true,

the Rumanian government releases some data that sheds light on the
governmental involvement of the nationalities.

However, these are

figures for the country as a whole and thereby fail to show the corre
lation between the nationality of the local official elected and the
national composition of the area for which he is elected.
it was pointed out by Rumanian authorities in 1968 that:

For example,
"Among the

over 155,000 deputies (elected) to the local organs of power more
than 11,800 are Magyar, almost 2,800 are German, and over 2,400 are
people of other nationalities."

139

Yet a name analysis of the pro

minent local officials of predominantly Hungarian areas, turns up just
as many or more Rumanians than Hungarians.

An example of this was the

leadership of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1963.

While the

138

International Commission of Jurists, p. 77; "Nem Xrt
Tudni," L drmafa, VII (October-December, 1960), p. 25; David Binder,
"Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New York Times,
July 14, 1964, p. 4.
13^Nicolae Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic
of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 2
(February 17, 1968), p. 14.
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region's population was predominantly Magyar, its leadership was at
least 50% R u m a n i a n . ^ ®
In the present Rumanian administrative set-up, such a distor
tion of self-government is even more possible and probable.

Since 1965

Rumania has eliminated from its Constitution any reference to autonomy
and self-government for the Hungarians or any of the other nationali
ties.

In 1968, it followed its theoretical commitment of 1965, with

an extensive administrative-territorial re-organization of Rumania.
The latter eliminated the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region.

It divided

Rumania into 39 countries, replacing the 17 regions which had been the
major subdivision of the country previously.

This re-organization

divided the "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region" into the counties of
Covasna, Harghita and M u r e s . S e e

Figure 7 for these changes.

The

names of the three counties are all geographically derived, with no
hint as to their dominant Hungarian composition.
Both the administrative set-up on the local level and the
national composition of leadership at the highest levels indicate that
Hungarian involvement is more for show than anything else.

However, in

the everyday lives of Transylvanian Hungarians, the attitudes and
behavior of the civil servants and the local police officials is direct,

•^^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; Deaky and
Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," pp. 2-8.
•'•Romania Szocialista Kbztdrsasdg Alkotmdnya (Magyar Nyelvii
Forditds; Bukarest;
Politikai Kdnyvkiadd, 1968), Art. 22, p. 8 .
•^2 " N e w Administrative-Territorial Organization of Romania,"
Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 4 (February 24,
1968), pp. 3-4; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic
of Romania," pp. 1-30.
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it is not meant for show.

The national background of civil servants

and of the police is, therefore, a more pressing question.

However, no

statistics are available to show either that Hungarians are active
participants in these occupations, or that the Rumanian police and
civil servants treat the Hungarians and other nationalities with
tolerance.

The only data we have is the impression of travelers and

newspaper men who have had the opportunity to visit Transylvania in the
course of the past fifteen or twenty years.

143

The general impression of such observers has been that public
officials and police are overwhelmingly Rumanian even in predominantly
Hungarian areas.

Perhaps, this impression is a result of an unwill

ingness on the part of some officials to speak Hungarian when asked
for assistance.

At any rate, in spite of constitutional guarantees to

the contrary, the exclusive use of Rumanian by civil servants and
police, indicates an overwhelming Rumanian membership in these occupa
tional areas.

Or, it can also indicate widespread pressure against

the use of Hungarian by public o f f i c i a l s . I n

either case, the end

result is the same--a general abuse of nationality rights.
In Yugoslavia
The examination of the governmental order and the part of

■^■^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 21; Binder,
"Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," p. 8 ; A Corre
spondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . . A Conversation Piece,"
Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 20-21.
^ ^ I bid.; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This
point is also stressed by many travelers who have tried to use
Hungarian. A number of these individuals have disclosed this impres
sion personally to the present student of this problem.
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Hungarians in it, is both easier and harder than was the case with
Rumania,

It is easier, because the Yugoslavs have made available much

more information concerning this question.

It is harder, because the

nationality problem in Yugoslavia is much more involved generally.
Furthermore, Yugoslavia has experimented more extensively with new
administrative forms.

This means that less administrative continuity

has prevailed.
In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, it is also necessary to distin
guish the symbolic role and the actual administrative role of the
national minorities.

On the highest level, in the Federal government,

their role is mainly symbolic, with very limited influence on ad 
ministration.

The Federal People's Assembly and the Socialist Alliance

of Working People of Yugoslavia are the two nation-wide organizations
that are most suited for this t a s k . * ^

As far as the Socialist

Alliance is concerned, like its Rumanian counterpart the Socialist
Unity Front, it is an enthusiasm building mass agency.

It too, is con

cerned mainly with elections to the national legislature, in this case,
the Federal People's Assembly.

In this role it tries to be representa

tive of all sectors of Yugoslav life, including all the nationalities.
As a consequence, its nationwide ruling council is made up of the
presidents of the Provincial and Republican councils of the Socialist

145The Socialist Alliance is not a governmental organ. How
ever, since it roughly corresponds--from a symbolic perspective--to
the electoral agencies of Western democracies, it can be considered
together w it h governmental agencies, rather than with the other mass
or front organizations of the LCY.
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Alliance.

In 1963, PAl Soti a Hungarian, was the President of the

Provincial Council in the Vojvodina.

This automatically made him one

of the nine members of the national leadership of the Socialist
Alliance.
Representation in the Federal People's Assembly is also pri
marily symbolic.

As Table V indicates, Hungarians have been repre

sented by anywhere from 11 to 16 of their fellow countrymen, in a
legislature that has a total membership of 670.
tional to their numbers in the population.
not even attempted.

This is not propor

However, proportionality is

As the above table also shows, the Montenegrins

have usually had at least twice as many representatives as the
Hungarians.

Yet their actual proportion of the population is the

same as that of the Hungarians.

Still another indication of this dis

parity in representation, is the number of the Albanian representa
tives.

Although there are almost twice as many Albanians as Monte

negrins, the latter have always had at least five more representatives
in the Federal People's Assembly.
This distortion in ethnic representation is in some ways less
hypocritical than Rumania's exact proportionality.

In Yugoslavia,

the representation in the Federal People's Assembly actually reflects
at the same time the degree of influence, which each one of the

■*•^ 1 0 0 0 Facts About Yugoslavia (Beograd;
"Jugoslaviaa," 1963), p. 6 6 .

Izdavacki Zavod

^ ^ F o r the population statistics of these nationality groups
see Chapter I, Table II.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

Reproduced
with
permission

TABLE V

of the copyright ow ner.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY
(SAVEZNA NARODNA SKUPfiTINA)* IN YUGOSLAVIA

Year

Total

Serbs

Croats

Slo
venes

Mace
donians

Monte
negrins

Unspeci
fied
Yugo
slavs

Alba
nians

Hunga Other
rians Nation
alities
**

Did not
indicate
Nation
ality

Further reproduction

Pre1958***
Elections

517

238

119

51

32

20

27

15

11

4

1958***

587

254

130

61

41

33

32

18

12

6

- -

(1963 Governmental Re-organization)

prohibited

1964

670

227

80

58

40

28

101

20

11

6

99

1965

670

251

102

58

45

29

57

16

16

8

88

1967

670

269

109

61

48

34

47

26

13

8

55

without p erm is sio n .

*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J 1958, Table 1-5, p. 36; StatistiCki Godisnjak
S i I960, Table 1-3, p. 26; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1964, Table 101-2, p. 62; StatistiCki
Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p„ 6 6 .
**Includes representatives of the Turks, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Rumanians.
a representative of the "Moslems."

For 1965 it also includes

191

***Prior to the governmental re-organization of 1963, the SkupStina was composed of two chambers, the
"Federa1-Republie Council" and the "Council of Producers." In this Table the composition of these
chambers has been combined to facilitate the comparison of the pre- and post-1963 SkupStina in
terms of its ethnic make-up.
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nationalities exerts on the national level— without regard to their
percentage of the population.

This is even more conclusively mirrored

in the make-up of the leadership of the Federal Assembly (10 members)
of which none are H u n g a r i a n . A

similar situation prevails in the

Federal Executive Council and the Federal Administration.

In 1963,

neither among the 37 members of the Council nor among the 23 Federal
Administrators

(Department heads) could one encounter a Hungarian.

This ethnically unrepresentative national leadership should not
lead us to the easy conclusion that the Hungarians enjoy less influ
ence in the Yugoslav than in the Rumanian government.
opposite is the case.

Quite the

It seems that the Rumanians feel that they have

done everything, by putting a few Hungarians into highly visible
governmental positions.

By doing this they feel they have done what

is required of them by the Leninist, nationality policy.

In a sense,

they have delegated authority to look out for the interests of the
Hungarians— as of the other nationalities--to individuals w h o are the
most unlikely to make a stand for their fellow nationals.
have not chosen this easy way out.

The Yugoslavs

They have not placed representa

tives of the Hungarians in high governmental posts.
delegate their responsibility to anyone.

Thus, they cannot

They must consider them

selves personally responsible for the correct application of the Yugo
slav version of the Leninist nationality policy.

Judging from the

actual consequences of nationality policies, the Yugoslav system seems

•*•^ 1 0 0 0 Facts About Yugoslavia, p. 63.
k^ I b i d ., pp. 63-64.
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to have favored the position of the nationalities more.
On the lower governmental levels, the Yugoslav system also
delegates authority to the representatives of the Hungarians.

On the

Republic level they have had anywhere from 18 to 24 representatives in
the Serbian Republic Assembly.
ject.

Table VI provides some data on this sub

As this Table indicates, the Hungarians have always had a con

siderable number of representatives in the Provincial Assembly of
Vojvodina.

It should be noted that while they compose about 24% of

the population in the Vojvodina, the number of their representation has
declined from 23.1% in 1958 to a little over 20% in 1964.

Whether this

trend has continued is uncertain,since no more recent statistics have
been released concerning this question.

What is certain, however, is

that the Serbs have preserved their dominance.
On the lowest possible levels of representation a somewhat
different pattern of representation emerged.

Initially, on the commune

level--in both the district and the commune committees and the dis
trict and communal workers' councils— Hungarians had a higher percent
age of representatives than did the Albanians.

For example, in 1957

Hungarians had 233 district committee memberships while the Albanians
had 241.

The Hungarians also had 167 members in the district pro

ducers' councils against 175 for the Albanians.

In commune committee

memberships the representation was somewhat more in line with

^ ® A s Table VI indicates, in the Serbian Republican Assembly,
the Serbs have always overshadowed the other nationalities.
In 1965
they had 328 representatives to 102 for all the other nationalities.
In 1967, they again retained their dominance 328 to 102.
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TABLE VI
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC SKUPSTINA AND THE AUTONOMOUS
VOJVODINIAN PROVINCIAL SKUPSTINA*

Total

Serbs

1958
Serbia
Vojvodina

310
190

252

1964
Serbia
Vojvodina

440
349

319
156

9
13

--

8

1

1965***
Serbia

440

328

15

1967***
Serbia

440

338

15

Year and
Area

112

Croats

Slo
venes

Monte
negrins

Unspeci
fied
Yugo
slavs

Alba
nians

-2
7
18
2
4
3
(1963 Governmental Re-Organization)
6
12

Hunga Other
rians Nation
alities
**

Did Not
indicate
Nationality

18
44

7
13

—
“—

35
—

23
70

12

---

7

34
27

28

47

1

7

17

38

24

10

—

2

9

5

36

23

12

*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak F H R J 1959, Table 1-3, p. 24; StatistiCki Godisnjak
il £ S H 1964* Table 101-2, p. 62; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; StatistiCki
Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p. 6 6 .
**Includes mainly the representatives of Slovaks and Rumanians.
***No statistics are available for 1965 and 1967 on the ethnic composition of the Vojvodinian
Skupstina.
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population statistics.

In the latter, Albanians had 1,704 memberships

as against 1,075 Hungarian memberships.

In the Commune producers'

councils it was 1,201 to 719 in favor of the Albanians.^ ^

A compari

son with the number of Serbs on these local councils also reflects
favorably on the proportional representation of the Hungarians.

152

The Governmental re-organization of 1963,led to a more propor
tional (in respect to the population) representation of nationalities
on the commune level.

There still existed some distortion in favor

of the South Slavic peoples, but was somewhat more in line with the
actual populations of various groups.

In 1963 on the commune level

Hungarians held 937 seats, Albanians held 1,934 seats, and the Montenegrins

153
held 1,643 seats.

In 1965,

for these same nationalities,

the numbers were 898, 1,748, and 1,107 r e s p e ctively.^^

As these

statistics indicate, the Montenegrins have fared better than either
the Hungarians or Albanians.

However, the latter two nationalities

have gained membership on commune committees, generally in proportion
to their percentage of the population.

^ ^StatistiCki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959, Tables 1-4 and 1-5, pp.
25-26; Statistigki Godisnjak FNRJ 1962, Tables 101-4 and 101-5, pp.
25-26.
152

Ibid.

Refer to both sources of footnote 151.

-^ S t a t i s t i C k i

Godisnjak SFRJ 1964, Table 101-2,

^•-^StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1966, Table 101-3,

pp. 63-64.
p. 65.

•'■■^For the population statistics of these nationality groups
see Chapter I, Table II.
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The active membership of so many Hungarians in the lower levels
of government does not mean that Hungarians necessarily rule themselves.
As in the case of Rumania, this is not revealed by the statistics.

In

the Vojvodina as a whole, as well as on all lower levels of government
(i.e., self-management), the Hungarians are usually in a minority
(although a strong minority) on committees.
the Yugoslav nationality policy.

136

But, this is part of

It allows the nationalities to be

represented in government, but never as a corporate unit.
The whole organxzatxon of the Vojvodxna as a special province
reflects this idea.

It is not a "self-governing" area run by Hun

garians like the Magyar Autonomous Region had been in Rumania.
Rather, the Vojvodina is a multi-national area, that allows for Hun
garian participation, but not for Hungarian control.
part, revealed by the post-war changes in its frontiers.

This is, in
While the new

Communist Yugoslavia definitely rejected the centralist banovinas
instituted by King Alexander in 1929, it also failed to re-establish
the boundaries of the historic Vojvodina.

jn its place it drew the

136
Milentije Peskovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia,"
Studies. No. 5 (Beograd: Medunarodna Politika, 19b4), p. 31, indicates
that in ten communes (out of the 48 located in the Vojvodina) the
Hungarians often have a majority position on the local community and
working organizations.
■*--^As part II of Chapter II has pointed out, the Magyar Autono
mous Region was "self-governing" only in theory.
In practice the CPR
and its predominantly Rumanian leadership exerted full control over it.
^•-^See Chapter II, part II.
■*--^See footnote 55 in Chapter II.
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boundaries of the Vojvodina by leaving the Baranya region (which had a
heavy Hungarian population) outside the province, while it added the
Srem region (with a heavy Serb and Croat population).

Compare Figure

8 with Figure 3 in the Prologue for these changes.

In this way, the Vojvodina was never really looked on as the
"home-rule" area of the Hungarians.

Rather, it is considered a multi

national area in which the Hungarians compose the major national minor
ity.

Within this area additional precautions are taken that they will

not be discriminated against because of their nationality.

But, these

precautions do not constitute exemptions or special treatment.

As the

Yugoslavs constantly point out, the existence of the Vojvodina as an
"autonomous province" is to ensure equality of treatment rather than
special treatment.

lfiO

As far as political influence is concerned, this

ideal is never really attained.

Perhaps only on the lowest level, in

the communes, can the Hungarians safe-guard their own interests.

On

this level, however, their influence is decisive in only 10 or 11 of
the 48 communes of the Vojvodina.

161

In Yugoslavia— as in the case of Rumania--it is evident from
what has been said in the foregoing, that the Hungarian participation
in the government on all levels (except in about 11 of the communes) is
mostly symbolic in nature.

The limited nature of their governmental

influence has some adverse consequences.

These are evident in the

•^Opesakovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," p. 31.
•^^Ibid., p. 31, footnote 8 .

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

THE

X

VOJVODINA

I Otfl

WITH

THE

SREM

AND

WITHOUT

THE

198

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

199

national composition of the police force and of the civil servants of
the Vojvodina.
ly Serbs.

Both the police and the civil servants are overwhelming

Even in smaller villages like Teleika (Telecska) and Ruskoe

Selo (Kis Orosz)— both of which are predominantly Hungarian--the village
officials are S e r b s . I n
same pattern prevails.

larger towns, like Kikinda and Zombor the

Frequently, the only person who speaks Hun

garian in governmental offices is the janitor.

He frequently performs

an indispensable role as translator and as "information" center.
The police force is also almost completely Serb.
is that very few of them know any Hungarian.

163

What is worse

Here again, the unoffi-

cial go-betweens--the janitors--are indispensable for communication.

164

Where there are no go-betweens, a person is lost who does not know
Serbo-Croatian.

As far as the police are concerned, the ethnic

imbalance is not completely due to governmental preference for Serbs.
It is, in part, due to Hungarian disdain toward this organization.

16S

■^j^Based on personal observations of the student writing this
study.
In the summer of 1966, he toured the Hungarian inhabited areas
of the Vojvodina by bicycle for two weeks.
On his tour, he visited
Ruscoe Selo (Kis Orosz') in the Banat.
This village was typical of many
others. Although it was predominantly Hungarian in population, of the
three "officials" running the village only the least influential— the
recording secretary--was Hungarian.
^ ^ B a s e d on personal observations of the student in the summer
of 1966, in the towns of Kikinda and Sombor (Zombor).
164 Ibid.

^®^In numerous discussions with Hungarians when the student
mentioned the l^ack of Hungarian police officials, he was met by
surprised stares.
These conversations usually revealed that Hun
garians viewed the security service as an undesirable type of occupa
tion.
In fact, in one case in the Banat it was known that a Hungarian
has actually become a police officer.
However, he was feared and
despised by his fellow nationals more than the Serb officers.
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But a similar excuse could not be made for the ethnic imbalance in
■
I££

other governmental offices. OD
The ethnic imbalance in the police force and among civil ser
vants would not, by itself, lead to discriminatory practices.

Dis

crimination results from the arrogant attitude of the civil servants
and the police.
i t . T h e

Even those who know Hungarian, simply refuse to speak

nationalism of the Serbs over-rides governmental guarantees.

But, the national (federal) government is in part responsible for this
state of affairs.

It does not try hard enough to recruit Hungarians

for government work and it fails to set an example for the use of
minority languages.

A n example of this are post office forms, which

appear only in Serbo-Croatian.

168

It is interesting to note, that most of these practices which
lead to discrimination come under Serbian Republican rather than federal
Yugoslav-supervision.

In both the Provincial Assembly of the Vojvodina

166T'ne student met innumerable well trained and highly quali
fied young Hungarians w h o were unable to find employment in Vojvodina.
Many could have become excellent civil servants.
167ihe student had a number of experiences in the Vojvodina
that indicated this.
In one instance, he went to the Putnik (Yugoslav
travel agency) office in Subotica (Szabadka) to purchase a railway
ticket to Zagreb. He stood in line behind an old Hungarian woman who
tried to ask for information in Hungarian.
She was rebuffed in icy
tones in Serb:
"Ne govorim Magyar!" ("I do not speak Hungarian!")
Then the student pushed his American passport before the forbidding
official and asked for information and a ticket in Hungarian.
The Put
nik official changed her tone drastically and answered politely in
Hungarian.
■^®In Kikinda, the student actually helped a local Hungarian
fill out a postal form which was all in Serbo-Croatian.
SpanishAmericans do not have this problem in New York State, in spite of the
fact that New York does not have a highly proclaimed "nationality
policy."
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and the Republic Assembly of Serbia, the Serbs have an unchallenged
majority.

This is clear even from a cursory examination of Table VII.

As this table indicates, the Serbs have the same type of sweeping
dominance over Republican and Provincial matters as the Rumanians have
over national matters in the Rumanian Grand National Assembly and the
Rumanian Communist Party.

This complete dominance of the Serbs and

the concomitant ethnic abuses are checked only by the League of Com
munists and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia.

In the latter, the

Serbs are less powerful due to the combined strength of the other
South Slav peoples.

Table V shows how the Croats, Slovenes. Mace

donians and other South Slavs can, by combining their voting strength
in the Federal Assembly check the Serbs in policy making for the
country as a whole.

As we have had occasion to see, a similar situa-

tion prevails in the League of Communists.

169

All this leads us to

conclude, that the political position of the Hungarian is quite pre
carious, it depends on the continued process of ethnic checks and
balances on the all-Yugoslav level.

Ill
Closely tied to the pervasive role of government in both
Rumania and Yugoslavia, is the control exerted over the economic and
social existence of the Hungarians.

While the Party and governmental

1f.Q
iu;7The constitutional trend toward decentralization is indi
cated by Pesakovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," pp. 13-19.
A similar trend in relation to the LCY is presented in Voja Micovid,
"Development of Inner Party Democracy," Socialist Thought and
P r a c t i c e , No. 18 (April-June, 1965), pp. 100-114.
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structures revealed to what extent the Hungarians can actually partic
ipate in the political life of Rumania and Yugoslavia, their economic
and social existence reveals to what extent even their "potential"
power is circumscribed.

Therefore, the examination and comparison of

certain agricultural, industrial, and social policies in these two
states will add to our understanding of the similarities and differ
ences between Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationality policies.
Before turning directly to agricultural and industrial prob
lems it is important to keep three factors in mind.

First, that the

Party-State administers, oversees and develops all agricultural,
industrial and social programs which are carried out in Rumania and
Yugoslavia.

Second, because planning is centralized all programs

are inter-related, making progress in one area (e.g. agriculture)
directly dependent on the developments in another area (e.g. industry).

171

Third, because of their inter-relationship it is difficult

to separate, isolate and describe any one area without reference to
another.

^"Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy,"
Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No. 11-12 (July 30,
1964), 8 ; Edvard K ardelj, "A PolgAr Helyzete Politikai As Gazdasdgi
Rendszerttnkben," in Lukd Andras (ed.) A Tdrsadalmi IgazgatAs
JugoszlAviAban: Cikkek ds Beszddek Gyiijtemdnye 1950-1960 trans.
Ldszld" Varga (Novi Sad: Forum KOnyvkiadd, 1963), pp. 214-217.
^•^ I b i d .; Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report Concerning Measures for
Perfecting the Management and Planning of the National Economy and
for Improving the Administrative-Territorial Organization of Romania"
delivered before the National Conference of the Romanian Communist
Party, December 1967 (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1967), pp. 5-138.
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In Rumania and Transylvania
The CPR from the very beginning of its ascendancy worked
assiduously to transform the economic and social relationships within
the country.

This transformation required a far-reaching regulation of

the existence and activities of the country's population, particularly
of the Hungarians of Transylvania.

It also required the replacement

of existing social and economic "institutions" with,; agencies and
organizations that were subservient to the Party.

Private property

and ownership in agriculture and industry were drastically reduced, as
was the social leadership of the existing churches.

Agriculture and Collectivization
Administrative re-arrangements in Transylvania— as in Rumania
as a w h o l e — have, from the inception of the People's Republic, been
designed to bring the rural areas into closer contact with the indus
trial centers of the c o u n t r y . I n

Transylvania this has meant that

the strongholds of the nationalities have been integrated more closely
with the Rumanian areas of dominance.

As such, urban-rural integra

tion was not at that time motivated by a desire to curb the nationali
ties.

Rather, it was one facet of the CPR's policy aimed at the rapid

industrialization of the country.

173

However, when the administrative

172

Daniel Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture,"
Problems of Communism, IV (July-August, 1955), p. 35; Miklds, "A
Romdn Nepkdztdrsasdgban 1950 Ota Vdgrehajtott KbzigazgatdsiGazdasdgi KOrzetbeosztdsok Nehdny Tapasztalata," pp. 307-325.
173Ibid., p. 309.
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rearrangements are related to the policies carried out in the agricul
tural and industrial area, it becomes apparent that they have worked
to the detriment of the nationalities in the long-run.

Immediate post

war agricultural policies also demonstrate this.
Since Rumania w as (and still is in 1970) a predominantly agri
cultural country, the nature of land ownership has always been of
primary importance.

While Rumania— including Transylvania--has had a

relatively well balanced distribution of land among the peasantry
since the 1 9 2 0 ' s , t h e

Communists and their sympathizers were still

able to utilize the slogan of "land reform" as a means of ingratiating
themselves with some segments of the have-nots.

Soon after the Groza

government came to power a land reform was carried out affecting the
whole country, but above all the national minorities.^-*
Like the previous inter-war land reforms , ^ 6

those carried out

by the Groza administration also affected adversely the position of the

■^^George H. Bossy, "Agriculture" in Romania ed. FischerGalati, pp. 196-197, including Table One; Nicholas Spulber, The
Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass. : The
Technology Press, 1957), pp. 237-238 and Chart 8 on p. 243.
■^-*Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 348-349; Markham,
Rumania Under the Soviet Y o k e , pp. 374-380, 516-517; Theodor Schieder
(ed.) The Fate of the Germans in Rumania (A Selection and Translation
from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa;
Bonn: Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and
War Victims, 1961), III, 86-87.
176

C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 316-320, provides a balanced
and objective description of the discriminatory nature of the inter
war land reforms.
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national minorities.

However, the Communist inspired distributions

struck a particularly strong blow at the German m inority.177

goth the

"Transylvanian Saxons" and the "Banat Swabians" suffered disposses
sion.^®

In this wa y the strong independent peasant class, which had

once been the backbone of the German minority, was broken.

The fact

that the "land reform" very closely followed national lines was rationalized as punishment of "disloyal elements."

179

However, the fact

that the recipients of the confiscated land were almost all Rumanian
demonstrates that the motive was not free of nationalist coloration.
The new landowners were, in the main, local poor Rumanian farm
laborers, or Bessarabian Rumanians transplanted to Transylvania as a
consequence of the Russian occupation of their homeland.

180

Two factors indicate the "Rumanization" result of these agrarian
reforms, regardless of whether they were intentional or unintentional.
The first is the dispossession and economic destruction of the German
minority.

The nature and extent of this intentional and systematic
IO I

"reform" is indicated by the figures in Table VII.

A second indi

cation of the "Rumanization" result is provided by a comparison of

•'•^Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, p. 237;
Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, pp. 86-87 and Documents
Nos. 64 and 65, pp. 299-305.
178 Ibid., pp. 90-91.

179

For example, of these rationalizations see "The Land Reform
Law of 1945" and "Regulations for the Agrarian Reform" in Ibid., Annex
10 and 11, pp. 156-164.
180 Ibid., p. 90.

181 Ibid., p. 91.
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TABLE V I I

THE RUMANIAN LAND REFORM OF 1945-46 AND ITS
IMPACT ON GERMAN INHABITED AREAS

Extent of
Average Size of
Expropriated
Expropriated
Nature
Number of
of Ethnic Expropriated
Land in
Holdings in
Composition
Owners
Hectares
Hectares***

Judet*

T r a n s y l v a n i a
Sibiu
Tarnava-Mare
Tarnava-Mica
Brasov
Fagaras
Alba
Nassaud
Mures
Other Eight
Judets
Total
T i s z a
Timis Torontal
Arad
Other Five
Judets
Total
R u m a n i ia
Total area

Areas
Having
Many
German
Inhabi
tants
Areas with
few Germans

16,809
15,468
9,578
3,108
7,594
1,711
4,544
1,914
1,430

62,157
P l a i n
(B a n a t
54,612
Areas
with many
Germans
15,654
Areas
3,115
with few
Germans

P r o p e r
42,223
80,070
36,229
24,443
38,127
8,045
36,469
28,213
48,779
345,598
a n d S a t u
205,607
45,182
111,971

73,381
362,760
(I n c 1 u d i n g
D o
P r o p e r
Predominant ly
Rumanian
7,681
735,553

2.6

5.1
3.7
7.8
5.0
4.7
8.0

14.7
34.1

M a r

5.6
e)**
3.7
2.8

35.9

4.9
b r u j a)****
95.7

*Judet was the largest administrative unit of Rumania prior to
the Communist redistricting of 1950, which changed the appellation to
regiune.
**As footnote 1 m the Prologue indicates, the designation "Tran
sylvania" has a wide and a narrow reference. The wider reference
includes the areas of the Tisza Plain.
***One hectare is 2.47 acres.
****"Rumania Proper" refers to the areas of the "Old Kingdom"
(i.e., Moldavia and Wallachia).
*****jhis TABLE has been compiled on the basis of the data provided
by Theodore Schieder and others (eds.),The Expulsion of the German Population From Hungary and Rumania. a selection! ‘arid 'translation- from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn;
Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War
Victims, 1961), III, 91.
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population statistics in the German areas, prior to and after the
"land reforms."

The phenomenal growth of the Rumanian population and

the parallel decrease of the German population, shown by Table VIII,
leaves little doubt as to the policy's net result.
This twofold policy--the economic destruction of the German
minority and the colonization of Rumanians in formerly solid German
areas— has had especially important consequences on the position of the
Transylvanian nationalities in general.

1ft3

The most obvious has been

the isolation of the Hungarian minority as the only one which was as
yet dominant in important areas of Transylvania.

Although in the agri

cultural realm the Hungarian minority had already been greatly weakened
in the inter-war years, in terms of population it is still the majority
nationality in areas like the Western Rumanian border strip and the
Szekely counties.

But the destruction of the German minority's posi

tion has accentuated the fact that only the Hungarian minority— the
largest--remains to be subjugated and broken.
Collectivization of agriculture was the first step which showed

is9

Ib i d . . p. 93.
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The extent of the havoc wrought by these "reforms" is best
described by Schieder in relation to the German minority.
He states
on p. 112; "An ethnic German economic life exists no longer in presentday Rumania.
The close community of the German peasant village, as a
living and economic organism, had already been destroyed by the
agrarian reform; subsequent measures of Bolshevisation had also
destroyed the traditional foundations of the German urban population,
and at the same time the German character of the towns they inhabited."
This quote could also be used to describe the position of the other
ethnic minorities of Transylvania, with the only qualification that
the Germans were subjugated the earliest.
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TABLE V I I I

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTED PARISHES IN THE BANAT BEFORE
AND A FTER THE LAND REFORM OF 1945-1946

Rumanians

Parish

Year

Germans

Lenauheim

1941

2,421

52

1948

1,717

1,718

1941

2,661

129

1948

1,527

1,803

1941

3,008

586

1948

2,791

1,650

1941

3,013

426

1948

2,448

4,024

1941

7,245

859

1948

5,489

3,422

Grabatz
(Grabat)

Biled

Zovrin

Hatzfeld
(Jimbolia)

*This TABLE is taken from Theodore Schieder and others (eds.),
The Expulsion of the German Population From Hungary and R umania, a
selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der
Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Published by the Federal
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 93,
footnote 65.
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indications of infringing on the position of the Hungarian population.

184

However, this policy got off to a slow start because of the
IOC

lack of farm machinery.

J

Only in more recent years has the collec

tivization drive really "arrived."-*-®^

Thus, until the very recent

past the Hungarian minority still had some economic base in agriculture.
In fact, according to reliable sources, collectivization proceeded
slowest in the areas with the highest proportion of Hungarian inhabitants.

187

This m a y be taken as an indication of Hungarian resistance

1QA

It must be pointed out, that the "land reforms" were merely
a transition stage in the process of subjugation which preceded total
collectivization.
For a discussion of the land reform as a tactic see
Bossy, "Agriculture," pp. 201, 207; Spulber, The Economics of Communist
Eastern E u r o p e , pp. 244-247.
■'■^Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture," pp. 35,
38-39, 42.
This lack of farm machinery is also admitted by the
article "Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," p. 10.
The author of this article admits that until 1959, there was only
"one tractor for an average of 270 hectares /of land/ while in 1963
for 150 hectares."
■*-®^Until 1957, collectivization was extremely slow. After that
date the momentum increased and by 1962, collectivization of agricul
ture was "completed." For a thorough breakdown of this process consult
the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic:
Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 112-114.
It is also of interest
to compare the collectivization process in Rumania to that of Hungary.
In both countries completion took place at about the same time, but in
Rumania the "transformation" was more consistent and gradual while in
Hungary it was more static and irregular. A good comparison may be had
from Samuel Baum's The Labor Force of Rumania (U.S. Bureau of the
Census; International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No.
14. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 1961), pp.
18-20 and the same author's The Labor Force of H u n gary, pp. 20-22,
published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1962 as Series P-90,
No. 18.
• ^ N o r m a n , "'New C o u r s e 1 in Rumanian Agriculture," p. 43; V.L.
"Nem Art Tudni," Ldrmafa, II (July, 1955), 24-25; F.E.C.
"A Szdkelyek
Ellendllnak," Ldrmafa, III (April-June, 1956), p. 9; Elie Able,
"Rumania Assures Magyars' Rights," New York Times, May 14, 1957, p. 8 .
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against moves which threatened one of its last areas of economic
strength.
Land collectivization, on the other hand, has provided the
R.P.R. with a powerful weapon in the drive to "integrate" the Hungarian
population with the Rumanian.

Since collectives are drawn up in dis

regard of national preferences, the Hungarian peasant is forced to take
part in collective state enterprises, which are controlled by
Rumanians or are overwhelmingly Rumanian in composition.

Instead of

"integration" this has resulted in the dispersion of the Hungarian
peasantry among the Rumanian.

What the regime hopes is that such dis

persion will result in increased intermarriage, assimilation and
eventually complete absorption of the Hungarian minority.

IQO
°

Collectivization, in this way, resulted not only in the de
struction of the independent farmer, but also in infringements on the
Transylvanian peasantry— Rumanians and non-Rumanians--in their right
to choose their own social life among fellow nationals.

Collectiviza

tion and the consequent "integration" of the peasantry's economic life
have brought also social "integration."
one-sided.

This process, however, is all

Equality is attainable in this social setting if the

Hungarian is willing to be "Rumanized," if he is willing to desert his

I b i d ., reveals that assimilation and inter-marriage is the
end sought by the regime of the R.P.R. The confirmation of this is
made by Endre Bodor who was in 1957 deputy chairman of the regional
council of the Magyar Autonomous Region.
This is also indicated by
Paul Underwood "Rumanians Spur Magyar Culture," New York Times (June
19, 1959), 5.
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national culture and language.

189

At present this does not seem to be

the case with the Hungarian peasantry.

Two probable reasons are their

strong national consciousness and the natural human reaction against
coercive t actics.
The one-sided nature of this process of collectivization was
demonstrated by yet one other policy.

This involved the government's

efforts to keep peasants from moving to the cities to avoid collec
tivization.

As land collectivizing began, many peasants of all n a 

tional backgrounds tried to avoid its adverse consequences by moving
to the cities.

The new economic opportunities in the growing indus

tries threatened to upset collectivization.

The CPR moved swiftly to

put a stop to this unplanned escape from the farm.

It had the govern

ment promulgate a law which forbade rural inhabitants settling in the
cities without special permission.

190

However, beginning around 1953,

this legal restriction applied only to the Hungarians.

191

Thus, the

vast urban growth that has taken place since 1953 has been almost
solely Rumanian.

This has included both Rumanians moving from the

Regat areas into Transylvanian cities and Transylvanian Rumanians

189
io:7A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . . A Conversa
tion Piece," p. 20, points out that;
"Ambitious youngsters, eager to
get on in life have to 'Rumanize' their names, and speak and write
perfect Rumanian.
Those who are not willing to do so are told to join
their 'capitalist 1 connections in the West or their 'revisionist' co
nationals in Hungary or Bulgaria."
190

Erddlyi Magyar, "Az Erd^lyi Magyarsdg Tragikus Helyzete,"
A H d t , II (December 16, 1966), 1.
191 Ib i d .
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moving to the cities. y

A consequence of this policy has been the

Rumanization of the cities and the erosion of Hungarian economic
strength.

Industry and the Nationalities
Industrialization has led to similar adverse results for the
Hungarians.

As the discussion of the Country's administrative re

organization revealed, one of the major concerns of the CPR is to
integrate urban and rural areas more closely.*92

Stalin's pressure,

however, had forced the Rumanians to heed "proletarian internation
alism" at the expense of integration, in the redistricting of 1952.
Until 1960, local autonomy was therefore constitutionally guaranteed
for the Hungarians living in the Secuesc (Szdkely) counties.

With

Stalin out of the way, the redistricting of 1960 returned to integra
tion and "non-political" factors as determining criteria for boundary
revisions.*9^

The re-organization of 1968 further emphasized that the

integration of urban and rural areas is a major consideration of CPR

192Ibid.
I no
7 For a discussion of the nationalization of industry in
Rumania consult Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe.
pp. 76-80, 145-146, and Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania,
pp. 109-111.
In the latter work also see "The Law Concerning the
Nationalization of Industry," Annex 12, pp. 165-175, and "The Decree
for the Expropriation of Real Estate," Annex 14, pp. 178-179.
*9^Mi k l d s ,"A Roman Ndpkfiztdrsasdgban 1950 (ita Vdgrehajtott
Kbzigazgatdsi-Gazdasdgi Korzetbeosztdsok Ndhany Tapasztalata," pp.
317-319, maintains that social and economic factors were responsible
for the "realistic" redistricting of 1960.
However, the dilution of
the region's Magyar composition points to political motivation.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

213

economic and social policies.^ 5

Thus, Hungarian local self-

administration was eliminated to integrate more fully the country's
rural and urban areas in keeping with the actual extent of economicsocial development.

1 Q6

As has been pointed out, the population of urban areas in
Transylvania had always been predominantly Hungarian and German
rather than Rumanian.

The rapid industrialization and urbanization of

the country, therefore, directly affected the nationalities.

Tran

sylvania's important wealth of natural resources made it imperative
that urbanization and the expansion of industry play a particularly
significant role in the area.

While the desire to provide efficiency

in the utilization of resources (i.e., by taking industry to the
sources of raw

m a t e r i a l s ) - ^ 7

was primary,

i t

national implications were lost from s i g h t .

does not mean that the
The nature of the over

all process of industrialization and urbanization and their respective
impact on job opportunities and housing make this all the more
apparent.

l^ C eausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administra
tive Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania,"
pp. 1 -6 .
196
Miklds, "A Romdn Ndpkftztdrsasdgban 1950 dta Vdgrehajtott
Kfizigazgatdsi-Gazdasdgi KOrzetbeosztdsok Ndhdny Tapasztalata," pp. 307,
317-319.
Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization
of the Population," Probleme Economice (February, 1964) translated ir.
Rumanian Press Survey, No. 438 (Radio Free Europe, June 3, 1964),
pp. 2 -6 .
198
Erddlyi Magyar, "Az Erddlyi Magyarsdg Tragikus Helyzete,"
p. 1 .
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Communist Rumanian officials are proud to point out that they
have reversed the process of the inter-war years when the "bourgeois"
government neglected the industrialization of many Transylvanian areas
because of their heavy non-Rumanian p o p u l a t i o n s . T h e y pride them
selves in having helped "drag out of backwardness" such non-Rumanian
areas as the Szekely counties, which had composed the Mures-Magyar
Autonomous Region, and today include the counties of Mures, Covasna
and Harghita.^OO

These same officials neglect to mention, however,

that what they mean by "drag out of backwardness" also entails national
assimilation.

The "Rumanization" of such traditionally Hungarian

cities as Oradea (Nagyv^rad), Cluj

(Kolozsvdr), Arad, Satu-Mare

(Szatmarnemeti) and Tirgu-Mures (Marosvdsarhely) demonstrates that
assimilation is a purpose of this policy and that it is a definite
"side-effect" of industrialization.
Table IX indicates the growth and ethnic composition of these
cities throughout the past hundred years.

As the population of these

cities reveals, the major shifts in favor of the Rumanians has occurred
in the last fifty years.

However, the changes wrought during the last

twenty years have been even more dramatic.

These more recent changes

have reduced the percentage of the Hungarian population in every
instance and in some cases have even pushed them into a minority status.

•'•^"Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," p.
10; Short Document on R um ania, p. 18.
^®®Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 450.
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TABLE IX*
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FOUR SELECTED TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES
(1869-1964)

Census
year

Total
pop.

Name of: town:
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910

26,638
29,923
32,736
49,295
60,808

1920
1930

83,542
100,844

1941*** 110,956
1956^.^ 154,723
1964
167,011
Name of town:
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910

32,725
35,556
42,052
56,260
63,166

1920
1930
1941***

62,490
77,181
86,674

1956
106,460
1964**** 115,294

Number ox:
H u n g .**
Rum.
Clui

Germ.

Percentage of:
Hung.
Rum.

Germ.

(Kolozsvdr)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE

22,761
27,514
40,845
50,704

3,855
1,423
76.1
3,226
1,336
84.0
6,039
1,784
82.9
7,562
1,676
83.4
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
49.8
41,583
28,274
2,073
54.2
54,776
34,836
2,702
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
88.0
97,698
10,029
1,825
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)
50.3
77,839
74,628
1,115
80,300
80,200
1,200
48.0

12.9
9.9
12.3
12.4

4.8
4.1
3.6
2.8

33.8
34.5

2.5
2.7

9.0

1.7

48.2
48.0

0.7
0.7

56.0
61.1
69.2
72.9

18.1
18.7
17.0
16.3

15.3
13.4

63.0
53.3
30.9
(CPR)
35.3
33.2

20.0

4.8

37.0
46.9

6.0

55.5
57.0

7.6
7.8

Arad (Arad)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,896
25,901
38,929
46,085

6,439
5,448
7,873
5,626
9,556
5,643
10,279
4,365
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
39,399
12,469
3,012
41,161
28,537
4,617
26,798
40,677
7,811
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
37,633
59,050
8,089
38,000
65,000
8,000
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TABLE IX* (Continued)

Census
year

Total
pop.

\
Number of:
Hung.**

Rum.

Germ.

Germ.

Name of town:
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1941***
1956**^
1964

Oradea Mare (NagyvArad)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
28,698
31,324
26,675
2,009
1,148
38,557
34,239
2,527
1,014
50,177
44,750
3,335
1,404
58,421
3,604
1,416
64,169
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
68,081
40,744
8,441
598
82,687
55,039
20,914
1,118
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
92,942
85,466
4,873
863
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)
98,950
62,804
34,501
373
65,000
40,000
400
110,296

Percentage of:
Hung.
Rum.

6.4

3.7

88.8

6.6
6.6

5.6

2.6
2.8
2.2

66.6

12.4
25.3

0.9
1.3

92.0

5.2

0.9

63.5
58.9

34.9
36.3

0.3
0.3

83.6
89.9
85.6
89.4

3.8
3.1
9.5
6.7

5.0
4.7
3.5
2.4

74.9
65.9

12.7
24.6

1.4
1.9

94.4

3.8

1.0

77.0
71.6

22.0

24.3

0.4
0.4

89.2
91.1
59.8

Name of town:
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1941***
1956
1964****

Tirgu Mures (MarosvAsArhely)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
13,018
13,192
11,028
508
657
14,412
669
447
12,785
19,522
1,864
686
16,705
22,790
25,527
1,717
606
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
30,988
23,178
3,947
446
38,517
9,493
735
25,359
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
44,933
1,720
436
42,435
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)
65,194
50,174
14,315
277
74,004
53,000
18,000
280

85.2

*This Table is based on the unpublished "Statistical Studies on
the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe" compiled by the Mid-European
Center in New York in 1968.
**Only the Rumanian, Hungarian and German populations are com
pared for lack of space.
However, in Arad and in Oradea Mare (NagyvArad) the Jewish population was also significant prior to World War II.
***The data for 1941 reflect the territorial and national transfers
which were a consequence of the Vienna Award.
This agreement returned
the northern third of Transylvania to Hungary.
****Xhe data for 1964 are estimates.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

217

The last twenty years have been the years of major industrial
development.

These years have, therefore, been responsible for the

rapid growth of the country's urban centers.
cate this growth.

Tables IX, X and XI indi

This industrialization has favored the Rumanians

rather than the Hungarians, because while the latter have been restrict
ed to certain regions and occupations, the Rumanians have been imported
from the Regat and rural areas of Transylvania to supply the growing
industries with a labor force.

201

The expansion of industrialization demanded a great increase in
the labor supply.

202

Since much of this post-war industrialization

has been in predominantly Hungarian and German areas, it would have
been natural to draw on these inhabitants for the needed labor.
Instead, the CPR imported Rumanians from the Regat as well as from the
surrounding countryside to man the newly established factories.

203

While the relatively dispersed German minority received an important
share in this expansion, the share of the Hungarian communities seems
to have been less.

Particularly in more recent years, employment in

^^^Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania,"
Congressional Record (House of Representatives, August 8 , 1964),
p. 18073; International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian
Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 77; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbs^g
Helyzete Rom^ni^ban," p. 1.
202

u Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization
of the Population," pp. 2-6.
203

Ibid., p. 5; International Commission of Jurists, "The
Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania,” p. 77.
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TABLE X
RUMANIA'S POPULATION BY MOTHER TONGUE IN URBAN AND RURAL
AREAS ACCORDING T O THE CENSUS OF 1956

Rural
areas

Mother tongue

Total urban
and rural areas

Total population

17,489,450

5,474,264

12,015,186

Rumanian

15,080,686

4,453,426

10,627,260

1,653,700

699,612

954,088

895,374

203,884

191,490

Ukranian, Ruthenian, Hutzan

68,252

7,092

61,160

Gipsy

66,882

13,699

53,183

Russian

45,029

16,509

28,520

Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian

43,057

6,287

36,770

Jiddish

34,337

30,962

3,375

Tartar

20,574

5,624

14,950

Slovakian

18,935

2,928

16,007

Turkish

14,228

8,860

5,368

Bulgarian

13,189

1,527

11,662

6,196

1,967

4,229

29,011

21,887

7,124

Hungarian
German

Czech
Other languages and non-stated

Urban
areas-*-

*This Table is taken from Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book
1964 (Rumanian People's Republic:
Central Statistical Board, 1964),
p. 23.
■^Including population of localities listed as urban.
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TABLE X I *

RUMANIAN AND TRANSYLVANIAN POPULATION GROWTH
I N RURAL AND URBAN AREAS
(1930-1966)

Area**
Rumania
(Including
Transylvania)
Urban areas
Rural areas

Dec.29,1930 Jan.25,1948 Feb.21,1956 M a r . 15,1966
14,280,729

15,872,624

17,489,450

19,105,056

3,051,253
11,229,476

3,713,139
12,159,485

5,474,264
12,015,186

7,305,303
11,799,753

1,178,976
244,670
934,306

1,189,646
289,412
900,234

1,195,871
485,656
710,215

1,285,313
587,859
697,454

Brasov (Brass^)
Urban areas
Rural areas

776,092
169,566
606,526

851,397
235,116
616,281

981,913
463,632
518,281

1,106,862
646,858
460,004

Cluj (Kolozs)
Urban areas
Rural areas

990,423
185,912
804,511

1,060,699
213,658
847,041

1,153,076
323,732
829,344

1,207,488
434,980
772,508

Crisana (Krisana)
Urban areas
Rural areas

801,487
109,725
691,762

807,247
110,467
696,780

848,272
236,937
611,335

852,025
310,861
541,164

Hunedoara (Hunyad)
Urban areas
Rural areas

503,111
62,653
440,458

495,003
76,852
418,151

572,963
273,146
299,817

670,298
391,706
278,592

Maramures (Mdramaros)
Urban areas
Rural areas

625,273
112,838
512,435

641,127
105,200
535,927

712,567
200,426
512,141

796,329
297,447
498,882

Mures (Maros)
Magyar Autonomous
Urban areas
Rural areas

659,251
78,054
581,197

703,401
90,767
612,634

767,650
181,524
586,126

818,968
244,191
574,777

Transylvanian regions:
Banat
Urban areas
Rural areas

*This Table is based on "Communique on the Preliminary Results
of the Population and Housing Census of March 15, 1966," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, No.18 (Oct. 15, 1966), p. 15.
**The population for 1930 is calculated for the post-World War
II area of Rumania.
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Transylvanian enterprises is hard to come by for those of Hungarian
ethnic background.
Members of the Hungarian minority are urged to find work in
areas outside Transylvania, in the "Old" kingdom (i.e., Moldavia and
W a l l a c h i a ) .205

This is particularly the case if the individual Hunga

rian is highly trained or educated, and therefore would occupy a lead
ing position.

For such individuals employment opportunities are closed

in areas where Hungarian workers still make up an important segment of
the labor f o r c e . T h e

purpose of this restriction seems to be twofold:

first to disperse the Hungarian minority as much as possible, and second
to deprive those Hungarians still concentrated in specific areas of
their leaders.

Even in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, this policy

had been p r a c t i c e d . H o w e v e r ,

dispersion has reached its most

^ ^ A s h b r o o k , "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p.
18073; "Az Erdelyi Magyarsdg Helyzete," News From Hungary, X (Radio
Free Europe, July 24, 1964), 2; F.K., "Romdnia Sztintesse Meg az
Erddlyi Magyarok UldSzdsdt!" Katolikus Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 21,
1964, pp. 1,5.
Some of the tactics used to discourage Hungarians from
seeking w o r k in Transylvania include— according to some of the above
sources--pay discrimination and the outright rejection of Hungarian
applicants to firms which already have 50% Hungarian employees.
^ ^ I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority
Problem in Rumania," p. 75; "Az Erddlyi Magyarsdg Helyzete," pp. 1-2.
^®^Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p.
18073; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," p. 4.
^®^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This is also
indicated by a name analysis of the Conference of Intellectuals of
the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region held during the Spring of 1964.
Such a name analysis— carried out with due care— can verify this
trend toward "Rumanization" of the leading cadres of the autonomous
region.
One article open to such analysis is provided by L. Deaky
and N. Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia
(March 3, 1964) translated in Rumanian Press Survey, N o . 426 (Radio
Free Europe, March 18, 1964), pp. 2-8.
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advanced stage in the border strip area in cities like Oradea

2 08

(Nagyv^rad) and Satu-Mare (Szatm^rndmeti).

Urbanization, artificially accelerated by industrialization,
has brought with it the vexing problem of housing.
industry lagged behind the others,

209

Since the building

it was evident that housing for

the increased labor population had to be solved by means other than
the construction of new buildings.

Since the existing facilities were

far from adequate, even with the total utilization of all living
space, the CPR undertook a policy of 'deportations."210

were

"useless" (i.e., unproductive) because of old-age, chronic illness, or
other causes, were to be moved out of the cities to make room for the
workers which were brought in from other a r e a s ^

As the city popula

tions have been traditionally Hungarian, German and Jewish, the depor
tation of anyone was bound to affect the minorities adversely.

This

was particularly so for the Hungarians who composed the largest segment
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International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority
Problem in Rumania," pp. 75, 77.
^®^George H. Bossy, "Industry," in Romania ed. Fischer-Galati,
pp. 306-307. This lag in the building industry is also admitted
inadvertantly by the propaganda pamphlet A Glorious Anniversary: The
Rumanian People *s Republic on the Road of Building Socialism
(Bucharest, Rumania;
Agerpres, 1964), p. 22, where the unknown
author boasts that:
"From State funds alone, nearly 162,000 flats
were built in the first few years of the Six-Year Plan, compared with
125,000 in the 1951-1959 period."
^■*-®Bossy, "Industry," pp. 317-319; Wolff, The Balkans in Our
T i m e , p. 462.
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Ibid., pp. 461-462; Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in
Rumania, pp. 115-116, 119.
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of Transylvania's urban inhabitants.
The replacements for these deportees were inevitably Rumanians.
In this w a y the Hungarian population of the cities has been greatly
reduced in proportion to the Rumanian inhabitants.

This trend has

also been accentuated by tying smaller towns and communes into the
administrative jurisdiction of certain c i t i e s . T a b l e

IX demon

strates the tremendous growth of the major Transylvanian cities since
the end of World War II.

These figures plus those of Tables X and XI

indicate that the rapid increase in the Rumanian urban population has
reduced, and in some instances destroyed, the Hungarian character of
most Transylvanian cities.
The foregoing demonstrates that the industrialization of Tran
sylvania has brought wit h it "Rumanization" as well.

While it m a y be

argued that this was merely a side-effect of the process, the methods
used to attain this result indicate that the CPR planners were aware
of the impact that these policies would have on the nationalities.

It

is possible that in the early years of industrialization this "sideeffect" was indeed unintended, but the more recent restrictions on
employment of Hungarians and their purposeful dispersal throughout the
country testify that this is no longer the c a s e . ^ ^

The fact that

2 12

International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian
Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 74; Baum, The Labor Force of R u m ania,
pp. 15-16.
■^According to Ashbrook, "Ehenic and Political Persecution in
Rumania," p. 18073, the extent of the dispersal of Hungarians by the
year 1964, is estimated to have affected 35 to 50 per cent of the
Transylvanian Hungarians.
This means that Hungarians not living in
their own areas is now possibly as high as 850,000.
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Rumania (in defiance of Comecon) plans to accelerate its industrializa
tion program, makes the position of the Hungarian minority all the more
precarious.

If industrialization has already caused great damage to

the Hungarian minority position with the country still devoted mainly
to agriculture, it is evident that they can expect only more of the
O 1J

same as the CPR pushes to reach complete industrialization by 1975.
This all the more so, since Transylvania provides the major possibili
ties for the further expansion of industry.

Social Organization
The inter-relation between rural and urban growth is stressed
time after time by Party leaders.

They also stress that these

developments in the economy have immediate effects on social relation
ships and nationality problems.215

Because they see social and economic

problems so closely intertwined, they are constantly involved in the
regulation of social relations.

At the present time, the Party carries

on this regulation directly through government action and also in
directly through numerous front organizations.

Among these the

Socialist Unity Front plays a part in generating mass support for Party

^■^Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization
of the Population," p. 8 ; "Harmonious, Balanced Development of
Rumanian Economy," p. 8 ; David Binder, "Rumania Adheres to Industry
Plan;" J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps out of Line," Survey, No. 49
(October, 1963), p. 20.
21 S
JCeausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administra
tive Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of
Romania," pp. 1-30.
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policies.

However, the labor unions, youth and student associations

and women's organizations, are more specialized and therefore also more
effective in guiding social behavior.

216

At the same time, the Party has tried to eliminate all com
peting groups and associations in society which have made claims on the
guidance of human behavior.

The churches of the various religious

denominations have been the major victims of the Party's drive to
establish its control-monopoly over society.

The elimination of the

churches deserves more in-depth analysis, since their fate was--and is
today, in a less sweeping way--tied to the existence of the national
groups in Transylvania.
The position of the churches and religions of Transylvania is
unique in two ways.

First, they are subject to suppression, both as

institutions and as advocates of doctrines by a regime that is deter
mined to control both the realms of organization and thought.

Second,

the religions of Transylvania and their respective churches composed
the last possible organizational area where national "particularism"
and "isolationism" (the first stages of "bourgeois nationalism") were
able to find sanctuary.

Consequently, the Communist Rumanian regime

endeavored to destroy the churches— while other institutions like the

Gregorian, "A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt - A Ndp Vezetdje
A Szocializmus tfpitdsdben" in A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt Politikdj^nak
IddszerG Probldmdi (Bukarest:
Politikai KOnyvkiadd, 1967), pp. 2758; P. Velica, "A Pdrt ds a Tflmeg - ds Tdrsadalmi Szervezetek" in Az
RKP Szervezeti Szabdlyzata (Bukarest:
Politikai KOnyvkiadd, 1967),
pp. 168-190.
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schools, it desired "only" to c o n t r o l . F o r

the purposes of this

study, the position of the churches as the last bulwark of "national
particularism" is of primary importance.
In Transylvania, national divisions closely parallel religious
divisions.While

the Hungarian and German inhabitants are, almost

to a man, either Roman Catholic or Protestant, the Rumanians are,
almost to a man, either Rumanian Orthodox or Uniate
lie.

219

(Greek) Catho-

This division reflects the Western historical orientation of

the Germans and Hungarians, and the Eastern and Balkan (Byzantine)
historical orientation of the Rumanians.
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As a result, the two

^ ^ I t would be more correct to state that the CPR wished to
destroy the respective churches and then to gain control of the remain
ing vestiges.
Raoul Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania,"
Journal of Central European A f f a i r s , XV (July, 1955), 162, makes this
clear when he states that "The first concern of the Communist govern
ment was to secure the compliance of the entire Orthodox clergy, from
the highest prelate to the most humble village curate.
It was hoped
that the prestige of the Church might thus be used on behalf of the
government's aims without resorting, if possible, to spectacular legis
lative measures that could not fail to dismay public opinion." Emil
Ciurea, "Religious Life," in Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu
(New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 167 and Persecution
of Religion in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Rumanian National Committee,
1949), p. 30, present a similar viewpoint.
^ ® B o s s y , "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania," p. 161;
M i M o s Veto, "Kremlin and Vatican," Survey, No. 48 (July, 1963), p. 164.
^ ^ I b i d .; Gordon H. Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites,” Inter
national J ournal, XVII (Autumn, 1962), 387; Wolff, The Balkans in Our
Time, pp. 559-561; Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 132-134, 136-137.
^ % o l f f , The Balkans in Our Ti m e , pp. 72-73, 560, indicates that
the Uniate (Greek) Catholic Church came into existence at the end of
the seventeenth century as a result of "pressure from the Hungarian and
Austrian Catholic churches" which caused Transylvanian Rumanians to
abandon the Orthodox faith and to recognize the Pope's supremacy. As
they point out, however, the Transylvanian Uniate Church finally
enabled the Rumanians to foster a more Western orientation.
In fact,
it was these Transylvanian Rumanians who led Rumanian orientation toward
France, rather than the Balkans or Russia. With their "re-incorporation"
into the Orthodox fold, the Rumanians have even lost this link with the
West.
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million Rumanian Orthodox and the 1,600,000 Uniate (Greek) Catholics
of Transylvania see their national existence as dependent on the fate
of Rumanians south and east of the Carpathians in the R egat.
1,050,000

The

Roman Catholics and 1,150,000 Protestants, on the other

hand, find their destiny to be more closely tied to the West, particularly to Hungary.

221

(See Table XII.)

The influence of the respective churches in molding these ori
entations was determined by the role of the churches as preservers
and defenders of national cultures.

All the churches, without excep

tion, provided the inhabitants of Transylvania not only with spiritual
solace, but also with social, cultural and educational opportunities,
as well as charitable and welfare institutions.

222

They played an

important part in the daily lives of the people and provided the guidoo o

ance which the Communist state monopolizes at the present.

J

Thus,

^•^The religious statistics are based on a comparison and
evaluation of data taken from: Veto, "Kremlin and Vatican," p. 164;
Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 559-561; Fischer-Galati, Roma n i a ,
pp. 132-137; and Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166. The numbers
arrived at above are only rough estimates.
Because Communist census
takers ignore religious affiliation, it is impossible to obtain more
exact figures.
222

Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 136-137, presents some of this.
However, his conclusion differs from that presented in this study
insofar that he considered the role of the churches to be "essentially
spiritual and certainly apolitical." While this may have held true
for the religious life of "historic" Rumania (i.e., the Regat), this
was not the case in Transylvania.
This is demonstrated by C. A.
Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 299-306.
2 2 *3

JEven in the realm of "folk" art, the influence of the
churches is quite perceptible.
A good
example of this
isthe combina
tion of "folk" motifs and more formal art in the decoration of some
churches in Wallachia and Moldavia. See for example, Monuments of
Religious Art in Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania:
"Carpati" National
Travel Office, /n.d./).
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TABLE X I I

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF RUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA
1930-1955 (IN THOUSANDS )3

Religion

Transylvaniah
1930

1930

Orthodox
Greek Catholic
(Uniate)
Roman Catholic
Calvinist
Lutheran
Unitarian
Baptist
Armeno-Gregorian
Seventh Day Adventist
Christians of the Old Rite
Moslem
Jewish
Other

1,932
1,385

13,108
1,427

947
696
274
38

1,234
711
399
69
61

----

----

193
13

185
757
106

Total

5,548

18,057

68

0

Rumania 0
1938
13,000
1,400

1955
13,700^
1,400

1,275
700
400
70
50
50
15
50
180
750
__ e

1,000

575
250
70
50
25
15
25
30
175
__ e

17,940f 16,315f

aFor data concerning the religious composition of Rumania and
Transylvania in 1930, this Table is based on Recensamintul Populatiei
Rominiei Din 29 Decembrie 1930, pp. 70-73.
For the 1938 and 1955 data,
this Table is
based on the estimates provided in
Stephen Fischer-Galati,
"Religion" in
Romania, pp. 132, 135-37.
^Including the

areas of Crisana, Maramures and the Banat.

c 1930
and 1938 statistics pertain to the expanded area of inter
war Rumania.
1955 statistics pertain to the present-day area of the
country.
^The estimates of the number of Orthodox and Greek Catholic
believers have been provided in spite of the "official" Communist spon
sored merger of the two religions in 1949.
In that year, the number of
adherents of the "united" Rumanian Orthodox Church was estimated at
13,900,000.
eUnfortunately, the estimates for 1938 and 1955, do not include
the number of non-believers, individuals without religion, and assorted
"others." However, it is probably safe to say that around 500,000
people would have fallen under the "other" listing in 1955— mainly
Communist Party members.
^These totals are merely the sum of the listed religious
adherents. They are not an accurate reflection of the country's total
population either for 1938 or 1955.
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the churches were not merely religious institutions, but they also
provided social, national and even political identification for the
inhabitants of Transylvania.
The importance of the national-cultural position of the
churches became evident in the inter-war years, when the Roman Catholic,
Calvinist and Unitarian Churches strove to further Hungarian learning
and culture in Transylvania in spite of the Rumanian government’s re
strictions .224

Recollecting this inter-war role of the Churches, the

Communists were quick to attack them following Groza's successful
seizure of power.

The churches were not to be tolerated as refuges

for "national particularism" and "isolationism."

Furthermore, they

would not be allowed to share with the CPR the right to educate the
inhabitants of Transylvania.

The Party could not bear or afford the

competition of the churches in the struggle for the minds of men;
thu s , they had to be destroyed.
Determined to seize complete control of all phases of life, the
Party set out to deprive the churches of their role in education,
charity, welfare and social intercourse.225

^his was done through a

dual process which utilized "legal" as well as extra-legal methods.

224Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. pp. 299-306.
29 s
-\Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 138, maintains that only after
the establishment of the R.P.R. in December 1947, did the regime begin
the "systematic" subjugation of the churches.
He also maintains (p.
146) that religious persecution had "generally been unnecessary,"
except for recalcitrant Uniates and Catholics.
However, other sources
point to the persecution of all religions. See Persecution of Religion
in Rum a n i a , p. 35.
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All religions suffered from these Communist tactics, regardless of the
nationality of their adherents.226

However, there were tactical dif

ferences in the treatment of the respective religions which, in the
long-run, worked to the detriment of the churches of the national
minorities, while they enhanced the position of the Rumanian Orthodox
Church relative to the others.
Although religious persecution was supposedly not directed
against the national minorities, its results definitely affected them
adversely.

The Party attacked all religions and its persecution

spared none, yet it still caused the greatest damage to the position of
the Transylvanian minority churches.

In the long-run, this means that

the "proletarian internationalist" government of Groza and GheorghiuDej achieved, perhaps inadvertantly, a greater stroke for the cause of
"Rumanization" than all the efforts of the bourgeois nationalist
administrations of the inter-war years.

They destroyed a bulwark of

ethnic minority strength, which in the past provided the cultural and
educational possibilities and the social opportunities needed for
nat iona 1 surviva 1.^27

^^ I b i d .; Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166; Wolff, The Balkans
in Our T i m e , p. 550.
^^^Regardless of what the motive was that brought about the
above delineated religious persecutions, it has not brought better
understanding in its wake between Rumanians and Hungarians.
Hugh
Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1951), p. 342, points out that:
"Even if Hungarian
peasants are no longer to be persecuted for being Hungarians, they are
liable to be persecuted for being kulaks, or for being Catholics, or
for being 'reactionary.' Will the average man distinguish the motives
for which he is maltreated, or prefer one form to another?"
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Rumanian society, has in this way achieved centralized direc
tion over human behavior.

The Party lays down the standards and its

front organizations have the task of inculcating and enforcing them.
The organizations perform this task with just as much ritualism and
rigidity as some of the churches were guilty of in the past.
they are organizations with a Rumanian national character.

However,
None of

them can be accused of providing one or the other national minorities
with preferred treatment.

Certainly all of them stress that the

Rumanian Socialist Republic is the home and guardian of all the peoples
w h o reside within its borders.

These front organizations, on the other

hand, are all predominantly Rumanian in membership and leadership.
Thus, unlike the churches which they have replaced, they do not look
after the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Hungarians or
other nationalities.

They serve only the CPR, and more recently, this

also means that they serve Rumanian nationalist interests as well.

In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina
The league of Communists of Yugoslavia, like its Rumanian
counterpart, also desired to transform drastically the existing social
and economic relations.

Its control of this transformation had far-

reaching consequences for the Hungarians living in the Vojvodina.

Agriculture and Collectivization
Long before the Communist seizure of power, it was a central
tenet of the Party's nationality policy, that the uneven rate of
economic development throughout the country was the major cause for
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national antagonisms.

OOQ
°

Two means of eradicating these antagonisms

were the more equitable distribution of land and collectivization.
These policies are contradictory, yet the CPY resorted to both.

First

it initiated a vast program of land reform, which it later negated-at least temporarily— with an ambitious program of collectivization.
Land reform and collectivization were not undertaken merely to
augment the CPY's nationality policy.

Collectivization was an end in

itself, necessary for transforming Yugoslavia into a Communist state.
Land reform, on the other hand, was a means of consolidating the polit
ical position of the CPY.

It enabled the Party to punish its enemies,

reward its friends and gain support from the landless peasantry.229
In other words, the agricultural policies of the LCY/CPY were from the
beginning molded by ideological and pragmatic considerations, besides
concern for an effective nationality policy.
However, the P a r t y ’s agricultural policies faced immense
obstacles.

The country had suffered extensively from World War II.

According to Zalar, 40.2% of the plows, 66.5% of the tractors, and
69.7% of the threshing machines had been destroyed in the course of
the war.

Furthermore, livestock had decreased by 55 to 6 0 % . ^ ®

Added

to this was the fact that the vast majority of the population depended

^ ® K o c a Joncid, "The Relations between Nationalities in Yugo
slavia," Studies, No. 24 (Beograd: Medunarodna Stampa - Interpress,
1967), pp. 12-28.
229
230

Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 137-139.
I b i d ., p. 142; Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , p. 323.
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on. agriculture for a livelihood.

To make things even more difficult,

this livelihood was based— for the most part--on land holdings that
were too small to permit the application of modern agricultural
methods.

According to Zalar "the average holding was slightly more

than five hectares or about 12.5 acres."

231

At first, the Party turned to land reform as the solution.

But

from the beginning it considered land reform mainly as a tactical move.
In this respect the redistribution of land in the immediate post-war
years, parallels closely the Rumanian land reforms undertaken about
this time.

In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, the major loser in the

"reforms" was the German mxncrxty.
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Wtixle thxs redxstrxbutxon had

nationwide implications, its impact was most sweeping in the Vojvodina.
There, the richest farmlands were to be had and they were in the
possession of non-Slavic nationalities.
On August 23, 1945 the Provisional People's Assembly enacted
the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization.

233

As the title of this

piece of legislation indicates, more was intended than the expropria
tion of estates exceeding a certain

s i z e .

^4

The "reform" had as its

O 0*1

JJ-Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138.
^■^Colakovid, et aJL., A JugoszlAy Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rttvid
Tdrtdnete, pp. 456-458; Theodor Schieder (ed.) Das Schicksal der
Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen
aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bundes-Ministerium fQr Vertriebene, Flfichtlinge
und Kriegsgesch&digte; Bonn:
Oscar Leiner Druck K.G., 1961), Band V.
233

Ibid.; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138.

234 ... .
Ibxd.
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aim also the outright confiscation of the lands of "enemies of the
people," "collaborators" and expelled Germans (Volksdeutsche).

Since

most of Yugoslavia's German population was concentrated in the Vojvodina,
it became the major setting for both land confiscation and land distri
bution.

The Vojvodina's German population— which had composed about

one-third of the area's total population— was forced to give up all its
land holdings.
country.

These covered some of the most fertile parts of the

Out of a total reform "land pool” of 1,611,867 hectares, more

than half--876,692 hectares--had been confiscated from the Germans and
"other enemies of the people."235
The lands confiscated from the Germans, together with the ex235

propriations of large estates,

were then either distributed among

landless peasants or turned into vast state farms.

Of the total,

791,755 hectares were distributed among 330,250 families, while
820,029 hectares were kept by the state to build up its socialist
sector in agriculture through the creation of collective farms and
state farms.

2 ¥7

Both of these consequences had long-range adverse

effects on the position of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

The ill

effects stemmed from the pro-Slavic distribution of the confiscated
lands.

Since priority was given to those who had taken part in the

23*5

JIbid.: Schieder, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien,

Band V.
JDAs Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138, points out, only
11,000 estates were larger than 50 hectares.
237

I b i d .. p. 139.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

234

partisan struggle against the Germans, few Hungarians obtained any
land.

Most of the German lands were taken over by landless South Slavs,

who were brought in from great distances to replace the expelled
Germans.

Just from the poverty-stricken areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina

and Montenegro, sixty thousand families were resettled in the Voj-

vodina.^®
This vast shift in population meant not only that the Vojvodina's national composition became almost three-fourths South Slav, but
also that in the newly created state farms and collective farms the
South Slavs were given a dominant position.

This became evident par

ticularly when the process of collectxvxzatxon get underway xn earnest.
Unlike the East-Central European satellites of the U.S.S.R.,
Yugoslavia began this process almost immediately with the termination
of hostilities.

In record time, the Yugoslavs hoped to achieve the

same degree of collectivization (relatively speaking) as the Soviet
Union had achieved over a period of two or three decades.

However, at

the very outset they encountered a great deal of resistance.

The land-

hungry peasantry was not easily convinced that collective and state

238This policy of colonization closely parallels the less
ambitious inter-war policies of settling dobrovoljci along the northern
frontiers of the Vojvodina.
See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors,
pp. 401-403, 426-428 and compare with Colakovic, et: al., A Jugszldv
Kommunista SzBvetsdg Rffvid Tflrt&iete, pp. 456-457; Wolff, The Balkans
in Our T i m e , p. 164.
One very telling example of the extensiveness of
this colonization can be found in the little village of Ruskoe Selo
(Kis Orosz) in the Banat.
Prior to World War II, it had one street
called "ndmet utca" (German Street) because Germans lived on it. After
the war it was renamed "bosznydk utca" (Bosnian Street) for the new
occupants who have replaced the Germans.
The village--excepting the
above named street--is overwhelmingly Hungarian.
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farms were in the best interest of all c o n c e r n e d . M u c h

coercion

and a great deal of economic pressure had to be used to reach 39% collectivization of all the land surface by 1950-1951,
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and 22 % of the

arable land by 1952.2 4 ^
The drive to collectivization hit the Vojvodina hardest, with
Macedonia a close second.

Together, these two areas by 1958 had 58% of

their arable land collectivized, which was almost three times the
highest rate of collectivization reached by the nation as a whole one
year later.

242

This by itself does not mean that collectivization was

used to subjugate some of the lesser nationalities of Yugoslavia, but
it does indicate that the Hungarians among others in the Vojvodina-through design or coincidence— again suffered the most from governmental
p olicies.
Fortunately, in the instance of these policies the government
itself realized that it had undertaken a self-defeating policy.

In

subsequent years it eased the pressure to collectivize, and this enabled
many peasants to leave the collectives into which they had been forced.
This re-evaluation of agricultural policies, came only after the
droughts of 1950 and 1952, and the alarming drop in livestock, showed
the weaknesses of collective agriculture.

2 2 ^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp.

Party leaders, have ever

139-140.

2 4 0Ibid .. p. 141.
2 4 -*-Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , p. 435.
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Ibid., p. 430, footnote 21.
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since blamed these early errors on over-centralized decision making
and bureaucratism.

243

The solution, more recently, has been left to

Republican level planning.

While this has b y no means terminated the

Yugoslav desire to socialize agricultural relations, it has reduced
the socialist sector as well as the efforts made to expand it.
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At the present writing (1970) agriculture in Yugoslavia is
based on a wide variety of land ownership.

State farms, numerous types

of collectives and private farms all indicate that a more pragmatic
approach prevails.

It is true that the Party encourages the expansion

of the socialist sector, but it no longer resorts to outright coercive
tactics and forced deliveries.
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Preference for the socialist sector

is evident mainly in taxing policies.
For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, as for all the other
peoples of Yugoslavia, this means a more tolerable relationship with
the government and also higher living standards.

Hungarian farmers who

have been able to remain independent are allowed to own 17 hectares of
land.

If more hands are available in the family it is possible to own
O A£

twice as much.

°

^^joncid,
pp. 22-23.

While more people in the Vojvodina are in the

"The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia,"

^ S f o l f f , The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 429-439; Pdter LSrinc,
"A Vajdasdgi Nagybirtok ds a Hare a Fblddrt," H i d , No. 4 (April, 1955),
698-703; IvAnka Ivkovid, "A Vajdasdgi Falukban Vdgbemend Tdrsadalmi ds
Gazdasdgi Vdltozdsok Ndhdny Jellegzetessdge," H i d , No. 4 (April, 1963),
474-487.
^ ^ D e n n i s o n I. Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia," American
Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Europe Series, XI
(June, 1964), 21-22.
^ ^ D a t a based on a personal conversation with a Hungarian
peasant in the Banat during the summer of 1966.
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socialist sector than in any other part of the country, membership in
those collectives has affected Serbs and other nationalities just as
negatively, or just as positively, as the Hungarians.

Only in the

drawing of the collective farm boundaries across nationality lines,
have the results been unfavorable for the Hungarians. This practice
has been responsible for some erosion of their ethnic solidarity.
this is still negligible.

But,

Most of the assimilation takes place in the

urban areas rather than on the f a r m . ^ ^
In summary, we can conclude that agricultural policies have
not been detrimental to the Hungarians in recent years.

Aside from the

inevitable integrative force of collective agricultural enterprises,
no policy in this area threatens them with assimilation.

The immediate

post-World War II policies did most of the damage, especially the
"land-reform."

In a real sense, these policies led to a recolonization

of the Vojvodina which placed South Slavs onto the rich lands vacated
by the Germans.

Industry and the Nationalities
Since the Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area of
Yugoslavia, very little can be said about the impact of its industrialization.
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On the other hand, the industrialization which is taking

^ ^ I n f o r m a t i o n based on personal observations and numerous con
versations with Hungarians in Novi Sad, Subotica, Sombor, Senta,
Srbobran, and Kikinda.
^ ® J a c k C. Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multi-National State (San
Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), p. 109.
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place throughout Yugoslavia has important cjnsequences for the nation
ality policy of the LCY.

As Koca Joncid, a deputy to the Yugoslav

Federal Chamber of Nationalities, pointed out:
In view both of overcoming certain adverse heritages and
providing optimum prospects for the development of the Yugoslav
community, it is to be remembered that economic relations form
the essence of inter-national relations.
The basic instrument
of Yugoslavia's economic development is income distribution
according to working results— a distribution practised in the
basic production units— which enables the producers to take an
active part not only in production but also in distribution.
Parallelly, a process of economic, voluntary, conscious integra
tion evolves as a form of concentration of product ion.
Joncid is saying among other things, that the right type of economic
and productive relations will lead to the right nationality policies.
Effective integration of the economy will produce internationality
solidarity.
Industrialization, unlike agriculture, has been more easily
dominated, directed and controlled by the state.

Thus, it has been

used even more effectively by the state to guide both social and n a 
tionality relations.

The LCY has on numerous occasions stressed that

economic development of backward areas of the country must take place
if nationality conflicts are to be reduced.

To this end, the Yugoslav

government has made special efforts to industrialize and modernize the
undeveloped republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Monte
negro, as well as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.

^“^ J o n c i d , "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia,"
p. 36.
^®Ibid_., p. 30, footnote 5.
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To achieve such industrialization, it has had to depend on the assis
tance and contributions of the already developed parts of the country,
including the Vojvodina.

However, this policy of "taking from the

rich to help the poor," has not been popular with the developed areas
of the country.

Some contend that it has created moire discord than

solidarity
The leaders of modern Yugoslavia believe that this policy wili
ultimately solve the country's nationality problems.

Thus, to obtain

machinery for their new industrial enterprizes in Montenegro and
Macedonia, they have had to trade on the international market the raw
materials and foodstuffs coming from the Vojvodina, Croatia or
Slovenia.

At least in the Vojvodina this has had some adverse effects.

It has kept the area predominantly agricultural.
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This, in turn,

with the extensive mechanization of agriculture in the latter part of
the 1950's and the 1960's, has led to unemployment--or excess labor—
in the Vojvodina.

Only by moving to other parts of Yugoslavia can

these unemployed find jobs.

Lately, the solution has been to go to

the West to seek employment, mainly in German factories.

2S3

Both these

^-**Most of the present economic policies--by allowing for d e 
centralized decision-making--seem to be based partly on this assump
tion.
See Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia," pp. 19-25 and Zaninovich,
The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, pp. 114-135.
9 S9

Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational S t a t e , p. 109,

^-^Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, p.
159, maintains that 250,000 Yugoslavs now hold temporary jobs in
Western European countries.
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alternatives are less than ideal from the perspective of the retention
of Hungarian ethnicity.

Employment in Yugoslavia outside the boun

daries of the Vojvodina puts excessive pressure on the individual to
Slavicize.

Employment in Western Europe reduces the size, and thereby

the influence of the Hungarian population of the Vojvodina.
The limited economic opportunities in the Hungarian areas are
indicated in part, by the difficulty the state has in finding employ
ment for those w h o end their schooling after the eighth grade.

In the

town of Senta (Zenta) in 1965, out of a graduating class of 400, one
hundred students did not continue their studies.
also failed to find employment in Senta.2^

These 100 students

In the following year it

was expected that 500 students would be graduating, and about half of
them would not continue their studies and would be unable to find
jobs in the town.

255

A similar situation prevails in Subotica

(Szabadka) where students leaving school also find themselves among
the unemployed.^56

Circumstances of this kind would indicate that

industrialization in Slavic parts of Yugoslavia has been possible at
the expense of economic stagnation in some others, among them the
Hungarian towns of the Vojvodina.

257

2 -^Zolt^n Hatala, "A Zentai Fiataloknak Nines Hoi Mesters^get
Tanulniuk," Dolgoz 6k No. 28, July 8 , 1966, p. 4.

255ibid.
256Tibor Kolozsi, "Az Ipari Tanuldk Sorsa," 1_ Nap No. 30,
July 22, 1966, p. 11.
2-^This is particularly true for the largest Hungarian city,
Subotica (Szabadka). During the interwar years it was the third
largest city of Yugoslavia after Belgrade and Zagreb.
In the post-war
period its population declined.
Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational
S t a t e , pp. 107-109.
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The lack of major industrial expansion in the Vojvodina has
meant that very little urban growth has taken place.

With the excep

tion of Novi Sad (Ujvid^K), the seat of the Provincial government, no
other municipality has a population of 100,000 or over.

In part, this

can be explained by the unique nature of Yugoslav industrialization.
As Dragoljub Milivojevirf points out, in Yugoslavia "industrialization,
which has been developing intensively since the war, did not have a
substantive influence on urbanization.
located far from the city sections."
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The new factories were often
Often, they were located in

such out of the way places as Montenegro, which has no urban center to
speak o f .2 ' 9

Social Organization
That urbanization has not taken place in the Vojvodina--with
the limited exception of Novi Sad— is indicated by Table XIH, which
reviews the evolution of the population in some of the larger munici
palities of the Vojvodina.
something else.

These population figures also reveal

They show that while urbanization has not taken place,

Serbianization h a s .

It is true that Serbianization has been most

dramatic in Novi Sad, the largest city, but it is also apparent that
the cities which have not been touched with urbanization have also

258"The Yugoslav Commune," Studies, No. 8 (Beograd:
Medunarodna Politika, 1965), p. 36.
2 SQ

In the past decade this process has been reversed by the
process of economic decentralization.
See Zaninovich, The Development
of Socialist Yugoslavia, pp. 114-135; Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia,"
pp. 19-25; Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 123=125.
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undergone changes in their national composition in favor of the South
Slavs.

260

For example, the Serb population of Zrenjanin (Nagy-

becskerek) has risen from 45% to 54.2%.

A similar trend can be found

in most of the other municipalities of the Vojvodina, not excluding
small villages . ^ 1
The change in the ethnic composition of these towns is due
mostly to colonization, although intermarriage and assimilation has
also taken its toll.

A close look at the statistics provided by Table

XIII will show that the rise of South Slav percentages, particularly
that of the Serbs, is closely related to the drastic post-war decline
of the German population.

This is even the case in Novi Sad.

In the

latter instance, however, a substantial shift in population has taken
place since 1948.

As Table XIII shows, the percentage of Hungarians

has dropped from 27.9 to 20.8, while the Serbs have increased from
59.5 to 66.6 percent of the population.

In the latter instance

urbanization and assimilation can be used to explain the shift.
While assimilation of one nationality by another is officially

260ihis Serbianization is also born out in a negative way by
religious data concerning some of these cities.
It is known, for
example, that Novi Sad's Catholic population dropped from 50,280 in
1941 to 43,436 in 1961, that Apatin's Catholics diminished from
34,689 in 1941 to 19,892 in 1961.
See Schematismus Cleri Apostolicae
Baciensis Administraturae (Subotica;
Procudebat Typographia Panonia,
1961), p. 37.
^ ^ S e e footnote 238 above.
262

121

.

Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, p. 107-109,
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TABLE X I I I

*

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FOUR SELECTED CITIES OF THE VOJVODINA
(1880-1965)

Census
year

Total
pop.

Number of;**
Hung.
Serbs

Croats

Gem.

Percentage of:
Hung.
S-Slav

Gem,

Name of town:
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1921
1931
1948
1953
1966

Novi Sad (Uividdk)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,119
21,325
5,517
8,790
5,159
7,804
9,608
5,996
24,717
10,321
9,889
562 6,483
29,296
13,343
33,590
11,594
624 5,918
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE
39,122
13,065
16,071
6,486
17,354 23,137
63,985
7,494 9,116
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY)
2 1,0 0 0
75,158
36,520
8,407
1,390
83,180
8,637
1,200
22,375 42,205
120,000
25,000 80,000***
1,300

26.9
31.6
35.2
39.7

42.8
38.9
35.6
36.4

25.1
24.3

33.4
27.1

41.0
48.0

6.5
14.3

27.9
26.8

59.5
66.5

1.9
1.5

2 0.8

66.6

1.1

18.9
23.3
35.1
35.2

40.3
36.4
32.1
34.5

32.4
36.0
30.5
26.1

27.3
26.9

39.0
45.0

28.6
24.8

40.3
37.7

51.5
54.2

2.1
1.8

22.1

17.6

Name of town;
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1921
1931
1948
1953
1965

Zrenianin (Nagybecskerek)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,666
19,529
3,639
7,868
6,356
5,116
8,020
7,874
21,934
9,288
8,091
707 8,055
26,407
9,148
26,006
8,934
73 6,811
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE
27,522
10,712
7,508
7,888
32,831
9,189
12,470
859 8,164
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY)
15,538
19,179
711
792
38,591
16,683 22,619
800
44,199
859
59,000****
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TABLE XIII (Continued)*

Census
year

Total
pop.

Number of:**
Hung.
Serbs

Croats

Germ.

Percentage of:
Hung.
S-Slav

Germ

Name of town;
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1921
1931
1948
1953
1965

Senta (Zenta)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,938
21,200
17,877
1,876
447
362
23,013
2,228
25,725
245
28,588
25,731
2,379
7
27,221
2,020
5
29,666
177
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE
310
30,694
26,529
2,857
412
25,924
4,181
454
31,969
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY)
32
20,898
3,536
169
25,277
21,238
3,324
206
35
25,524
2 2 ,000 ****

8.8

2.1

8.7
8.1

1.4
.9

7.4

.6

87.0
81.1

9.3
14.5

1.0

82.5
81.7

14.6
15.4

.1
.1

15.0
15.5
37.3
22.3

60.7
56.4
32.6
54.5

22.9
25.2
32.5
21.9

16.0
18.7

58.6
56.5

22.5
20.4

24.1
24.1

70.6
70.3

1.4
1.3

1.3

Name of town;
1869
1880
1890
1900
1910
1921
1931
1948
1953
1965

Kikinda (Nagykikinda)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
18,834
19,845
2,960
11,023
4,531
5,719
22,768
3,519
12,870
8,055
24,843
9,288
8,091
70
5,968
14,148
13
5,855
26,795
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE
5,774
25,774
4,122
15,060
3,803
28,400
5,333
15,530
483
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY)
408
6,922 20,276
264
28,667
7,122 20,796
245
400
29,570
33,000****

84.4
89.5
81.6
91.6

*This Table is based on the unpublished "Statistical Studies on
the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe" compiled by the Mid-European
Center in New York in 1968.
**Only the Serb, Croat, Hungarian and German populations are com
pared for lack of space. However, in Novi Sad and Senta the Jewish popu
lation was also significant prior to World W ar II. The Croats and Serbs
are listed separately in the columns designating their numerical share of
the population.
Under the column for percentages the two peoples have
been listed under the "South-Slav" designation.
***The 1966 statistics for Novi Sad are based on Gydrgy G3m6ri,
Irodalmi Ujsdg of November 1, 1966.
****The 1965 statistics for the total populations of the respective
cities are based on Statistical Pocket-Book or Yugoslavia 1966 (Beograd:
Federal Institute for Statistics,' 1 9 6 6 ) , p . T T 3 .
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actual practice an undetermined number

of Hungarians become Serbs every year.

The reverse process is not as

likely to occur at present, although it has taken place in years past.
Social pressure, rather than governmental pressure, is responsible for
this.

Mixed marriages inevitably lead

to a Serbian rather than a

Hungarian upbringing, since the setting is dominated— at least in the
Vojvodina--by Serb society.

If a child of such a mixed marriage does

not want to designate himself either as a Serb or a Hungarian, he will
call himself a Yugoslav .2 ^ 4

The latter designation, however, still

diminishes the number of Hungarians while it increases the number of
South Slavs.

Population figures for all of Yugoslavia indicate that

there are about 317,125 inhabitants that view themselves in this way.
Although most are Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least
20,000 are inhabitants of Serbia proper.

The latter, or many in the

latter group, are probably individuals who have had parents of two dif
ferent nationalities.265
Assimilation in this biological sense is not yet--as the above
statistics indicate--the major threat to the Hungarians.

Much more

pernicious is the social pressure to use Serbo-Croatian instead of
Hungarian in public discourse.

Even in cities with a large Hungarian

population like Subotica (Szabadka), more likely than not, a stranger

2 ^ 2 Joncid, "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia,"
pp. 54-57.
2 6 4 Ibid., p. 56.

2 6 5 Ib i d ., pp. 56-57.
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will be spoken to in Serbo-Croatian rather than H ungarian .^ 6

This

social pressure to use the language of the South Slavs, erodes Hun
garian cultural development.

Hungarian ethnicity, in other words,

becomes a liability, particularly if one would like to make it to the
top in Yugoslav society.
Hungarian culture also faced this threat in the inter-war period.
At this time, the Catholic churches provided the Hungarians with a final
defense of their cultural traditions.

In Yugoslavia, such an extra-

governmental defense of "national particularism" is no longer possible.
Like its Rumanian counterpart, the Yugoslav CP eliminated at the outset
the social and behavioral influence of the churches in the country.
This process of elimination was in no respect less sweeping or final
than the Rumanian subjugation.

However, due to Yugoslavia's greater

"visibility" before the West, particularly the U.S., the subjugation
was relatively less brutal.^ 7
As Table XIV indicates, in 1953 Yugoslavia had 5,383,000 Roman
Catholics.

Of these 565,000 reside in the Vojvodina.

In the Vojvo

dina, as was the case in Translyvania, religious affiliation has been
closely related to nationality.
garian, German or Croatian.

All Roman Catholics are either Hun

Since in the Vojvodina there are few Croa-

tians, most of the Catholic population is now accounted for by the
Hungarians .2 ®8

However, the center of their Church organization is

^ 6 *>See footnote 167 above.
^ ^ W o l f f , The Balkans in Our T i m e , p. 559.
^ ^ S c h e m a t i s m u s Cleri Apostolicae Baciensis Administraturae,
pp. 13-24.
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TABLE X I V

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE
VOJVODINA 1921-1953 (IN THOUSANDS )3

Religion
1921

Yugoslavia^
1931

1953

Vojvodina 0
1953

Orthodox
Roman Catholic

5,593
4,709

6,786
5,218)

7,011

780
565

40

)
45)

5,383

Greek Catholic
(Uniate)
Old Catholic
Lutheran
)

7
175)

--

--

)
56)

148

)
Calvinist
)
Other Christian
Moslem
Jewish
Other Religions
Without Religion
or unknown
Total

-229

__ d

--

1,561

71
2,083

68

--

--

156

139d

--

--

1,345
65
2)

)
)
1)
11,985

__ d

5

1

13,917

2,083

225

16,937

1,714

aFor 1921 and 1931 statistics this Table is based on Jugoslavia;
H istory, Peoples and Administration, pp. 155, 219, and Stephen Clissold
(ed,), A Short History of Yugoslavia, p. 165.
For 1953 statistics it
is based on Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Tables 3-2 and
3-3, pp. 33, 35, and Eterovich and Spalatin (eds.), Croatia; L a n d ,
P eople, Cu l t u r e , p. 17.
^1921 and 1931 data pertain to the inter-war territory of
Yugoslavia, while the 1953 statistics pertain to the enlarged area of
present-day Yugoslavia.
cData pertains to the post-World War II territory of the
Vojvodina.
It includes the Srem but excludes the Baranya.
^Lutherans diminished greatly as a consequence of the elimina
tion (i.e., deportation, evacuation, etc.) of the formerly important
German minority. Most of the remaining Protestants are enumerated
under "other religions" in this Table. Most of the Calvinists are
Hungarian.
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located outside the Vojvodina.2*>9

Already in the interwar years the

Yugoslav government tried to limit the Church’s national role, by
making Hungarian Catholics subject to a non-Hungarian Church hier
archy.

This policy was continued by the Communist Government follow-

ing the Second World War.

270

The Tito government actually followed the interwar policies
of Yugoslavia also in at least two other respects.

It continued to

restrict the educational role of the Churches and it continued to sub
sidize them.

The first policy ensured the P a r t y ’s monopoly of decision

over the content and objectives of education.
the churches in a dependent status.

The second policy kept

Their right to existence became a

question of constant review by the CPY.

271

This eliminated the

churches as possible competitors in the area of social control and
ensured that they would not hinder the Party in carrying out its
nationality policy.
The CPY was able to do this not only because it wielded the
power of the state, but also because the churches had greatly dis
credited themselves during World War II.

This was particularly true

of some of the Croatian clergy that had supported the Ustasha
imposed conversions of Orthodox Serbs, but also was the case in the

2 6 9 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
2 7 0

Ibid.; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 424;
Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , p. 156.
2 ^ I b i d .. pp. 551-553, 557-559; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism,
pp. 243-249.
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instance of some Hungarian clergymen who had greeted the invading
Hungarian army as a force of national liberation.

In the immediate

post-war years man y of these Croatian and Hungarian clergymen were
thrown into prisons or even executed.272

jn subsequent years, a con

tinued propaganda campaign against the Roman Catholic Church in
particular, diminished its influence among the young.27^
This heavy-handed policy has been eased with the years.

Im

prisonments have become less frequent and some clergymen formerly
imprisoned were released.

By 1960 the Yugoslav government showed a

definite desire to restore relations with the Vatican.27^

By the

o7 c
summer of 1966 this was done.

However, in the area of social

policy, the Party has continued to bar church involvement.

The

churches have been--as in the case of Rumania— left only a purely
religious role.

That is, they have been allowed to retain certain

buildings to administer to the "spiritual" needs of those who explic
itly want it.

To this end, the churches— including those of the

Hungarians--have been allowed seminaries to educate the personnel of

272Ibid.
O7O

Churchgoing is one of the few concrete indications of this
process of alienation between the youth and the Churches.
In 1966
this student attended at least a dozen Catholic church services.
These services were attended mainly by women, old m e n and young chil
dren with their grandmothers.
Very few people between 12 and 40
attended these services.
27^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 247.
275

"RendezSdik Hazdnk ds a Vatikin Viszonya," Magyar Sz 6 ,
June 25, 1966, p. 1.
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the cult.

They have also allowed the Churches to publish religious

material.

In 1966, for example, the Catholic seminary in Subotica had

about 90 Hungarian students.^76

The Catholics also publish the H u n 

garian language monthly periodical, H i t d l e t In return for these
concessions, the Church plays a passive political role.

At times,

certain "peace priests" actually support government policies.

The

periodical Hitdlet sometimes contains writings from some of these
"peace priests."278

material testifies, the Catholic Church

in the Vojvodina is not capable of defending the national heritage of
the Hungarians.

It has reduced itself to providing Christianized

Hungarian language arguments for "peace," "international understand
ing" and obedience of state authorities .^79
The Church has become tolerated because it is no longer a
threat to the Party's control of society.

Its guiding role in setting

standards for the community has now been replaced by the Party and its
numerous mass organizations.

None of the latter can be accused of

being overly concerned with the national cultures of the country's

^ ^ B a s e d on personal conversations with certain staff members
of the seminary.
^ ^ T h i s publication is edited in Novi Sad and printed in
Subotica.
Its editor in 1966 was Huzsvdr Ldszld.
278

/
"Afrika Nemcsak A Gyarmati Rendszer Rabl&ncat Torte Kette,
Hanem . . . Termdkeny Tdlcdra Talalt az Evangdlium Is," H i t diet, IV
(February, 1966), p. 3; "Erre Van P d n z !?" Hitdlet, IV (April, 1966),
p. 3; "Olvasdink Bardtaink - Irjak, Kdrdezik," Hitdlet, IV (June,
1966), p. 28.

^^Ibid.
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minorities.

They are all the creatures of the LCY and their sole

purpose for existence is to implement the policies of the Party on
a day-to-day basis.^80

Their composition in membership and leadership

is predominantly South Slav, although each of them have at least a
token representation of the national minorities.
The brief look at the Socialist Alliance earlier in this
chapter, revealed that the Hungarians have their share in the leader
ship of the Party's most general purpose mass organization.

Such

proportional representation— as was the case in Rumania also--seems
to occur less frequently in the more specialized mass organizations.
In the CTUY (Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia), the youth
organizations (SKOJ, Union of Pioneers, Ciciban, etc.) the Union of
W o m e n ’s Societies of Yugoslavia, the Veteran's Union of Yugoslavia
and other mass organizations, the leadership is overwhelmingly South
O Q1

Slav.

The eclipse of the churches by these mass organizations has

left the Hungarians without a mass organization that would concern
itself with their national survival.
depend directly on the LCY.

2©o

For the latter, they have to

However, in Yugoslavia, these mass

^®^Jovanovic, "The Social and Political System in Yugoslavia,"
pp. 20-23; Kardelj, "Some questions Relating to the Further Development
of the Assembly and Political System," pp. 15-21.
OQ1
OAWhile no statistical data is available concerning the n a 
tionality background of the membership and leaders of these mass
organizations, a name analysis of the top leadership invariably shows
South Slav dominance. As an example, see P.R.
"A Munka Eredmdnye Legyen
a Mdrce," Dolgoz 6 k . July 22, 1966, p. 1.
2 QO
° For the nature of LCY control of the mass organizations, see
Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 230-238.
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organizations— unlike their Rumanian counterparts— are not dominated
by any one of the nationalities.

Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins

and Macedonians all have an important voice in their policy making.
This results in a general tolerance for minority views, even if those
views are not proportionately represented in the organization.

IV
From what has been said in the foregoing, we can conclude that
the actual and potential power position of Hungarians in Transylvania
and the Vojvodina have certain similarities and differences.

In terms

of their relations with the Communist Parties concerned, their situa
tion is drastically different.

In Yugoslavia, the CPY (LCY) has

always been a South Slav national movement in which the Hungarians
have never felt completely at home.

As a consequence they have not

joined the Party in large numbers and are at present not proportionally
represented in it.

However, this Party has expanded rather than

restricted their opportunities to enter its power structure.

Until

the present writing (1970) this has led to some influence, particu
larly on the Provincial level of the Party.
tion has prevailed in Rumania.

The exact opposite situa

In its origins, the CPR was to a large

extent a cosmopolitan Party representing all the nationalities of the
country.

It was able to be this, because it was never really a

"national" movement like its Yugoslavian counterpart.

However, once

the Party seized power it began to nationalize itself through a series
of purges and a rapid expansion of Party membership.

By the late

1 9 5 0 ’s the CPR became an ethnic Rumanian Party inspite of the fact that
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all nationalities are still "proportionally represented" in it.

As

such, it is becoming less responsive to nationality needs and to their
representatives.
In the governmental set-up, yet another difference in nation
ality relations is revealed.

The Yugoslavs seem to care much less for

window-dressing than the Rumanians.

In their major governmental and

quasi-governmental bodies they are not concerned with giving propor
tional representation to the nationalities.

On the top levels, Hun

garians hold very few important posts aside from their share in the
Chamber of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly.

This does not mean

that the Hungarians do not have a share in government.

It only means

that their share reflects more closely the extent of their importance
in policy-making.
In Rumania, the Hungarians have a proportional role visibly,
but only a very limited role in actuality.

On all the major govern

mental organs Hungarians are given positions which are merely
in nature.
levels.

symbolic

This policy is also evident on the lower governmental

While Yugoslavia has constantly expanded self-government on

this lower level, the Rumanians have stressed centralization.

The

elimination of the Hungarian Autonomous region is testimony to this.
Two additional differences emerge.

First, that the Yugoslavs

have provided decentralization and limited self-rule according to
regional and economic criteria rather than according to nationality.
This has denied the Hungarians autonomy as a group, but it has enabled
them as individuals to further their "group" culture.

In Rumania the
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Hungarians gained group autonomy for a time, but this never allowed
for real self-government.
right without substance.

It remained, until its eclipse, a symbolic
Second, the Rumanians have always delegated

their responsibilities for the treatment of the Hungarians to the de
nationalized "representatives" of the Hungarians.

The Yugoslav

government, on the other hand, because it did not delegate this respon
sibility, was more involved and concerned over the correct application
of its nationality policy.
Finally, in the economic and social area, there are perhaps
more similarities than differences.

Both the Rumanians and the

Yugoslavs have eliminated the churches as possible competitors for
control over society.

Under both systems, the Hungarians have thereby

lost one of the best means of defending their cultural heritage.
Together with this loss, the Hungarians have also been disadvantaged
by the post-war land reforms in both countries.

Land collectivization

and the nationalization of enterprises affected them adversely also,
but not more so than those of the majority nationalities.

In this

area the only difference between the two countries has been in the
application of the policies, and the extent of success achieved.

The

more flexible and pragmatic approach of the Yugoslavs— at least since
1952— has provided a more bearable setting for all peoples (regard
less of nationality) than has Rumanian dogmatism.
On the other hand, industrialization and urbanization have a
less erosive effect on the durability of the Hungarians in the
Vojvodina than on those in Transylvania.

The reason for this has been
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twofold.

First, very little industrialization has taken place in the

Vojvodina.

The major shifts in the ethnic composition of the area have

been due l^o outright colonization.

Second, in Transylvania extensive

industrial and urban development has taken place.

Furthermore, these

developments have been used to strengthen the Rumanian population of
Transylvania.

The application of the law concerning rural mobility

into urban areas, as well as the law encouraging a higher birth rate,
indicate that purposeful Rumanization is taking place.
These similarities and differences indicate that the Hungarians
in the Vojvodina have much more potential as well as actual powers than
do those of Transylvania.

This also means that they are usually better

treated as a national group.

The irony of this is that in Transylvania

there are three times as many Hungarians as in all Yugoslavia.
This great disparity in the power positions of the two minor
ities is due to the nature of the political balance of power within
the respective countries and the role of the Hungarians in these re s p e c
tive balances.

In Yugoslavia the Hungarians have taken a limited

share in Party and governmental activities.

While they have not yet

gained proportionality (in comparison to the Montenegrins, for example),
their political position has improved appreciably in the last ten
years.

Parallel to this improvement there has also been an improvement

of their economic position and their social opportunities.

At the

same time, no one nationality has been able to dominate the political
setting, thereby putting numerically lesser nationalities at a dis
advantage .
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In Rumania, on the other hand, the exact opposite has happened.
The Party purges of the 1950's hurt primarily the representatives of
the ethnic minorities, particularly the Jews and the Hungarians.
Similar purges also swept through all levels of government.

While

there are still many Hungarians in the Party and government for
propaganda purposes, they lack influence or have lost their national
consciousness.

Furthermore, one nationality, the majority nationality,

now dominates all major positions of power.

This unchecked dominance

has led to disadvantages for the Hungarians, as for other minorities,
in both their economic and social existence.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EDUCATIONAL A ND CULTURAL POSITION
OF THE HUNGARIANS

The political existence of the Hungarians in Rumania and Yugo
slavia has demonstrated that the internal political balance among the
nationalities has increased the likelihood of a more humane or
tolerant treatment for them.

We shall now try to ascertain if this

is also the case in relation to their educational and cultural
opportunities.
In the past, non-governmental institutions like the churches,
played an important role in providing such opportunities.

As the pre

ceding chapter stressed, in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the
treatment of the churches was not officially considered to be a part
of nationality policy.

However, since religious affiliation in both

areas was closely related to particular ethnic groups, the treatment
of church groups has had a direct bearing on the treatment of the n a 
tionalities.

In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina Communist policies

toward the churches reduced the churches as effective defenders of the
nationalities.

While the policies differed in their methods and

severity, their results were alike in that the churches lost their
former roles in the social and educational life of the peoples of both
countries.

They underwent a period of repression and persecution

which left them active only in the spiritual field.

Briefly, the
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churches were eliminated as competing centers of influence to the
party-state.-*-

I
This drastic reduction of the influence and activities of the
churches had a direct consequence on educational policies in both
Rumania and Yugoslavia.
state.

In both, education became the monopoly of the

Unlike the state policies dealing with religion, education was

from the beginning considered a testing ground for nationality policies.
It was contended that the state would guarantee the nationalities the
preservation and development of their cultural and linguistic pecu-

2

liarities.

In Transylvania
For the purposes of this study the Rumanian educational system
will be examined only as it relates to the nationalities of Transylvania.
The educational opportunities ("socialist in content and national in
form") of the Hungarian inhabitants will provide a basis for evaluating
the practical application of "proletarian internationalism."

-*-See Chapter III above for a more extensive treatment of this
problem.
^"Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic 1952" in
Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J, Peaslee (Second edition; Hague,
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), III, Art. 17, paragraph J,
p. 242; "Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"
Collection of Yugoslav L a w s , ed. Borislav T. Blagojevid (Beograd:
Institut of Comparative Law, 1963), Arts. 41, 42 and 43, p. 25.
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Nationality Schools Past and Present
A superficial examination of school statistics leads to the
impression that the R.P.R. has followed the tenets of "proleterian
internationalism."

The comparison of educational establishments for the

national minorities under the inter-war "bourgeois nationalist" regime
with the establishments provided by the R.P.R. presents a hopeful
picture.

While the inter-war regime allowed the Hungarian minority 819

confessional educational establishments and 217 state schools plus 232
3
sections,

the R.P.R. provides this same minority with 1,632 state

school units,^

an increase of 364 school units.

Table XV presents a

O
C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London;
Oxford
University Press, 1937), p. 308 presents the statistics cited above.
Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford
University, California:
Stanford University Press, 1932), pp.209-210,
presents the number of state maintained minority schools as 1,525M
This number is not broken down by Roucek, and therefore it is impossible
to evaluate the number of the Hungarian Schools supported by Rumania.
Nonetheless, Macartney (p. 311) sheds more light on the real state of
Rumanian supported minority schools.
He relates that;
"An inquiry
conducted in 1934-35 by the Magyar minority leaders resulted in the
conclusions that instead of 271 State schools and 218 sections with
Magyar language of instruction (as shown by the Ministry of Education
for 1933), there were, in reality, only 55 such schools and 57 sections.
The remainder did not function, had been closed, or were staffed
entirely by Rumanian teachers."
^Brahara, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic,(U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.:
U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 77, presents the above total
for the 1955-56 school year. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time,
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 461, footnote
7, presents the Hungarian total at 1,597 for 1954. Fischer-Galati,
"Education," in Romania ed. Fischer-Galati (New York;
Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 160, maintains that;
"The number of educa
tional institutions for national minorities increased from approxi
mately 100 in 1938 to approximately 3,200 in 1954 . . . "
Though
Fischer-Galati1s numbers are exaggerated, it is apparent from a com
parison of Macartney's and Braham s statistics that the minorities
gained in educational facilities because of the CPR's early adherence
to "proletarian internationalism."
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TABLE X V

THE EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE THREE MAJOR NATIONALITY
GROUPS IN TRANSYLVANIA 1914-1957

Type of Schools

1914
School
Unit s

Primary Schools
Secondary Schools
Special Schools
Training Colleges
Universities
Primary Schools
Secondary Schools
Special Schools
Training Colleges
Universities
Primary Schools
Secondary Schools
Special Schools
Training Colleges
Universities

1,145
11
2

3
0

1932
Sections

R U M A N I A N
4,100
199

--- **
1

H U N G A R I A N
232
1,265
993
92
30
0
84
8
0
7
0

254
16
16
3
0

1957
Sections
School
Units

0

G E R M
399

0

1,396
62
20
0
11***

A N
75

259

32

0

5

0
0

11
1
0
0

0

196
81
48
5
5
89
17
11
1
0

*This Table has been compiled on the basis of data in Joseph S.
Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 209; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 264,
306-315; Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest: Directia
Centrale de Statistica, 1958), Tables 138 and 139, pp. 236-241.
How
ever, it should be kept in mind that school units can be compared fairly
only when conditions are alike.
This is not the case with the times
and the school systems which are presented here. Thus these figures are
more valuable for reference than for comparison.
**Data concerning the Rumanian educational institutions in Tran
sylvania have not been available, since Rumanian school statistics are
presented only in relation to the country as a whole.
***The 11 refers only to "Faculties" (ie., Departments), not to
independent minority universities.
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general breakdown and comparison of educational establishments for the
major minorities in the years 1914, 1932 and 1957.

This would seem to

indicate a decided improvement in the educational position of the
minorities.
What the statistics in the above table do not show is that
this favored position of the minorities was merely a passing phase.^
As early as 1956-1957, there were significant reductions in this
£
favorable minority educational situation.

They took their toll par

ticularly in the Hungarian sector, but the trend in this direction
affected the other nationality groups as well.

In fact, Braham points

out that decreases of this nature had been going on ever since 19521953.^

However, these earlier reductions were not systematic and

planned like those which occur after 1956.

By 1958 the position of

the Hungarian minority grew even more depressing, particularly on the
higher levels of education.
It seems that the R.P.R. followed a truly "proletarian

-’"Transitional phase" may, perhaps, better describe this past
favored treatment of minorities.
It may bring to mind a similar
"transitional phase" in the existence of the Soviet Union's national
minorities, just before the re-assertion of Great Russian nationalism
in the 1930's.
^"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," Bulletin of the
International Commission of Ju r i s t s , No. 17 (December, 1963), p. 76,
indicates--together with some other studies--that 1958 was the
critical year in Rumanian nationality policies.
However, Table XVI
presents statistics which indicate that a shift in policy was already
in existence in the 1955-56 school year.
^Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 74.
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internationalist" educational policy from 1948 to about the autumn of
g

1956.

With the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956,

this policy of "enlightenment" underwent a drastic change which became
apparent by 1958.

Several aspects of government-educational policy

indicate this change.

The reduction in the number of nationality

schools, the complete amalgamation of high level minority educational
facilities with the Rumanian, the decrease of minority language instruc
tion and the concomitant increase of Rumanian language instruction in
minority s c h o o l s , a l l point to this unmistakable trend which looks
more and more like the "Rumanization" policies of the inter-war y e a r s .

Recent Educational Policies
Using the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the parallel dis
turbances in Transylvania as the pretext, the Rumanian Ministry

of

Education has initiated and is now pursuing educational policies
designed to reduce and eventually to eradicate all forms of national

O
"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
^Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites," International
Journa1 . XVII (Autumn, 1962), 388, seems unable to see this change.
While he is aware of the moves against the Hungarian institutions
in Transylvania, he does not draw the logical conclusions warranted
by the evidence. This is probably due to his unfamiliarity with
the general Transylvanian situation, which he reveals in the dis
cussion of the "merger" of the Babes and Bolyai Universities.
^ I b i d . ; Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's
Repu b l i c , pp. 78-79.
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"particularism" and "isolationism."

11

These policies are to achieve

their goal by stressing the "socialist content" rather than the "national form" in education.

12

While the "national form" was hedged in

and carefully limited, the new designs to de-emphasize the "national
form" entails such steps as restrictions on presentation as well as
content of curricula.

In content, more emphasis is to fall on Rumanian

subjects and less stress on those which are of more particular rele
vance to national minorities.

In presentation as well, Rumanian

instructors teaching in the Rumanian language are given precedence in
educating the minorities.
The most outstanding feature of minority education in Transyl
vania has been the appearance of "parallelization."

Though "para-

llelization" has always played a part, it has become particularly
important in the last few y e a r s . ^

"Parallelization" means the

setting-up of Rumanian language classes parallel with the existing

11

Ibid.; George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," The
Reporter (November 19, 1964), p. 26; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania"
in East Central Europe and the World ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 158-166.
Actually, even one year prior to the revolution there were some hints
of a turn toward more nationalistic policies. Along this line see
LcJszld Bdnyai, "Tizdves a Bolyai Tudomdnyegyetem," in A Kolozsvdri
Bolyai TudomAnyegyetem (1945- 1955) (Cluj: Allami Tanugyi ds
Pedagdgiai Kdnyvkiadd, 1956), pp. 5-13.
19

Ibid.; La'szlcf Bdhyai, "Forum:
Irodalomtanitds ds Hazafias
NeveIds," Igaz Szrf, VII (Feb., 1959), 236-242.
1^

x "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76;
Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites," p. 388; Tamds Schreiber, "A
Magyar Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romdniaban," Irodalmi Ujsdg (July 15, 1961).
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minority language classes.

This is done even in areas where there are

no Rumanian students to attend them.

The primary purpose is to induce

minority students to leave their own schools and classes to attend the
schools and classes of the majority nationality.

This policy reduces,

in the long-run, the existence of the nationality schools.

What

happens is that one minority school after another is closed because
there are supposedly not enough pupils to attend t h e m . ^

The real

reason, however, is that the parallel schools and sections exist to
absorb the students of the minority schools, after they have been
pressured into deserting the latter.
As the national minority school loses students to the parallel
Rumanian institution, the government closes the former and replaces it
by a nationality section, which is then attached to the formerly
"parallel" Rumanian institution.

In this w a y the "parallel" Rumanian

school becomes the sole school for the community.

■^In contradiction to the above contention it is possible to
show that the total number of minority students in 4-year schools
increased to 131,773 in 1956-57 from 127,634 in 1955-56.
Yet in this
same space of time the number of minority schools decreased from
1,416 to 1,343 in these same 4-year schools.
This pattern is also
apparent on the higher levels of education.
See Braham, Education
in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 75, Table 13. While the
decreases of the years prior to the above seem more natural, the
decrease in later years certainly does n o t . Now the decrease of
minority schools is followed by the decrease of minority students
rather than the other w a y around.
■^These pressures are of various kinds, some direct and some
indirect.
See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in
Rumania," p. 76; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbseg Helyzete Rom^ni^ban."
F. K . , "Romania Szuntesse Meg az Erde'lyi Magyarok tildozds^t," Katolikus
Magyarok Vasirnapja, 71 (June 21, 1964), 1.
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This policy has steadily reduced the number of "independent"
educational institutions of the nationalities--increasing the nation
ality sections attached to the Rumanian i n s t i t u t i o n s . ^
indf^ates this trend until 1958.^

Table XVI

"Parallelization" is then followed

by the progressive curtailment and reduction of the nationality sec
tion, until it becomes indistinguishable from the rest of the new
parent school either in curriculum or in staff.
Parallelization has affected all levels of education, not
excepting universities and higher institutions.

In fact, it is on the

level of higher education that this policy most clearly reveals the
attempt to "Rumanize" and to a ssimilate.^

While proletarian

•^ I b i d .; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romaniaban";
"Level ErddlybcSl," Irodalmi Uisag (Aug. 1, 1964).

17
'Unfortunately there are no statistics available which would
shed light on the position of the nationality schools since 1958.
The R.P.R. has omitted any reference to nationality educational
facilities since that date. Apparently the data was too incriminating
to be published.
Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic,
p. 74, footnote 70, also makes note of this "omission."
-*-®"Levdl Erddlybdl," Irodalmi U i s d g ; Schreiber, "A Magyar
Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romdnidban"; F. K., "Romania SzCintesse Meg Az
Erdelyi Magyarok Uldozdsdtl"
IQ

^Higher education demonstrates this trend best because (1)
it has been totally "Rumanized," (2) it has affected the leading
strata (i.e., intelligentsia) of the Transylvanian Hungarians, and
(3) it has been least possible to camouflage or hide from world
scrutiny the absorption of these important institutions.
In this
regard see Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27; David
Binder, "Rumania’s Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New
York Times (July 14, 1964), p. 4; J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question
of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (Nov., 1963), 503-504.
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Type of School

Further reproduction

NATIONALITY SCHOOLS AND SECTIONS IN RUMANIA 1948-1958

Teacher Training**

19481949

19491950

19501951

19511952

Academic Years
195219531953
1954

19541955

19551956

19561957

19571958

Schools of General
Education, Grades 1- 1 0 (1 1 )
2,233
2,202
Schools
2,115
2,201
2,273
2,153
2,209
2,203
2,020
2,023
110
108
133
202
Sections
123
148
135
146
404
388
No. of Students
220,337 236,650 241,627 244,649 235,563 231,259 217,150 208,658 214,785 219,612

prohibited
without p erm is sio n .

----

----

----

----

----

Schools
No. of Students

31
5,503

24
7,492

18
10,061

18
12,198

11,448

19
11,917

Vocational
Schools
Sections
No. of Students

0
0
0

0
0
0

41
48
8,543

36
46
8,566

25
50
8,151

15
42
6,974

17

17

16

17

0

20
0

15

0

0

0

0

2,835

2,887

3,512

3,304

3,253

4,138

----

----

----

7,650

7
1,186

8
1,212

1,409

11

•20

41
5,425

40
6,061

13
59
7,029

13
54
5,624

16

13

11

12

0

0

3,515

3,437

5
3,692

4
4,082

----

Technical

Higher Education
Faculties
Sections
No. of Students

21

12

8

**For the minority teacher-training program in Rumania see TableX/I in this chapter.
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*This Table has been compiled on the basis of Table 13 in Randolph L. Braham, Education in the
Rumanian People's Republic (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 75, and Table 138 in Anuarul statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest:
Directia Centrala de Statistica, 1958), pp. 236-237.

267

20

internationalism lasted, u the Hungarian minority had its own indepen
dent Bolyai University at Cluj

(Kolozsvar), its Medical and Pharmaceu

tical Institute in Tirgu-Mures (MarosvAsArhely), and a Hungarian
section in the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and at the Gh. Dima
Conservatory also at Cluj.

21

All four have been "parallelized."

The

B61yai University was the first to meet this fate, when in 1959, it
was merged with the "parallel" Rumanian Babes U n i v e r s i t y T h i s was
followed by the reduction (i.e., absorption) of the Hungarian section
of both the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and the Hungarian
Medical-Pharmaceutical Institute at Tirgu Mures in 1962.^3

since that

date all higher education for Hungarians is restricted to Rumanian

Of)
Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 341, notes that this early policy was
by no means whole-heartedly and enthusiastically supported.
He
maintains that:
"This liberal nationality policy was not carried
through without strong opposition, not only from the Rumanian nation
alist followers of Maniu but also from a part of the Rumanian Party
itself, led by the former Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascanu.
The removal of Patrascanu from his office and his disgrace within
the party were certainly to some extent due to his 'incorrect 1 atti
tude on the national question."

21

"Cluj Regiune" according to Faclia, Feb. 6 , 1958, in
"Comprehensive Regiune Summaries," Weekly Summary of the Rumanian
Provincial Press 4-9 F e b . 1958 (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - April 22,
1958), p. 3.

22

Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania"; Braham,
Education in the Rumanian People's R e public, pp. 78-79; Bailey,
"Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27.
It was in connection with
this "parallelization" that three Hungarian professors committed
suicide. One of them, Szabddi LAszlcf, was a famous Communist poet
and intellectual of the Hungarian minority.
See in this regard "The
Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
^ I b i d .; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; F. K.
"Romania Szuntesse Meg Az Erddlyi Magyarok UldbzesdtJ"
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institutions, and to the few remaining Hungarian sections, which still
maintain a precarious existence within such Rumanian facilities
The Romanizing effects of parallelization on the highest levels
can be seen in the academic publishing activity of the Babes-Bolyai
University.

While Nikolai Ceausescu and lesser party leaders have

denied that Rumanization e x i s t s , ^ a brief analysis of the official
academic journals of the Babes-Bdlyai University indicates just the
opposite.
Before the Babes and the Edlyai Universities were merged, in
1958 their learned journals were published in Rumanian and Hungarian
respectively.26

After the merger, the academic publications still

appeared in both languages, but now the Rumanian and Hungarian studies

Besides this formal pattern of "integration" there is also
an informal trend along similar lines which is stressed and fostered
by the Rumanian regime.
The most recent example of this policy has
been the sharing of rooms in student hostels and dormitories by
Rumanians and Hungarians. The pretext for this is that the Hungarian
students will more easily learn Rumanian if they share rooms with
Rumanian students.
See "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania,"
This policy received its inception soon after the Hungarian Revolution
of 1956. A. Rosea, "The Party Organizations and the Patriotic
Education of the Youth," Lupta de Clasa (Nov., 1957), pp. 87-96 in
Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and
Papers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - Feb. 28, 1958), p. 126.
2-*Nicolae Ceausescu, "A Romdniai Tdrsadalom Szerkezetdben
Vdgberaend Mdlyrehatd Tdrsadalmi-Politikai Vdltozdsok," (Speech
delivered on Oct. 24, 1968; Bukarest;
Politikai Kdnyvkiadd, 1968),
pp. 28-41, and "Speech by Jdnos Fazekas at Odorhei Meeting," Docu
ments , Articles and Information on R omania, No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968),
pp. 36-38, provide the best two examples of such denials.
26Compare Buletinul; Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai,"
Vol. I, Nr. 1-2, (1957), and V. Bdbes e's Bdlyai Egyetemek
KBzlemdnyei, I. ev., 1-2 sz., (1956).
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appeared together rather than in separate journals.

In most cases each

of these studies was followed by a brief summary of its contents in
the other language.

27

However, with the passage of time (less than

seven years) the Hungarian language studies were almost completely
eliminated.^®
As a perusal of these studies indicates, Hungarian scholars now
publish their studies mainly in Rumanian.
"natural process."

OQ

This tendency is not a

It is a consequence of both faculty and editorial

pressure. 30
u
Perhaps an even more telling indicator is the "format" of these

27

Ibid.; Buletinul:
Vol. I, Nr. 1-2, (1957).

Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai" .

OQ

In 1956-57 it was still possible to find scholarly works in
Hungarian.
In V. Bdbes ds Bdlyai Egyetemek Khzlemdnyei, I e v . ,
1-2 sz., (1956), there are fourteen Hungarian language studies and
five Rumanian language studies followed by the Hungarian summaries of
seven Rumanian studies.
By 1960 it is evident that Hungarian language
studies decline in numbers. In Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai
Series 1, Fasciculus 2, Anul 5 (1960), there are 26 items, articles
and studies of which only one appears in Hungarian, while 21 of the
contributors are Hungarian.
By 1965 the situation is even worse.
Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai (Series Philosophia et
Oeconomica, Anul X, 1965), contains seventeen items, articles and
studies of which none appear in Hungarian in spite of the fact that
five of the contributors are Hungarian.

^Ibid .
®^Ihat such faculty and editorial pressure exists is hard to
substantiate.
This contention is based on the observations of two
scholars, a Pole and an American, who spent extended periods of time
doing research at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj (Kolozsvar)
during 1967 and 1968 respectively.
Both maintained, in personal con
versations with this student, that the pressure was evident in the
language used by the Hungarian faculty members.
They never speak to
one another in Hungarian, if even one Rumanian faculty member is
present.
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academic journals.

In the years immediately after the merger, the

journals were truly bi-lingual in appearance as well as content.

The

"table of contents" in each journal listed the articles according to
the language in which they were written.

The Hungarian article liston

ings were even followed by Rumanian translations.
"contents," appeared in both languages.

Titles, such as

At first even the name of the

place (Cluj-Kolozsvar) of publication, was provided in both languages.
But, this was not to last.
listed only in Rumanian.

32

By 1959, the place of publication was
In some journals even the bilingual

designation for "contents" (Sumar-Tartalom) was replaced with the
Rumanian " S u m a r . " ^

while this may seem trivial, it indicates that

the "national form" is being eliminated in the University life of the
Transylvanian Hungarians.
A substantive analysis of these articles also indicates that
the "socialist content" of higher learning, is falling more and more
within a national Rumanian, rather than an international Communist
mold.

This, of course, is discernable only in studies which fall

within the Social Sciences.

^V.

A comparison of the pre-merger academic

Bdbes ds Bdlyai Egyetemek KBzlemdnyei, I e v . , 1-2 s z .,

(1956).
32

Compare I b i d ., and Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai,
Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959).
33

Studia:

Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus

1, Anul 5 (1960); Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 3,
Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959);
Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai,
Series Psychologia Paedagogia, Anul 9 (1964).
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journal, appearing in Hungarian, wi t h its post-1958 successors, reveals
that the earlier studies were often concerned with local Transylvanian
problems and Hungarian cultural m a t t e r s . ^

The later studies, on the

other hand, have been concerned more with the problems, culture and
OC
history of Rumania as a whole. J
This examination of the academic publication of the BabesBolyai University has shown one facet of Rumanization in higher educa
tion.

Another, even more menacing feature of Rumanian educational

policy has been the steady decrease in the training of minority n a 
tionality teachers.

While reliable data on this trend are available

only to about 1957, some later sources indicate that this process
has since been accelerated; so that today the minority teachers'
program is negligible or non-existent

Table XVII indicates the

A Kolozsvdri Bo'lyai Tudomdnyosegyetem (1945-1955) (Cluj ,
Transylvania:
Allami Tanttgyi ds Pedagdgiai K 6nyvkiadd, 1956), con
tains some of these studies. Also representative are: Emil Petrovici,
"A R oman Sris, 0ri§, Or^ia, Ora§a, Ora^ani, Ora^eni Magyar Varjas,"
pp. 223-226, Attila T. Szabd, "A Gyermekld ds Rokonsdga," pp. 235-251,
and M 6 zes Gdlffy and Gyula Mdrton, "A Bdlyai-Egyetem Magyar Nyelvdszeti
Tanszdkdnek Nyelvjdrdskutatd Tevdkenysdge A Magyar Autonom Tartomdnyban,"
pp. 253-279, in V. Bdbes ds Bdlyaj Egyetemek Kflzlemdnyei, I e v . , 1-2
sz., (1956),
■^Some examples are: A. Bodor, "Adaldkok a Helyi Elem
Fennmaraddsdnak Kdrddsdhez a Romaikori Ddcidban: A Liber ds a Libera
Kultusz," Studia: Universitatis Babes-B o l y a i , Series 4, Fasciculus 1
(1960), pp. 25-58; Zoltdn Farkas, "Allam, Nemzet ds Szuverdnitas a
Szocializmusban," Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series
Philosophia, Anul XI (1966), pp. 19-27.
•^Pdl Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Uj Tanitd," Igaz Szd, VIII (Aug.,
1960), 243, mentions that 28 students graduated from the Jdzsa Bdla
Pedagogic Institute in 1960.
Nagy seems to imply that there are many
throughout the country who would like to attend the institute.
But
the results seem meager indeed.
Five of the graduates were from Stalin
(Brassd) Regiune, three from Baia-Mare (Nagybdnya), two from Oradea
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TABLE X V I I

NATIONALITY TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAM IN RUMANIA FROM 1948 TO 1958
INDICATING THE HUNGARIAN SHARE FOR THE YEARS 1955-1958

Academic Year

Number of
Teacher Train
ing School
Units

Number
of
Pupils

Schools
Sections

15

Schools
Sections

22

Schools
Sections

23

Schools
Sections

24

Schools
Sections

26

Schools
Sections

25

1954-55

Schools
Sections

17
13

2,638

1955-56

Schools
Sections

10

1,197

14

Schools
Sections

0
12

503

1957-58*** Schools
Sections

1
11

387

1948-49

1949-50

1950-51

1951-52

1952-53

1953-54

1956-57

3,327

Hungarian
Share of
School
Units
---- **

Number of
Hungarian
Pupils

1

4,275

3
5,617

6

6,217

10

5,728

8

5,671

8

4

672

10
0

246

5
1

248

5

*This Table has been compiled on the basis of Tables 13 and 14
in Randolph L. Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 75-76, and Tables 138 and
139 in Anuarul statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest:
Directia centrala
de statistica, 1958), pp. 236-241.
**No data is available for the share of the respective minorities
prior to and including the academic year 1954-55.
***The last year that any data has been released by the R.P.R.
regarding the state of minority education is 1958.
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drastic nature of this policy until 1958.

It shows, among other things,

that while in the 1948-1949 school year 3,327 students were in the
teacher-training program (for the nationalities) and 2,835 were in
institutions of higher education, by the 1956-1957 school year the
respective realms had 503 and 3,692 students e a c h . ^

In a country

where everything follows a state plan this systematic elimination of
a minority teaching program cannot be explained by reference to "lack
of interest," particularly not among nationality groups which have
been determined to preserve their national identity.
More recent sources indicate that the reason for this drastic
curtailment in nationality education opportunities is due to the
regime's policy toward the graduates of higher institutions.

The

regime fosters a policy of dispersing the minority intelligentsia
throughout Rumania, particularly the Regat, in order to leave the

(Nagyvdrad), two from Timisoara (Temesvdr), one from Gluj (Kolozsvdr),
and the rest from the Magyar Autonomous Regiune.
Since 1960 no other
reliable evidence is available that would shed light on the nation
ality teachers-training program. Also see "White Paper" on the
Liquidation of the Hungarian Minority's Educational Facilities in
Roumania (New York: Association of Hungarian Students in North
America, 1966), Table II, p. 12. The only evidence that can be found
is negative.
For example, the fact that propaganda brochures no
longer boast of the "great opportunities" for minority national
cultural facilities. The Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest:
Agerpres, 1964), pp. 5-6, conspicuously avoids reference to Hungarian
educational facilities in cities like Cl u j , which in earler brochures
were always mentioned. More recent sources also avoid mention of
Hungarian educational opportunities.
See "Start of School-Year in
Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 17
(Sept. 15, 1970), pp. 23-24.
07

'Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 75,
Table 13.
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respective minorities without leaders of their own.^®

Since special

ized qualifications for the instruction of minority nationalities is
incompatable with such dispersal, the program has been eliminated as
useless.

All those w h o enter the teaching program must now be ready

to teach anywhere in Rumania and cannot "specialize" in minority na39

tionality instruction.

In this way not only is the back of minority

education broken, but the respective minorities are deprived of intel
lectual leadership.
In content the minority educational program is, of course,
"socialist."

This means that the minorities have had the same material

presented to them as the rest of the population, with the exception
only that they were able to have it presented in their own language.^®

F. K . , "Romania Sztlntesse Meg Az Erddlyi Magyarok ftldbzdsAt."
Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Uj Tanitd," also indicates this trend when he
inadvertantly reveals that almost all the graduates of the J 6 zsa
Bdla Pedagogic Institute would like to return to their respective
regions to teach. The implication is that this may not be possible.
A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . . A Conversation
Piece," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 20, also throws
weight behind this observation when he states that:
"Ambitious
youngsters, . . . have to . . . speak and write perfect Rumanian."
This policy is also evident in the recruitment of skilled workers.
See the advertizement "A BalanbAnyai Szakiskola SzakmunkAsokat KApez
Ki," Elflre. June 20, 1970, p. 2.
39

As far as could be ascertained no specific restriction
exists. The Ministry of Education merely leaves out the minority
teachers-training program and nothing is again said about it.
^ E n d r e IstvAnfy, "Assimildlddds ErdAlyben," LArmafa, III
(Oct.-Dec., 1956), 11; A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest
. . . A Conversation Piece," and Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania,"
p. 27, indicate, however, that even the use of the minority languages
in public is now greatly curtailed.
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The difference between the education of the Rumanian and the nonRumanian sector of society was thus reduced to language.

Otherwise

both majority and minority are equally subject to Communist indoc
trination.
In spite of the "socialist content" of education for all sectors
of society, the differences granted in presentation by "proletarian
internationalism" enabled the minorities to foster their respective
cultures.

As Braham points out, the "national form" of presentation

entailed giving the minorities at least the opportunity of furthering
the national language and the study of the national l i t e r a t u r e H o w 
ever, soon after 1956 the authorities began to clamp down even in this
area.

The R.P.R. set out to "Rumanize" even the "national form" of

the educational system.

First, as the foregoing demonstrated, the

regime began to limit the educational facilities for minorities by
eliminating their schools

(where possible) and replacing them with

sections which were later also to be absorbed.

Then it encroached on

the remaining institutions by limiting the hours devoted to the study
of the nationality language and l i t e r a t u r e . ^

This was followed by

a policy of discouraging students from attending nationality schools.

41

Braham, Education in the Rumanian People *s Republic, p. 74,
Table 12, presents the number of hours devoted to the study of the
respective mother tongues. A Correspondent, "Nationalism in
Bucharest . . . A Conversation Piece," points out that "the minority
languages . . . have again been abolished as media of teaching in the
former 'minority' schools; they have now been granted the position of
'first foreign language' taught."
Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbs^g Helyzete RonUmi^ban."
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According to reliable sources, the restriction has gone so far as to
limit "nationality" education in the Hungarian communities to the eldest
son in each

f a m i l y . ^

There is no doubt that the R.P.R. has reduced, through these
methods, the opportunities of the nationalities to foster their respec
tive cultures.

In this way the R.P.R. has reverted to a policy similar

to the inter-war Rumanization policies of the bourgeois nationalists.
Yet, it has done this under the pretext of eliminating national partic
ularism and isolationism, two handmaidens of "nationalist reaction."
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and others have deemed this to be a real
struggle for the furtherance of proletarian internationalism and
socialist p a t r i o t i s m . ^

But through it all, the pattern of nationalism

begins to emerge as the emphasis is placed increasingly on "socialist
patriotism," rather than on "proletarian internationalism."^

The

educational policies of the R.P.R. have in fact not only Rumanized the

^ I b i d .; "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
4V
A. Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteristics of the
Great October Socialist Revolution," Probleme Economice, (Oct., 1957),
pp. 8-10, in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals
and Newspapers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - March 7, 1958), pp. 138-139,
states that "proletarian internationalism is inseparable from the
socialist patriotism; they are interlaced, representing the unity be
tween the national and international interests of the workers." This
definition is very revealing, for it shows that the "inseparable unity"
of the workers is in danger only if their national and international
interests conflict.
^ B d n y a i , "Forum:
Irodalomtanit^s 4s Hazafias Nevel^s," pp.
236-242; Rosea, "The Party Organization and the Patriotic Education of
the Youth," pp. 115-126; Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteris
tics of the Great October Socialist Revolution," pp. 138-139.
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"national form" of minority education, but they have, to some extent,
even put their Rumanian imprint on the "socialist content."
The net result of these Rumanian educational policies has been
to make the minorities more aware of their obligations under "prole
tarian internationalism," while the Rumanian majority has been able to
revel in old-fashioned nationalism under the guise of "socialist
patriotism."
cies.

This has been translated into general educational poli

Some indications of this are discernable in the statements of

leading Party members, educational officials, and youth and student
leaders.^

In the Vojvodina
In this area of education, Yugoslavia's treatment of her H u n 
garians is quite unlike Rumania's prevailing policies.

Generally,

there has been an expansion rather than a reduction of educational
opportunities.

Due in large part to this difference, the Yugoslavs

46Rosca, "The Party Organization and the Patriotic Education
of the Youth," p. 115; Tudor R. Popescu, "The Educational Function
of the Family under Socialism," Revista de Pedagogie (Jan., 1963),
Trans, in Rumanian Press Survey N o . 342 (Radio Free Europe, May 2,
1963), pp. 10-11; N. Ceausescu, "The Fourth Conference of the Union
of the Rumanian Students' Association," Scanteia Tineretului (Feb. 2,
1963) Trans, in Rumanian Press Survey N o . 329 (Radio Free Europe,
Feb. 28, 1963), p. 3; P^l Nagy, "Irodalom ds Iskola: A Prdza
FejlSddse," Igaz S z o . XI (Apr., 1963), 589-590; and "Gheorghe GheorghiuDej Elvtdrs Beszdde Az Irok Orsz^gos fSrtekezletdnek Zaroiile'sen," Igaz
_Szcf, X (Feb., 1962), 156.
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have released much more data concerning their nationality educational
programs.47

Nationality Schools Past and Present
From the Yugoslav educational data we can discern that its
policies were not always more permissive than those of Rumania.

In the

immediate post-World War II period, the Hungarians actually fared
better in Rumania than in Yugoslavia.

As the Statistical Yearbook of

the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for 1954 shows the number
of Hungarian schools increased to only 212 in the 1950-51 academic
AO

year from the woefully inadequate 186 of 1938-39.

It was only with

the 1951-52 school year that serious efforts were made to expand the
educational opportunities of the H u n g a r i a n s A s we have seen, in
the case of Rumania the opposite trend prevailed.

It was the late

1940's and early 1950's that enabled the Hungarians to have their own
schools, while more recently— particularly since 1956--the Rumanians
have tried to limit Hungarian educational opportunities.
It is true, however, that in the case of both these countries

^ Y u g o s l a v i a has been less reluctant to release such data
because it has nore to be proud of. With the exception of only the
German minority--which has only limited educational opportunities-Yugoslavia has released data on the educational opportunities of all
ethnic groups.
See Jugoslavia 1945-1964: Statistidki Pregled
(Beograd:
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1965), Table 19-3, pp. 295-296.
48

Statistidki Godisjak FNRJ 1954 (Beograd;
Statistiku i Evidenciju, 1954), Table 257, p. 331.

Savezni Zavod Za
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minority educational opportunities increased after the second World
War.

In the Vojvodina the contrast between pre- and post-war condi

tions was even greater than in Transylvania.

The reason for this was

that in Yugoslavia the Church was already eliminated from education in
the interwar ye a r s .
World W ar II.

In Rumania this elimination took place only after

At any rate, for the Magyars of the Vojvodina this

interwar elimination meant the loss of education in their own language.
The state schools controlled by the Serb dominated Ministry of Educa
tion in Belgrade, had very little sympathy for national minorities.
They allowed the Hungarians instruction in their own language only in
the first four elementary grades.

In all education above that level,

instruction was given exclusively in S e r b i a n . B u t

even the number

of elementary schools allowed the Magyars was well below that which
their numbers would have warranted.
school units.

In 1934 they possessed only 157

This is meager indeed, when compared with the 693

school units which they had prior to World War 1.^^

By the 1938-39

academic year the number of their school units increased to 186, which
was still completely inadequate.

Furthermore, the content of educa

tion in these schools was often little above the level of indoctrina
tion in "Yugoslav nationalism," taught by a staff that was at least

-*®Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , p. 156; Macartney, Hungary
and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.
^■*-It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that many of
these 693 school units teaching in Hungarian prior to World War I,
were merely instruments of "Magyarization." Thus, the comparison is
not altogether fair.
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one-third Slav even in the Magyar school units.

Recent Educational Policies
Yugoslavia's current policies are a healthy corrective for
these previous shortcomings.

As Table XVIII reveals, the number of

ethnic minority school units has remained relatively stable since the
early 1950's.

However, the number of classes,

has constantly increased.

students and teachers

In the case of the Hungarians of the

Vojvodina, a similar trend is revealed by Table XIX. As the latter
indicates, however, the Hungarian growth has been somewhat less
dramatic.

This can be explained, in part, by the limited growth of

the Hungarian population of the country.

53

It is somewhat harder to explain the steady decline
number of Hungarian students in primary schools.

of the

As Table XIX demon

strates, beginning w ith the 1956-57 academic year, the number of Hun
garian grade-school children has fallen from 49,844 to 45,311 by the
1965-66 academic y e a r . ^

This has taken place in the face of expanded

educational opportunities.-’-’

A simple explanation is again demographic.

-^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.
5^See along this line "A Ddlvideki MagyarsAg Demogr^fidja,"
News from Hungary - Magyarorsz^gi Hirek (Compiled by Free Europe, Inc.)
XVI (Aug. 28, 1970), 4.
-’^'See Table XIX.
It is not possible to trace this trend past
1966 since the latest available source on this question was published
only in 1967.
See StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1967 (Beograd:
Savezni
Zavod
Za Statistiku, 1967), Table 126-4, p. 286.
-’-’Note particularly the increase in the number ofHungarian
teachers in primary, vocational and secondary schools.
See Table XIX.
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9
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192
1964/65
7,830 248,853 8,717
90
12,780 1,050
33
457
403
5,615
1,422
1965/66
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228
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488
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37
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*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: Statistigki Pregled. Table 19-3, pp. 295-96;
Statistigki Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Ifable 24-5,'p. 378; Statistigki Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Table 125-2,
p. 299; Statistigki GoUisnja'k S | R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.
**For the 1938-39 school year the above sources provide conflicting data.
The data in this Table
for 1938-39 is based on Statistigki Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378, because this is the only
source which provides data on all the minorities, Including the Germans.
***The data for the 1949-50 school year are based solely on Statistigki Pregled.
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****The classification of types of schools between 1951-56 differs slightly from the classifications
of other years.
This accounts for the important changes in the statistics of the "Vocational & Other
Schools" category in the 1956-57 school year. Another reason for variations in data is the inclusion of
the German minority's educational data in the 1951-56 sources.
The latter are left out of all subsequent
Yugoslavian statistical sources.
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274
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690

10,423
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2
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2
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5
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2
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6

40
1,076
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5
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1
1
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1
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32
1
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1,643
-89
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13
37
1
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3
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4,756
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1
1
37
2
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4
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35
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13
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1
1
2
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5
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8,677
13
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14
32
2
1
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4
8
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22
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17
1
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1
1
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9
8,043
23
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11
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16
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3,570
1,385
v Students
24
1,920
759
4
110
70
# Teachers
7
6
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5
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24
# Teachers
7
I
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1
1
33
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195944
4
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3
# Classes
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1,0^9
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9
8
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# Teachers
13
50
908
1
1
34
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4,599
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5
3
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# Classes
1963
2,4 It
6,533
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4 211
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7
5
# Teachers
16
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941
1
1
f Schools
1965128
5,375
299
6
5
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# Classes
1966
3,835
8,624
176,723
131
142
4,605
# Students
239
568
5.858
9
18
233
# Teachers
*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: StatistiCki Pregled, Table 19-3, pp. 295-296; Statistiki
Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Tabl~. 125-2, p. 299;
StatistiCkT Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.
**Data for the 1938-39” school year includes Czech as well as Slovak educational institutions.
Post-World
War II data separates the two. In the present Table only the Slovak statistics are indicated for the years
between 1949 and 1966.
***Educational data concerning the German minority in Yugoslavia is available only for the period between
1938-56.
See StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J
1954, Table 257, p. 331.
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It relates to the aging of the East-European populations, particularly
that of the Hungarians.

Accordingly, school age children compose a
c/r

smaller percentage of the Hungarian population than previously.
This explanation is far from satisfactory.

It fails to account

for the growing numbers of Hungarian students in the Vojvodina who
attend the Serbo-Croatian schools.

Unlike their counterparts in T r a n 

sylvania, they are not under overt pressure to attend the schools of
the majority nationalities.

This is brought out by the lively debate

which has grown up concerning the future of Hungarian educational
opportunities in Yugoslavia.

57

Most of the analysis coming from the

Vojvodina, indicate that it is "parental opportunism" that is mainly
responsible for the defection of Hungarian students.-^

Educators,

newspapermen and community leaders all point out that the burden of
guilt rests with the parents of the p u p i l s . T h e y

send their children

to the schools taught in Serbo-Croatian in order to provide them with
a better understanding of the country's major language.

These parents

feel that only education in a non-minority school will provide their

-^"A Ddlviddki Magyarsdg DemogrAfiAja," News from Hungary, p.
4; "A Kelet-Eurdpai TArsadalmak ElSregeddse," News from Hungary-MagyarorszAgi Hirek (Compiled by Free Europe, Inc.) XVI (Aug. 7, 1970), 3.
-*^MihAly Agoston, "Hova Irassam?" Magyar Szd, July 3, 1966,
p. 14; Gdza Vukovics, "Buzld Iskolaudvar Meg a Tflbbi," Magyar Szo',
June 24, 1966, p. 9.
-^ I b i d .; Agoston, "Hova Irassam?", p. 14; ZoltAn Varga,
"Petdfi Hitet . . .
Itt-Ott, III (Sept., 1970), 23.
~*^ I b i d .; Agoston, "Hova Irassam?", p. 14; Vukovics, "BuzlcS
Iskolaudvar Meg a Ttfbbi," p. 9; Gdza Vukovics, jAnos Vlah and Jdzsef
PolyvAs, "A Nyelv Nem AkadAly," Magyar Szd*, June 2, 1966, p. 3.
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children with an adequate command of Serbo-Croatian for continued
studies on the university level or equal opportunities in social-

ftfl

economic advancement.

To combat this drain on the Hungarian language schools, educa
tors and community leaders have proposed "dual language" schools on
the primary and high school levels.
both Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian.

These schools have instruction in
Their advantage is that both the

minority and the majority languages are used and learned simultaneously.
This educational approach results--under ideal circumstances— in m inor
ity students learning the language of the majority without losing their
own.

At the same time, it educates the majority nationality students

in the language of the minority people with wh o m they live side by
. . 61
sid e .
So far no data has been made available which would indicate
that the "dual-language" schools have put an end to the erosion of
Hungarian education in the Vojvodina. ^

However, their existence and

constant expansion demonstrates that Yugoslavia is much more generous
in its nationality policies than Rumania.

The difference between the

policies of the two countries is summarized in the contrast between

^ I b i d .; Varga, "Petdfi Hitdt . . . ," p. 23.

ft1

Two interesting discussions of such "bilingual education" are:
Ldszld Varga's "KdtnyelvG Oktatds Vajdasdgban," Hid, X X V (Feb., 1961),
pp. 157-165, and jdnos Kossa's "Nyeivmuveies a Kdtnyelvtiseg
Kfirfilmdnyei K 6 zdtt," Hid, XXX (Nov.-Dec., 1966), pp. 1296-1301.

62

The effectiveness of bilingual education has been evaluated
in a number of articles.
Of these the thoroughest analysis is provided
by Varga, "Kdtnyelvu Oktatds Vajdas^gban," pp. 157-165.
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the Rumanian policy of "parallelization" and the Yugoslav policy of
"dual-language" instruction.

As w e have had occasion to see, "paral-

lelization" eliminates Hungarian language instruction.
linguistic assimilation.

Its purpose is

The "dual-language" system on the other hand,

has as its goal the preservation of the minority languages of Yugo
slavia.^
The content of the curriculum, as in Transylvania, is "so
cialist."

However, a perusal of social science textbooks--particularly

history textbooks— indicates that a great deal of attention is given
to the history of the individual national groups that make up Yugo
slavia.

For example, in the Hungarian language world history text for

high-school students, a great deal of attention is devoted to the
development of Communism in both Yugoslavia and Hungary.

fifa.

No similar

attention is paid to Hungarian Party developments in Rumania.

In the

latter case, the role of Hungarians is examined only as it relates to
Rumanian Party and national h i s t o r y . ^

The difference between the two

educational systems is that in the Yugoslav case a trans-ethnic
"national" consciousness is inculcated, while in Rumania it is a more

^ T h e contrast between these policies is effectively presented
by Ste.en Bdla V^rdy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part 2 (Astor
Park, Florida:
Danubian Press, Inc., 1969), pp. 338-360.
/:a
Bogdan Smiljevid and Horde Knezevid, A Legujabb Kor
T 6 rt d n e t e , trans. Kdlmdn Csehdk (Subotica: Minerva KSnyvkiadd,
pp. 14-18, 32-41, 96-101, 123-129, 212?215, 260-263.
^ F o r example:
Constantin Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania
(Bucharest:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).
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narrow ethnic Rumanian national conciousness.

This difference will be

examined more closely in relation to the over-all cultural policies of
the two states.
The contrast between Rumanian and Yugoslav policies is also
evident in the teacher-training programs of the two countries.

Unlike

Rumania, Yugoslavia has constantly expanded its teacher-training
program for the Hungarians.

Table XIX shows that from the academic

year 1949-50 to the academic year 1965-66, the number of Hungarian
teachers has grown from 588 to 2,079 in primary schools and 32 to 434
in vocational and specialized schools.

Very recently, the Yugoslavs

have expanded this program even further by establishing a teachertraining center in Subotica (Szabadka) which will be concerned mainly
with the education of "dual-language" instructors.8 ^
Only in the area of University instruction do the Hungarians
of the Vojvodina seem to lag behind their fellow nationals of Tran
sylvania.

They possess only one "faculty" (i.e., department) in the

Hungarian language.

This is the Hungarian Literature and Language

Faculty at the University of Novi Sad (Ujvid^k).88

However, it should

66

On the other hand, Table XIX also indicates that the number
of secondary school teachers has declined from 333 in 1949-50, to
141 in 1965-66.
This discrepancy is difficult to explain.
It is
probably due to two factors:
the parental opportunism mentioned
earlier and the states relocation of many high-school teachers in the
expanding vocational institutions.
^^Varga, "Pettffi Hitet

. . .," p. 23.

68Ibid.
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be noted that this department came into existence only ten years ago,
and that there is talk of adding more Hungarian language departments
at the University of Novi Sad.^^

As opposed to this, Rumania possesses

more instruction in Hungarian at the Babes-Bolyai University.
this instruction is being reduced rather than expanded.

But,

Thus, a statis

tical comparison of Hungarian instruction in the two countries is bound
to be misleading unless the long-range developments are also considered.
In the area of academic publications a similar situation
prevails.

Seemingly, the Hungarian scholars are better off in Rumania,

where some of them may get a Hungarian language article or study pub
lished in the Babes-Bolyai Studia. ^

In Yugoslavia no such dual

language publication exists for Hungarian scholars.

They publish

everything in the journals and language of the majority nationalities
or they send their studies to scholarly publications in Hungary.

The

latter alternative is less available to Hungarian scholars in Tran
sylvania.

Thus, it would not be fair to say that in this area oppor

tunities for Hungarians are less in Yugoslavia than in Rumania.
Rather, the inequalities of treatment are a product of different
academic developments.

Transylvania was always an intellectual center

and it had many Hungarian scholarly publications before being incor
porated into Rumania.

The Vojvodina, on the other hand, was never a

^ I b i d .; "Hirek," News from Hungary - Magyarorsz^gi Hirek
(Compiled by Radio Free Europe), XVI (July 17, 1970), p. 6 .
^®See footnote 28 above concerning the extent of these oppor
tunities .
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major intellectual center, due to the geographic proximity of the Hun
garian universities of Pecs and Szeged.

When the Vojvodina came under

Yugoslav rule, it had no Hungarian higher educational institutions.
Only in the latter half of the 1960's have such institutions begun to
make their appearance
Many Hungarians attend the universities of Belgrade and Zagreb.
More recently, they are an important part of the student body at the
72
University of Novi Sad (Ujviddk).

As the Hungarian instruction

expands at the latter, even more Hungarians will continue their studies
there rather than at the more distant educational centers of Zagreb
and Belgrade.

Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, this will enable

Hungarian intellectuals in Yugoslavia to take a more active role as
leaders of their people.

It will bring them closer to their people

geographically, socially and in their professional concerns of re70

search and education.
The above analysis indicates that the educational policies of
Rumania and Yugoslavia contained certain disadvantages for their

71"Hungarol<4giai Intdzet Ujviddken," A H d t , May 12, 1967, p. 1;
Varga, "PetSfi Hitdt . . .
p. 23.
nr
j
' A c c o r d i n g to "Hirek," News from Hungary, p. 6 , during the
1969-70 academic year only 1,376 Hungarians were enrolled at the
University of Novi Sad (Ujviddk).
This made up 11.8 per cent of the
University's total enrollment in an area where the Hungarian share
of the population is 24.2 per cent.
It is contended by Hungarian
student leaders, that "dual-language" (bilingual) instruction in the
University would eliminate this imbalance.
^ I b i d .; "Hungaroldgiai Intdzet Ujviddken," A Hdt, p. 1.
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Hungarian inhabitants at one time

or another.

In Yugoslavia the

educational deprivation was most acute in the immediate post World
War II years.

In Rumania, on the other hand, it became detrimental

only after the internal and external checks were removed from the rule
of the Rumanian ethnic majority in the years between 1956-58.

By and

large, the analysis reveals an increase in the educational opportuni
ties for Hungarians in the Vojvodina and a drastic reduction of the
educational opportunities of their fellow nationals in Transylvania.

II
A similar picture emerges from the comparison of Rumanian and
Yugoslav policies in the area of mass communication.

While in both

states the news media--and all other means of disseminating information--came under close governmental supervision and control, their
policies differed in the impact they had on minority— particularly
Hungarian--cultural developments.

In Transylvania
The Party considered the news media instruments of education,
second only to the schools in effectiveness.

From the beginning, the

CPR made extensive use of these media to gain the support of the nonRumanian n a t i o n a l i t i e s . ^

It appealed to them in their respective

languages through the daily press, radio broadcasts

and assorted other

74
Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 570-581; Romulus Boila,
"Press and Radio," in Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New
York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 264-267.
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printed and electronic media.

Ever since, the media continue to per

form such a propaganda or control role among the Hungarians and other
nationalities.

At the same time, the media also serve as channels of

cultural expression and development.

The dual nature of the media—

i.e., as control instruments of the state and servants of nationality
culture--will be examined in two parts.

The role of the printed media

(newspapers, periodicals, etc.) will be examined first and then
compared to the role of such electronic media as radio and television.

Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines
As in the case of the schools, "proletarian internationalism"
was a real working factor in the realm of the written word prior to
1956.

National groups could have and, in fact, were encouraged to

have their own periodicals and newspapers in order to better disseminate
the directives of the Party.

75

The volume of these publications com

pared favorably w i t h the inter-war period, even if their number and
quality did n o t . ^

(Table X X presents a comparison of minority

^ H a j d u GyOzd, "Forum: A Pdrtos Szellem Erttsitdsddrt Irodalmunkban," Igaz S z d , XV (June, 1956), 871-74, presents this "educational"
role and at the same time provides a good example for the evaluation of
this function of the printed news media, even if his concern is
primarily with literature.
^ T h e status of minority periodicals for the inter-war years
presented by Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems, p. 209,
and Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 315. The post-war status
of these periodicals is presented in Boila, "Press and Radio," pp.
268-269.
Some more recent trends are treated in;
Bailey, "Trouble
over Transylvania," p. 29; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by
Nationalist Drive," pp. 1, 5; "Levdl Erddlyb81," Irodalmi U i s ^ g , p. 1.
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TABLE X X

RUMANIAN A ND NATIONAL MINORITY PUBLICATIONS IN
THE INTER-WAR AND POST-WAR PERIODS

Nationality

Type of
Publication

Inter-War
(1929)

Post-War
(1963)

Newspapers

505

107**

Periodicals

433

279**

Newspapers

112

Rumanian

Hungarian

28***
Periodicals

69

Newspapers

72
13***

German
Periodicals

30

*This Table has been compiled on the basis of data in Joseph S.
Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 208-209; Rumanian Statistical
Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic;
Central Statistical
Board, 1964), Tables 138 and 139, pp. 266-268; Catalogue 1963;
Rumanian Periodical Publications (Centrului National de Schimb;
Bucharest, Rumania:
Biblioteca Centrala de Stat a R.P.R., 1963). For
somewhat different inter-war figures, see C. A. Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 315.
**Rmnanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, o p . c i t .
***Catalogue 196 3 , o p . c i t .
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publications in inter-war and post-war Rumania).

When the CPR aban

doned "proletarian internationalism" it still continued to utilize the
mass media in its relations with the Hungarians.

Thus, to the present

there are numerous Hungarian language publications and broadcasts in
the country.

These, however, serve the minority cultures less and less

and the Communist control apparatus more and more.
One outstanding feature of the minority publications world,
until very recently, has been its relative stability.

According to the

Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 the total number of minority
publications rose from 29 in 1950, to 38 in 1 9 6 3 . ^

This figure is

misleading, however, insofar as it does not designate the gain in
relation to specific minorities.

Such round numbers only indicate that

publications for all nationality groups increased, it does not show
that certain nationalities lost some publications while others gained
some.

To find out to what degree any such gains or losses affected the

nationalities of Transylvania, it is necessary to examine those Rumanian
catalogues which list the number and nature of the publications origi70

nating in the country.

^ Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's
Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 266-268, Tables 138 and
139.
It is interesting to note how I. Nistor inflated the number of
these periodicals to a total of 48 when he wrote a propaganda article
for Izvestia (Dec. 27, 1953). For this article consult under "Rumania"
the "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," The Current Digest
of the Soviet P r e s s , IV (Feb. 7, 1953), 18.
^®The catalogues which are most useful included: Newspapers and
Periodicals from Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania;
Cartimex, 1962); Cata
logue 1 9 6 3 : Rumanian Periodical Publications (Centrului National de
Schimb; Bucharest, Rumania;
Biblioteca Centrala de Stata R.P.R., 1963);
and Catalog 1962 (Academia Republicii Populare Romine; Bucharest,
Rumania:
Institutul de Studii Romino-Sovietic, 1962).
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According to the most recent catalogue which could be obtained,
there are 28 Hungarian, 13 German and 2 Serbian minority publications
listed.

The discrepancy between this number and that presented in the

Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 above, is explainable only by
the latter's attempt to distinguish between "foreign" and "domestic"
publications.

The Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 presents a

smaller number of minority entries, probably because it divides the Ger
ma n publications into two categories:
foreign consumption.

one for domestic and one for

With this discrepancy explained, it is possible

to evaluate the catalogue entries in more detail.

Of the 355 entries,

258 are Rumanian, 28 Hungarian, 13 German, 2 Serbian, 12 English, 10
Russian, 19 French, 1 Chinese, 7 Spanish and 2 L a t i n . ^

of

the 258

Rumanian entries, 70 contain German extracts and summaries, 76 contain
English extracts and summaries, 197 contain Russian extracts and

sum

maries, 189 contain French extracts and summaries, and 2 contain
Italian extracts and summaries.

on

It is then apparent that the minorities are relatively well
provided with publications in their own language, with the exception
of Yiddish.

79

O1
1

However, this evaluation must be qualified by the fact

Catalogue 1963:

Rumanian Periodical Publications.

on
Some of these publications contain summaries and extracts
in more than one language, of which the Russian and French appear most
frequently.
None of them have summaries in Hungarian!

81

Boila, "Press
and Radio," p. 269,
points out, however, that
the Jews were not worse
off than any of the
other groups in this
category. Though they only
had two Yiddish
publications, they also
had two in Rumanian and
one in Hungarian;
The Germans had four; the
Yugoslavs two; the Ukrainians two; the Armenians two; the Greeks one;
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that in the last two years significant reductions have taken place in
some areas, affecting particularly circulation (number of copies)
OO

rather than the number of the publications.0^- However, in the realm
of publications it ma y be premature to state that a systematic policy
is being undertaken to reduce minority papers and periodicals.

At

present, such a policy would be a disadvantage to the CPR because these
publications provide it with the best means for disseminating its
propaganda among the nationalities.

At the same time the Party seems

magnanimous toward the minorities by allowing "their" journals to
exist
The reduction of "proletarian internationalism" in the pub
lication world has, therefore, taken a different path.

This differ

ent approach is successful because the written word is more pliable
and controllable than the school system.

Censorship enables the

government to have more control over each and every periodical, than

and the Hungarians thirty.
If these figures are added together they
present a total of 46 publications.
This is again at variance with
the 32 which are allotted in the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964
for the year 1955 (the year given by Boila for his statistics).
For
this discrepancy, however, the investigator is unable to provide an
explanation.
^ " L e v ^ l Erd^lybol," Irodalmi U j s d g , p. 1.
OO

It would be a disadvantage to the CPR at present because a
large segment of the minority populations still only understand their
own languages, or very little Rumanian.
However, this situation is
being altered by the great emphasis which has been put on the study of
Rumanian among the national minorities.
In a few years it may be
possible for the Rumanians to take away all minority publications.
By
then only the old people will be unacquainted with Rumanian, but they
are the ones for whom the Party cares least anyway.
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QA
is the case wit h individual t e a c h e r s . T h u s ,

it is unlikely that the

Party will destroy one of its most effective means of control over the
nationalities by using the same elimination methods as against the
schools.

Rather than eliminating the minority periodicals, the CPR

utilizes them as avenues of propaganda in the offensive against "parQC

ticularism" and "bourgeois nationalism."
CPR publications have had a long tradition as champions of
"proletarian internationalism" and as uncompromising fighters against
manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism."

Even before the seizure of

power, such journals as Korunk were early Communist centers of
Rumanian-Hungarian co-operation.®®

However, as was demonstrated in

relation to Party-nationality relations, those early years of co
operation were possible only because of the truly "internationalist"
composition of the CPR.

Today, when the CPR has lost this "inter

nationalist" character, it is no longer possible to expect that Elftre,

®^These periodicals and publications are easily controlled by
the CPR, because they are few in number (38 in 1964), they are all
printed in government publishing houses, and the contributing writers
are not only Party members but also front-line fighters for the cause
of Rumanian "socialist patriotism."
See in this regard, H. F., "A
M ai Erddly II," Nemzetfir, June 1, 1960.
®®Banyai, "Forum:
Irodalom Tanitds ds Hazafias Nevelds," pp.
236-242; GyiJrgy Kovefcs, "GySzelmek Utjdn," Igaz Szd , IX (May, 1961),
645; and "A Szocialista Realizmus," Igaz S z d . X (May, 1962), 755-766,
present the usual arguments of these "front-line fighters for
socialist patriotism."
®®IstvAn Nagy, "Forum:
Tiz fives Az RNK IroszOvetsdge," Igaz
Sz 6 , VII (March, 1959), 415-417; N. Kallos, "The Journal 'Korunk' and
Its Animator, Gdbor Gaal," Lupta de Clasa (June, 1964), t r a n s . in
Rumanian Press Survey N o . 447 (Radio Free Europe, July 15, 1964), 2-5.
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K o r u n k , Igaz Sz 6 and other Party journals keep reflecting that spirit.
The spirit of "proletarian internationalism" has been slowly replaced
by the spirit of "sodalfct: patriotism."®^
Transylvanian nationality publications can be divided mainly
into two groups:

technical-professional and economic-political-social-

OO
cultural publications.00

The second group of the two is, by far, the

more important in the life of the minorities, not only as regards the
number of the reading audience, but also as regards their effective
ness as channels of propaganda.

This is not the case with the first

group, which contains periodicals likely to suffer elimination (i.e.,
absorption) in the near future.

The prospects for elimination are

indicated by the fact that all important such journals appear only in
Rumanian.®^

Anyone who wishes to enter these coveted professional-

technical circles must, therefore, be well acquainted with the Rumanian

®^See footnote 44 above.
OO

The above division can be justified because the primary func
tion of the technical-professional periodicals is not indoctrination
(though they sometimes contain such articles), as it is for the
economic-political-social-cultural publications.
Furthermore, the
above division facilitates a clearer analysis.
®^This is based on the examination of Catalog 1962, which deals
with technical, scientific, medical and other professional publica
tions. The catalogue is published by the Institute of Rumanian-Soviet
studies of the Academy of the R.P.R.
The striking feature of this
catalogue is that not one of the works listed therein appears in Hun
garian. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 573 maintains, on the other
hand, that "the less elaborate works were printed in Magyar and German,
as well as Rumanian."
Catalogua 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publica
tions , lists five such publications in the Hungarian language (Orvosi
Szemle, p. 53; Mdhdszet, p. 75; Matematikai ds Fizikai L a p o k , p. 41;
Tanflgyi U j s d g , p. 29; and KSnyvtarosok Tijdkoztatdja, p. 12) and also
studies of the Babes-Bolyai University which still appear in Hun
garian and Rumanian in 1963.
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language.
The economic-political-cultural-social journals, on the other
hand, have become the most convenient channels of CPR efforts to
90

instill &xiaL3st patriotism" into the national minorities. u

While

formerly these journals were important avenues for the expression of
class solidarity and tHe common struggle of all nationalities for the
socialist fatherland, now these same journals have become Rumanizing
instruments of the majority nationality.

This can be easily ascer

tained by an examination of the development of any of these periodicals
since the Communist seizure of power.

While earlier articles stressed

the equality theme, the more recent ones stress the need for closer
identification with the majority n a t i o n a l i t y A r t i c l e s before 1958
gjlorified the R.P.R. for enabling the minority nationalities to
develop their own national cultures on the basis of proletarian inter
nationalism and brotherhood.

Since then, the stress has been on

becoming better acquainted with the culture and language of the major
ity n a t i o n a l i t y . ^

The constant emphasis on learning the Rumanian

language and reading Rumanian literature has become more insistent in

^See

footnote 83 above.

91

Bdnyai, "Forum: Irodalom Tanitds e's Hazafias Nevel4s," p.
242; A. F., "A Mai Erd^ly II," Nemzetfir, June 1, 1960.
92

Hajdu GydSzd, "Menet Kttzben," Igaz S z d , VI (May, 1958),

655-656.
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these periodicals with each passing y e a r . ^
At present the periodicals and publications printed in the
languages of the national minorities serve only one purpose--the subjugation of the nationalities to the CPR*

94

Their subjugation, unlike

that of the Rumanian masses, is in this way twofold— ideological and
national.^

Thus, it seems meaningless to quote statistics regarding

the number of publications allowed the national minorities,

since each

of those publications serves the CPR and its Rumanizing g o a l s . ^

93

The first Congress of the Rumanian W r i t e r s 1 Association in
1956 was already deeply concerned with furthering the learning of the
Rumanian language and with the position of the minority nationalities.
See "Vigyazo:
dsszehivtdk a Romdn Ndpkdztdrsasdg Iroinak ElsS
Kongresszusdt," Igaz S z d , IV (April, 1956), 601.
Stressing the need
for more translations and language studies is also emphasized by:
Veronica Porumbacu, "KOzBs Uton," Igaz S z d , IV (June, 1956), 876-877;
Elemdr Jancso, "Szemle:
Dunanak, Oltnak Egy a Hangja," Igaz S z d , VI
(Jan., 1958), 139-140; "Forum;
A Korszertlsdg ds Pdrtossdg Jegydben,"
Igaz Sz d , VIII (June, 1960), 854, Az 'Igaz S z o 1 SzerkesztBsege, "A
szocialista ifpitds Szolgdlataban," Igaz S z d , X (Dec., 1962), 892;
Ldszlo Baldzs, "Mddszeresseg a Nyelvtanuldsban," Igaz S z d . XI (Jan.,
1963), 113; Bdla Kelemen, "Nyelvtanulds-Olvasds," Igaz S z d . XI (April,
1963), 587.
94

7 This is best indicated by the uniformity of all such publica
tions. Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 268, 270, points out this feature
of the Rumanian news media.
He states:
"Every editorial of every
paper might have been written by the same person, for all the differ
ences to be observed.
Even the makeup of newspapers is similar . . .
aside from insignificant details, all newspapers nowadays are but
specialized editions of Scanteia."
^-*F. K., "Romdnia Szuntesse Meg az Erddlyi Magyarok Ulddzdsdt,"
Katolikus Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 21, 1964, pp. 1, 5.
^ S o m e light is shed on this by Ldszlo Sdndor, "Ukrajnai
tizenet" in "0lvas6k Foruma," Igaz S z d , VI (May, 1958), 794-795, when
he complains that the periodical (Igaz Szd) is very deficient in the
works of Hungarian writers from anywhere but Rumania.
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The Air Waves:

Radio and Television

Much of what applies to the printed news media also applies to
the electronic media.

However, in this realm there are no data avail

able which would make it possible to compare the inter-war period and
the p r e s e n t . ^

While this makes it almost impossible to provide an

adequate treatment of the electronic news media, it does not mean that
some of their general characteristics cannot be presented to indicate
the nature of their contribution to minority opportunities.

One such

characteristic is that broadcasting resembles publishing as an easily
controlled and manipulated means of news dissemination.^®
Available sources also indicate that radio transmission is a
growing and important channel of news dissemination for the CPR.
rapid expansion of radio broadcasting indicates this.

The

While in 1938

Rumania only had two broadcasting stations, by 1963 their number had
grown to twenty-two.^9

However, to assess the share of the national

^ G e o r g e H. Bossy, "Transportation and Communications" in
Rumania, ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 331, 342, presents some figures which
enable a general comparison of pre-war and post-war broadcasting
facilities and capabilities.
However, these shed little light on the
share (if any) which the national minorities may have had in this
area. A further complication in any such comparison is the role of
television, which was non-existent in pre-war Rumania.
^®Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 272-273, presents this malleable
feature of the written and electronic news media.
However, in one
respect the latter faced an obstacle which the written media did not
have to confront, namely broadcasts from abroad.
Jammings did not
always successfully eliminate the outside intruders (e.g., Radio Free
Europe, Voice of America, etc.).
But for the Rumanians this also
entails competition in the broadcasting field with the Communist H u n 
garian stations.
^ R u m a n i a n Statistical Pocket Book 1964, pp. 262-263, Table 134.
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minorities in this growth is d i f f i c u l t . T h e

nearest estimate

possible has to be based on regional divisions, which of course cross
linguistic and national lines.

A comparison based on regions cannot

provide conclusive evidence because of the very limited data available.
While it is true that the predominantly Hungarian Mures-Nagyar
Autonomous Region had a low rate of radio subscriptions, so did the
predominantly Rumanian regions of Iasi, Suceava and Dobrogea.

While

it is also true that Rumanian areas (Ploesti and Bucharest city and
region) had the highest subscription rates, Brasov, a region with a
heavy Hungarian population, was not far b e h i n d . R a t h e r

than re

vealing national discrimination, all the available data indicate that
subscriptions run higher in the industrially more developed regions
than in the more backward ones.
Since the texts of radio and television broadcasts are also
unavailable, it is impossible to assess the content of the programs
maintained for the nationalities of Transylvania.j But, since the
electronic news media are as well controlled and censored as the
written ones, it is probably safe to assume that, rather than decrease
nationality programs the CPR just shifts the emphasis of the propaganda

■'•^About all that can be stated with certainty is that broad
casts in the language of the national minorities exist and have in
fact been expanded.
See along this line "Erddlyi Hirek," Larnafa, V
(April-June, 1958), 33; Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Rumania
(Bucharest:
Foreign Language Pub. House, 1959), p. 516.
^ R u m a n i a n Statistical Pocket Book 19 6 4 , p. 264, Table 135.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

302

toward more 'feocfalifit patriotism" as was the case with the nationality
publications.
The only concrete source that is available for an evaluation
of the Hungarian share of broadcasts in Rumania is the listing of
radio and television programs in the daily papers.

A perusal of this

listing for the past two years (1969-1970) indicates that separate
generalizations must be made in discussing the two media.
Television seems to have been an overwhelmingly ethnic Rumanian
media until November 1969.

Until then, there were no distinct Hun-

*1 A O

garian language programs. u

This does not mean that Hungarian sub

jects, personalities or films were barred from television, it means
only that there were no regular Hungarian language programs.

Programs

dealing with a Hungarian subject were most frequently presented in
Rumanian.

103

Only in the course of the present broadcasting season

has the Rumanian Television network allowed for a "Hungarian Hour."
In actuality, this involves a one-hour Sunday afternoon program
(beginning at 12:30 or 1:15 p.m.) and a half-hour program on Thursdays
(beginning usually at 5:30 p.m.).

The German minority also has a one-

hour program on Saturdays.

102 This is indicated by a comparison of the "television and
radio guide" sections appearing in the Saturday issues of the Hungarian
daily printed in Bucharest.
Particularly:
"Mtlsorkalauz," Elfire, Nov.
15, 1969, p. 4, and "Mtisorkalauz," Elfire, Nov. 22, 1969, p. 4. Prior
to Nov. 22, 1969, no mention is made of Hungarian programs.

•*-^Ibid., and all "radio and television guide" sections in the
Saturday issues of Elfire prior to Nov. 22, 1969.
■*-®^See all "radio and television guide sections in the Saturday
issues of Elfire from Nov. 22, 1969 to the present.
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The

opening of television to such

grams--even on such

regularized minority pro-

a limited scale— is a complete reversal of the

Rumanian allocations of television time.

The drastic nature of this

change for the Hungarians--is evident from the content of the televi
sion programs preceding the Fall of 1969.

The discriminatory nature

of broadcasting is to be found more in what had been omitted than in
what was included.

Aside from the inclusion of political programs

and programs taken over from Western Television— like "Bonanza"—
the Rumanian programs were for the most part educational in nature.
For example, the television carried regular language instructional
programs.

It had regular weekly language programs devoted to

Rumanian, Russian, German, French, Spanish and English.

However, it

did not have any Hungarian language instruction programs.
The

motives for the change in Rumanian attitudes seems to stem

from their more exposed political posture

vis-h-vis the Soviet Union.

The Rumanian leaders are much more uncertain of their position since
the Czecho-slovakian events of August 1968.

As a consequence, they

have become more concerned with mending their political fences at
home.

Thus, they have granted a number of opportunities for cultural

development to the national minorities, such as the "Hungarian Hour"
on television.
In the area of Radio broadcasting, the Hungarians have had a

^O^Ibid.; for more specific examples see "Mfisorkalauz," El 6 re,
Apr. 5, 1969, p. 4; "Mfisorkalauz," Elflre, Mar. 29, 1969, p. 4;
"Mfisorkalauz," E l d r e , Aug. 19, 1969, p. 4.
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more proportional share of broadcasting than in the case of television.
This has been particularly true since the addition of the broadcasting
center at Tirgu-Mures (Marosvdsarhely) in March 1957.

This center

had for a long time the second most powerful transmitter after the one
at B u c h a r e s t . A t

Tirgu-Mures and at Cluj

have always had daily programs.

(Kolozsvdr) the Hungarians

The number of hours transmitted in

Hungarian has always varied, but it has been substantial.

At both

these broadcasting centers the Hungarians can listen to about onethird of the programs in their own language.
This does not mean that everything is well in this area.

In

terms of program content, the Hungarians are more frequently objects
of propaganda than not.

In this their fate does not differ greatly

from that of the other inhabitants of Rumania.

It does, however,

limit the role of the media as instruments of cultural preservation.
On the all-national level, this is apparent also in the limited use of
Hungarian in the programs of the broadcasting center at Bucharest.
Only one half-hour of news is provided on weekdays and twenty minutes
1 f)Q

on Sundays.

The broadcasts transmitted for abroad from Bucharest

also show a bias against the Hungarians.

Thirteen languages are used

106"Erddlyi Hirek," Ldrmafa, V (Apr.-June, 1958), p. 33.
107T, . ,
Ibxd.
10®See any "Miisorkalauz," in the Saturday issues of E16re from
March 1957 to the present.
■*-^See:
"A Bukaresti Rddi<i Magyar Nyelvti Adasa," Elffre, Nov.
22, 1969, p. 4, and Eldjre, June 13, 1970, p. 4.
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to transmit to areas outside of Rumania, but Hungarian is not one of
t h e m .110

In The Vojvodina
As in the case of Rumania, so in Yugoslavia, from the end of
the Second World War to the present,

the mass media have played a

significant role both as instruments

of Party

for the preservation of nationality cultures.

control and as

vehicles

To evaluate the media

in terms of this dual role the study

will--as

sylvania--separate the analysis into

two parts.

in the case of

Tran-

The printed media will

be considered first and radio and television second.

Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines
In Yugoslavia, the right to publish newspapers and periodicals
in the language of the minority nationalities has been considered an
indication of the correct application of nationality policies.

111

While no data has been obtained to indicate nationality publishing
activity prior to 1953, we do know that the post-war period saw a vast
expansion of nationality publications.
Hungarians suffered a great lack in this

In the inter-war period the
respect.

Their two major

publications Kal£ngya and Hid were continuously ready to fold.11^

Thus,

110 See:
"The Daily Schedule of Broadcasts for Abroad," in
Documents, A
cles and Information on R u m a n i a , for June 20, 1965,p.
21, for Dec, i<J, 1966, p. 21, and for June 15, 1970, p. 26.

111Ldszld Reh^k, "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszl^via Uj Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," H i d . XXVII (May, 1963), 573.
112»szemle, Szemelv^nyek:
Kaldngya" in Hid 1934-1941 eds.
J^nos Kov^cs, et a l . , (Novi Sad, Yugoslavia:
Forum Kdnyvkiadd, 1964),
pp. 272-273.
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the period after the Second World War has been in this respect a
great improvement over the past.

By 1953 the Hungarians had seven
1 1 O

periodicals and ten newspapers that appeared regularly.
This expansion in nationality publishing is a source of pride
to the Yugoslav authorities.

Consequently they have been assiduously

collecting and publishing all data related to minority newspapers and
periodicals.
efforts.

Tables XXI and XXII summarize the results of their

As Table XXI shows, the number of Hungarian newspapers has

remained relatively stable in the 1950's and 1960's.

It has varied

between eight and twelve in number, but in the number of issues pub
lished there has been a steady increase from 7,615,000 in 1953 to
15,687,000 in 1 9 6 4 . Since 1964 a slight decline has taken place,
so that in 1966 there were 13,912,000 issues published.
In periodical publication a slightly different picture emerges.
The number of periodicals has increased, while the number of issues
has slightly decreased.

Thus, Hungarian periodicals have increased

from seven in 1953 to eleven in 1966.

At the same time the number of

their issues has decreased from 670,000 in 1955 to 508,000 in 1966.

116

In general, the periodicals have had a somewhat more erratic develop
ment than the newspapers.

However, as both Table XXI and Table XXII

indicate, among all the non-Yugoslav nationalities, the Hungarians

113

Jugoslavia 1945-1964;

Statistifcki Pregled, Table 20-13,

p. 331.
114

See Table XXI.

115 Ibid.

116See Table XXII.
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TABLE XXI
NATIONAL MINORITY NEWSPAPERS IN YUGOSLAVIA*

Nationality
Bulgarian

Czech
and
Slovak
Italian

Hungarian

Rumanian

Ruthenian

Albanian

Turkish

German**

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

2
1
# of
Newspapers
# of issues
in Thousands
73
64
# of
Newspapers
2
5
# of issues
in Thousands
769
394
# of
Newspapers
2
4
# of issues
in Thousands 1,026
794
# of
Newspapers
10
9
# of issues
in Thousands?, 615 10,370
# of
Newspapers
2
2
# of issues
in Thousands 378
141
# of
Newspapers
1
1
# of issues
in Thousands
70
73
# of
Newspapers
4
5
# of issues
in Thousands 528
580
# of
Newspapers
2
1
# of issues
in Thousands
50
34
# of
Newspapers
# of issues
in Thousands

2

1

30

4

2

1

1

4

4

434

368

93

498

506

1

1

2

3

6

645

687

700

791

847

8

9

9

12

11

7,638

8,691 11,054 10,526 13,284

1

1

1

2

2

136

130

14

213

849

1

1

1

2

1

74

88

89

97

21

6

4

4

6

6

550

662

297

628

1,997

1

1

3

3

0

116

61

94

3

3

3

2

32

71

93

5

*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statis
tical yearbooks which have been published since 1954.
Consult StatistiCki
Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and
StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku,
1963-1967).
**Data for the German language newspapers is available only for
1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958.
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TABLE XXI (Continued)

Nationality
Bulgarian

Czech
and
Slovak
Italian

Hungarian

Rumanian

Ruthenian

Albanian

Turkish

German

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

# of
2
2
2
2
Newspapers
1
1
3
# of issues
152
153
in Thousands
37
36
37
164
179
# of
Newspapers
4
4
4
6
7
6
5
# of issues
300
in Thousands
1,084
994 1,239
526 . .2,916
779
# of
Newspapers
6
5
5
5
5
7
5
# of issues
in Thousands
952
893
1,003
1,025
1,030
969
851
# of
Newspapers
11
12
11
12
9
9
9
# of issues
JL«/ ^ 010
./
in Thousands 15.593 16,150 12,768 14,018 15,687 14,130 11
# of
2
2
2
2
Newspapers
2
2
3
# of issues
1,312
402
in Thousands 1,139
308
315
229
355
# of
2
Newspapers
2
2
2
1
2
1
# of issues
1 Aft
loz
in Thousands
108
255
90
487
20
165
# of
8
Newspapers
6
9
10
9
7
7
# of issues
in Thousands 1,703 2,070 2,531 2,280 3,101 2,936
3,883
# of
Newspapers
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
# of issues
in Thousands
218
894
144
190
101
226
1,929
# of
Newspapers
# of issues
in Thousands
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TABLE XXII
NATIONAL MINORITY PERIODICALS IN YUGOSLAVIA*

Nationality
Bulgarian

Czech
and
Slovak
Italian

Hungarian

Rumanian

Ruthenian

Albanian

Turkish

German**

1953
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

4

4

4

4

4

1

2

55

72

72

60

82

4

19

2

4

4

2

2

1

1

45

81

73

29

65

27

30

7

9

10

9

10

6

6

422

466

670

653

585

340

296

3

3

2

2

2

1

1

47

21

20

5

3

4

5

2

2

1

1

1

17

15

15

17

4

5

6

6

6

7

4

4

286

377

261

247

278

109

166

1

25

1

1

2

37

45

58

4

5

4

4

50

47

11

45

*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statis
tical yearbooks which have been published since 1954.
Consult StatistiEki
Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and
Statistjgki Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 19631967).
**Data for the German language periodicals is available only for
1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958.
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TABLE XXII (Continued)

Nationality
Bulgarian

Czech
and
Slovak
Italian

Hungarian

Rumanian

Ruthenian

Albanian

Turkish

German

# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands
# of
Periodicals
# of issues
in Thousands

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

2

2

2

2

2

2

4

20

7

17

18

18

18

235

1

3

2

1

3

3

4

40

51

71

45

52

69

67

7

8

8

7

9

11

11

321

327

214

148

409

677

508

1

1

2

(1 )

(2 )

(4)

(2 )

4

4

0

_(4)

(4)

(8 )

(8 )

(1 )

(2 )

(4)

(2 )

__(4)

(4)

(8 )

(8 )

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

157

166

24

256

314

426

441
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have the most publications and the most issues.

This is due not so

much to their numbers as to the high rate of literacy among them.
The number of publications and the number of their issues, by
itself, does not reveal whether the minority is under pressure from
the majority.

The fate of the Hungarians in Rumania attests to this.

So, the examination of the contents of these publications is necessary.
After all, these Hungarian language newspapers and periodicals could be
used merely to facilitate the Party's control of the Hungarians, with
out any regard for Hungarian cultural survival.
A content analysis of Hid (the most influential periodical in
the Vojvodina) and Magyar Szd (the largest Hungarian language daily
newspaper of Yugoslavia) indicates that while the lip-service paid to
"proletarian internationalism" is not much more pervasive than in
Rumanian publications, the Hungarians have greater opportunity to use
the media to further their own cultural development.
outstanding indications

One of the most

of this is the constant concern for the ex

pansion of cultural opportunities.'*''*'^

Articles also abound in the dis

cussion of Hungarian cultural development on a wider scale, throughout
1 I Q

all the Hungarian inhabited areas of East-Central Europe.

■'■■'■^Akos Benkfi, "A Jugoszl^viai Magyar Proza
Forres. IV (July-Aug., 1970), 44-54.

'Uj HullAma,"'

■‘•^Some examples are;
S^ndor Bogd^nfi, "Rdgi KOvek, Uj
Emberek KolozsvArott," Magyar S z d , July 1, 1966, p. 6 ; B. I. "Egy
Biblic5gr<£fia Tanulsdgai," Hid, XXX (Apr., 1966), 526-527; B. I. "A
'Hid-Szerep' IrodalomtBrtdn^sze," H i d , XXX (Mar., 1966), 382-384;
Julia Baranyai, "Jegyzetek Az Orm^ns^fgi ^s Dr^vaszSgi T&jnyelvrbl,"
H i d , X X V (July-Aug., 1961), 673-676; Ervin Sinko, "Magyar Folyoiratokban Lapozgatva," Hid, XXVIII (Apr., 1964), 363-392.
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Furthermore, the writings of Hungarians from other countries frequently
119
appear on the pages of periodicals like H i d .

It is true that the

League of Communists of Yugoslavia uses those publications to control
the Hungarians, but the publications are in turn made to serve
cultural needs also.
The above is not valid for Yugoslav publications in general.
As in the case of Rumania, only the social, economic, political and
cultural printed media appear in the languages of the minority na
tionalities.

The technical and professional journals appear almost

exclusively in Serbo-Croatian or S l o v e n i a n . ^ ®

Thus, as in the case of

Rumania if anyone wishes to become accepted in professional circles, he
(or she) must be proficient in the language(s) of the majority nation
alities.

In Yugoslavia the problem is mitigated somewhat by access to

such professional journals published in Hungary.

In Rumania, the

latter are for the most part— difficult to come by.

Another mitigating

factor is that in Yugoslavia books are published in Hungarian relating
to technical and professional fields.

121

In Rumania, this is not the

^••^ I b i d .; Tibor D^ry, "Ambrus," H i d . XXIX (May, 1965), 636-659;
Imre Bori, "Luk^cs GytJrgy as a Magyar Irodalom," H i d , XXIX (Apr.,
1965), 441-463.
120This was the case in the summer of 1966. At that time, a
personal effort to find such technical-professional journals failed to
locate any in the Hungarian book and periodical stores of Novi Sad
and Subotica.
•‘‘Forum Kttnyvjegyzlk 1965-1966 (Novi Sad:
1966), pp. 27-29.

Forum KSnyvkiadd,
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The cultural-social-political publications in Yugoslavia do not
propagate an ethnic nationalism under the guise of "socialist patrio
tism."

They cannot do this, since no ethnic group can monopolize the

designation of being Yugoslav.
narrow ethnic categories.

To be Yugoslav, one has to transcend

Thus, the articles and editorials which

refer to "socialist patriotism," always do so in reference to trans
ethnic goals.

In Yugoslavia, "socialist patriotism" is truly unimagin

able without "proletarian internationalism."

The connection between

the two is usually illustrated by the common Partisan struggles of all
the people of Yugoslavia against the German occupiers.

This

tendency to equate "patriotism" with the trans-ethnic Partisan tradi
tions of World War II ensures that none of the nationalities remain
outside the Yugoslav political "mainstream."

As was shown, a quite

different situation prevails in Rumania.

The Airwaves:

Radio and Television

In Yugoslavia too, much of what applies to the printed news

^ ^ S ^ m u e l Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgrdfidja
1831-1960 (1961- 1965) (Bukarest: Irodalmi KOnyvkiadd, 1966), pp.
30-33 indicates that translation has been overwhelmingly concerned
with literary works.
^ ^ D a n i l o Kefiid, "Figyeltf: A JKP Vajdasdgban a Felkelds
Elfikdszitdsdnek ds Meginditdsdnak Napjaiban," H i d , X X V (Sept., 1961),
784-792; Pdter Lflrinc, "Vajdasdgi Nemzetkdzi Harcosok," Hid, XXI
(Oct., 1957), 784-793; Mihdly Olajos, "Egybeolvadds - Nem Beolvadas,"
Hid,XVII (Dec., 1953), 837-840; Zsivan Miliszavac, "A Partizdnsajt 6
Vajdasdgban,” H i d . XVI (Nov., 1952), 659-661; Kdroly Brindza,
"Adatok a Jugszldviai Magyarsdg Rdsztvdteldrfll a Nepszabaditd
Hdboruban," Hid, X V (May, 1951), 323-336.
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media also applies to the electronic media.
unchallenged.

Government regulation is

Both radio and television are first and foremost the

channels of communication of the Party.
modernized and vastly expanded.
licenses in the country.

As such, these media have been

In 1939 there were only 155,000 radio

By 1962 there were 2,040,000.

124

For tele

vision, growth and expansion began only in the second half of the
1950's.

The first television program was broadcast from Zagreb on May

15, 1956.

Presently, three television studios operate in Yugoslavia,

in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.
It would be unfair to compare the post-war share of minority
broadcasts to the pre-war situation.

For one reason, the electronic

news media have only become mass media in the post-war period.

For

another reason, in the pre-war period there were no ethnic minority
broadcasting opportunities.

In this respect, both Rumania and Yugo

slavia improved conditions greatly after the war came to an end.
Radio broadcasting has been influenced much more than tele
vision by post-war efforts to increase programs in the language of
the national minorities.

While no exact data has been made available

on this question, a perusal of the weekly listings of radio programs
indicates that at least in the Vojvodina, Hungarians have the oppor
tunity to listen to broadcasts in their own language.

Of Yugoslavia's

10 /

1000 Facts About Yugoslavia (Beograd:
"Jugoslavija," 1963), p. 104.

Izdavacki Zavod

125Ibid.
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ten major broadcasting centers, two have Hungarian language programs
on a regular basis.
Osijek (Eszdk).

These are located in Novi Sad (Ujviddk) and

The station at Novi Sad broadcasts 15 minutes of news

daily in Hungarian.

The station at Osijek provides one hpur and fif

teen minutes of news daily in Hungarian.

Aside from these regular

programs, both stations dedicate at least one or two hours per week to
Hungarian popular and/or folk music.
Yugoslav television does not offer the Hungarians a special
program in their own language.
is one step ahead.

In this respect Rumanian broadcasting

However, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina are geo

graphically close enough to Budapest to pick up the programs of the
major Hungarian television network.

In fact, all the Hungarian

language newspapers of Yugoslavia carry a complete listing of all
television programs beamed from Budapest.

This is a service that

the Hungarian language papers in Rumania fail to provide.

In this

respect, Yugoslav policies are more favorable to the Hungarians.
This discrepancy in the Rumanian and Yugoslav policies can be
explained, in part, by different views toward the relation of the
Hungarian government to Hungarians living in areas outside its present

19A

For complete program listings see the special "radio and
television guide" sections of the Saturday issues of Magyar Sz 6 .
The more specific sources for the data presented above include:
"Radioujsag," Magyar S z d , July 16, 1966, between pp. 6-7; "Rddidujsag,"
Magyar Szd, July 9, 1966, between pp. 4-5; "7 Nap Rddid-Televizid
Musora," T_ N a p , July 22, 1966; "Novi Sad-i Musor," Dolgozok, July 8 ,
1966, p. 13.
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borders.

The Rumanians try to limit contacts between Hungary and the

Hungarians of Transylvania.

As a consequence, Rumanian broad

casting is in constant competition with Budapest. -^9

r^g recent

addition of two weekly television programs in Hungarian may be indica
tive of this.

The policy of silently ignoring Hungarian broadcasts

coming from Budapest, makes this even clearer.

Thus, the expansion of

Hungarian language broadcasting in Rumania seems to be more a response
to growing competition with Hungary than a policy of strengthening
nationality opportunities.
The Yugoslav experience lends further support to the above
observation.

In recent years, relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia

have been better than at any time either before or after World War II.
However, the prevalence of cordial relations between the two states
has not been followed by an expansion of Hungarian-language broad
casting in the Vojvodina.

Instead, more co-operation has prevailed in

the mutual publication of broadcasting p r o g r a m s . T h i s

is in con

trast to policies of the past, particularly the time of the Tito-Stalin
split, when relations were poorest between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

At

that time there were actually more Hungarian language broadcasts in the

l^SBaiiey^ "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
129 Ibid.

^ ^ F o r example:
"Jugoszlav Televizirf-Magyar Televizio'," T_ N a p ,
Jul y 22, 1966, between pp. 18-19.
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Vojvodina to counter the broadcasts of Rakosi's H u n g a r y . T h i s
points out again that broadcasting time by itself is not an adequate
indicator of nationality policies.

Much more revealing is the content

of the programs.
As the above description and comparison of Rumanian and Yugo
slavian policies indicates, the Hungarian population in both is closely
circumscribed in its access to the mass media.

However, while in both

countries there is close supervision of Hungarian use of the mass media,
in Yugoslavia more leeway is allowed for publications and programs of
a non-political nature.

In Rumania, on the other hand, Hungarian

language publications and broadcasts are primarily and overwhelmingly
political in content.

Thus, in Yugoslavia the mass media is a means

of transmitting material and information which can at times contribute
to the development and preservation of national cultures.
this is less frequently the case.

In Rumania

Here, the news media are more

prominent as instruments of Rumanization, or in the very least of de 
nationalization .

Ill
To this point, we have only considered specific institutions
and instruments for the transmission of ideas, values and culture.
While we have also considered the content of the transmitted ideas and
values, this was done from a rather narrow perspective (i.e., in

101

■LJ This was pointed out to this student in a personal conversa
tion, by a secretary for one of the Hungarian-language periodicals in
the Vojvodina during the summer of 1966.
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relation to

specific means of transmission, such as schools,

radio

programs or

newspapers).

of the

Now we wi]l turn to an examination

question of "content" from a more general perspective by considering
those elements of Rumanian and Yugoslavian historical self-interpre
tation, literature and art, which reflect on the place of the minority
nationalities in the respective societies.

In Rumania

Historical Self-Interpretations
Rumanian historical self-interpretations reveal a great deal
about the treatment of the Hungarians of Transylvania.

The national

mythologies

of the post-World War II period have placed them

interesting

relationship with the Rumanian majority.

into an

These mythologies

see the Hungarians as one of the "co-inhabiting" nationalities that
has had a share in the formation of modern Rumanian history.

At the

same time, the Hungarians are presented as sharing only in the
"Socialist" traditions of the past.

They are considered outsiders as

far as the "national" history of Rumania is concerned.
This ambivalent relation of the Hungarians to the Rumanians is
a consequence of two streams of recent historical interpretations.

One

emphasizes socialist traditions and "proletarian internationalism"
while the other stresses national development and "socialist patrio
tism."

The first stream of interpretation dominated Rumanian histori

cal writings from 1945 until about 1956-58, while the more "national"
orientation has become prominent since that time.
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The interpretation and presentation of history has always had
political significance for the inhabitants of Transylvania.

Chapter I

touched on the utilization of historical arguments by Hungarians and
Rumanians in presenting their respective claims to Transylvania.

132

With the advent of "proletarian internationalism" these arguments were
dismissed by the Communist governments of Rumania and Hungary as mere
devices of the past bourgeois regimes to divide the working classes
TOO

along national lines in order to exploit them more easily.

The

Communist regimes turned historical study away from these divisive
claims to "studies" which demonstrated the common destiny of all
workers, regardless of nationality.

■^■^Michae 1 J . R u r a , Reinterpretation of History as a Method of
Furthering Communism in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer
sity Press, 1961), pp. 1-2, also demonstrates the predominant nation
alist strain in pre-World War II Rumanian historiography.
■^•^^Banyai, "Forum:
Irodalomtanitds ds Hazafias Neve'lds," p.
239, states:
"The teaching of history was a special tool of the
former Hungarian and Rumanian capitalist-landowner regimes for the
furtherance and extension of chauvinistic and nationalistic prejudices.
The teaching of literature had a similar role.
As opposed to this,
socialist history and literature teaching strengthens the brotherly
unity of our nation's workers in the spirit of proletarian interna
tionalism."
^■•^While these divisive claims were not debated (prior to the
summer of 1964) this does not mean they had ever been completely
abandoned.
For example, Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 92f., restates many
of the claims (e.g., origins, colonization, etc.) which had been first
presented by pre-Communist historians.
However, the emphasis in these
works is rather on unifying factors.
In fact, some events are completely
ignored and insignificant occurrences stressed in order to drive home
the idea of class unity regardless of nationality.
Some examples of this
can be found in the treatment of historical events by Tibor Oldh,
"Moldva ds HavasalfiJld Egyestildsdnek Centendriuma," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan.,
1959), 7; Endre Kdkassy, "Anyag ds Adat: Moldva ds Havasalfdld
Egyesuldse a Korabeli Kirlapok Tiikrdban," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan., 1959),
116-117, 120; Gyorgy Adorjian and Victoria Marinescu, "A Nemzetkozi

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

320

Rumanian historical interpretations were permeated in the
early post-war years with tfye general spirit of "proletarian interna
tionalism," fostered by both the CPR and the Soviet U n i o n . T h i s
historiography was dominated by the precepts of Communist ideology and
the influence of Soviet historiography.

Two main threads of thought

thus became ingrained in the Rumanian post-war interpretations of
history.

The first stressed the importance of class struggle and class

solidarity throughout Rumania's past.

The second emphasized the

importance of Russian and Slavic influence on the cultural and political
1 O7

development of Rumania.

'

The interest of the nationalities was relatively well served by

Munkasszolidaritds Nagyszeru Megnyilv^nuldsa," Korunk, XXIII (Feb.,
1964), 236-241; P^l Binder, "Avram Lancu Levelezds " K o r u n k , XXIII
(March, 1964), 425-427.
135The tactical purpose of this favorable "proletarian inter
nationalist" setting has already been examined in Chapters I and II.
Wolff, "Rumania," in The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D.
Kertesz (Notre Dame, Indiana;
University of Notre Dame Press, 1956),
p. 261, maintains that one of the motives for this early policy was
the Russian desire to reduce Rumanian nationalism.
Whatever the
motive, Rura, Reinterpretation of History, pp. 8-9, 17, presents the
strong influence of Soviet historians on early postwar Rumanian
attempts in this field.
■LJOStephen Fischer-Galati, "Review Article:
Fifteen Years of
Rumanian Historiography, 1947-1962," Journal of Central European
Affairs, XXIII (Oct., 1963), 361f., and Rura, Reinterpretation of
H i s t o r y , pp. 18-22, both stress the overriding importance of the
ideological element of Communist Rumanian historiography.

137

I b i d ., also shows the great importance of the emphasis in
Communist Rumanian historiography on the debt of the country to Slavic
and particularly Russian influence and culture.
Wolff, The Balkans in
Our T i m e , pp. 459, 575.
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this historiography as it reduced the nationalism and the extremist
assertions of the majority nationality, which in the past had
presented the minorities as mere interlopers.

138

Now, instead of

presenting them as second-rate citizens and interlopers, the history
of the R.P.R. was revised to show them as equals on the basis of class
struggle and solidarity.

Past events, like the "Revolutions" of Ddzsa

Gyorgy and that of 1848, were reinterpreted to show that, regardless
of nationality, the oppressed segments of society all had a common
destiny which was class-bound.^ 9
More recent trends in Rumanian historiography seem to point in
a different direction, which has become apparent particularly in the
past ten y e a r s .

The new direction is evident in Rumanian histories

discussing Transylvania and its nationalities, and Rumania's relations
with the Soviet Union.

References to Russian or Slavic influence on

•1O Q

JORoucek, Contemporary Rumania and Her Problems, p. 5; Charles
Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania 1s Case / n . p .: n . n . , 1941/, p. 11.
IS^Three examples of this are:
Binder "Avram Lancu
Levelezdse"; Jdzsef Faragd, "Anyag ds Adat:
Bern A p 6 t Vdro Romdn ifnek
1851-bUl," Igaz Sz6 , IX (Oct., 1961), 613-616; and GyOrgy BGzfidy,
"K6z5s Harcok Nyomdban,” Igaz Sz<5, IX (Dec., 1961), 861-863.
l^Oit is, of course, difficult to compare the earlier works with
the more recent ones. A number of obstacles stand in the way of such a
comparison.
First, the language barrier; second, the fact that earlier
sources are relatively scarce; and third, the similarity of methodolog
ical procedure (e.g., collective scholarship) in the studies often blurs
their dissimilarities.
Due to these difficulties the analysis of
historiography has been mainly carried out through the examination of
secondary sources.
Two revealing sources have been book reviews and the
news concerning historical conferences.
In both areas since 1964 there
has been a strong turn toward Rumanian nationalism.
See C. Daicoviciu,
"Debates of Historians," Contemporanul (May 29, 1964) t r ans. in
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Rumania are now toned down.

Where previously the U.S.S.R. had received

lavish praise from Rumanian historians, it now receives little
■
j/ 1

credit.

Rumanian "nationalism," in spite of ideological hindrance

has reasserted itself, and is belittling the role of the Russians and
I/O
the Slavs while enhancing the role of the Rumanians.
Rumanian writings concerning the ethnic minorities of Tran
sylvania reveal a similar "nationalist" tendency.
affects the nationalities directly.

This latter trend

As in inter-war Rumania, so in

the R.P.R. the question of origins and continuity is again becoming a

Rumanian Press Survey N o . 446 (Radio Free Europe:
July 8 , 1964), pp.
2-6; G. Unc, "Book Review; E. I. Rubinshteyn;
The Downfall of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," and T. Lungu, "Book Review;
History of
Rumania, Vol. 4, "Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe
Lange CC al PMR, Vol. 10 (1964), trans. in Rumanian Press Survey No.
451 (Radio Free Europe;
Sept. 26, 1964), pp. 2-8.
^•*-While in 1959, Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 143, praised the
role of the "glorious Soviet Armies" in the liberation of Rumania, by
the summer of 1964— on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Rumania's
"liberation"--the role of the Red Army was merely mentioned.
See for
example, "The Great Anniversary" and "It Happened in August 1944,"
Rumania T o d a y , 116 (1964), pp. 1-5; David Binder, "Bucharest Plays Down
Arrival of Mikoyan for Liberation Fate," New York Times (Aug. 21, 1964),
P. 2; David Binder, "Rumania Enjoys Being Red Mecca," New York Times
(Aug. 24, 1964); Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 27.
I/O

Ibid., pp. 25, 27.
However, the relatively recent histori
cal writings do not show this process too clearly.
The emphasis on
Slavic influence is still important in Short Document on Rumania, p. 8,
and this seems also the case according to Keith Hitchins, "Book Review;
Istoria Rominiei, Vol. 1," Balkan Studies. IV (1963), 183.
Yet, these
latter sources are already dated to a certain degree, since the new
"nationalist" trend in historiography vis-h-vis the Slavs begins only
in the spring of 1964.
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dominant area of historical r e s e a r c h . B u t ,

more alarming than this

is the "re-re-interpretation" of the role of nationalities in such
events as the Revolution of 1848.

New historical treatments present

what has been termed "double-subjugation."^^

Rumanian historians in

their writings have abandoned a solely class-determined explanation
and have combined it with a national one.

In this way, Rumanian

historians can claim that the role of the nationality groups (par
ticularly the role of Germans and Hungarians) in the past, was to sub
jugate the Rumanians and the Slavs under their rule regardless of
class.This

inversion of former interpretations puts the nationali

ties back into the position of former "oppressors," who are now ruled

^Hitchins, "Book Review:
Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," pp.
182-183; Short Documents on Rumania, p. 7; Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp.
92ff.; Fischer-Galati, "Review Article: . . .," pp. 162-163.
144rjihis concept of "double-subjugation" is a recent (spring of
1964) interpretation of Rumanian-Hungarian relations of the past.
Short Document on Rumania, pp. 8-11, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 129,
still stress the class subjugation of Rumanians and Hungarians alike.
The new "double-subjugation" thesis is presented in Daicoviciu,
"Debates of Historians"; Unc, "Book Review: . .
Lungu, "Book
Review:
. . ."; Bailey, p. 27; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed
by Nationalist Drive." Also indicative of this trend is the erection
of a bust in the honor of Stephan Ludvig Roth in Medias (Megyes) in
the spring of 1964.
Roth had been a "Saxon" leader who, together with
the Rumanians, opposed the Hungarian insurrection of 1848. He was shot
in 1849, by the Hungarians as a traitor and the enemy of Hungarian
freedom and independence.
The celebration of Roth clearly shows the
nationalist reassertion of the Rumanians vis-h-vis the Hungarians.
The above event was noted in the May 16 issue of Elflre according to
"Hirek:
Udvarolnak a Szdszoknak," Transylvdnia, VI (June, 1964), 12.
1AS

Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania"; Daicoviciu, "Debates
of Historians," p. 3.
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by the formerly "oppressed."
The historical self-interpretations of the past ten or fifteen
years de-emphasize Hungarian-Rumanian relations in all but the
"socialist" traditions of the c o u n t r y . I n

the writings concerning

both the Rumanian acquisition of Transylvania and the development of
the Rumanian people, the Hungarians are either left out or they are
given a negative r o l e .

Thus, the old national myths of the inter-war

years have been revived to prove Rumanian prior occupation of Tran
sylvania.

This is done by concentrating studies on the Dacian kingdom

of the third century A . D . ^ ^

It is also done by stressing only the

Rumanian traditions of Transylvania.'*'^

This Rumanian nationalist

• ^ O n e of the foremost indications of this is the "rehabilita
tion" of the anti-Hungarian Rumanian historian, Nicolae Iorga.
His
works provide the foundation for most of the arguments for continuity
of "Romanian" history from Decebal (2nd century A.D.) to the present.
See:
"25th Anniversary of Assassination of Scientist Nicolae Iorga, "
Documents, Articles and Information on R u m ania, no. 22 (Dec. 1, 1965),
pp. 12-13.
147ihe recent celebration of the 50th anniversary (Dec, 1, 1968)
of Transylvania's incorporation into Rumania, provided the opportunity
for the writing of some of these historical self-interpretations.
See:
"Jubilee of Transylvania's Union with Romania," Documents, Articles and
Information on R o m a n i a , Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), pp. 6-9; "New Books:
Review of C.C. Giurescu's 'Transylvania in the History of the Romanian
P eople,'" Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 12 (June
30, 1968), pp. 14-15; Constantin Daicoviciu, "The Achievement of the
Unitary State--an Age-Old Aspiration of the Romanian People," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, No. 21 (Nov. 15, 1968), pp. 8-9.
•*~^ I b i d .; "New Books: Review of C.C. Giurescu's
in the History of the Romanian People,'" pp. 14-15.

'Transylvania

■*^Along this line see particularly Daicoviciu, "The Achieve
ment of the Unitary State . . .," pp. 8-9.
He summarizes two-thousand
years in the history of Transylvania without once mentioning Hungarians.
This is quite an achievement since from 895 to 1918 the area's history
was primarily Hungarian in content.
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interpretation of history has two consequences.

It cuts off the H un

garians from the history of Rumania and it exaggerates the importance
of the Rumanians in the history of Transylvania and the Balkans.

This

type of historical interpretation fans nationalistic claims and also
relegates the Hungarians into the position of "late-comers" or
"foreigners

Literature, Publishing and Libraries
While these "nationalist" tendencies are relatively easy to
trace in historical self-interpretations, they are more difficult to
trace in l i t e r a t u r e . I t

is, nevertheless, possible to discern the

pattern of Rumanian nationalism here also.

The perusal of the Rumanian,

Hungarian language literary periodicals Igaz S z 6 , Korunk and Utunk have
proved fruitful.

In fact, the pattern that emerges is not unlike that

produced by the analysis of Rumanian historical writings.
As in the case of Rumanian historical studies, the literary
creations up until the autumn of 1956, also reflected the spirit

1cn

In spite of this, the underlying similarities of Party
control vis-h-vis literature and historiography enable any investiga
tion to confront literature, like historiography, as part of the
repertoire available to the Party-State control-system.
The differ
ences of Party control are mainly due to tactical demands.
The role
of the respective fields is, however, the same.
See Wolff, The Balkans
in Our Time, pp. 576-577; "Literature and the Arts," Romania, ed.
Fischer-Galati, pp. 172-173, 174.
1 SI

Nicholas Timiras, "Communist Literature in Romania,"
Journal of Central European A f f a i r s , X I V (Jan., 1955), 372-373.
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of "proletarian internationalism."^^

By 1958, there are indications

that some literary works began to experiment with the treatment of more
"national" Rumanian topics.
tion than the rule.

Yet, these were few and rather the excep

What indicated to a greater extent the "turn" toward

more national interests was the revival of many of Rumania's past
literary greats.*-^

Writers like I. L. Caragiale, Vasile Alecsandri,

Mihail Eminescu, Alexandru Davila and some others were again presented
on stage and their works were republished.

Classical Rumanian litera

ture was revived and again made available to the Rumanian public.
for the minority nationalities the revival of Rumanian national
literature meant a further encroachment on the development of their
respective "national forms" in literature.

Instead of being allowed

1J52Daicoviciu, Ru mania, p. 178, notes that:

"The national
minorities also have a flourishing literature.
This is something
typical of the new conditions and of the equality enjoyed by the
national minorities and guaranteed by the people's democratic regime.
So among many others we have the poetry of Imre Horvdth and LdszlA
Szabddy and the prose writings of Istvdn Nagy, IstvAn Asztalos . .
It is ironic that the poet Szabddy, mentioned by Daicoviciu, committed
suicide in protest to infringements on Hungarian cultural institutions
(i.e., Bdlyai University) in the same year when Daicoviciu's book went
to the press.
ICO
J-,JSee, The Theatre in the Rumanian People's Republic (Bucharest,
Rumania: Meridians at "Scinteia House," 1961), pp. 22-24, and
Caragiale Sur Les Scenes Roumaines et Etrangeres (Bucharest, Rumania;
Commission Nationale de la Republique Popolaire Roumaine Pour L'Unesco,
1962).
•^^Tt is in the field of literature that perhaps the earliest
return to national forms took place.
"Literature and the Arts,"
Romania,, pp. 175-176, already presents this trend as in full swing
prior to 1956.
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to revive their own great literary c l a s s i c s , t h e Hungarian, German
and other nationalities were encouraged to adopt the Rumanian classics
as their own.

156

The articles in Igaz Szd reflect this policy of

literary Rumanization.

In the issues of this periodical appearing

after 1956, articles translated from Rumanian appear in ever increas
ing numbers.

These contributions present a good cross-section of

classical and contemporary Rumanian writers.
Besides the increasing number of Rumanian contemporary and
classical works, the Hungarian minority is permitted to read the works
of its "own" contemporary writers and selected writings of

■^-*In fact, limitations have even been placed on their reading
of contemporary Communist Hungarian literature, from areas outside
Rumania (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Carpatho-Ukraine) as is
indicated by "Olvasdk Foruma," Igaz S z d , pp. 794-795; Tibor Ddnes,
"Az Erddlyi Magyar Kultura 1970-ben," Irodalmi Ujsdg (July-Aug., 1970),
p. 7.
^ ^ F i s c h e r - G a l a t i , "Rumania," pp. 164-165, in his discussion of
the regime's efforts to stem the tide of "unhealthy"activities and
"national isolation" does not specifically refer to the adoption of
Rumanian classics for the minorities.
However, to reduce "nationalism"
and "isolationism," it is apparent from other sources (see below) that
the regime has fostered the reading of Rumanian classical and con
temporary literature among the Hungarian minority.
^-*^More inidicative is the great number of articles devoted to
the propagation of reading Rumanian works.
See GydzS Hajdu, "Pdrtos
Egysdgben-Testvdri Osszeforrotsdgban," Igaz S z d , VII (Oct., 1959),
515-516; Veronica Porumbacu, "Aranyhid," Igaz S z d , VII (Oct., 1959),
641; Scridon Gavril, "Rebreanu Jon'ja Magyarul," Igaz S z d , IX (June,
1961), 861; jdzsef Izsak, "Koltdszet ds Korszeruseg," Igaz Szo/, IX
(Oct., 1961), 593-594; Endre Kdkdssy, "Nagy Mii-Nagy Forditd Feladat,"
Igaz S z d , X (May, 1962), 723. Also indicative is the great number of
translations from Rumanian into Hungarian.
Andor Rethi, "Adalekok a
Romdnbol Magyarra Forditott Irodalmi Miivek KSnyvdszetdhez (Aug. 23,
1944-Aug. 2 3 j 1959),"Igaz Szd, VII (Oct., 1959), 719-731, presents a
list of 133 Rumanian writers whose works have been translated into
Hungarian in the indicated fifteen year period (1944-1959). Also see
Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgrdfiaja.
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"left-democratic" writers of the past like Ady Endre and Jdzsef
Attila.

158

These latter works are all in the spirit of "proletarian

internationalism," unlike the enumerated Rumanian works which call for
"socialist patriotism" and pride in the achievements of the R.P.R.
Thus, the Hungarians are robbed of their own national consciousness,
while at the same time they are extolled to become better Rumanians.
In this way the minorities find that their right to use the mother
tongue does not include the right to read the literature that goes with
the mother tongue.

Instead, they have to be satisfied with transla

tions of Rumanian authors and the stilted, artificial products of the
minority authors who write in the Hungarian, German or Yiddish language
but who think in the Rumanian.

158g£nya £^ "Forum:
Irodalom Tanitds ds Hazafias Nevelds," pp.
238-241, presents the rigid qualifications that must be met by the
writers of the past before their works are ideologically accepted as
reading material for the Hungarian minority.
Some examples of the type
of reading material having origins outside Rumania include:
the
official Hungarian Communist Party stand regarding "reactionary"
writers, "Forum: A 'Ndpi 1 Irokrdl," A MSZMP KOzponti Bizottsdga
Mellett Mtikfidfl Kulturdlis Elmdleti MunkakozSsseg Alldsfoglalisa" (con
densed, appeared originally in Tdrsadalmi Szemle No. 6 , 1958) Igaz S z d ,
VI (Oct., 1958), 452-479; the castigation of evidences of "revisionism"
in the writings of George Lukdcs by jdzsef Szigeti, "MGvdszi Alkotds es
Pdrtossdjg Lukdcs GySrgy Esztdtikajaban," (taken from Tdrsadalmi Szemle
No. 9, 1958) Igaz S z d , VI (Sept., 1959), 283-297; the preachments of
past writers like Jdzsef Attila and Ady Endre against nationalism or
for collaboration w i t h the Rumanians.
Even in this case, usually some
one writes about what these individuals said rather than presenting the
original works of the authors concerned.
Along this line see Endre
Bustya, "Szemle: A d y Endre, Vallomds a Patriotizmusrol," Igaz Szd,
VI (June, 1958), 924; Veronica Porumbacu, "A Szocializmus Kortdrsa,"
Igaz S z d , XI (Jan., 1963), 102, 104.
■*-^See along this line Zsolt Galfalvi, "A Kommunizmus Tdvlatai
es az Irodalom," Igaz S z d , VI (April, 1959), 481-482; L. Deaky and N.
Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia (March 6,
1964) trans. in Rumanian Press Survey N o . 426 (Radio Free Europe:
March 18, 1964), 7.
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The pressure on Hungarian literary publications is indicated
by yet another consideration.

This is their isolation from worldwide

Hungarian literary developments.

Little or no contact seems to take

place with Hungarian writers in Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R., Czecho
slovakia and Hungary.

At any rate, references are rarely made to Hun-

garian literary productions outside Rumania.

ifin

Only ideological works

from "foreign" authors are given certain consideration.

In a real

sense this means that the Transylvanian Hungarians are closed off from
the major literary trends of their people.

This stiffles their own

literary development to a considerable degree.
This policy in literature carries over to the government's
attitude toward book publishing and libraries.

Besides censoring the

writings which are in conflict with Communist ideology, recent censor
ship also has been extended to those works which conflict with the
Rumanian nationalism expressed in "socialist patriotism."

The result

has been a two front campaign designed to undermine the cultural
"national form" of the Transylvanian minorities.

The first is the

"positive" tactic of publishing more and more Rumanian works in the
language of the national minorities.

162

The second consists of

160Not to mention Hungarian writers in the West, who are com
pletely inaccessible to them. For the latter see:
Bdla Pomogdts,
"Magyar KSltbk Nyugaton," Forras, IV (July-Aug., 1970), 55-59; Ddnes,
"Az Erddlyi Magyar Kultura 1970-ben," p. 7.
Ib i d .; Domonkos Varga, "A Megmaradds Irodalma," Valdsdg,
XIII (Aug., 1970), 84-86; Mihaly Czine, "A Romdniai Magyar Irodalom
FejlSddse 1945 Utin," in A Kassai Batsdnyi-Kor Efvkdnyve 1965-1968
(Bratislava: Maddch Kdnyvkiado, 1969), pp. 317-332.
•*-^See: Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgraphidja.
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disbanding many old libraries, which are overwhelmingly minority
libraries, and scattering their contents throughout the country.
Since these libraries contain works mainly from pre-Communist days,
many works are consigned to trashheaps as unfit for the furtherance of
Rumanian "socialist patriotism."

164

This does not mean, however, that book publishing in the H u n 
garian language is being reduced.

As with everything else, opportuni

ties in this area are closely tied to domestic and international
political developments.

As Table XXIII indicates, publishing activity

in the language of the ethnic minorities has been reduced to some
extent since the Hungarians revolted in 1956.

From 917 titles in

1957 the number of ethnic minority books has been reduced to 519
titles in 1964.
titles.

This reduction does not show the Hungarian share of

However, in the same period that the number of minority

titles were being reduced the number of books published in the country
1

rose from 2,469 in 1959 to 3,268 in 1963.

This indicates, that

163i'xhe Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
It is
also interesting and ironic to note in this connection the impounding
of the old Hungarian Library at Aiud (Nagyenyed).
Just a few years
ago (1959) Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 507, could still boast of Rumania's
benevolent treatment of the Hungarian minority by referring to the
famous many centuries old (six centuries to be exact) College and
Library of Aiud; which showed to the world "the common struggle waged
by Rumanians and Magyars against the tyrants."
•*-6^0f course this purge of "unfit" books affected Rumanian
works as well as those of the minorities, as Rura, pp. viii-ix points
out. However, the later impoundings and confiscations have affected
mainly the Hungarian libraries.
165gee Table XXIII and Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964,
Table 137, p. 265.
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TABLE X X I I I

BOOKS AND BOOKLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE
NATIONAL MINORITIES IN RUMANIA*

Year

Titles

Editorial
Sheets

Number of
Copies in
Thousands
5,868

1949

770

4,322

Average Volume
of One Title in
Editorial Sheets
5.6

1950

935

3,855

4.1

7,234

1951

888

3,673

4.1

4,216

1952

879

5,001

5.7

5,926

1953

806

5,920

7.3

4,730

1954

741

5,832

7.9

3,272

1955**
Hungarian
Share
German
Share

724

4,736

6.5

3,007

432

3,139

7.3

2,569

159

884

5.6

313

1956**
Hungarian
Share
German
Share

745

5,617

7.5

3,487

437

3,740

8.6

2,902

180

1,174

6.5

461

1957

917

6,319

6.9

3,907

1958

656

6,830

10.4

2,648

1959

592

5,291

8.9

2,108

1960

569

5,517

9.7

2,612

1961

584

3,895

10.1

3,142

1962

587

5,665

9.7

3,635

1963

574

5,357

9.3

3,545

1964

519

4,951

9.5

3,153

*This Table is based on Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1965
(Bucuresti: Directia Gentrala De Statistica, 1965), Table 256,' p. 532;
Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1957 (Directiunea Centrala DeStatistica;
Bucuresti:
Editura Stiintifica, 1957), Table 138, p. 222.
**Aside from 1955-1956, Rumanian statistics are not available
indicating the share of the respective minorities.
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minority publishing— of which the Hungarian language books are the
most numerous— has stagnated while Rumanian publishing has been ex
panded .
It is, perhaps, due to this stagnation— as well as interna
tional developments (the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968)--that
efforts have been expanded recently to encourage nationality publica
tions.

A new publishing house was established in the early part of

1970 which is to deal strictly with nationality titles.
publishing house

The "Kriterion"

(this is its official name) has already published a

number of Hungarian w o r k s .

It remains to be seen whether or not

such a separate publishing house will actually raise the number of
works published in minority languages.

It also remains to be seen

whether or not this new set-up eliminates the great gaps in the content
of nationality titles.

This is particularly relevant for Hungarian

titles, which have rarely included technical and professional works, or
works which would make the Transylvanians more conscious of their
linguistic affiliations and their national history

The Fine Arts
In the area of music, drama and the plastic arts a great deal
more leeway is allowed individual representatives of the national
minorities.

The Rumanian government encourages cultural development by

providing certain opportunities (e.g., folklore festivals, exhibitions,

l ^ V a r g a , "a Megmarad^s Irodalma," p. 84.
■*-^^ I bid., pp. 84-86.
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musical contests, etc.) and facilities (e.g., opera houses, theatres,
museums, etc.).

At the same time, this development must not conflict

with the Communist order in Rum a ni a .

The latter consideration is

the major limitation on the creative urge among both Hungarians and
Rumanians.
In Transylvania there are some indications that besides Party
restrictions, there may also be certain Rumanian "national" restric
tions on Hungarian artists.

While the government fosters development

in the fine arts and attempts to involve all segments of the population
in cultural activities, it seems to do this on the basis of a double
standard.

It encourages the "revival" of all Rumanian national art

forms, while it allows the Hungarians only the "folk" forms of their
national culture.
This Rumanian cultural policy is discernable from even a super
ficial examination of Rumanian tourist pamphlets designed for Western

168"Literature and the Arts," Romania, pp. 180-181; Burillianu,
"Cultural Life in Captive Rumania," pp. 129, 134, 149, 155-157.
Two
areas, which play an important role for cultural development in general
but are less concerned with the position of the minorities per s e , are
the Rumanian-Soviet Institute (recently curtailed in activity) and the
motion-picture industry of the R.P.R.
Buirillianu discusses this on
pp. 158 and 162. Also see Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 578-580.
■^Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 189, presents some of the "oppor
tunities." jdzsef Faragd, "Anyag is Adat: Hdromszdki Magyar Miorita,"
Igaz S z d , VII (Oct., 1959), 689-695, indicates that "folk" culture can
also demonstrate not only the interdependence; of Hungarian and Rumanian
people's culture, but that the Hungarians "owe" a great deal to the
Rumanians in this area.
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consumption.*-^®

Such propaganda brochures present with great skill

the art treasures of Rumania, regardless of their origin— whether they
were products of medieval, bourgeois, or proletarian culture.

But there

is little or no mention of the great art treasures of Transylvania of
past ages which point to the Hungarian and German cultural life of the

171

area. '

In fact, this policy of erasing nationality cultural accom

plishments has taken particularly objectionable forms recently.

These

include the demolition of the ruins of non-Rumanian castles, which
provide historical links for the Transylvanians with their Hungarian
past.

172

One of the recent examples of this policy has been the

regime's attempt to demolish the Church of St. L^szlc^ in Orodea
(Nagyvirad), which is a church of great interest for medievalists
both in art and architecture.*-^-*
Nationalist cultural policies, however, are blurred by the
great strides made by the regime in spreading cultural facilities to

1 70

' See in this regard issues of Rumania for Tourists, Rumania
T o day, or such specific brochures as Monuments of Religious Art in
Rum a ni a , and Livres Anciens en Roumanie (Bucharest:
Commission
Nationale de la R. P. Romaine Pour L'Unesco, 1962).

171

' Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 507, 511, cometimes violates the
above generalization by acknowledging the contribution of Hungarians
or Germans in one or two special cases.
But then he proceeds to
belittle the role of these same nationalities in other cases (pp. 197198, 523).
172

International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minor
ity Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
*-^-*Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28; "Levdl
ErdelybOl," Irodalmi U j s a g .
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all areas of the country.

174

The national minorities have been given

a proportional share in these institutions.

Thus, of the 37 state

supported theatres 6 belong to the Hungarians, 2 to the Germans and 2
to the

J e w s .

175

A similar policy is followed in relation to opera

houses, orchestra halls, museums, houses of culture and folk-culture
study centers.

But even while the facilities are distributed propor

tionally to all nationalities, it must be remembered that the produc
tions, exhibitions, etc., which appear in these centers of culture,
are controlled and censored by a government which is becoming more
nationalistic and more intolerant toward non-Rumanian art forms.
The extent of this intolerance is reflected in the themes of
recent cultural productions.

In the movie-making industry the

Rumanians have stressed nationalist themes, which place the Hungarians
particularly in a disadvantageous light.
and "The Column."

176

Two examples are "Dacians"

Both these films portray the ancestors of

*1*7/

This should be qualified, however, by the fact that recently
a similar process like that of "parallelization" in the educational
system has been evident in the theatrical world.
See Bailey, "Trouble
over Transylvania," p. 27.
•*~^ T h e Theatre in the Rumanian Pe o p l e 1s Republic (Bucharest:
Meridians - "Scinteia House," 1961), pp. 7-8, 12-13. However, these
figures should be taken with a grain cf salt.
It is probably more correct
to assume that about half of these minority theatres are "sections" of
Rumanian establishments rather than "independent" ones.
Some further
statistics regarding theaters in the R.P.R. may be found in Rumanian
Statistical Pocket Book 1964. pp. 260-263, Table 133. Also See Wolff,
The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 456-457, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 189,
288, 684-685, 759-762, 818-819.
176a brief description of these films is provided in: "A New
Romanian Film: The Column," Documents, Articles and Information on
Romania, Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), p. 19.
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present-day Rumanians as defenders of Western Civilization against the
incursions of barbarian horsemen from the East (Huns, Avars, Bulgars,
Hungarians?).

The film-industry supports in this way a national

mythology that is exclusivist.

Films stressing the solidarity of all

peoples in Transylvania seem no longer to be in vogue.

The only such

film that, has been produced recently, dealt with the Dozsa Gyorgy
peasant uprising.

However, this was mainly a Budapest production.^ 7

In theatre, a similar one-sided situation prevails.

While the

Rumanian language theatres frequently present plays writted by
Rumanians covering Rumanian themes, the Hungarian language theatres
rarely have the chance to present the plays of Hungarian authors or
plays which have Hungarian themes.

A perusal of theatre productions

during the years 1965-1970, indicates that the dramas of Rumanian and
non-Hungarian writers completely dominate the Hungarian language stage
1 70

of Transylvania.

Furthermore, when theatre groups from Hungary

tour Rumania, they can perform only in Bucharest and other cities
which fall far from Hungarian inhabited Transylvania.^ 9
In the world of music and the plastic arts less restrictions
prevail.

From available information concerning music, painting and

sculpture, it is possible to conclude that Hungarians are given more

177

Exerpts of the text of this film are reproduced under
"LAncosok" in Elflre, June 22, 1969, p. 4.

178

A slightly more favorable situation prevails in relation
to musical productions.
See along this line Ferenc l A s z IA' s , "Profil
As /£rnyAk," in Elflre, M a y 4, 1969, p. 4.
179M ichel Tatu, "A RomAnositAs Uteme ErdAlyben," U j Europa,
VII (Feb., 1968), 22.
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extensive opportunities than either in the world of motion-pictures or
theatre.

In fact, many of the foremost artists of Rumania are of Hun

garian e x t r a c t i o n . T h u s ,

it is possible to conclude that less

national persecution takes place in Rumania's policies toward indi
viduals who excel in music, painting or sculpture.

In Yugoslavia

Historical Self-Interpretations
Like its Rumanian counterpart, Yugoslavia's historical self
interpretation reveals a great deal about the country's policies
toward its minorities, particularly the Hungarians.

The nature of

Yugoslavia's self-interpretation has undergone a number of significant
changes.

These can be considered in three phases:

the post-war period,

the era of Soviet-Yugoslav discord and the period following the EastCentral European upheavals of 1956.
The experience of World War II provided Yugoslavia with its
major source of self-definition.

This experience produced the

"Partizan myth" discussed earlier.^®'*'

It also provided the definition

of the proper historical roles and relationships of the Yugoslav peoples
and the national minorities in the expansion of Communism.

■^®Ldszl 6 , "Profil 6s Xrny^k," p. 4. A perusal of the cultural
section of the Sunday editions of Eldfce, presents a good cross-section
of the richness and variety of the contributions of Hungarian artists.
Also see "A Maros-Magyar Autondm Tarom^nyi Kdpzffmflvdszeti Tcirlat
Anyagdbol," Igaz Sz<5. XII (Nov., 1964), 732-735; Iv£n Kovrfts,
"Miivdszvil^g: Tdli Tdrlat MarosvAsdrhelyen," Igaz Sz6 , XIII (Mar.,1965),
432-437.
^■^^See Chapters I and II.
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In the immediate post-war period the historical works tended
to stress the themes of war guilt, progressive versus reactionary
nations, and the major role of the South Slavic nationalities in the
liberation of Yugoslavia.

These themes usually appeared together.

182

They not only provided an interpretation of the war, but also a ra
tionalization for the post-war treatment of the German, Albanian,
Italian and Hungarian minorities.

183

World War II is presented in these writings as the great world
conflict in which the progressive forces led by the Soviet Union,
destroy the forces of reaction led by Nazi Germany.

Closely tied to

this world conflict is the Yugoslav struggle for national indepen
dence and social transformation.

The partizan conflict against the

foreign occupation is portrayed as the South Slav peoples' struggle
leading to the country's liberation and communization.

In this

struggle, the role of the ethnic minorities was originally considered
either minimal or negative.

The Germans of the Vojvodina were pre

sented as the outright collaborators of the Nazis.

The other non-Slav

nationalities— including the Hungarians— were less sweepingly condemned.
In the case of the Hungarians the condemnation was directed mainly at
their "ruling classes."184

182MiioVan Djilas, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bdkeert es a Demokr^ci^ert," H i d , XI (Jan., 1947), 12-20, and from the same author,
"Jugoszldvia Ndpeinek Harca ds a Marxizmus-Leninizmus," H i d , XI (Dec.,
1947), 873-83.
•IQ O

Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities under Communism,"
Slavic R e v i e w , XXII (Mar., 1963), 66-73, has the best short summary
of this treatment.
•^^Ibid . . pp. 70-73; Djilas, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bekeert es
a Demokraciddrt," pp. 12-20.
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After the "enemies of Yugoslav independence and social trans
formation" were liquidated, a re-evaluation of their role took place
in historical writings.

This re-evaluation corresponds roughly to the

political ideological dispute with the U.S.S.R.

185

In the years

1948-49, as outside political pressure mounts and as the threat of
Soviet intervention grows, the emphasis in Yugoslavia falls on solidar
ity among all the peoples.

This stress on a common destiny and unity

in the face of adversity, puts the Hungarians and the other non-Slavic
nationalities back into Yugoslav history.

The historical writings

which emerge at this time, "prove" that the Hungarians and other n a 
tionalities fought "shoulder to shoulder" with the South Slavs against
the foreign invader during World War 11.^®®
From the Tito-Stalin rift to the present
argument dominates.

(1970), this line of

In reference to the Hungarians, it exaggerates

their partizan role by stressing the PetSfi Brigade and the interwar
Communist movements of the Vojvodina.

The Petdfi Brigade, in particular,

has been embellished greatly to give the impression of popular support
for the "national liberation war."

187

This has meant that the purpose

^•^^Kdroly Gyetvai, "Vajdasdg Onkormdnyzati Alapokminya," Hid,
XII (Oct.-Nov., 1948), 475-480; "A Vajdasdgi Magyar Kulturmunkdsok
tjjrtekezletdnek H a t d r o z a t a i H i d , XII (Dec., 1948), 560-562; Pdter
Lbrine,"P^rtszeruseg es Hazafisdg," Hid, XIV (July, 1950), 486-497.
■*-88 j 6 zsef Merton, "Fdsi Ferenc Elvtirs, A Magyar Partizan,"
H i d , XII (Jan.-Feb., 1948), 25-28; Brindza, "Adatok a Jugszlaviai
Magyarsdg Rdsztvdteldrdl a Ne'pfelszabadito Hdboruban," pp. 323-336;
Lftrinc, "Vajdasdgi Nemzetkozi Harcosok," pp. 784-793; KeSid, "Figyelo:
A JKP Vajdasdgban a Felkelds Elfikdszitdsdnek ds Meginditasanak
Napjaiban," pp. 784-792.
187Lajos tfltetd, "Petflfi Hitet Hoztuk Magunkkal," Itt-Ott, III
(July-Aug., 1970), 16-19.
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of the struggle became much more than South-Slav liberation.

It has

become the event which has ended national and social exploitation of
IOO

all peoples.

°

This latter interpretation means that all nationali

ties— except the Germans--find that they are no longer considered "out
siders" in Yugoslav history books.
In general, the Yugoslav self-interpretations— historical self
definitions --have been broadened and made more tolerant over the years.
This has meant that the "national destiny" of Yugoslavia has been much
freer of ethnic exclusivism than is the case in Rumania.

In the

latter instance, both the war experience and the revival of "DacoRoman" myths, has emphasized the ethnic Rumanian destiny of the country.
On this score the Hungarians of Transylvania have much less opportunity
to identify with Rumanian national self-interpretations, than their
fellow nationals have in the Vojvodina to identify with Yugoslavia's.

Literature, Publishing and Libraries
Yugoslavia's historical self-interpretation and its consequences
are also reflected in the literary and publishing activities of the
Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

The major trends and opportunities of a

literary nature are indicated by the periodicals published in Hungarian.
The periodical Hid and the experimental publication Uj^ Symposion,

188Tibor Minda, "A Nemzeti Kisebbsdgek Helyzete Vajdasdgban,"
Hid, XXVII (Jan., 1963), 102-107; Edvard Kardelj, "A Nemzeti Kdrddsr81," Hid, XVIII (Jan., 1954), 31-40; Olajos, "Egybeolvadas— Nem
Beolvad^s," pp. 837-840.
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provide two of the most important sources in this area.'*"®9

The develop

ment of these two publications--as of Magyar Szo— mirrors the evolution
of the cultural life of Hungarians in the Vojvodina.
As the perusal of Hid reveals, until about 1949-50, there was
very little in the w a y of Hungarian literature in Yugoslavia.

The

articles in Hid and many other publications appeared in Hungarian, but
were concerned primarily with CPY propaganda rather than Hungarian
culture.

As a Hungarian writer of this period admits, much that went

by the name of literature was for the most part "directed" writing
serving socialism as the new political order.

It was a period when

191
"revolutionary slogans" composed much of the content of H i d .

Only

in 1950 is there a shift away from such strictly politically oriented
writings.

19?

v

The Hungarian writers of this transition period found it diffi
cult to adjust to the new Yugoslavia.
particularist, regionalist perspective.

Many continued to write from a
Although they were all

champions of the "new order," their literary contributions manifested
a certain isolation from literary developments throughout the rest of
Yugoslavia.

To remedy this situation, the government fostered a policy

of translation of Hungarian literary works into Serbo-Croatian.

This

policy immediately broadened the perspectives of the Hungarian writers.

•^Benkfl, "a jugoszlaviai Magyar Proza 'Uj Hull^ma,1" pp. 44-48;
Janos Herceg, "A Mai Jugszlaviai Magyar Irodalom Vazlatos Attenkint^se,"
in A Kassai Bats^nyi-Kflr gvkflnyve 1965- 1968. pp. 293-307.

190

Ibid.

191

I b i d . . pp. 294-295.

192 I b i d .. p. 295.
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Their audience had been expanded to include others besides their own
people.

Thus, they could no longer remain just regional and just

ethnic writers of the Vojvodina.

At any rate, the new generation of

writers, seems to have become more cosmopolitan in orientation and at
the same time also less ideological.^ 3
While Hungarian writers have abandoned their narrowed perspec
tive, they have not been hindered in the publication of Hungarian
language works.
deluged by t

Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they have not been

aslations of the works of the majority nationality.

Although m any Serbo-Croatian works have been translated into Hungarian
it seems that reciprocity prevails in this area.

Many Hungarian works

are translated into Serbo-Croatian, although not quite as many as
Serbo-Croatian works into Hungarian.

194

This contrasts favorably with

the situation in Rumania, where the predominant trend is all one-sided
in favor of Rumanian works, which are translated into Hungarian.
A content analysis of the literary productions also favors the
Yugoslav setting as against the Rumanian.

Hungarian writers--both

classical and modern— are generally more favorably received by the
publishers.

In large part this is due to the "Forum" publisher of

Novi Sad, which concentrates on the publication of Hungarian

» 3 Ibld.
^ J u g o s l a v i a 1945-1964; Statistidki Pregled, Tables 20-14
and 20-15, p. 332; "Az Ujviddki Forumrol," Eldre, Apr. 20, 1969,
pp. 3-4; Forum Kttnyvjegyz^k 1965-1966, pp. 5-32.
•'•^Domonkos, A Romin Irodalom Magyar Bibliografiaja.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n er. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

343

works.

196

In Rumania, such an "independent" Hungarian publisher is

inconceivable.

Only v ery recently, have the nationalities obtained the

"Kriterion" publisher.
non-Rumanian works.

However, the latter is a publisher for all

None of the nationalities have exclusively their

own publisher.
Also indicative of Yugoslavia's more tolerant view toward its
nationalities is the content of nationality publications.

The Hun

garian publication H i d , contains much more material that is cultural
than its Rumanian counterparts Igaz Sz<$ and Korunk.

While these

Rumanian periodicals concentrate much of their attention on translations
of Rumanian works and propaganda articles, Hid is primarily concerned
with literary and cultural problems.

This is not to say that Hid is

free of translated materials or propaganda, it is merely to say that
it is less dominated by them.

Furthermore, the political propaganda

which appears--particularly recently--in H i d , reflects a more tolerant
atmosphere than that which appears in Korunk or Igaz S z o .

Unlike the

Rumanian stress on "socialist patriotism" and "Daco-Roman" antecedents,
the writings in Hid have continued to reflect "proletarian internation
alist" ideals, particularly in discussions of World War II and the
struggle against Nazi occupation.^ 7
Book publishing reflects this atmosphere also.

Over the years

the publishing opportunities of the Hungarians have been constantly

^ ^Forum KOnyvjegyz^k 1965-1966, pp. 5-32; "Az Ujvid^ki
Forumrol," pp. 3-4.
■^^See footnote 186 a b o v e .
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expanded.

This is particularly true since 1964.

As Table XXIV reveals,

from 1953 to 1963 a yearly average of 51 Hungarian books were published
in Yugoslavia.

In 1964 and 1965 respectively, more than twice that

number were published.
to 1 5 2 . ^ ®

By 1966 the number of such books had increased

Parallel to this development there has also been an i n 

crease in the overall volume of the number of books published.
This expansion of Hungarian publishing activity in Yugoslavia
contrasts favorably with the dwindling publishing activities of the
minorities in Rumania.

199

However, the Yugoslav policies are more

responsive to minority needs in yet another way.

Unlike Rumanian poli

cies, they do not try to isolate their Hungarian minority from the
literary and cultural publications of Hungarians in Hungary or other
"socialist" lands.

This is shown both by international debates which

take place on the pages of Hid among Hungarians and also by the content
of books published for them in Yugoslavia.

In the case of Rumania, the

Hungarians suffer a great lack by being deprived of such international
contacts.^®®

■^^Between 1951 and 1954 the situation was even more favorable
for the Hungarians.
In 1951 they had 120 titles, in 1952, 83 titles,
and in 1953, 65 titles.
It seems that in response to international
political pressure, (Tito-Stalin Conflict) the Hungarians were given
more opportunities to publish. As this pressure diminished with the
death of Stalin, the number of Hungarian titles also declined.
For
this data see Statistidki Godisnjak FNRJ 1954 (Beograd;
Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku i Evidenciju, 1954), Table 278, p. 349.
■^^Compare the data of Tables XXIII and XXIV.
The favorable
position of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia does not mean that they do not
have some problems in this area.
See jAnos HorvAth, "HiAnyoznak a
Magyar Kttnyvek" Magyar Szd, May 16, 1970, as quoted in Nemzetor,
July-Aug., 1970, p. 12.
^^DAnes,

h^z

ErdAlyi Kultura 1970-ben," p. 7.
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TABLE XXIV*
BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THREE
SELECTED NATIONAL MINORITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA

Year

German**
No.of
No. of
titles
copies

Hungarian
No. of
No. of
titles
copies

Albanian
No. of
No. of
titles
copies

1953

33

174,000

65

325,000

56

169,000

1954

53

489,000

62

260,000

89

356,000

1955

53

898,000

41

182,000

69

388,000

1956

31

201,000

58

213,000

65

414,000

1957

60

1,058,000

65

396,000

58

185,000

1958

85

248,000

49

279,000

67

311,000

1959

78

355,000

46

174,000

64

312,000

1960

49

401,000

35

175,000

44

160,000

1961

48

309,000

66

294,000

86

382,000

1962

64

495,000

76

314,000

80

459,000

1963

68

447,000

42

149,000

134

1,113,000

1964

84

234,000

121

583,000

180

951,000

1965

85

271,000

125

758,000

150

618,000

1966

64

254,000

152

983,000

132

638,000

*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1967
(Beograd:
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1967), Table 127-19, p. 301;
StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1964 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1964), Table 126-15, p. 328; Jugoslavia 1945-1964:
StatistiEki Pregled (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1965),
Table 20-14, p. 332; StatistiEki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959 (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1959), Table 2-310, p. 267.
**Most of the books published in German are intended for
East and West Germany rather than the few Germans left in Yugoslavia.
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The Fine Arts
Music, drama and the plastic arts among the Hungarians of the
Vojvodina seem to receive ample state support.
controls.

This support involves

However, the cultural policies of Yugoslavia allow the

Hungarians more leeway to develop their "national forms" than Rumania1s
policies.

This difference between the two countries is due primarily

to Yugoslavia’s internal "liberalization" following the Tito-Stalin
split and also the country's heterogeneous ethnic make-up.
Since no single nationality has a dominant majority position
in Yugoslavia, it is impossible to find agreement as to what composes
the "national" culture of the land.

It is generally contended that the

South Slavic cultures together, provide the country with its major
sources of cultural identification.^®^

However, the diversity of these

cultures makes the exclusivist claims or privileged treatment of any
one of them highly unlikely.

Thus, the cultural diversity of the non-

Slavic nationalities is tolerated and preserved by the cultural divers
ity of the majority nationalities.
The rift which developed between Yugoslavia and the "socialist
camp" in the late 1940's also increased nationality cultural oppor
tunities in the long-run.

In terms of immediate consequences the

201

For some different interpretations of this question see:
Milovan Djilas, "Nemzeti Miszticizmus--A Mi Idealismusunk Jellegzetes
VonAsa," Hid, XVI (July-Aug., 1952), 427-435; Dusan Popovics,
"Kulturegyeshleteink FogyatdkossAgairol ds Uj TAvlatairol," Hid,
X X (Aug.-Sept., 1956), 565-573; Dobrica Cosic, "A Korszerutlen
Nacionalizmusrol," Hid, XXVI (Jan., 1962), 21-31; Dusan Prijevec,
"Szlovdnsdg, Jugoszldvsdg ds Szocializmus," Hid, XXVI (Mar., 1962),
289-303.
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9 09

Tito-Stalin split actually worsened nationality relations. w

But the

general liberalization which followed on the domestic scene, eventually
contributed to increased national opportunities in the area of music and
art.

The conflict with Stalin led to the isolation of Yugoslavia in the

cultural as well as the political and economic area.

Consequently, the

Yugoslavs turned to the West to break out of their isolation.

In the

cultural area this involved, among other things, an extensive film
exchange program.

This and other exchanges with the West, worked to

make Yugoslav cultural policies more flexible than that of the other
East-Central European states.

2 0 3

This flexibility meant— after Rdkosi was eclipsed temporarily
by Nagy--that Hungarians in the Vojvodina were able to gain access to
films produced in Hungary.

However, the number of films rarely exceeded

three per year prior to 1964.

204

This number compares unfavorably

with the number of films allowed in from other countries, such as
Czechoslovakia, Italy, France and the U.S.S.R., none of which have sub
stantial fellow-nationals living in Yugoslavia.

It also seems one

sided, when one considers that Hungary imported 21 and 10 Yugoslav

2 ®2Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 3 6 8 -3 7 1 , 3 7 5 -3 7 7 , 4234 2 7 ; Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," p. 73;
John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road (New York;
Harper & Row, 1 9 6 7 ),
pp. 2 1 , 113.
203

For the dramatic shift in the film exchange program of
Yugoslavia see particularly Statistidki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959 (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1 9 5 9 ), Tables 2 -3 0 7 and 2 - 3 0 8 , p. 266,
and Jugoslavia 1 9 4 5 -1 9 6 4 : StatistiCki Pregled. Tables 2 0 - 5 and 2 0 - 6 ,
p. 3 28.
204Ibid.
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films in 1963 and 1964 respectively.

Hungary has a very small Serbian

population which does not even come near in size to the half-million
Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

However, this lack of imported Hungarian

films in the Vojvodina is still better than the film policies of
Rumania.

In the rare instance when a Hungarian film finds its way to

Transylvania, it ends up with a deliberately unsynchronized sound
track.20^
The films available to the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are
primarily non-Hungarian.
anti-Hungarian.

However, the content of these films is not

Western films are all of the light variety, with

emphasis on entertainment.

Yugoslav films, on the other hand, are

set to perpetuate attitudes which tone down ethnic animosities.

Thus,

World War II and the Partizan struggles provide one of the major
sources for the themes of Yugoslav films.200
common struggle against foreign oppression.

The latter stresses
It propagates solidarity

among the nationalities and minorities of the country by emphasizing
proletarian internationalism.

As opposed to this, Rumanian film

policies have begun to emphasize the strictly "national" heroichistorical themes.

Thus, they have produced "The Column," "Dacians"

and "Decebal"— films which delegate all the country's- national minori
ties into the "foreign" category.

20 0 Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.

2 06

Out of 20 films produced in Yugoslavia during 1965-1966,
eleven are in some way related to the Partizan struggles of World War
II.
See Jdnos Brenner, "Megmentik Polit," 7 N a p , July 22, 1966, p. 12.
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In the area of theatre, the Hungarians in the Vojvodina have
less opportunities than those of Transylvania.
garians in Transylvania possess six theatres.

As was shown the Hun
In the Vojvodina, they

have access to theatres in Novi Sad and Subotica.
theatres are predominantly S e r b i a n . T h e

But, both of these

only consolation to this

great lack is that Yugoslav Hungarians can cross the border and attend
the open-air theatre in Szeged.

The latter is just across the Hun

garian- Yugoslav frontier and is frequented by many Vojvodinians during
the summer.^®®

Another consolation is that Hungarian actors and

theatre groups from Hungary have more opportunities to perform in

1 - 2 0 9
Yugoslavia.
Theatre life in the Vojvodina is a rare luxury for Hungarians.
However, it is only fair to point out that opportunities in this area
are more extensive than at any previous time in Yugoslavia's history.
In the interwar years, only the most primitive types of theatre productions seem to have been tolerated or encouraged.

210

In the imme

diate post-war period, the Stalinist atmosphere also stiffled creativity.
Only in the second half of the 1950’s and the 1960's has it been

207'iElkdszult a szabadkai N^pszinhaz Oszi Miisorterve," Magyar
S z d , July 29, 1966, p. 12; "Ot Szinhdzi Est Mdrlege," Magyar Sz6 , June
24, 1966, p. 9; Istvkn Ldnyi, "A Vajdas^gi Szinjatszas Ndhdny
Probldm^ja'rol," Hid, XXII (July-Aug., 1958), 617-620.
208j^roly Erd^lyi, "Utlev^lel a Szegedi Szabadt^ri jAtekokra?"
Magyar Sz d , July 16, 1966, pp. 1, 3.
209por example:
July 8 , 1966, p. 9.

Sz. M . , "Nevess Veltink--Ha Tudsz," Polgoz 6k .

^•^Istvin Lateik, "A Vojvodinai Magyar Szinjatszas Kerdds^hez,"
in Hid 1934-1941, pp. 298-303.
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possible to discern certain improvements in theatre production.

How

ever, only a very limited number have been performed in the Hungarian

,

211

language.

In the musical life of the Hungarians a similar situation seems
to prevail.

Aside from folk and popular music, very few Hungarian

renditions are available of

serious or classical music.

212

This lack

is unfortunate from a broader cultural perspective, but it does not
involve national discrimination.

Numerous radio programs devote time

to Hungarian music of the folk and popular variety.

Furthermore, broad

casts from Budapest fill the classical gaps which exist.

These broad

casts are followed religiously by ma n y Hungarians in the Vojvodina.
In the plastic arts the Hungarians seem to enjoy just as many
opportunities as the other peoples of Yugoslavia.

They hold frequent

O IO

exhibitions which seem to be well a ttended.

Both painters and

sculptors gain extensive recognition of their works.
towns of the Vojvodina have artist's associations.

Many of the major
Their works have

been taken on international tours, mainly in "socialist countries."

A

^■Kjdzsef Sulhof, "A VajdasAgi SzinhAzak Unnepi SzemlAje,"
H i d , XXI (July, 1957), 544-546; IstvAn LatAk, "A VajdasAgi Magyar
SzinjAtszAs Nagy Halottja," H i d , XX I V (May, 1960), 375-378. Also see
footnote 207 above.
^•^KAroly Krombholz, "A VajdasAgi Magyar ZeneszerzSk KArde'sArol,"
H i d , XVII (Feb., 1953), 133-135.
213

Imre Devits, "A VajdasAgi Miivesztelepek," H i d , XXI (Dec.,
1957), 1065-1070; "Julius 7-An: TArlat Palicson," Magyar S z o , June
24, 1966, p. 9.
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favorite route of these exhibits is Hungary, where they are usually
well-received^
The architectural development and the upkeep of historical sites
has been less discriminatory than in Rumania.

Reminders of the area's

Hungarian past are not being systematically eliminated or "re-possessed."
This may be due, in part, to the less obvious nature of the Hungarian
monuments in the Vojvodina, but also to the generally more tolerant
attitude of the Yugoslavs toward symbols of cultural diversity.

Thus,

old Hungarian churches and castles, instead of being demolished receive
some state assistance for their u p k e e p . T h e

latter is motivated

less by nationality policies than by considerations affecting tourism.
Still, the net result is a type of co-existence for the historical
reminders and symbols of the inhabitants of the Vojvodina.
Yugoslav policies toward the museums and libraries also mirror
tolerance.

Unlike the case of Rumania, there does not seem to be a

policy aimed at dispersing minority nationality books or historical
artifacts.

While the number of libraries and museums has constantly

expanded, so has the share of the Hungarians increased in both areas.
Village libraries and houses of folk culture have been some of the
major gainers of this expansion.^16

21^[argit V. Kiss, "Zrenjanini Mtiv^szek Kiillitasa Bdke'scsab^n,"
Bdkdsi |let, V, No. 1 (1970), pp. 107-110.
Ol C

good example of this is Petrovaradin (Pdterv^trad) across
the Danube from Novi S a d . Ivo Frol (ed.) Petrovaradin (Novi Sad:
Izdavac Matica SRPSKA, 1963), presents a good description of this
historical landmark and the efforts made by the government to preserve
it.
^ ^ Jugoslavija 1945-1964;

Statistigki Pregled, Table 20-10,

p. 330.
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IV

The general cultural setting of the Hungarians in Transylvania
is much more restrictive than that of their fellow nationals in the
Vojvodina.

As the preceding discussion of education, the mass media

and cultural life demonstrated, Rumania is also more restrictive from
an institutional perspective.

However, this generalization is valid

only from the late 1950's to the present.

The Yugoslav policy of

relative tolerance is also historically circumscribed.

It is a conse

quence of the post-war challenge to create internal unity in order to
ward off external threats to national security.
This difference in the cultural and educational policies of
the two states reflects the erosion of the ethnic balance of power in
Rumania and the relative stabilization of the ethnic balance of power
in Yugoslavia.

In Rumania the shift toward more repressive policies

is evident following the Party purge of some of the major representa
tives of the Hungarians and the other minorities.

This shift in the

balance of power within the Party took place between 1952 and 1957.
Parallel to these shifts, the educational policies reflected some r e 
strictions on the Hungarians already in the 1955-56 school year.

These

became much more pronounced by 1958 and all-pervasive in the late
1960's, when the ethnic Rumanian dominance of Party leadership is no
longer challenged.

As the analysis shows, cultural policies also

followed this pattern.
In Yugoslavia a somewhat different trend has prevailed.

Until

about the middle of the 1950's Hungarian opportunities were closely
limited.

Since then educational and cultural policies try to satisfy
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the needs of the Hungarians as well as most of the other nationalities.
In the past few years even more effort has been exerted to remove any
disadvantages that may have prevailed in this area.

This effort

parallels the solidification of the balance of power between ethnic
groups in the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

Since

the majority nationality cannot dominate the Party leadership, it is
also unable to carry out repressive policies as it had done in the
interwar years.

While the possibility does exist that the Yugoslav

nationalities together m a y turn to oppress non-Slavic nationalities,
this has not happened lately due to the unofficial alliances between
certain Slavic and certain non-Slavic nationalities.
The close relationship between internal political changes and
ethnic policies has been demonstrated.

However, the shifts in the

internal balance of power do not give a complete picture.

Many

changes in ethnic policies are understandable only if we examine the
international relations of the states which are most concerned with
the future of Transylvania and the Vojvodina.

This concern and the

relations of these states provides the focus for the next chapter.
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INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS
OF NATIONALITY POLICIES

The fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina is
closely intertwined with the peace of East-Central Europe.

Ethnic

animosities in this area have been the cause of a number of major con
flicts.

Since the Hungarians compose the largest minority population

in the area, their treatment affects the international relations of
most states in Eastern Europe, but particularly that of the U.S.S.R.,
Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary.^
This chapter will examine how the treatment of the Hungarians
influences relations between these states.

At the same time, it will

consider how relations among these states affect nationality policies
in Transylvania and the Vojvodina.

By examining the problem from both

directions, it m a y be possible to avoid the fruitless debate as to
what came first.

Furthermore, the examination of the problem's inter

national ramifications will demonstrate to what extent international
power relations influence the intra-national balance of power among the
ethnic groups of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

•*-Czechoslovakia also deserves to be on this list since it has
more than 517,000 Hungarian inhabitants.
It has been omitted from the
above listing only because the present study is concerned solely with
Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina.
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I
In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the Soviet Union has,
at times, influenced the treatment of the Hungarians.

In Transylvania

this influence has frequently been directly responsible for certain
policies or policy shifts.

In the Vojvodina such influence has been

more indirect, but at times also decisive.

This influence has been

exerted politically and ideologically.
The political influence of the Soviet Union is a consequence
of its expanded role in East-Central European affairs since World War
II.

Its ideological influence is even older, going back to the

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

These two sources

(political and ideo

logical) of its policy-making encounter in Rumania, Yugoslavia and
Hungary the national aspirations, political interests and ideological
commitments of small states trying to maintain their independence and
security.

To rephrase Philip E. Mosely, is it ideological or political

considerations that guide the relations among these "Socialist"

s t a t e s ’ ^

The answer to this question has already been provided in the
discussion of the domestic policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia with
respect to their Hungarian inhabitants.

Now we will examine what the

relations among these states, the U.S.S.R. and Hungary reveal about
the fate of national minorities under Communist rule.

This will help

determine the role of ideology and power in the international relations

O
"Introduction:
Power and Ideology in the Communist States,"
in The Communist States at the Crossroads, e d . Adam Bromke (New Y o r k :
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-4.
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of these states.

First, we will concentrate on the Soviet Union's

attempt to keep these nation-states within its hegemonial o r b i t .
Second, w e w i l l examine how the conflicting interests of Rumania, Yug o
slavia and Hungary— as reflected by their nationality policies--thwarts,
or limits the Soviet efforts to solidify the "socialist camp."^

The Impact of Soviet Hegemony and Ideological Solidarity
One of the outstanding developments of the post-World War II
era has been the dominant role played by the Soviet Union in the affairs
(internal and external) of East-Central European states.

The incorpora

tion of these countries into the Soviet bloc, with the exception of
Yugoslavia, has made the U.S.S.R. not only "guide" but also "arbiter"
of affairs generally.^

Thus, the problem of Transylvania and its

large Hungarian population also became subject to Soviet supervision.
Only Yugoslavia has been able to maintain its political independence.
However, ideological "solidarity" has even affected it and its policies
in the Vojvodina.

In Rumania
In the immediate post-war years Stalin's grip on East-Central

-’Yugoslavia's leaders dislike the idea of "Socialist camp."
It indicates cold war alignments.
In public statements and in their
policies as well, they have indicated their independence from this
" c a m p ."
^Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Revised paperback
edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), p. 51, notes
the three mai n reasons for this state of affairs as:
(1 ) "over
whelming Soviet strength" (the Red Army of occupation); (2) "weak
ness of the non-Communist forces in East Europe"; and (3) "the rapid
demobilization and disengagement of the West."
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Europe enabled him to determine the fate of the Hungarian and other
nationalities of Transylvania.

As earlier chapters have already indi

cated, he utilized the discord in the area to further his own end--the
rapid Comraunization of Rumania.-*

Stalin used Transylvania as a means

to control the newly acquired Rumanian and Hungarian satellites.^

To

say, however, that this was just an extension of the policy of divide
et impera would be to over-simplify.

Undoubtedly, use of this dis

puted area for such purposes was not neglected by Stalin.^

Yet,

stability and conformity were more important to him at this stage, and
it does not seem likely that he would have encouraged dissension between

-*The utilization of Rumanian-Hungarian discord by Stalin to
facilitate the Communist seizure of power in the former country has
already been treated in foregoing chapters.
However, besides the
sources mentioned previously regarding this tactic, an interesting
sidelight is provided for it by Hungdricus, "Romania Uj Politikija ds
Erddly Kdrddse," Nemzetffr, IX (Sept., 1964), 1. In this article it
is related that the September 1945 election in Hungary giving the
Communists only 17% of the vote, and the election of May 1946 in
Rumania giving the Communist dominated National Democratic Front 70.5%
of the vote, convinced Stalin that Rumania should receive all of
Transylvania.
Petru Groza did in fact quote the election results as
"proof" that Rumania was more dependable.
His argument seems to have
carried weight since the Peace Treaty of 1947 confirmed the annexation
of Transylvania to Rumania.
The fact that Stalin did not even attempt a compromise— he
annexed Transylvania in toto to Rumania— adds credence to this conten
tion.
^Along this line see Nicholas Halasz, In The Shadow of Russia
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959), pp. 185-186.
Yet, Stalin
was also searching for a viable and stable order in East-Central
Europe--under Soviet control.
He at one time even toyed w ith the idea
of incorporating the satellites directly into the U.S.S.R.
This he
wanted to achieve by first amalgamating Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and
Albania, then by federating Rumania and Hungary, and also Poland and
Czechoslovakia.
See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin t r a n s .
Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962),p.
177.
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two satellites which he already controlled.

The fact that he pro

tected the Hungarian minority against Rumanian terror and oppression
shows, however, that he saw tactical utility for the Soviet Union in
keeping a strong minority (dependent on Soviet protection) within
Rumania.**

His support for establishment of the Magyar Autonomous

Region is yet further indication of this.

o

Stalin's death in 1953 ended the position of the Autonomous
Region as a possible counter-weight to Rumanian ambitions.*-®

The

old dictator's successors turned to utilize more formal means of con
trol.

While this does not necessarily mean that minorities were

relieved of this role, it does mean that their importance diminished
considerably in the eyes of Soviet policy makers.

In fact, the H u n 

garian Revolt of 1956, and the parallel disturbances among the Hun
garian population of Transylvania ended Soviet expectations of
minority support for the U.S.S.R. in Rumania.*-*-

Q

Halasz, In the Shadow of R u s s i a , p. 82; Robert Lee Wolff,
"Rumania," The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D. Kertesz
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 256257, 261.
^Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambirdge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 453.
10But it was not the death of Stalin, as much as the with
drawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, that eliminated com
pletely the "counter-weight" idea of the Hungarian minority.
For the
importance of this troop removal on Rumania's re-assertion of more
independence see John Michael Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern
Europe," Foreign Affairs. 43 (January, 1965), 332.
*-*Kciroly Illyds, "A Kreml Keserti Csaldddsa Az Erd^lyi Magyarokban," L d r m a f a , III (October-December, 1956), 21; J. F. Brown, "The
Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World T o d a y , XIX (November,
1963), 502.
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The Khrushchev policies of the latter 1950's and early 1960's
reflect this Soviet "apathy" toward the Transylvanian nationalities.
Just prior to, during, and after the disturbances of 1956, Khrushchev
was already in the process of providing the "bloc" with a more formal
organizational structure.

1

This structure was built on the founda

tion of Soviet sponsored cooperation among East European satellites in
matters of defense and economy.

The Warsaw Pact and COMECON (CEMA)

were to provide the central core for this system of coordinated
planning and c o n t r o l . ^

The position of Rumania's Hungarian minority

was greatly affected by these changes, positively as well as nega
tively.
The "negative" impact has already been noted above as the
decrease of the political importance of ethnic groups.

The "positive"

result was that closer relations were fostered between individual
satellites.

This meant that relations between Rumania and Hungary

would also involve more cooperation.

In the economic sphere this was

to entail more trade agreements, and the continuation of such projects
as Romagchim, which had been brought into existence under the watchful
eye of S t a l i n . ^

This latter "joint company" enabled Hungary as well

■^Brzezinski, The Soviet B l o c , Appendix I, pp. 445-451; J. F.
Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," Survey, No. 49 (Oct., 1963), 19;
Andrzej Korbonski, "Comecon," International Conciliation, No. 549
(Sept., 1964), 4-7.
1^

Ibid.; Brzezinski, The Soviet B l o c . Also see Nicholas
Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (Cambridge, M a s s . :
The Technology Press, 1957), pp. 425-432, for the early development of
Comecon.
■^George H. Bossy, "Mining," Romania ed. Stephen FischerGalati (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 244.
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as Rumania to use the natural gas deposits of Transylvania for their
respective industrial u n d ertakings.^
In spite of such formalization of relations, the relations
between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated rather than improved.

16

Soviet

overlordship ensured that their differences would not be paraded pub
licly before the world, but disagreements were nonetheless real.
Soviet hegemony acted as a break on these differences.

More recently ,

particularly since 1963, the Soviet system of satellite control has
loosened just enough to allow outsiders to verify the existence of these
differences."*"^

The root of contention between the two satellites has

remained the question of Transylvania and minority rights.
In the summer of 1963, rumors were wide-spread that Transylvania
or a part of it would be returned to Hungary.

18

It was contended that

the Soviet Union was using this as a threat toward Rumania in order to
force the latter to submit to Comecon policies and coordination.

Since

15I b i d .
•*"^This deterioration of Rumanian-Hungarian contacts must not be
blamed on the formalization of relations.
Rather, the deterioration
was a consequence of the greater "independence" of the respective
satellites; an "independence which developed parallel to, but not in
direct conjunction with the formalization of relations.
■^See for example in the New York Times: "Rumanians Print
Views of Peking," June 23, 1963, pp. 1, 12; David Binder, "Rumanian
Leader's Visit to Tito Held New Sign of Independence," November 24,
1963, p. 15; Paul Underwood, "Yugoslavia Signs Rumanian Accord," Dec.
1, 1963, p. 14; David Binder, "Rumania Adheres to Industry Plan," Jan.
19, 1964, p. 18; and more recently Binder's, "Rumania's Minorities
Pressed by Nationalist Drive," July 14, 1964, p. 4.
18

Seymour Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took," New
York Herald Tribune. Sept., 14, 1964, p. 6.
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nothing came of this, it can be assumed that the rumor was either false
or just the "news" of a Russian bluff never carried out.

19

At any

rate, the Soviet Union avoided such a step--the re-partitioning of
Transylvania--for fear of further unrest and instability in the
satellite empire.
The re-partitioning of Transylvania is undesirable from a
Soviet perspective primarily for two reasons.
some ways related,
in the area.

These reasons are in

since both afreet the position of Soviet authority

The first is that the redrawing of boundaries would r e 

open the whole question of borders, ceded territories, and annexations.
Since the Soviet Union had gained the most territory in the last war,
the re-opening of this question would undoubtedly affect it adversely.^®
This is also underlined by the fact that Transylvania in Rumanian hands
provides the Soviet Union with less military headaches.

The present

set-up impairs the strength of Hungary and at the same time leaves the
strategically important area of Transylvania in the possession of a
satellite which is more open to direct Soviet military pressure.
Another factor, perhaps not as important as the above two, is

■^The Rumanian elation following the replacement of Khrushchev
would indicate that such a bluff m a y have been made.
Rumanians viewed
him as a personal enemy of their country.
The CPSU criticism of
Khrushchev after the take-over by Brezhnev and Kosygin lend additional
weight to this view.
See particularly points 5 and 6 enumerated by
Henry Tanner in "29 'Errors' Laid to Khrushchev," New York T imes, Oct.
30, 1964, pp. 1, 13. Also see David Binder, "Rumania Retains Indepen
dent Line," New York T i m e s , Nov. 16, 1964, pp. 1, 5. It still remains
to be seen, however, whether the policies of Brezhnev and Kosygin can
really take a more "conciliatory" stance toward Rumanian nationalism
than had Khrushchev's.
^Freidin,

"East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took," pp. 1, 6 .
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that Rumania proved to be a "loyal" satellite while Hungary had revolted.

21

This loyalty was not only demonstrated by allowing the Soviet

Union to use Transylvania as the base of operations against the Hun
garian freedom fighters, but also by Rumania's subsequent role in helpOO

ing to eradicate all vestiges of the opposition. ^

Thus, Rumania

emerged from the traumatic events of October-November 1956, as an e x 
ponent of "stability" and "loyalty," while the Hungarians--in Hungary
and in Transylvania--were labeled as "reactionaries" and enemies of
OO

the U.S.S.R.

Since the Kremlin center wanted to preserve the post

war East-Central European gains and the Communist status quo at all
costs, it naturally backed the "stability" of the Rumanians rather than
the "turbulance" of the Hungarians.
Only the events of August 1968, seem to have made Soviet policy
makers re-evaluate Rumania's "dependability."

In the Soviet military

campaign to stamp out national Communism in Czechoslovakia, the
Rumanians were excluded.

Rumania was the only Warsaw Pact nation

which did not send (or was not asked to send?) troops to help crush
the DubCek regime.

Instead, Rumania itself faced the prospect of a

^ G e o r g e Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," The R eporter,
XXXI (Nov. 19, 1964), 26, demonstrates how the Rumanians have playedup this "loyalty" theme to enhance their own position in the bloc.
^ I t should be noted that Imre Nagy, p£l Maldter and other
Hungarian leaders of the Revolt of 1956, were sent to Rumania after
their capture, both for their trial and execution.
See, Ibid.; Elie
Abel, "Nagy is Abducted by Soviet Police:
Sent to Rumania," New
York T i m e s , Nov. 24, 1956, pp. 1-2.
OO
•‘•-’Along this line see Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania,"
East Central Europe and the World ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 165.
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Soviet invasion due to its maverick international p o s t u r e . ^

This

again raised the possibility of territorial revisions in Transylvania.
However, the Soviet policy-makers considered their show of force in
Czechoslovakia as indication enough of their determination to inter
vene when any member of the Socialist "camp" became too vociferous in
proclaiming its independence.

Rumania, therefore, has taken some

steps backward from its exposed international stance.
The bond of ideology is less evident but no less important than
the bond provided by Soviet hegemony.

While the two are closely

related, it is still possible to discern the distinct impact of
ideology on Transylvania's inhabitants--Rumanians and Hungarians
alike.

This "common" factor of ideology involves more than "just" the

fate of Transylvania; it directly affects the destiny of Communist
Rumania and Hungary, as well as the Soviet Bloc as a whole. J

^ S t e p h e n S. Anderson, "Yugoslavia;
The Diplomacy of Balance,"
Current History, vol. 56 (April, 1969), p. 216.
^^This powerful bond of ideology can be discerned from KAd^r's
report to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party on Nov.
30, 1959. At this time the Rumanian Communists were already openly
carrying out policies which undercut the position of the Hungarians in
Transylvania. Yet, in the face of this, Kdd^r still could say that the
interests of all socialist countries were identical.
He still m a i n 
tained that:
"The solid and everlasting foundation of the unity of the
socialist camp lies in the common socio-political system, the common
road of building socialism, a common ideology and joint efforts to
safeguard p e a c e . Our cooperation within the camp is regulated not only
by full equality . . . but . . . by the principles of mutual assis
tance. . . . Loyal service to the vital interests of our people
requires that one of the main tasks of our foreign policy continue to
strengthen the power and unity of the socialist camp and to repel
decisively all attempts against it . . . to strive to establish good
relations with all neighboring countries. . . .
In addition to the
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In the case of minority nationalities, the concept of "class
solidarity" has been most important.

It was this concept that was to

end the ethnic strife that had existed between Rumanians and Hungarians
in the past,

It was easily "achieved" in the monolithic structure of

the Soviet Bloc under S t a l i n . ^

With the older dictator’s death, h o w 

ever, enforcement of "proletarian internationalism" or class solidarity
became more complicated.

The formalization of bloc relations—

mentioned above— added to these complications; but so did the fact that
first Tito, then Mao and Hoxha, and then Gheorghiu-Dej and now Ceausescu
have come to play roles as interpreters as well as followers of Com
munist ideology.
The loosening grip of one authoritative ideological center and
the subsequent "polycentrism" of the bloc has greatly affected the
place of Transylvania in the relations of Rumania and Hungary.

Yet,

Soviet Union . . . the fraternal Czechoslovak Republic and the Rumanian
People's Republic are direct neighbors of ours . . . our steadily
flourishing friendship with these two people's states is firmly based
upon the most intimate understanding and proletarian internationalism."
See jinos KcidcTr, Socialist Construction in Hungary: Selected Speeches
and A r t i c l e s , 1957-1961 (Budapest;
Corvina Press, 1962), pp. 207-208.
^ A t this point it should be noted that some students of the
bloc reject that, even under Stalin, "monolithic" was a correct adjec
tive for the "Socialist camp." Brzezinski, The Soviet Bl o c , maintains
that the bloc has in reality oscillated between diversity and uniformity.
He stresses that diversity reigned supreme until 1947. However, Paul
Kecskemeti, "Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Bloc Politics,"
World P o l i t i c s , XIII (Jan., 1961), 317, points out that this early
post-war "diversity" described by Brzezinski was imposed rather than
spontaneous.
Still, it is good to ponder Montias' contention that the
differences between "monolithic" Stalinism and the following "thaw"
is overdrawn.
See Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern Europe," pp.
333-337, and Morton A. Kaplan, "Old Realities and New Myths," World
P o l i ti c s , XVII (Jan., 1965), 335-343.
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the uniting force of ideology still remains.

This is due to the

common ideological heritage of most Central and East European Communist
parties and the fact that leading positions of interpretation are
occupied in both Rumania and Hungary by men of relatively similar backgrounds.

27

Furthermore, since Communism must also view the possibili

ties of spreading and exporting the ideology to new areas, it is
necessary to stress the "traditional" class solidarity of peoples and
their right to "national self-determination" from Western colonial
OO

powers. 0
While recent developments have strongly shaken the effective
ness of ideology as a uniting force, it must be remembered that ideology
has been effective when the "interests" of Rumania and Hungary, the
hegemonial power, and the bloc in general coincided with its demands.
The "ideological" struggles against nationalism bear this out.

First,

the struggle against Titoist deviations and the Yugoslav heresy of
"National Communism."

Second, the constant ideological struggle

against Western and non-Communist international influences, whether
these be in the form of "black Vatican reaction," "capitalist
imperialism," or "rootless Zionist cosmopolitanism."

Third and last—

but not least--the concerted drive to fight nationalism among the

^ B y "similarity" of backgrounds not social-class composition,
but developmental pattern is meant.
Both in Rumania and Hungary the
"centrists" are now predominantly at the helm.
In both countries the
"left" and "right" elements have been kept from exercising influence
within or without the Party.
OO

See N. A. Mukhitdinov, "Nationalities Policy and Imperialism,"
(originally appeared Jan. 31, 1959 in Pravda, pp. 7-8, and Izvestia,
pp. 4-5) translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet P r ess, XI
(March 25, 1959), 25?29.
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Hungarians of Transylvania as well as Budapest and the surrounding
lowlands
The struggle against Titoism united Rumania and Hungary in the
Stalinist campaign against "National Communism."

This campaign, how

ever, was also inspired by Stalin's political desire to subjugate
Yugoslavia completely to his own absolute authority.

Stalin utilized

ideology mainly as a tool to rally his satellites against the deviator.
Thus, Rumania and Hungary joined hands in the castigation of "Titoist
OA
traitors" and "National Communists." u

These tactics were applied

w it h equal effectiveness and even more brutality against those who had
connections and ties with the non-Communist world.

Both the Bucharest

and Budapest regimes unleashed attacks against the Roman Catholic
O -1

Church and its "international conspiratorial network."

A similar

campaign was also carried out against "the machinations of rootless
OO
cosmopolitans" who divided their loyalties between Rumania and Israel.

OQ

7In relation to Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, this ideo
logical unity completely disintegrated in August, 1968.
on

JUFor a description of this persecution see Wolff, "Rumania,"
The Fate of East Central E u r o p e . p. 262, and The Balkans in Our T i m e ,
p. 459. Also see "Minorities in Eastern Europe-II," East Eu r o p e , VII
(April, 1959), 9-11, and Evangelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities Under
Communist Regimes," Balkan Studies. II (1961), 39.
33-Wolff, "Romania," pp. 269-271.
OO

J In the anti-Zionist campaign, Rumania for a long time took a
more aggressive part than did Hungary.
The reason for this may be
attributed in large part to R u m a n i a ’s possession of the largest Jewish
minority among the satellites.
See F. F., "Jews in the People's Demo
cracies," The World T o d a y , X I V (March, 1958), 119-121; Jacob K. Javits,
"The Presecution of Jews in Rumania by the Soviet Puppet Communist
Regime," Congressiona1-R ecord-Appendix (House of Representatives, June
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Ideological solidarity was even more evident when Communist
Hungarians and their Rumanian counterparts moved to crush the
"bourgeois nationalist" manifestations among Hungarians at the time of
the 1956 Revolt.

The cooperation between the two governments was

close and brutally similar .33

This cooperation was couched in ideo

logical terminology, but evidently was based on political expediency.
Nonetheless, the major ideological argument called for the destruction
of "reactionary" and "bourgeois nationalist" elements which were
attempting "to turn back the clock" to the national hatreds and a n i 
mosities of the p a s t .34
Ideological unity between the two regions was so close at this
time that Party solidarity— but not class solidarity— bridged national
divisions.

The Communist leadership of both satellites followed con

certed and systematic strategies which were to eradicate the "national
ist germ" for g o o d .33

Party leaders from Rumania visited YL&d&r twice

during the three months after the Soviet Union crushed the Revolt in
November 1956.33

At this time agreement between the Party leaders of

22, 1954), pp. A-4565 - A-4566; R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism
in Eastern Europe (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 167; Wolff, The Balkans in Our T i m e , pp. 459-461. More
recently Rumania has tended to be somewhat more moderate.
See Ldszl 6
Hory, "A Romdn-Magyar Viszony es Erddly Magyarsdga," in Larmafa
Erd^lyi Evkanyv ed. Andres Kedves (Lienz, Austria:
Erddlyi Miihely,
1968), p. 78.
OO

This "cooperation" is reflected best in "Joint Communique on
Rumanian-Hungarian Talks," Pravda, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 3, as condensed
and translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet P r e s s , VIII (Dec.
26, 1956), 19.
34 I b i d .

36

3 5I b i d .

Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," pp. 502-503.
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the two satellites seems to have been c o m p l e t e . H o w e v e r ,

the very

weak position of the Kaddr regime was, in part, responsible for this
unity of purpose.®®
Ironic as it m a y seem, this unity of the two satellites in
fighting "nationalist reaction" also sowed the first seeds of dissen
sion which were to develop between them later.

The seeds of this

dissension were to be found in the over-enthusiasm of the Rumanian
Communist Party in eradicating the "nationalist isolation" and "back
wardness" of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

This enthusiasm has not

slackened in pace since 1956; in fact it has become more systematic in
its expressions vis-h-vis the Hungarian m i n o r i t y . jn Hungary the
anti-nationalist campaign had been completed more or less by 1961.

In

fact, its most brutal manifestations were already history by the close
of 1958, wh e n the Rumanians were still executing "secessionist" or
"separatist" conspirators.^®
The Romanians have rationalized their repressive tactics by

Joint Communique on Rumanian-Hungarian Talks," p. 19.
®®Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," p. 503.
®^Senator Pell, "Negotiations with Rumania," Congressional
Record (Senate, M a y 11, 1964), p. 10532, states:
"What lends particu
lar irony to the Rumanian situation is the fact that in Hungary, where
the 1956 revolutions all began, there has been a general amnesty so
that vast numbers of persons who participated in the uprising in that
nation are now free. We in the West can only ask w h y Rumania has not
seen fit to do the same." For this contrast also see "Magyarellenes
Hajszdra Izgat a Romdn Sajtd, Megszigoritottdk a Hatdrdtl^p^st Nehogy
Kulfoldre Szivdrogjanak Az Irt 6 Rendelkezdsek Rdszletei," Katolikus
Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 14, 1964, p. 1.
^®Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 26; "Eight in
Rumania Reported Executed," New York T i m e s . Spet. 6 , 1958, p. 8 .
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stressing that "national sovereignty" and "socialist patriotism"
demand the complete subjugation of elements which conspire against
the interests of the R.P.R.

41

The fact that Rumania asserted its

independent nationhood in the Soviet bloc has made it possible for her
to interpret ideology regarding the Transylvanian minorities from this
purely national perspective.
The Hungarian Communists, on the other hand, have been handi
capped in opposing these innovations in Communist

i d e o l o g y . ^

They

were, and still are, more dependent on the Soviet Union than the
Rumanians.

Interference with Rumanian nationalities policy would be

construed as a violation of "national sovereignty," thereby leaving
the Hungarian regime open to the charge of "bourgeois nationalism."
Consequently, the present stance of the two satellites toward each
other is one of muffled discord, generated by the plight of the
Transylvanian H u n g a r i a n s R e c e n t Rumanian-Hungarian talks have shed
some light on the extent of this d i s s e n s i o n . ^

This discord, however,

^*Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," pp. 164-165.
^Bailey,

"Trouble over Transylvania," pp. 23-30.

^ O v e r t manifestations of this discord can be found in the
recent restrictions against Hungarians who wish to visit relatives in
Transylvania.
Often they are subjected to intensive searches at the
border crossing points in order to determine that they have no
Hungarian books and periodicals in their possession.
See "Hirek,"
Transsylvdnia, VI (July, 1964), 11.
^■‘^'David Binder, "Rumania Presses Pursuit of Independent
Economy," New York T i m e s , July 6 , 1964, pp. 1, 10, indicates that the
high level Rumanian-Hungarian talks of early July, "did not appear too
successful." Also see: Hory, "A Romdn-Magyar Viszony ds Erddly
Magyarsdga," pp. 73-78.
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is cloaked and hidden from world view by the surface homage paid in
both Bucharest and Budapest to "proletarian internationalism."

In Yugoslavia
Soviet political and ideological guidance of Yugoslavia came
to an early end in 1948-49.

Yet, while Yugoslavia is no longer con

sidered part of the Soviet "bloc," it cannot avoid being influenced—
at least indirectly— by Soviet political moves and ideological inter
pretations.

However, unlike any of the other East-Central European

states, Yugoslavia is not in a dependent status vis-k-vis the Soviet
Union.
In the political relations of the two states, from the begin
ning, Yugoslavia's "self-liberation" and "self-communization" enabled
Tito and his followers to make their own policies.
do this because they had a popular power base;

They were able to

the Partizan movement.

This did not mean that they opposed Soviet policies in the area.
They were, in many respects the most circumspect supporters of the
Soviet U n i o n . ^

But the fact that they did not owe their liberation

or their power to the Soviet Union, made them automatically more prone
to stand on their own.

The Communists in the rest of East-Central

Europe, on the other hand, were the mere creatures of Soviet policy.
This difference ultimately undermined the Soviet Union's efforts to
extend its hegemony to the Adriatic.

^ M i l o r a d M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in The Communist
States at the Crossroads, p. 179.
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The Soviet Union's policies vis-h-vis Yugoslavia did not reveal
frustration prior to 1948.

After all, soviet forces did help liberate

parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the V o j v o d i n a . ^

This wartime coopera

tion carried over into the immediate post-war period.

Soviet foreign

policy supported Yugoslavian claims not only against the territorial
claims of Bulgarians and Hungarians, but also in the West, concerning
Carinthia and Trieste.

47

This support faltered only when Stalin became

convinced that he could not control the Yugoslav leadership, like he
controlled all the other Communist parties in the area.
Once this was realized, Stalin attempted to impose hegemony
on the Yugoslavs from outside.

This attempt led to the familiar Com

munist Information Bureau dispute, which ended by expelling the
leaders of the Communist Yugoslav Party from the "socialist camp."
This expulsion was followed by a concerted effort to have the Yugoslav
leadership replaced.^®
Stalin tried to isolate and quarantine the Yugoslavs and their

^ P u n i s a Perovid, "Twenty-five Years of the Yugoslav Revolu
tion," Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-June, 1966)
pp. 18-19.
^ T h e Yugoslavs claimed later that this Soviet support was
less than half-hearted.
See: John C. Cambell, Tito's Separate Road
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 11; George W. Hoffman and Fred
Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1962), p. 100.
AQ
^ F o r two thorough discussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet con
flict see:
Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism,
Chapters 8-10, pp. 113-151; and Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our
T i m e , Chapter 11, pp. 352-390.
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pernicious doctrine of "Titoism" which threatened Soviet h e g e m o n y . ^
The Soviet Union proceeded to foment national animosities between
Yugoslavia and her neighbors as well as between the peoples of Yugo
slavia.

Stalin was well aware of Yugoslavia’s A c h i l l e s 1 heel.

Thus,

his puppets in Rum a n i a , Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary began to make
old territorial claims on Yugoslavia.

They also tried to arouse

national antagonisms between the peoples of Yugoslavia by claiming
that the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Hungarian minorities were
being oppressed.'*®
Stalin's campaign failed!

The national minorities did not

take the bait and the peoples of Yugoslavia supported their leaders'
defiance of the new external threat.'*'*'

However, this did not end

Soviet efforts to gain political control over Yugoslavia.

Although

Stalin's death in March 1953 put an end to crude and overt efforts
like the above, the new leaders of the Soviet Union tried a number of
times to regain Yugoslavia for the socialist camp.

After Stalin's

death they immediately set to mend their relations with Tito.

They

reduced their propaganda barrages and called on their satellites to
stop creating frontier incidents.

This was followed by diplomatic

^ T h e best brief discussion of "Titoism" as a doctrine is in;
Fred Warner Neal, Titoism in Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
Univer
sity of California Press, 1958), Chapter 2, pp. 15-33.
-*®Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 143147; Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , Pp. 21, 113; Paul Shoup, "Yugo
slavia's National Minorities Under Communism," Slavic R e v i e w , XXII
(March, 1963), p. 73.
51 I b i d .
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exchanges at the highest level, with Khrushchev making his "trip to
Canossa" to Belgrade in 1955.

52

This trip re-established Soviet-Yugoslav relations for a brief
period, but not Soviet hegemony.

In fact, the Belgrade Declaration

which resulted from this meeting of reconciliation, confirmed that Tito
had bpen in the right and Stalin in the wrong. Furthermore, it also
enshrined a number of principles which indicated Soviet acceptance of
Titoism.

These included "respect for the sovereignty, independence,

integrity and . . . equality among states in their mutual relations
and in their relations with other states," and "mutual respect for, and
non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever,
whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because
questions of internal organization, or differences in social systems
and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the con
cern of individual countries ." ^
The Soviet effort to regain influence in Yug slavia was short
lived.

Events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 disrupted

the Soviet-Yugoslav detente.

Tito's speech at Pula on November 11,

1956, angered the Soviet leaders because of its criticism of Soviet
intervention in

H u n g a r y . 54

cjiarge Qf "revisionist" again became

■^Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , pp. 31-35.
CO

Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.), The Soviet-Yugo
slav Controversy 1948-58: A Documentary Record (New York:
Prospect
Books, 1959), pp. 55-60, as quoted in Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d ,
p. 33.
54jhe thoroughest discussion of Yugoslav-Hungarian, and
Yugoslav-Soviet relations for this period can be found in Ferenc A.
Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1961), particularly pp. 343-352, 472-473.
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popular in Pravda as an adjective for Yugoslavia,

Relations between

the two states reverted to open antagonism, although somewhat less
vociferous in nature than during Stalin's lifetime.
Events in the "socialist camp" forced Soviet policy makers to
heal this second rift.

The growing dispute with China, particularly

by 1960, and Albanian defection in 1962, made Tito appear ideologi
cally less dangerous and Yugoslavia geo-politically more attractive.
Thus, Tito received an invitation to Moscow, which he honored in
December 1962.

On this occasion Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union again

became reconciled.

This was supported by Yugoslavia's more active

relations (economic, cultural, etc.) with members of the Soviet bloc.
By 1965, Yugoslavia began to participate in certain of the commissions
of C EM A .55
Soviet efforts to pull Yugoslavia even closer to the bloc
failed to materialize as conflict in the Middle East and disputes
within the bloc revealed the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign
policy.

The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 gave the Soviet fleet the

opportunity to move into the Mediterranean en masse.

This eliminated

the previous naval weakness of the Soviet Union in this area.

Further

more, it thereby gained the military potential to exert pressure on
Yugoslavia from the West.-^

-^Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , pp. 59-60; Peter Mayer,
Cohesion and Conflict in International Communism (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1968), p. 150.
56yugoslav policies concerning the Middle-East crisis of 1967
and after reveal certain inner contradictions.
While Yugoslavia has
consistently supported the Arab states against Israel, it has also
feared the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. For this
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Just one year later, in August 1968, the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies over-ran Czechoslovakia and forced the abdication
of the reform-minded DubCek regime.

This intervention in the internal

affairs of another socialist state— one that was a full-fledged m e m 
ber of the blo c — made Yugoslav leaders more uncertain and more cautious
about their relations with the Soviet U n i o n . T h e y have condemned
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and have become less enthusi
astic about expanding their relations with the Soviet U n i o n .-*8

Instead,

they have concentrated on strengthening their relations with Rumania
and some other smaller states in the socialist camp.
Yugoslavia's post-war relations with tl^ie Soviet Union indicate
a series of Soviet foreign policy blunders.

Stalin's coercive tactics,

and subsequent diplomatic efforts, have failed to bring Yugoslavia
back into the socialist camp.

This has led the Brezhnev-Kosygin team

to try a totally new approach.

It has bypassed the necessity of making

Yugoslavia part of the "camp" by moving past it— with its naval
forces--into the Mediterranean.

This solution has made Yugoslavia less

important from a political perspective, but it has still not neutral
ized its ideological impact on socialists the world over.
All these attempts to re-incorporate Yugoslavia into the

dilemma, compare Bernard Gwertzman, "Unprecedented Reforms;
An
Upheaval in Yugoslavia," The (Washington) Evening S t a r , Dec. 4, 1967,
p. 6 , and Jack Anderson, "Tito Opposed to Soviet Power Gains," The
(Toledo) Blade, Nov. 16, 1970.
-^Anderson, "Yugoslavia;

The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 216,

5 8 I b i d ., p. 217.
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Socialist camp reveals very little about the national minorities and
their treatment.

Unlike Transylvania, the Vojvodina has not been

used by the U.S.S.R. as a lever to influence the Yugoslav govern
ment's behavior.

Only Stalin had attempted to use national animosi

ties to force Yugoslavia to its knees.

His failure has probably kept

Stalin's successors from resorting to this tactic.

This does not

mean, however, that in the future such a Soviet tactic would fail.
It is quite conceivable, that the strained relations between Croats
and Serbians and other nationalities, could be used to disrupt Yugo
slavia once Tito is no longer on the s c e n e . W i t h o u t

Tito's

presence the tactics of 1948-1952 might succeed in destroying Yugo
slavia.
It would seem, however, that the U.S.S.R. would prefer to
gain Yugoslavia's support on the basis of ideological affinity.

This

has not been possible since 1948, and is less likely to be the case
in the future as well.

The reason is that Yugoslavia's independence

from the bloc has enabled it to become an interpreter of ideology in
its own r i g h t .
Until the Cominform dispute Yugoslavia conformed to Soviet
leadership in this area.

However, once the Soviet shackles had been

removed, the Yugoslavs set out to let their unique national problems

"^Gwertzman, "Unprecedented Reforms: An Upheaval in Yugo
slavia," pp, 1, 6 ; Vincent Buist, "Yugoslavia Continues as
Maverick, But Internal Cultural Feuds Remain," The (Toledo) B lade,
Dec. 13, 1970, p. 3.
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guide their ideological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s S o
nationality policy also.

it was in the area of

While the Yugoslavs took over "Leninist"

principles on this question, it has been the unique experiences of
their own country that has molded their national policy.

Experience,

plus Yugoslav reaction to Stalinist abuses, were the guides.

In

looking at the Soviet example they saw a great deal that was acceptable
in theory, but contradicted by Soviet p r a c t i c e . ^
acted against this hypocrisy.

The Yugoslavs re

They also responded to the needs of the

multi-national make-up of their country.

Thus, they put into practice

a nationality policy which rejected Soviet over-centralization and has
instead expanded self-government opportunities for all the peoples of
Yugoslavia.
As in the case of the nationality problem, so in the question
of "worker's councils," economic decentralization, relations among
socialist states, and numerous other areas, the Yugoslavs have come
up with their own ideological justifications and interpretations.^
This has made them competitors of the Soviet Union and China.

As a

consequence, each dispute between Yugoslavia and the major Communist
states has at the same time also carried ideological undertones.

It

is due to this ideological role of Yugoslavia, that it has been
attacked most frequently.

6%eal,

Titoism in Action, pp. 29-30.

fi1

Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism,"
pp. 69-72, points out that in the immediate post-war period even
some of these contradictions were copied.
^ N e a l , Titoism in Action, pp. 18-33.
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While the variety in ideological interpretations has under
mined socialist solidarity, this does not mean that "socialist
solidarity" is dead.

It is sacrificed only when national interests

come into conflict (e.g., Czechoslovakia 1968, Rumania 1964, etc.).
In instances where no national conflict prevails it still enables the
socialist states to take a united stand (e.g., Vietnam).

A good

example in Yugoslavia was T i t o ’s reaction to the writings of Mihajlo
Mihajlov.

Tito was incensed not only because Mihajlov criticized

his domestic policies, but also because the writings offended Moscow
and thereby strained Tito's relations with the Party of the first
Socialist s t a t e . ^
This last point, however, also tells us that in the inter
national relations of the socialist states, the respective definitions
of "national interest" will tell more about the treatment of the Hun
garians in Yugoslavia and Rumania than the examination of Soviet
efforts to guide these states politically and ideologically.

II
For a time both Soviet hegemony and Communist ideology per
formed a conflict reducing role in Eastern Eu r o p e .
to the stifling of national animosities.
on the area.

They contributed

However, both had been imposed

Consequently, their effectiveness was tied to the Soviet

monopoly of both ideological and political leadership.

As this leader

ship was challenged, the former nationality conflicts again cropped up.

63

Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , pp. 146-147.
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The re-emerging nationalisms of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary
have become the most important consideration in the nationality poli
cies of these states.

In each case, the national interests of the

country has a direct bearing on the treatment of the Hungarians in
the two areas under study.

We will examine how these national inter

ests are defined and how they affect international relations.

Con

versely, attention will be paid to the impact of these international
relations on domestic policies.

The Impact of Nationalism and Separate Roads to Socialism
The political interests, as well as the disagreements between
Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, are an inheritance from the inter-war
years.

The friction was suppressed in the Stalinist era b y the

demands of the hegemonial power for stability and ideological unity.
However, this imposed stability could last only so long as the
leadership of the bloc remained unquestionably the Soviet Union in
all matters.

In Yugoslavia this was no longer the case after 1948.

In Rumania this was the case during Stalin's lifetime and even under
his successors until the events of 1 9 5 6 . ^

But by the end of that

CA

Imre Nagy, "Nationalism and Proletarian Internationalism"
in Imre Nagy on Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I n c . ,
1957), pp. 238-239, presents an opposed view.
He stresses that rela
tions between socialist countries were far from being ideal.
Some
verification can be found for Nagy's contention in a HungarianRumanian convention announced in early 1950. According to this con
vention, Magyars could opt for Hungarian citizenship and move to
Hungary.
This reflects in a way, an early subtle attempt to reduce
the Hungarian minority numerically. However, it seems that very few
people took advantage of this "opportunity."
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year, the monolithic character of the bloc was irreparably destroyed
as Gomulka led Poland toward more "independence" within the Socialist
camp.

In the succeeding years other satellites also contributed to

the loosening of the bloc, though in differing ways.
national communism was being copied by others.
were also affected by this "thawing" process.

Yugoslavia's

Hungary and Rumania
As a result, their

former national claims again became prominant in their relations.

Rumania
The re-assertion of political interests between Rumania and
Hungary took place in spite of an elaborate network of treaties and
agreements which were to safe-guard the unity and stability of the
bloc. J

Economic, military, cultural, "friendship," and other

treaties and agreements obligated both satellites to look at the we l l 
being of the bloc as a whole rather than their respective "narrow and
selfish" national n e e d s . ^

But this re-assertion was possible only

^ F o r this "network" see Brzezinski, The Soviet B l o c , pp. 106111, 395-400.
However, in some instances the formal framework of
agreements actually undergirded Rumania's ability to subjugate its
Hungarian minority.
Legal conventions and agreements particularly
would fall into this category. According to Paragraphs 115, 204, or
120 of the new Hungarian penal code, Hungarians may be punished and
even extradited to other satellites for speaking, acting, or inciting
against the "social or economic order of another country." Thus,
"criticism of the rights (or of their absence) of the Hungarian minor
ity in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, for instance, could make its author
liable to be tried under the Hungarian conspiracy Act, if so requested
by either of these two countries." See G. R. Urban, "Hungary:
The
Balance Sheet," Survey, No. 40 (Jan., A>62), 8 6 .
°°For a list of treaties ant
;reements that are to insure
Rumania's participation in bloc affairs see "Appendix-Principal
Treaties 1945-1956" in Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 362-367.
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because the Soviet Union sustained set-backs as the leading authority
on questions of ideology and policy, thereby leaving the satellites
more room for maneuvering within the bloc.

Thus, they could raise

questions (e.g., the position of Transylvania and the national minori
ties) which had never been really settled or s o l v e d . T h e
split of the early 1960's accentuated this tendency.

Sino-Soviet

It was in part

responsible for Rumania's ability to stress its own sovereignty and
"unquestionable" right to Transylvania.®®
Developments in the economic field provide, perhaps, the
clearest example of the re-assertion of Rumanian nationalism and the
concomitant revival of Hungarian minority problems.
of these relations will be examined here;

Only one example

That is the sharing of

Transylvania's natural gas by Rumania and Hungary through the joint
company Romagchim.
Romagchim was set-up in the early 1950's.

It was to enable

Hungary to utilize some of Transylvania's natural wealth in coopera
tion with Rumania.

This was just one of the many joint projects

between satellite countries.

®^Brown, "Rumania Steps

The case of Romagchim is significant

Out of Line," p. 19.

DORumania has even gone so far in its national "claims" as to
present her bill for Bessarabia to the Soviet Union according to
Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took." Yet in the question
of other boundaries (particularly the Rumanian-Hungarian border) the
Rumanians have rejected any considerations for revision.
See:
"Hirek: A Hatdrok Bdkes Revizidja," Transsylvdnja. VI (July, 1964),

12 .

fi 9

Bossy, "Mining," p. 244; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time,

p. 516.
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for this study because it was an experiment in the exploitation of
the natural wealth of an area which was claimed by both satellites.
In m a n y ways Romagchim was the perfect example of economic integra
tion within the bloc— which was being emphasized more and more by
COMECON (CEMA).7®

However, it also contained the roots of potential

discontent insofar as this agreement enabled Hungary to obtain raw
materials from Transylvania, while providing Rumania in return mainly
with finished g o o d s . ^
Rumania's rebellion against Comecon planning and the develop
ment of "economic nationalism" also complicated the existence of
Romagchim.

Since Rumania was no ^onger subject to the Soviet joint
72

companies ,7

the same charges, which had previously been leveled

against them, were now leveled against Hungary.

Discontent with

Comecon and past Soviet economic exploitation was thus transferred to
Rumanian-Hungarian common utilization of Transylvania's natural
wealth.

As some available sources indicate, Romagchim is to be dis

banded so that Rumania can better utilize her "own" industrial

^^Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 40-44.
Ionescu, "The Economic Field," Captive Rumania ed.
Alexandre Cretzianu (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956),
p. 8 8 , Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 523.
72

For discussion of "joint companies" and their negative
legacy see: Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 40-41; Spulber, The Economics
of Communist Eastern E urope, pp. 190-193; Ionescu, "The Economic
Field," pp. 50-55; Pavel B. Steanu, "The Nationalization of Rumanian
Industry," Journal of Central European Affairs. XI (Jan.-Apr., 1951),
49-51.
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potential and raw materials.73
The economic disharmony of Communist Rumania and Hungary is
also evident in the positions taken by the two satellites over the
question of Comecon planning and bloc integration and specializammf

tion.

As opposed to Rumania's independent stance, the Communist

Hungarians have supported the economic integration of the bloc,^-*
and have frequently commented on the evil effects of "economic nationalism.

76

The reason is quite clear:

Hungary without Transylvania is

very poor in natural resources and therefore more dependent on sharing
and cooperation.

Rumania with Transylvania, on the other hand, is

more able to preach a policy of economic sovereignty.

The fate of

Romagchim makes this all the more apparent.
The United States and the Western "camp" are the outside sources
of support for independence among the satellites.

Trade is the major

^ T h e investigator has no direct statement to the effect that
Romagchim is or will be disbanded.
The above conclusion is based on
the correlation of reports that imply that this was the next "logical"
step.
See; Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute
w it h Comecon," pp. 126-127; "Levdl Erddlybdl," Irodalmi U j s d g , Aug. 1,
1964, p. 1; "Rumania and Comecon," Background Report (Radio Free
Europe, May 6 , 1964), pp. 1-3; "Rumanian Edition of 'World Marxist
Review* Omits Article on Joint Planning," Rumania (Radio Free Europe,
Sept. 3, 1964), p. 6 .
^ K o rbonski, "Comecon," p. 52; John Michael Montias, "Back
ground and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," Soviet
Studies, XVI (October, 1964), 150-151.
"Az Integrdcid Feld: A KGST
RendkivUli Moszkvai Uldsszaka Utdn," Magyar H i r e k , XXII (May 17,
1969), p. 3.
^ I b i d .; Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 49-55.
76

"Rumanian Edition of 'World Marxist Review' Omits Article on
Joint Planning," pp. 3-4.
_
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incentive that is offered to Rumania and the other satellites to
encourage them to drift away from the Soviet s p h e r e . B o t h Rumania
and Hungary have taken the bait.

It remains to be seen to what extent

the West can really reel them away from the Soviet "camp" before the
line snaps.

78

The Rumanian attempt to gain more Western trade has affected
the fate of Transylvanian Hungarians in two contradictory ways.

First,

it has moved Rumania toward a more independent and nationalist course,
thereby putting the minorities in a less favorable position.

Second,

it has forced the Rumanian government to provide the West with some
evidence of good faith toward its citizens irrespective of nationality.
At present the first result of the road to "independence" is more
prominent.

However, since the summer of 1968 the second consideration

is also evident.^9
Another area that has felt the impact of revived Rumanian
nationalism (i.e., "socialist patriotism") has been the realm of
Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations.

The two satellites have had
on

cultural agreements going back to the early post-war years. u

Both

^ B r o w n , "Rumania Steps Out of Line," p. 27.
The Western
assumption is, of course, that such trade agreements also lead to other
agreements.
A reflection of this is the recent U .S .-Rumanian cultural
exchange agreement.
See "U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural Exchange
Agreement for 1965-66," The Department of State Bulletin, LII (Jan.
18, 1965), 87-90.
^ V i c t o r Zorza, "Mr. Johnson Provokes Moscow's Anger," Manches
ter Guardian W e e k l y , Jan. 14, 1965, p. 7, indicates that the U.S.S.R.
policy makers see this as a hopeless venture on the part of the West.
79»Helyzetkep 1970 Vdgdn," Ldrmafa, XII (Dec.,1970), p. 1.
^^Michel Tatu, "A Romdnositds titeme Erddlyben," Uj^ Eu r d p a , VII
(Feb., 1968), pp. 21-22.
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countries were to send a certain number of exhibitions, folk-dance
groups, theater productions, films, etc. to the other country.
Hungary has no numerically significant Rumanian minority,

81

Since

it is

apparent that the value of this cultural exchange was appreciated most
op
by the Hungarian minority of Transylvania.oc- Not only did this provide
the Transylvanian Hungarians w i t h a connection with their fellow ethnic
nationals, but it enabled them--at least in the folk realm--to
reinforce their cultural identity, an identity which was definitely
Hungarian in "form" even if socialist in "content."
As Rumanian socialist patriotism gained prominence, a campaign
was initiated against the "particularism" of the Hungarian minority.
However, this was not immediately evident after 1956.

The shortcomings

of the Rumanian-Hungarian cultural exchange program, became apparent
only after 1962.

The Western press picked up indications of it first

®-*-In 1956, Rumanians composed only 0.1 per cent of the popula
tion according to Facts About Hu n g a r y ; The Fight for Freedom (ed.)
The Hungarian Committee (New York: Waldon Press, 1966) p. 349. As
P. T., "A Mi Nemzetis^geink," Magyar H i r e k , XXI (Dec. 10, 1968), p. 3,
points out, the Keid^r regime is exerting its utmost to make its
minorities the best treated in East-Central Europe.
It is hoped by
the regime that the power of example m ay rub off on the Rumanian
policy makers as well. The KAd^r regime has carried out numerous such
manifestations of "proletarian internationalism." One such futile
effort has been the erection of a monument honoring "the heroic
Rumanian soldiers who . . . participated in the liberation of Hungary."
See the news of this event in the Jan. 3, 1958, issue of Esti Hirlap
translated in "Review of the Hungarian Central Press, March 11, 1958,"
p. 8 , in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals
and Newspapers (Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Joint Publications Research
Service, 1958).
®^Tatu, "A RomAnosit^s tfteme Erd^lyben," p. 22.
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in Soviet-Rumanian relations.®®

Nonetheless, the change was not

limited to the discontinuation of Soviet Cultural penetrations®^"-correctly diagnosed by the Rumanians as attempted "Russification."
The Rumanians extended their campaign of "de-Russification" or
"Rumanization," as has been seen, to include the Hungarians of Transyl
vania .
Cultural relations between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated.
The cultural agreements signed in the past were not abrogated; they
were, in fact, carried out to the letter.

The spirit of these agree

ments, however, was now sabotaged in the way they were carried out.®-*
George Bailey describes this in reference to the Rumanian-Hungarian
film exchange program.

He maintains that films sent by the Hungarian

government to Rumania--particularly Transylvania— were provided with
Rumanian sound-tracks and Hungarian sub-titles.

When this was pro

tested by the Hungarian regime, the Rumanians left the Hungarian
sound-track but desynchronized it with the film.

8A

As Bailey indicates,

these tactics are not limited merely to the film exchange program, but
encompass the whole gamut of recent Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations.

OO

Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," pp. 32-33. Also see,
"Rumanian-French Cultural Agreement," News from Rumania, VII (Jan. 14,
1965), 10, and "The Visit of the Rumanian Government Delegation to
France," Rumania T o d a y , 117 (Sept., 1964), 4, as indications of this
change in Rumanian outlook toward the Soviet Union.
°^"For a description of this past cultural penetration see
Wolff, "Rumania," pp. 272-273 and The Balkans in Our Ti m e , pp. 459-579.
®-*Tatu, "A Romanositds Uteme Erddlyben," pp. 21-22.
86"Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
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As in the cultural and economic realm, the impact of Rumanian
nationalism has also affected the military role of Transylvania in
the bloc relations of Rumania and Hungary.

However, since in the

military relations of the bloc Soviet hegemony is the "all-knowing"
planning, and controlling factor, it is of little consequence what one
satellite would prefer as opposed to the wishes of another.®^

Further

more, the strategic position of Transylvania places it into the center
of Soviet military planning.

Yet, because of Transylvania's position

between Rumania proper and Hungary, the area is a definite asset to
the possessor state from a military or strategic point of view.®®
Under Soviet control, the relative military advantage does not
constitute a danger to Communist Hungary at present.

The only really

significant danger is aimed at the position of the Transylvanian Hun
garians.

With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, they are

®^For all practical purposes the armies of the respective
satellites are merely units of the Soviet army.
This is ensured by
the numerous controls exercised from the Moscow center over training,
strategy, indoctrination, etc.
See Serge H. Aronovici, "National
Security," Romania ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 124-130; Vali, Rift and
Revolt in H u n g a r y , pp. 78-80. While in the military area there is
little opportunity for independence, Rumania has gotten by with minimum
participation in the past few years.
It did not participate in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, it has successfully declined use of its
territory (as of 1970) to Warsaw Pact maneuvers, and it participated
in the vast East-German Warsaw Pact maneuvers with only a token force
of 300 men.
See:
"Helyzetk^p 1970 Veg£n," Ldrmafa, p. 1; Kurt L.
London, "The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth,"
Current H i s t o r y , Vol. 56 (April, 1969), pp. 198-199.
OQ

This, of course, presupposes conventional military tactics.
Otherwise nuclear and missile warfare has made obsolete both Rumania
and Hungary as military factors.
For a treatment of this problem see
John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (Paperback
edition; New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962).
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left defenseless vis-A-vis any depradations the Rumanian army might
engage in.

Such a contingency should not be ruled out as unlikely in

view of past atrocity campaigns against the Hungarians (e.g., the
terror of the M a niu Guardists after World War XI and the Iron Guardists
OQ

before that)
Rumanians.

and the ever mounting resurgent nationalism of the
While the restraints of the Warsaw and "Friendship and non-

Aggression" Pacts are, at present, all important, some recent Rumanian
statements indicate that these too might be only relatively "allimportant ."90
The opportunities provided by Sino-Soviet rift, have enabled
the Rumanians to map out a foreign policy which is very similar to
that of Yugoslavia.

It is based on "the principles of sovereignty,

national independence and noninterference in internal affairs . " ^
Rumania's actual ability to follow such an independent course is, how
ever, more circumscribed.
even if a reluctant one.

Rumania is a member of the Warsaw Pact,
It has also been compelled to sign a new

89

Ursula Lenoy, "Transylvania," East Europe and Soviet Russia,
VIII (Aug. 21, 1952), 12.
"A Vasg^rda Rdmuralma Romdn MegviIrfgitdsban,"
L^rmafa, XII (Dec., 1970), pp. 5-6.
^^David binder, "Rumania Stresses Independent Role in Red
Fight," New York T i m e s , Nov. 20, 1964, p. 2.
Q1
7 On the occasion of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian
"friendship" treaty, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer toasted Premier
Alexei Kosygin by reminding him that;
"The treaty we will sign seals
the principles underlying these relations, namely fraternal assistance,
mutual advantage, observance of national sovereignty and independence,
equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs." See "Romania
Signs Russian Pact;
Bucharest Insists on Sovereignty," The (Toledo)
Blade, July 7, 1970, p. 2.
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Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty on July 8, 1970, which has committed
the Rumanians to support the Soviet Union in the event it is attacked
by any other p o w e r . ^

This last point commits the Rumanians to support

the Soviet Union even against a Chinese attack.
For the Rumanians this involves a step away from their previous
"neutral" position between the U.S.S.R. and China.

However,

the events

of the past two years have forced Rumania to be less vocal in
asserting its independence from the Soviet Union.

The prospects of a

Czechoslovak type intervention have moderated the Rumanians.

So, they

have signed the friendship treaty and they have publicly emphasized
their good relations with the U . S . S . R . ^

At the same time, they have

tried to continue their own policies by strengthening their contacts
with other Balkan states as well as some non-Communist states, includ
ing the United S t a t e s . ^
In the course of the 1960's the Rumanians have been particu
larly active in the United Nations.

They have used their position in

^ " S o v e r e i g n t y , Mutual Aid Stressed in Delayed Soviet-Romanian
Treaty," The
(Toledo) B lade, July 8, 1970, p. 2; "Aldirtdk a Romdn™
Szovjet Bardtsdgi Szerztfddst," Elffre, July 9, 1970, pp. 2-3; "An
Important Event in the Development of Romanian-Soviet Cooperation,
Alliance and
Friendship," Documents, Articles
and Information on
Romania, No.
13 (July 15, 1970), pp. 1-2.
^ I b i d .; "Aldirtdk a Romdn-Szovjet Bardtsdgi Szerzflddst,"
Eldre, pp. 2-3. At the same time they have also stressed their con
tinued good relations with Communist China.
"Debate Among Communists
Urged by Romania President," The (Toledo) Blade, July 10, 1970, p. 3,
^ " N i c o l a e Ceausescu Eln&k Franciaorszdgi Ldtogatdsa," Elflre,
June 20, 1970, p. 1; "Richard Nixonnak, Az Amerikai Egyesfilt Allamok
Elnokdnek Latogatdsa Romanidban," Elffre, Aug. 3, 1969, p. 1.
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this international body to further the ideals of "non-interference"
in the affairs of s t a t e s . T h e y have stated their opposition to
military blocs and other manifestations of cold war conflict.

At the

same time they have supported efforts which would provide for European
security. ^

All these efforts point to a Rumanian desire to loosen

the ties binding them to the Soviet bloc and thereby enable them more
flexibility in both internal and external policies.
Until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the most important
part of Rumania's policy was to solidify its relations with Yugoslavia.
Their joint construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Danube is the
most outstanding example of this policy.

While the events of 1968

have not hindered the further strengthening of these relations, they
have kept Rumania from expanding such ambitious bilateral contacts
with other socialist states.

Until 1968, it seemed as if Rumania were

trying to re-create the Little Entente of the inter-war years— but in
a socialist context.

Besides extensive and ever-expanding contacts

with Belgrade, the Rumanians also tried to draw DubCek's Czechoslovakia
closer to themselves.

97

At the same time Ceausescu cold-shouldered the

^ S e e for example their attempt to provide the United Nations
with a "workable" definition of aggression.
Gheorghe Badescu,
"Concern for Defining Aggression:
Romania's Contribution," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania. Nos. 15-16 (Aug. 15, 1970), p. 22.
^ " S p e e c h by President Nicolae Ceausescu in the Moroccan
House of Representatives," Documents, Articles and Information on
Romania, No. 40 (Dec. 14, 1970), pp. 9-12.
^ L d s z l 6 Hory, '"Vfirfls Kis-Entente'— Romania Vdgy^lma,"
Ldrmafa, XIII, No. 2 (1966), pp. 11-12; Anderson, "Yugoslavia;
The
Diplomacy of Balance," pp. 214-217.
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Hungarians and the Bulgarians.
This attempted re-creation of the inter-war political alignment
in East-Central Europe, had a very ominous implication for the Hun
garians.

It would have united the policies of those three states which

had the largest Hungarian minorities (Rumania 1,603,000, Czechoslovakia
517,000, Yugoslavia 503,000).

Dubcek's reluctance and Soviet inter

vention, kept this plan from unfolding.

Thus, since 1968, Rumania has

been more intent on strengthening its relations in the Balkans.
Besides Yugoslavia, it has expanded its relations with Bulgaria,
no

Turkey and even Alb a n i a .70
These Rumanian international policies indicate a great deal of
flexibility.

At the same time they indicate certain continuities.

The most obvious has been the continued poor relations with Hungary.
Although numerous contacts have

taken place between the two states,

these have not altered the cool atmosphere between the two states.99
Rumania's international posture toward Hungary reflects its
less than ideal treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

Yet, since

1968, the Rumanian nationalist pressure has been eased a little.

This

can be accounted for by the Rumanian realization that better relations
with the Hungarians may actually be a wiser policy in the long-run.

9®In Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, see for
instance:
"Prospects of Romanian-Yugoslav Friendship," Dec. 1, 1970,
p. 1; "A Historical Page of the Growing Romanian-Bulgarian Friend
ship," Dec. 1, 1970, p. 3; "The Visit of President Nicolae Ceausescu
to Turkey," April 15, 1969, pp. 1-2.
^Hory,

"A Rom^n-Magyar Viszony £s Erddly Magyars^ga," pp. 73-85.
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It may enable Rumania to become stronger internally and also more
respected internationally.

It remains to be seen, whether such a more

tolerant policy can continue to prevail after overt Soviet pressure is
again relaxed.
In conclusion, we can say that Rumania's more independent posi
tion within the bloc has had a dual consequence.
tive on the international level.

It has been disrup

Within the Socialist camp it has

contributed to disharmony, particularly in relation to the U.S.S.R.
and Hungary.

The fate of ROMAGCHIM, Hungarian-Rumanian cultural

exchange programs, and the break-down of COMECON integration testifies
to this.

On the other hand, intra-nationally it has led to more

cohesion by unleashing a new wave of Rumanian nationalism.

This has

provided the Rumanian Communist Party with a stronger base of popular
support.

Yet, this support has been gained at the expense of

alienating the Hungarian population of Transylvania.

The latter, in

turn, has kept Rumania and Hungary from drawing closer to each other,
thpreby also perpetuating East-Central European "Balkanization."

Yugoslavia
Tito's Yugoslavia initiated the process known as polycentrism
in the Socialist camp.

The Cominform dispute in 1948 enabled the

Yugoslavs to go their own way, to follow their specifically Yugoslav
road to Socialism.

This independence— unlike Rumania's more recent

efforts to assert national goals apart from the interests of the Soviet
bloc— has not led to more strife among the nationalities of the
Vojvodina.

Exactly the reverse has been the case.

The Hungarian and
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other non-South Slav minorities were under most pressure while Yugo
slavia was still in the Socialist camp.

With each passing year since

the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has improved its relations with these
minorities and also the neighboring countries of which these minorities
are representatives.

There are some exceptions to this rule.

The

Albanian minority has been under more pressure than the others.
This is in large part due to the poor relations that have existed b e 
tween Yugoslavia and Albania throughout the post-World War II period.
The Hungarians of the Vojvodina, on the other hand, have been
treated much better in the late 1960's than at anytime in Yugoslavia's
turbulent past.

As we have seen in the examination of the country's

domestic policies, this improvement is a consequence of the political
system's internal need for stability and peace.

On the other hand,

it is also due to Yugoslavia's improved relations with Hungary.
During Stalin's lifetime, Rdkosi's Hungary was one of the most vocif
erous opponents of Yugoslavia.

This is indicated, among other things,

by Tito's desire to have R^kosi replaced as head of the Hungarian
Workers' Party in 1955.

im

Soviet intervention achieved just that.

Rdkosi's successor, ErnO GerS, tried to improve relations with Tito.
However, his overtures were unsuccessful because his Stalinist back
ground and the Hungarian Revolt of October 1956, intervened.
During the early days of the Hungarian revolt, Tito sympathized

^•®9At the end of 1968, they were promised certain reforms-including greater autonomy and expanded economic opportunities.
Anderson, "Yugoslavia:
The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 213.
•*-®^Brzezinski, The Soviet Bl o c , pp. 220-222.
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with Imre Nagy and the goals of the freedom fighters.
the revolt became m
suppression.

1 02

However, as

e anti-Communist in nature, Tito called for its

His role simultaneously as supporter of Nagy, critic

of the revolt and then critic of Soviet intervention left a deep rift
in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations.

Jdnos Kdd^r's government was able to

bridge this rift only in the early 1960's.

1 f)3

Since about 1962, the

relations between these two states have steadily improved.

Delega

tions of the two countries exchanged visits and these were followed
by economic and cultural agreements.
slovakia marred

Only

the invasion of Czecho

these relations briefly in 1968.

Since then, the

two

states are again on friendly terms.
Yugoslavia has followed a consistent policy toward the other
socialist states of East-Central Europe.

As Stephen S. Anderson

points out:
Although emphatically not a member of the Soviet bloc,
Yugoslavia has nonetheless maintained a lively interest in its
affairs, not only seeking normalization of relations with all
Communist nations, but also trying to promote trends within
the bloc w h ich make it less likely and less able to threaten
her. Again
and again, this has placed Yugoslavia on the side
of Communist leaders attempting to liberalize domestic policies
and loosen their bonds to the Soviet Union.
This has made Tito expand Yugoslavia's relations with Rumania,

•*~^I b i d . , pp. 229-235; Campbell, Tito's Separate Ro a d , pp. 40-41.
103

UJVali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary,presents the best discus
sion of Yugoslav-Hungarian discord following the events of 1956, He
indicates that one of the major reasons for conflict was the Kadar
government's inability to keep its pledge to Tito that Imre Nagy
would not be executed.
104"Yugoslavia:

The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 212.
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Hungary and Poland, while he has been more hesitant with Bulgaria
and the post-Dubdek C z e c hoslovakia.-^
Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc countries are an important
part of its over-all foreign policy to maintain domestic tranquility
and international independence.

In its broader international policies

Yugoslavia has tried to retain its non-aligned position between East
and West.

In part, it has achieved this by taking a leading role in

the organization and policy-making of the "Third World" countries.
To appeal to these states, Yugoslavia has been doubly sensitive about
its internal policies, whether they involve economics or relations
among the different nationalities of its population.
A related over-all goal of Yugoslav foreign policy is to safe
guard its non-alignment by avoiding becoming too dependent on any one
state or group of states.

The lessons c£ 1948 are a bitter reminder of

the dangers involved in such dependence.

Thus, Yugoslavia has tried

"to put its eggs in more than one basket" both politically and economi
cally.

Tito's trips around the world, Yugoslavia's stands at the

United Nations, and her economic policies as well, point this out.

For

example, its trade policies--unlike other socialist states--are not
dependent primarily on other socialist states.

Instead, about 60 per

•*-®^0f all these countries, however, the relations with Rumania
have been the most extensive.
See: Ibid., p. 217; "Joint Communique
on the Iron Gates Meeting Between Nicolae Ceausescu and Josip Broz
Tito," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 18 (Sept.
30, 1969), pp. 1-2; "Interview Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the
Journal !Komunist' of Yugoslavia," Documents, Articles and Information
on Romania, No. 16 (Nov. 21, 1969), pp. 10-12; "Tito Aid in Romania,"
The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 26, 1970, p. 3.
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cent of its trade is with the Western democracies,

10 per cent with

the underdeveloped world, and only 30 per cent with the socialist

camp.’*"^’
Its trade with both Hungary and Rumania has been growing.
But Poland, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. are Yugoslavia's most
important trade partners in the bloc.

However, of these states only

the U.S.S.R. can compete with the volume of trade carried on with West

108

Germany, Italy and the United States. u

Because of this diverse

source of its trade, Yugoslavia has been intent on receiving at least
observer status at the meetings of trade associations and economic
organizations like CEMA and the E.E.C.

Yet, it has hesitated joining

any of these groupings, for fear of losing its non-aligned

p o s i t i o n .

-^9

Yugoslavia's trade with Hungary is about equal in volume to
that carried on with Rumania.

®

Its most important export to

Hungary is timber, while it imports foodstuffs and certain finished
goods.

This trade furthers good relations between the two states.

Its

■^And e r s o n , "Yugoslavia:
The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 212;
Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , p. 165; Statistical Pocket-Book of
Yugoslavia 1966 (Beograd: Federal Institute for Statistics, 1966),
pp. 73-74.
•^•^ I b i d . In the case of Hungary, Yugoslavia's trade has been
increased, but it has declined in terras of its proportional share of
Hungary's total trade.
See Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation,
Table XIV, p. 409.
•^^Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1 9 6 6 , pp. 73-74.
•'•^Anderson, "Yugoslavia;

The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 214.

•^•^Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1966, pp. 72-73.
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expansion would sustain Yugoslavia's continued tolerant nationality
policy, but its existence is not the primary reason for such tolerance.
In the cultural relations between the two states, the needs
of Hungarians in the Vojvodina are rarely neglected.

A number of agree

ments have been negotiated between the two states which cover cultural
exchange programs of all types.

Yugoslav films are sent to Hungary,

while Hungarian films are taken into Yugoslavia,

111

Artist groups,

theater groups and various other cultural organizations and associa
tions carry on extensive tours in the respective countries.

The Hun

garian groups tour mostly in the Vojvodina, while the Yugoslav groups
112

tour mainly Budapest. L

These exchanges are also supplemented by

agreements which concern cooperation in book publishing and subscrip1 IO
tion opportunities across national boundaries.

J

The only area where very little cooperation has taken place is
military affairs.

Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact keeps the

Yugoslavs from attempting extensive military relations or security

-kjugoslaviia 1945-1964; Statistidki Pregled (Beograd;
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1965), Tables 20-5 and 20-6, p. 328;
Facts About Hu n g a r y ; The Fight for Freedom, Table on "Feature Films
Shown," p. 359.
1 -^The extensiveness of these exchanges is also indicated by
cultural, economic, etc. programs carried on by individual cities
across the borders.
For example see "Szoros Kapcsolat Zombor ds Baja
KttzOtt: Hazatdrt a Zomboriak KttldOttsdee Magyarorszdgrol," Magyar Szo',
July 28, 1966, p. 2.

■^•^Compare in this relation, Tatu, "A Romdnositds Crteme
Erddlyben," p. 22, with Tibor Korom, "A Jugoszldviai Magyar NyelvmtivelO Egyesulet Munkdjdrol, TerveirOl ds Probldmdirol" in A Kassai
Batsdnyi-Kflr ifvkflnyve 1965- 1968 (Bratislava; Maddch Konyvkiado,
1969)., pp. 277-278.
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discussions with Hungary on a bilateral basis.

Although some discus

sions have taken place between the two states concerning military
matters, these have been of a very limited n a t u r e . W h e r e

the two

states have had opportunity to cooperate, has been in relation to
recent efforts to strengthen European security.

Both states, plus

Rumania and some Western states have been pushing for discussions with
the aim of establishing a secure Europe free of military blocs.

115

Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact has at times made the
existence of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina more d i f f icult.

This was

the case in August 1968, when Warsaw Pact armies crushed Czechoslovak
independence.

In this latter instance, Warsaw Pact military units

also exerted pressure on Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Soviet,

Bulgarian

and Hungarian troops were drawn up along the borders of both these
states.

In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito's government reacted with exten

sive, well publicized, military preparations of its own.

Among these

preparations, its deployment of troops deserves closer attention.
As in the old Austro-Hungarian empire, so in Yugoslavia, troops
of a particular nationality are usually not quartered or trained in
regions populated by their fellow nationals.

In practice this means

that Hungarians from the Vojvodina spend their military duty in far-off

114

See reports in News From Hungary-Magyarorszagi Hirek XVI
(Radio Free Europe) for late 1970 and early 1971.
■ ^ " I n t e r v i e w Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the Journal
'Komunist' of Yugoslavia," pp. 5-6; Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d ,
pp. 156-157; "A Katonai T 8mbSk Feloszlatdsdval Csdkkenne a Fesziiltsdg--Jelentette Ki Ceausescu," Magyar Szd, July 17, 1966, p. 6 .
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Macedonia or Bosnia-Hertzegovina.

Macedonians or Albanians, on the

other hand, serve the military in Slovenia, Croatia or the Vojvodina.
In 1968, however, the Yugoslav strategists altered this usual practice
in response to the Warsaw Pact pressure.

They moved their Hungarian

troops back to the Vojvodina to face their fellow nationals across
the border.

If hostilities were to commence, it would mean--at least

initially— Hungarians fighting Hungarians and Bulgarians fighting
117
Bulgarians.
In conclusion, we can say that Yugoslavia's "secession" from
the bloc has had both constructive and disruptive consequences.
Internally, it has led to more cohesion and harmony.

The peoples of

Yugoslavia became more united in the face of outside Soviet pressure
w h i c h attempted to make them conform.

The memory of German occupation

in World War II and the more recent Soviet threat of 1968, reinforced
this inner unity.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia's defection has also

had disruptive consequences for the Socialist camp.

It has, through

its stress on independent roads to socialism, contributed to the con
tinued fragmentation of East-Central Europe.

From the perspective of

limiting Soviet hegemony this is a positive development, but as the

12.6

Anderson, "Yugoslavia:
The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 217,
maintains that;
"All military leaves were cancelled and a partial
mobilization began . . . /this was/ reinforced by announcement of an
8.2 per cent increase in the 1969 military budget, by extension of
draft obligations (including women in time of emergency), and by re
activation of the civil defense and partisan command structure."

117

'Based on personal observations of a high school teacher who
w a s in the Vojvodina during the Czechoslovak crisis of August 1968.
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case of Rumania illustrates, it can also become a negative development
by pitting one nationality against another.

Hungary
As the above discussion shows, Hungary is much more circum
scribed in its international relations than either Yugoslavia or Rumania.
The more restricted international posture is due primarily to Hungary's
traumatic reincorporation into the bloc after the revolt of 1956.

118

This event not only inundated the country with Soviet troops, but it
made the c o u n t r y s
of power.

leaders dependent on these troops for their exercise

As opposed to this, neither Rumania nor Yugoslavia are

presently occupied by Soviet Troops.

Furthermore in both these latter

instances the leaders have created their own control-systems indepen
dent of the Soviet Union.
Hungarian dependence on the U.S.S.R. is evident not only in its
political statements in the United Nations and its role in the Warsaw
Pact, but also in its economic relations.
dominated completely by the U.S.S.R.

Its foreign trade is

In fact, in the 1960's Hungary's

dependence on the U.S.S.R. has been increased rather than reduced.

In

^Campbell, Tito's Separate R o a d , p. 112, defines this depen
dent status in the following way:
"Hungary . . . has perhaps more
national claims and grievances than any other nation of the region.
Yet the Hungarian government handles these questions in the most
gingerly way.
Despite considerable provocation, it is very careful not
to stir up the Hungarian people over the treatment of the Magyar
minority in Rumania.
The Hungarian press is full of warnings against
'bourgeois nationalism' . . . Undoubtedly the Hungarian leaders have
in mind the outburst of nationalism in 1956 . . . /which/ sought to
liberate Hungary not only from Soviet control but from the Communist
system as well."
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1960, 31 per cent of its imports and 29.3 per cent of its exports
were tied to the Soviet Union.

In 1965 this figure rose to 36.4 per

cent and 34.8 per cent respectively.

119

By 1970, it was estimated at

40 per cent and 42 per cent r e s p ectively.^®

In the case of both

Yugoslavia and Rumania, the opposite trend is observable, although
Rumania is also heavily dependent on its trade with the U.S.S.R,
In spite of Hungary's excessive dependence on the U.S.S.R.,
it too has attempted to undertake policies motivated by national
interest.

In relation to Yugoslavia and Rumania this is evident in

Hungary's increased concern for the Hungarians of the Vojvodina and
Transylvania respectively.

19 1

^

The increased concern is demonstrated

by Hungary's policies toward its own minority nationalities, by its
commitment to expand tourism with Yugoslavia and Rumania, and the
growing popularity in Hungary of federalist schemes for re-ordering
East-Central Europe.
Since the beginning of the 1960's Hungary has been interested
in expanding tourism.

In general, this concerns mainly increasing the

attractiveness of Hungary to tourists from other lands.

But in the

H ^ V a r d y , History of the Hungarian Nation, Part Two, Table XIV,
P . 409.
^ ® A . L.
Itt-O t t , I (Feb.
"Hungary Today:
(Nov. 28, 1970),

"A
1,
An
p.

Nemzeti Erz^s Magyarorszagon ^s a Szdtszortsigban,"
1968), p. 13. Also see Joseph Wechsberg,
Arrangement with the Present," Saturday Review
22.
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As two examples of this concern see;
Domonkos Varga, "A
Megmaradds Irodalma." Va l d sig, XIII (Aug., 1970), pp. 84-86; Akos
BenkfJ, "A Jugszlaviai Magyar Pr<4za 'Uj HullAma'" ForrAs, No. 4
(July-Aug., 1970), pp. 44-54.
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case of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia this interest is also
motivated by the desire to increase the opportunities of Hungarians in
each of these countries to visit their relatives in Hungary or viceversa.

With Czechoslovakia an extensive tourist exchange has been

possible.

In the case of Yugoslavia, such exchange has been re-

stricted— primarily by the Hungarian government.

123

However, since the

early 1 9 6 0 !s the number of tourists in both directions has been on the
increase.

Many of these tourists are Hungarians visiting their rela

tive s.
Only in the case of Rumania has the question of tourism been
a source of friction in recent years.

While in 1962 as much as 15.7%

of Hungary's tourists went to Rumania, in 1964 their percentage dropped
to 5.3%.

125

This decline was due to Rumania's unwillingness to liber

alize its visa requirements vis-a-vis Hungarian citizens.

Hungary was

able to get such liberalized treatment from Bulgaria, Poland,

•*-^As the Table on "Destination of Hungarians Traveling Abroad"
in Facts About Hungary: The Fight for Freedom, p. 359, indicates,
Czechslovakia leads all other countries as the destination of
Hungarian "tourists." In 1964, 71.9 per cent of the Hungarians
traveling abroad went to Czechoslovakia.
123

Throughout the 19 5 0 's fear of ideological "contamination"
was responsible for the Hungarian government's strict limitations.
•*-^No exact statistics are available which indicate the per
centage of the tourists that visit with relatives.
However, the fact
that ma n y choose the Vojvodina rather than the scenic Adriatic as their
destination, indicates that their motives include more than vacation
ing.
Based on personal observations, during the summer of 1966.
Im p a c t s About H u n g a r y :

The Fight for Freedom, p. 359.
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Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (in the form of no visa requirement)
while Rumania was even hesitant in allowing an increase in the number
of Hungarian tourists under stringent visa requirements.

Finally in

September 1967, a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement was signed relative to
tourism which would raise to 100,000 the number of visitors allowed
in both directions.

126

However, this agreement referred primarily to

increasing the number of tourist groups and omitted any reference to
127
facilitating trips by individuals between the two countries.-

Thus,

as late as August 1968 (before the Czechoslovak tragedy), the Hun
garians were still one of the most restricted source of tourists for
Rumania.

128

However, policy makers in Budapest continue to exert

pressure to have the existing restrictions removed.
Another area where the Hungarian government wants less restric
tion is in the opportunities for cultural exchange.

As we have had

occasion to see in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslavian domestic
policies, in the latter country more opportunities exist for the
Hungarians.

To support its arguments for more cultural exchange and

opportunities the Hungarian government has held up its own "nation
ality policy" as an example.
H u n g a r y ’s national minorities composed only 1.8 per cent of

•*-^Hory, "A RomcJn-Magyar Viszony es Erd^ly Magyarsaga," p. 80.
127T, . ,
Ibid.
l28Tatu, "A Rom^nosit^s Uteme Erd^lyben," p. 22.
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its population in 1 9 6 0 . Thai is, only 175,000 individuals declared
themselves as having a non-Hungarian mother-language.

For the more

numerous of these nationalities the state upholds an extensive system
of public schools and cultural opportunities which ensure the preserva
tion of their national heritage.

The German, Croatian, Serbian,

Slovenian, Rumanian and Slovak minorities all have primary and secon
dary schools, teacher-training institutions and cultural organizations
1 on

and periodicals.

They even have certain television and radio

programs in their own language or devoted to their folk culture.
In giving these politically insignificant minorities— they are
geographically scattered and few in number--extensive cultural oppor
tunities, Hungary is trying to set an example for its neighbors which
have large and geographically concentrated minorities living within
1 ^9
their borders. J

That this is not without its effects is demonstrated

by Tito's visit to Hungary in 1967.

On this occasion, both he and his

wife visited Hungarian educational institutions near Budapest for the
Serbian m i n o r i t y .-^3

fa te of the Hungarians in Transylvania

shows, reciprocity in such policies does not always follow.

129p.

However,

"A Mi Nemzetisdgeink," Magyar H i r e k , p. 3.

130

I b i d .; Jdzsef Mdrtin, "Nemzetisdgek Magyarorszdgon," Magyar
Nemzet, Jan. 12, 1969, p. 2.
\

"A M i Nemzetisdgeink," Magyar H i r e k , p. 3.

-L^ M ^ r t i n , "Nemzetisdgek Magyarorsz^gon," p. 2.
133npresident Tito's Visit to Hungary," Borba, Feb. 5, 1967,
trans. in "State Visits 1966-1969," Yugoslav Survey, XI (May, 1970),
141-142.
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the impeccable nature of Budapest's policies makes it more difficult
for neighboring states to rationalize intolerance and discrimination.
The Soviet Union can find nothing--or very little— in these
relatively passive policies, that would endanger its control over EastCentral Europe.
the area.

The policies do not incite national antagonisms in

Probably, the U.S.S.R.'s tight control over Hungary keeps

the latter's policies passive vis-k-vis Rumania and Yugoslavia.

Only

in one area is it possible to discern potential conflict between
Soviet and Hungarian policies.

This involves the Hungarian desire for

a more integrated East-Central Europe as an independent entity.

Hun

garian thinking concerning East-Central Europe's "federation" has not
gone past the speculative stage, although it is a very popular theme
in the writings of m any prominent Hungarians.

They concur, that

only a multi-national unified and socialist East-Central Europe can
resolve the national antagonisms that still prevail in areas like
Transylvania.

However, in practice the Hungarian government continues

to be one of the firmest pillars in Soviet integration efforts within
the bloc.

It actively supports both the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, which

envision an East-Central Europe dependent on the U.S.S.R.

1^5

l-^'Imre Kovacs, "The Establishment in Hungary," East Europe,
XI V (May, 1965), p. 7; Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, part
Two, pp. 355-360.
135"az Xntegrdcid Feld; A KGST Rendkiviili Moszkvai Uldsszaka
Utdn," Magyar H i r e k , p. 3; "Losonczi EiniSk Mongolidban Elk&telezte
Magyarorsz^got Kina Ellen?" News From Hungary - Magyarorszigi Hirek
XVI (Radio Free Europe), July 17, 1970, p. 1.
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III
The political conflicts which have arisen in East-Central
Europe since the end of World War II have affected and in turn have
been affected by the nationality policies which have been adhered to.
In conclusion, we will reflect on some of the foregoing observations
related to these policies.
In the case of Rumania's treatment of the Hungarians, the
country's international involvement has had ambivalent consequences.
While Rumania was totally dependent on the U.S.S.R., it treated the
Hungarians much more liberally than after it began to undertake a more
"independent" international posture.

This independent posture

developed parallel to the internal shift of power which strengthened
the ethnic Rumanian dominance of the CPR.

The dual nature of these

developments should caution us not to impute the repressive nationality
policies to only one or the other of these causes.

Rather, it would

be more accurate to conclude that the more permissive "polycentric"
setting has enabled the Rumanians to follow a policy that is now more
in accord with what they believe to be their national interest.
The above observation is supported by the sequence of develop
ments in the Party power structure, in the shifts in nationality poli
cies and in the political changes which led Rumania to a more
independent posture internationally.
power shift

It will be remembered that the

(favoring the dominant nationality) within the CPR took

place between 1952 and 1957.

The earliest overtly disadvantageous

policies toward the Hungarians became evident already in the 1956-57
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academic year, when many nationality educational facilities were
"integrated” with the schools of the majority nationality.

However,

the major repressive policies against the Hungarians took place only
after the Hungarian Revolt of 1956.

This event shifted Soviet favor

away from Hungary and in favor of Rumania.
evacuation of the Red Army from Rumania.

It led, in 1958, to the
This removed the last major

restraint against repressive nationality policies.

Only in 1968 does

this repression slacken somewhat, when in the wake of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, a similar fate becomes feasible for
Rumania as well.
That external and internal political developments both have a
bearing on nationality policy is also born out by the treatment of
the Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

As previous chapters have pointed

out, the Hungarians were considered undependable until about 1955.
This was the case because they were identified with the disintegrative
forces which destroyed Yugoslavia in 1941, and also because in the
Yugoslav struggle against the Cominform, the Communist Hungarian
Rakosi regime tried to sow discontent among the population of the
Vojvodina.
The Yugoslav treatment of Hungarians in the period between 1945
and 1955 was consequently more repressive than Rumania's treatment of
the Transylvanian Hungarians during that time.

However, the Yugoslavs

have, since about 1955, extended rather than restricted the opportuni
ties of the Hungarians to further their national development.

This

Shift reflected the growing influence of Hungarian and other minority
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representatives within the Yugoslav League of Communists, and also the
precarious international position of Yugoslavia between two power
blocs.

Both these developments required more cooperation among the

various nationalities of the country.

And, since no nationality was

strong enough to dominate the Party by itself, the rights of all n a 
tionalities received protection.

In Rumania no similar situation ever

had the chance to develop because by 1958 the artificial balance which
had been imposed by a direct Soviet military presence was eroded.
The different policies pursued by Yugoslavia and Rumania also
indicate Hungary's relative political impotence.

Due to its excessive

dependence on the U.S.S.R., it has had to follow a cautious policy
toward its neighbors.

It has been compelled to follow a passive

policy which does not stir up national antagonisms.

Hungary has,

therefore, succeeded in getting better treatment for Hungarian
minorities only in Yugoslavia, where domestic politics had already
decreed that they should be treated well.

In Rumania, on the other

hand, where nationalism came into conflict with the rights of the
Hungarians, the government in Budapest has not been able to influence
nationality policies.

Only the prospects of a Czechoslovak-type

Soviet intervention has eased the Rumanian policies toward the T r a n 
sylvanian Hungarians.
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CHAPTER VI

NATIONALITIES WITHOUT NATION-STATES
UNDER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS
In the assimilationist settings which have produced both the
American and Soviet man, there is very little sympathy for the cultural
uniqueness and developmental distinctiveness of any East-Central
European national group.

In considering the oppression or systematic

de-nationalization of certain ethnic groups, the response of many is
to say "so what?"

These individuals usually consider nationalities a

negative, or at least an anachronistic phenomenon.

In part, this is

due to the belief that the conflicts among these nationalities have
produced the major political confrontations of our century.
This study has not tried to disprove the above view.

However,

it does point out that policies of forced de-nationalization lead
directly to nationality conflicts which could mushroom into political
confrontations as well.

This is born out by the observations of the

present study in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality poli
cies.

It would seem, therefore, that an awareness of nationality

problems, rather than an escapist "so what," is more likely to
produce constructive thought concerning the peace and the future of
East-Central Europe.

I
We have attempted to reflect on these problems by asking a
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number of questions.

Is the Communist workers' class solidarity a

"solution" of the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality problems?
w h y not?

Or to what extent?

If it is not, then what considerations

guide the nationality policies of these states?
of these states similar?

Why or

How are they different?

How are the policies
Why are they differ

ent?
The answers to these questions are summarized and discussed in
the following pages.

Before turning to them directly, some general

preliminary observations are in order.

These concern the second reason

w h y m a n y representatives of a "melting-pot" setting refuse to consider
the question of minority nationalities with any other than a negative
attitude.

It involves the belief that nationalities as such, especial

ly minorities, are fated to become absorbed.

Furthermore, absorption

is considered not only "natural" but also "desirable."
This view is understandable in the United States and the
Soviet Union where assimilation of some sort is needed to produce the
American or the Soviet man.-*-

However, it should be noted, that

neither the Soviet nor the American man is devoid of nationality or of

*-In the present chapter "assimilatiori' is given a narrower
meaning than in the preceding ones. Assimilation will be defined as
absorption, a process whereby one nationality or culture is dissolved
and completely mixed into another nationality or culture.
It is a
process similar to the dissolution of aspirin in water.
"Integration,"
on the other hand, is defined as the uniting of two or more nationali
ties or cultures without destroying the identity of the components
making up the mixture.
To use a physical analogy, it is very much like
a grafted tree or a mosaic in a church window.
For the American mind
this difference is not foreign. White Americans rarely talk of assimi
lating the black Americans, they think rather of integrating them.
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a national language.
pot environments.

So, nations are perpetuated even by the melting-

But, in the American case, at least, the assimila

tion is usually a voluntary process, not one that is forced onto the
inhabitants.

In this sense it is a "natural" process.

Whether or not

it is a "desirable" process depends totally on the perspective of the
viewer.

It is good or desirable if it can be proved that the nation

ality which absorbs is superior to the nationality that is being
absorbed and that the product is a more peace-loving, more humane and
more rational being.
This study has not tried to prove any of the above.

On the

other hand, it has pointed out that the process of assimilation which
is being fostered in Transylvania is neither "natural" nor "desir
able."

It is not natural because it is being forced.

It is not

desirable because it enhances the possibility for further conflict.
Furthermore, these policies are based on the questionable assumption
that the more powerful, or the more numerous nationality is superior
to the less numerous nationalities.
The East-F.uronean setting is not like the American melting-pot.
It is composed of culturally compact areas, where nationalities living
side by side speak different languages, follow different customs and
enjoy different types of food and wine.

The tolerance and understand

ing of these differences, rather than the systematic destruction of
them, provides the only sane and humane solution to existing nationality
conflicts.

A pluralistic conception allowing for divers cultural

developments does not rule out the possibility of political unity in
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the area.

Quite the contrary, such a conception presupposes political

unification whether that be "Carpathian," "Danubian," or "CentralEuropean" in scope.

II
The comparison of Rumanian and Yugoslav policies indicates that
a minority can be treated in one of three ways.

It can be excluded or

isolated from the general life of the national community as a whole
(e.g., Jewish ghettos).

A second alternative is to try to assimilate

or absorb the minority into the national community in such a way that
it will abandon its own identity for the national identity of the
majority nationality (e.g., Russification, Magyarization, Rumanization).

Finally, the third alternative is to integrate or fuse the

minority wit h the majority to create a union that is more than its
component parts.

In the latter case both minority and majority retain

their own identities, but also identify with each other through the
realization of certain common interests (e.g., Yugoslav policies in
the 1960's, policies in Switzerland).

Rumanian and Yugoslav policies

can be identified with the second and third alternatives respectively-although both countries have resorted to all of these policy alterna
tives since the close of World War II.

In Transylvania
Rumanian policies toward the Hungarians were initially guided
by the spirit of proletarian internationalism imposed by Stalin.

It

envisaged a relationship between Rumanians and Hungarians which would
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not necessitate the abandonment of their respective national cultures.
It demanded only that the two peoples live together within one state
as "co-inhabiting nationalities" striving "shoulder to shoulder" to
defeat the "forces of reaction" and inaugurate the new socialist
millenium.

This definition of the place of the Transylvanian Hungarians

transformed them into partners of the majority nationality.

They were

given every opportunity to preserve their cultural identity, as long as
they supported the process of Socialist transformation and the Soviet
Union's hegemonial interests.

These opportunities were spelled out

both in the country's ideological commitments and its constitutional
objectives.

Until October 1956, these opportunities were also put

into practice.

Schools, publications, even some "national autonomy"

in the Magyar Autonomous Region reflected this "integrationist"
approach.
Changes in Rumania's internal and external political relations
have turned it away from the "integrationist" solution.

In the years

between 1952-1957 the CPR lost its cosmopolitan character and became
primarily an ethnic Rumanian organization, both in membership and
leadership.

This ethnic Rumanian nationalization of the Parfv paral

leled the period of de-Stalinization in the bloc, which loosened Soviet
hegemonial controls.

The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 led to unrest among

the Hungarians in Transylvania.

This made the Hungarians suspect in

O
That Stalin was thinking along these lines is also indicated
by his abortive plan to have Rumania and Hungary federated.
See
Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin trans. Michael B. Petrovich
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 177-178.
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the eyes of both Rumanian and Soviet policy-makers.

Rumanian efforts

to help quell this unrest as well as the Hungarian revolt, increased
Soviet confidence in Rumania's dependability to such an extent that in
1958 all Soviet troops were removed from the country.

This military

withdrawal gave Rumanian leaders more control over their internal
policies.

By the beginning of the 1960's they also gained more con

trol over their foreign relations as the Soviet Union became more and
more embroiled in its ideological and political dispute with China.
By 1963, Rumanian policies began to reflect openly the coun
try's more nationalist orientation both internally and in the inter
national arena.

Defiance of COMECON integration efforts reflected

this new Rumanian nationalism on the international front.

Internally,

the shift to an assimilationist nationality policy became its most
concrete expression.

The reduction of Hungarian educational and

cultural opportunities, as well as their symbolic self-government in
the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, reflected the new Rumanian
"socialist patriotism" on the domestic front.

Only at the end of

1968, following the Czechoslovak crisis, did Rumanian assimilationist
policies slacken

in momentum. Thus, Rumanian nationality policy

be summarized as

integrationist from 1945 to 1958.^

drawal of Soviet

troops it has

become assimilationist.

the 1968 events,

it remains to

be seen whether or not the

Since

can

the w ith
In lightof

O
JIn the area of education, the turn toward assimilationist
policies was evident already in the 1956-57 academic year.
Along this
line see Chapter IV above.
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assimilationist policies will be continued.

As of 1970, they have

been toned down.

In the Vojvodina
The Yugoslav policies were at first "exclusivist" in nature.
The Hungarians— as well as seme other non-South Slav nationalities-were treated as former enemies.

They were held responsible for Yugo

slavia's dismemberment during the war.

In the years immediately

after the War they were openly persecuted, thereby signifying that
they were excluded from the national community.

As Communist rule

became more firmly established this separation was slowly replaced
by tolerance for Hungarian cultural development.

As in the case of

Rumania, internal and external political pressures provided the
impetus for alterations in Yugoslavia's nationality policy.

The

external threat of Stalinist intervention was, perhaps, the most
important catalyst.

It signified to the Yugoslav leaders that they

had to w in the support of all the peoples of the country if they were
to ward off successfully the Stalinist threat.

The CPY, therefore,

began to put into practice in the years 1948-1950 the nationality
policy which the country's constitution and the Party's ideology
demanded.

Expansion of cultural and educational opportunities, as

well as local self-government, has characterized this policy.

It has

become an "integrationist" policy, uniting all the peoples of the
land, by granting them the opportunity to preserve their diversity.
Internal political factors have reinforced this trend.

The

traditional antagonism which existed between Serbs and Croats, the
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conflicting economic interests of northern and southern Yugoslavia,
and the divided emotional loyalty of border nationalities, auto
matically ruled out an assimilationist policy.

(Which nationality

would or could provide the standards for assimilation?

Since Yugo

slavia does not have one majority nationality no such standard is
4

available.)

Furthermore, the fear of the revival of ethnic nation

alisms made Tito and the other leaders of the CPY/LYC extremely sensi
tive about the correct application of their nationality policy.

They

want to perpetuate the trans-ethnic Yugoslav character of the state.
They have been able to do this only by giving all nationalities a
certain representation in the Party (League) without any one gaining
a predominant position.

Parallel to this, all nationalities have also

been guaranteed opportunities for their own cultural development.
Thus, Yugoslavia has followed since about 1948, but more consistently
since 1955, an "integrationist" nationality policy."*
The major reason for the different treatment of nationalities

4
This generalization is true only for Yugoslavia as a whole.
On the Republic level there are standards of assimilation.
In Serbia
one can become Serbianized and in Croatia it is possible to be
Croatianized.
But mixed marriages usually tend to produce individuals
w ho claim to be Yugoslavs rather than Croats or Serbs.
For non-South
Slav nationalities Yugoslavianization in this sense is assimilationist
rather than integrationist. As of the present, however, this trend is
not widespread.
^Integrationist policies were already evident during World War
II in the relations of the South Slav peoples. However, these inte
grationist policies were not practiced vis-h-vis the Hungarians (and
other non-South Slav nationalities) until 1948. Until that time the
Hungarians were "excluded" from full membership in Yugoslavism.
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in the two areas is that the setting and the problems faced by Yugo
slavia and Rumania have been unique.

In both countries the Hungarian

inhabitants have posed similar yet different domestic and international
problems.

While in both the internal unity of the country has guided

nationality policies, the different internal political situations and
the unlike international posture of the two countries, produced differ
ent results.

Consequently, in Rumania the Hungarians have lost many

of their former national-cultural institutions and opportunities.
They have been suffering real repression.
has happened.

In Yugoslavia the opposite

Over the years nationality policies have become more

permissive.

Ill
The above observations lead us to a number of conclusions.
First and foremost, that it is national needs and developmental pecu
liarities rather than ideology and class solidarity that guide both
Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies.

In other words, nation

alism has been more important than Communist ideology and its claim
that class solidarity unites peoples regardless of their national
backgrounds.

Power relations and the demands of "national interest"

have guided the formulation of nationality policies in practice.

This

is reflected both by Rumania's contradiction of Communist nationality
theory and Yugoslavia's adherence to it.6

In Rumania, Communist

£
Both states claim that they follow Communist nationality
policy based on proletarian internationalism.
Only the difference in
the actual policies of the two states indicates that Rumania is merely
paying lip-service to these ideals.
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nationality theory does not adequately serve the leaders of the coun
try, so they ignore it in practice.

In Yugoslavia, on the other hand,

it does serve the leaders of the country in furthering unity.

Thus,

in the latter country theory is followed.
The observation that power relations rather than ideology

now

guide the treatment of the Hungarians in both areas, leads to the
further conclusion that the problem is a political one requiring a
political solution.

However, political solutions may be both far

sighted and near-sighted.

(In the present context, by "far-sighted"

we mean a policy that contributes to the well being of the greatest
number of people--across national lines— and to the peace and security
of all the peoples living in the area.

By "near-sighted" we mean a

policy that contributes to the well-being of only one nationality at
the expense of other nationalities.

In the latter case unity is

always imposed rather than a c c e p t e d . W e have indicated that Yugo
slavia has a more far-sighted nationality policy than Rumania.

In

recent years Yugoslavia has made a real effort to balance the interests
of all its nationalities.

In this way it has ensured that the

citizens of all nationalities will be able to live in peace with one
another.

In Rumania the opposite now prevails.

The latter become

more conscious of their disadvantaged position and tend to view the
state as their enemy.

Cooperative and peaceful co-existence is almost

7

"Near-sighted" policies are also distinguishable by their
definition of national interest in terms of the interests of the
dominant ethnic group.
This means that national interest becomes
merely race interest.
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impossible in this setting.

Furthermore, it leads to the exact

opposite of what was intended.

Instead of increasing unity in the

country it encourages conflict and weakens the country both internally
Q

and internationally.
The above difference in ethnic policies leads to yet another
conclusion, that far-sighted policies take into account a balancing of
the interests of all nationalities.

Furthermore, such a balancing of

interests is a result of an existing balance of power.

Where a

balance of power prevails among nationalities, as in Yugoslavia, there
can also be found a balancing of interests.

Where no such political

balance exists, there will also fail to be a balance of interests.
The above conclusions hold true as long as there is no external
interference in either the political or the interest balances (e.g.,
Soviet troops on Rumanian soil prior to 1958), or if the role of an
individual leader (or a group of leaders) does not intervene in
spite of the existing imbalance of power to create a balance of
interests.

(In the latter category the role of Petru Groza in Rumania

and the role of Tito in Yugoslavia are particularly noteworthy, i.e.,
their roles as "balancers.")

Q

Rumanian realization of the weakening impact of such policies
was indicated by the numerous pacifying speeches made to Hungarian
audiences in Transylvania in the wake of the Czechoslovakian crisis.
See as examples the speeches of Ceausescu, Maurer, Fazekas and
Patilinet in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna and
Harghita Counties," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968), pp. 2-38.
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IV

The future prospects for both the Transylvanian and the
Vojvodinian Hungarians depend as much on international as on intranational developments.

However, while no major shifts take place in

the international alignment of states, it is safe to say that the con
dition of those in both Rumania and Yugoslavia will remain as at
present.

That is, in Rumania continued repression will prevail while

in Yugoslavia more opportunities in national-cultural matters may be
expected.

But even here changes are apt to take place, particularly

after Tito is no longer on the scene.

So it is really impossible to

say more than that if things remain as they are, nationality policies
will remain as they are.

But since change is the only certainty in

the world, it is not out of place to consider how the ethnic relations
of Eastern Europe could be placed into a far-sighted policy perspective.
As we have shown, an integrationist rather than an assimila
tionist nationality policy can prevail only where a balance of power
favors it.

The solution is to foster the ability of all nationalities

to defend themselves.

Only in this way will interests be considered

by the majority nationality or nationalities.

However, the creation

of such a balance is extremely difficult (without external intervention)
when one nationality numerically overshadows its minorities, as is the
case in Rumania.

In the latter instance other solutions should be con

sidered as a check on the unrest and national animosities which are
being produced.
A complete re-thinking is required to solve the problem.
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preceding discussion indicates, ideological commitment to better
nationality policies is considered seriously only when such policies
correspond to the interests of the state concerned.

Thus, tolerant

nationality policies are only possible in a state which is multinational.

q

Unfortunately, the trend in East-Central Europe has been

to strengthen the new nation-states rather than to attempt a larger
multi-national state based on both economic and political realism.

The

emotional sunk cost in petty ethnic nationalisms has been too strong.
As a consequence, the post-World War II re-ordering has perpetuated
the political fragmentation of the area.
Political developments supported the strengthening of this
fragmentation.

Two in particular deserve mention:

the expansion of

Soviet hegemonial control over the area and the drastic reduction of
minority populations through deportations, territorial transfers, popu
lation exchanges and exterminations.

Soviet hegemonial control led

to a freezing of the fragmented nation-state system inherited from the
interwar years.

This was reinforced by the drastic reduction of the

minority populations of East-Central Europe.

As Professor Leszek

Kosinski has pointed out, in 1930 out of about 94 million people living

^A multi-national composition is by itself no guarantee of
tolerant nationality policies.
Policies in the U.S.S.R. and some
other states (including Czechoslovakia until the second half of the
1960's) testify to this fact. However, where no one nationality has
a majority, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the chances for tolerance
seem to improve immeasurably.
•*-®See Chapter I above for a discussion of some of these develop
ments .
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in East-Central Europe (he included seven countries under this desig
nation:

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia

and Albania) 24 million (26%) were members of minority groups.'*''*'
World War II and its consequences altered this picture completely.
Due to deportations, territorial transfers, etc., the minority popu
lation of the same seven countries was reduced to 7.1 million or 7.2%
of the 99 million inhabitants in 1960.*"^
Most of the changes in this ethnic picture took place in the
northern areas of East-Central Europe, particularly in Poland and
Czechoslovakia.
drastically.

The German and Jewish minorities were reduced most

While in the interwar period they represented 5,878,000

and 4,096,000 of the minority population respectively, in the postwar
period they have become an insignificant part of the population in all
1^
states except R u m a n i a .■LJ

Only the minorities of the southern areas

of East-Central Europe remain in significant numbers.

Of these, the

Hungarians are the most numerous, with 1,604,000 in Rumania, 504,000
in Yugoslavia, 517,000 in Czechoslovakia and about 200,000 in the
U.S.S.R.

(Carpatho-Ukraine).

Aside from the Hungarians, only the

Albanians have a numerous representation.

There are 915,000 Albanians

in the Kosmet of Yugoslavia.

•*■•*•'"Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries of East-Central
Europe," Lecture delivered at Louisiana State University on February
29, 1968, under the auspices of the Geography and Anthropology and
the History Departments.
Taken from a copy of the speech's text, p. 7.
12 Ibid., pp.

7, 11.

•*~^ I bid., Tables 3 and 4, between pp. 11 and 12.
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The revised ethnic make-up of the area has a number of note
worthy consequences.

The German minorities are no longer an effective

lever of German foreign policy in the area.

The Jews have lost thcxr

important--even dominant--position in the commercial and intellectual
life of these countries.

As a consequence, only the Hungarians remain

as a significant "link" between the various nation-states of EastCentral Europe.

They, on the other hand, are less cosmopolitan in

their perspective, but also more directly tied to the destiny of the
area than either the Germans or the J e w s . ^
The continued existence of the Hungarian minorities, however,
is viewed by nationalists with frustration.

Hungarian nationalists

would prefer to solve the problem by re-annexing the areas where these
fellow nationals reside.

Rumanian and Slovak nationalities, on the

other hand, would like to eliminate their existence by assimilation
or expulsion.

They cannot conceive of these minorities as "links"

between the various peoples, playing a mediating role between them.

■^Germans envisioned East-Central Europe as part of their
sphere of incluence.
They were concerned only in extending their
power over it so as to increase the wealth and power of Germany
generally.
The Jews, on the other hand, were (relatively) newcomers
in the area. Most (although by no means all) moved into the area in
the last two centuries. Many of them stayed briefly, continuing their
journey further West.
The persecutions imposed in these countries
were at times just more of what had been their fate in Czarist Russia.
Furthermore, even recent Soviet policies (due to the Arab-Israeli con 
flict) have made them less than enthusiastic about their stay in EastCentral Europe.
The existence of Israel, moreover, has provided them
with an alternative homeland that is more hospitable. Unlike the
Jews and the Germans, the Hungarians cannot move to areas outside EastCentral Europe if conditions do not favor them.
Nor do they want to,
since their national fate is directly tied to this area.
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Only the Yugoslavs have come to accept this latter view.
Expulsion fortunately is now less likely than in the period
right after World War II.

Population exchange, however, must certainly

have crossed the mind of policy makers in the area.

In the case of

the Transylvanian Hungarians this is not a rational option.
all there are only a handful of Rumanians in Hungary.
a fair trade would be impossible.

First of

This means that

Second, present-day Hungary could

not absorb an influx of almost two million additional inhabitants.
Together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary has the greatest population
density in East-Central E u r o p e . ^

Its population density of 282 per

square mile compares unfavorably with Rumania's 208 per square mile
and Yugoslavia's 188 per square m i l e . ^
Such a n exchange of populations would be possible only if it
were tied to some sort of territorial exchange.

Here the experience

of the Second Vienna Award would be instructive.-^
is a "solution" geared to a nation-state system.
an anachronism.

However, partition
As such it is already

Yet, if the peoples of East-Central Europe continue

to think emotionally as ethnic nationalists, then this may become the
only feasible solution.

It is not resorted to at present, since the

Soviet Union does not want to re-open the question of ceded and annexed

15

In this study East Germany is not considered part of EastCentral Europe.
It, of course, has even a greater population density
than Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
•^ T h e New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac 1970 e d . Seymour
Kurtz (New York:' The New York Times, 1969), pp. 799, 858, 898.
■^See Chapter I, above.
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territories.

A discussion of such questions would place the U.S.S.R.

in an embarrassing position in view of its own territorial expansion
following World War II.
The disadvantage of partition would be that it would continue
the hostility between Rumanians and Hungarians.

On the other hand, it

would definitely eliminate the persecution of minorities.

The

persecution would end because both states would have to frame their
nationality policies with a view to reciprocity.

That is, Hungarians

would treat their Rumanian minority well in order that the Hungarian
minority in Rumania would be treated well, also.

Thus, an external

balance of power between the two states would ensure that in their
internal policies they would attempt to integrate rather than assimi
late their respective minorities.
Setting-up a federal independent Transylvania has been a
popular suggestion put forward in the past.
is also geared to a nation-state system.

This suggestion, however,

It is thus less realistic

than partition, though more humane than the "population transfers"
suggested by some.

All these methods, however, contain the weakness

of conceptualizing the present as if it still followed the rules of
the European "sovereign" nation-states.

This federated Transylvania

solution would make sense only as a transition to a more inclusive
federal state including both Rumania and Hungary.
The European Common Market, Nato, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact
indicate that new and larger units are needed to meet modern problems
in the political as well as economic field.

Regarding the fate of the
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Hungarians in Transylvania, the solution of their plight also seems to
lie in such a greater unit which can end the conflicts among member
nationalities.

To the present writing, however, Comecon and the

Warsaw Pact have not proved up to this task in the question of Tran
sylvania.

The reason for this is probably that they are more instru

ments of hegemonial control than of a community of nations welded
together by common interests.

V
A more imaginative alternative to partitions is the political
unification of all, or of parts, of East-Central Europe.

No matter

how utopian this may seem at first glance, it is probably the only
solution that could bring an end to ethnic repression as it exists in
Rumania today.

T h e artificial attempt to create nation-states in this

area, has from its inception led only to conflict.

East-Central

Europe is multi-national and most nation-states within it (excepting
only present-day Hungary, Poland and Albania) are likewise multi-

18

national. °

As the preceding discussion has shown, even the most

judicious partitions and boundary rectifications can only hope to even
out the number of minorities that will fall under the rule of other
nationalities.

The unification of the area under a multi-national

government, however, would make all peoples minorities, as in

Poland will become even more homogeneous ethnically as a
consequence of the Bonn-Warsaw treaty signed recently.
See "Poland
Reportedly to Let 90,000 Germans Depart," The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 6 ,
1970, p. 3.
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present-day Yugoslavia.

This would allow for a balance of power among

nationalities which would ensure a balance of interests among them as
well.
The peoples of East-Central Europe have innumerable common
interests.

Politically they are in the shatter-belt region of Europe,

hemmed in by the German (today Western powers) and the Russian (today
Soviet) power blocs.

Their disunity and weakness make them subject to

the imperialism of both.

By becoming a united independent federation,

neutral of both blocs, they could serve the interests of themselves
as well as world peace.

Of course, their present position within the

Soviet sphere of influence makes such a union highly unlikely if not
impossible.
In spite of the fact that such a union is faced by seemingly
unsurmountable obstacles, it has fascinated and occupied the atten
tion of numerous outstanding individuals of almost all East-Central
European peoples.

From the middle of the 19th century to the present,

these individuals have attempted to demonstrate not only the need for
such a unification, but also its feasibility.
leaders of the area have toyed with the idea.

19

Even the Communist
In their formulations

a central consideration was always the final resolution of nationality
problems.

20

■^%Iiroslav Lazarovich, "Regional Federalism or a New Catalysm,"
Studies for a New Central Europe, Series 2, No. 1 (1967-68), pp.
20-30.
^ S t e v e n Bela Vardy, History of the Hungarian N a tion, Part II
(Astor Patk, Florida:
Danubian Press, 1969), pp. 355-360.
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While obstacles to such a multi-national federation seem great,
the emergence of a distinctively East-Central European culture, the
apparent common interests of these people versus German and Soviet
encroachments, and the technological unification of the area, have
drawn most of them closer to one another than at any time in their past
history.

What remains now is a concerted process of bridge-building

among the respective nationalities.

In this role the minorities of

the present have a particularly significant role.

They provide the

area w ith the people that are bilingual or multilingual, the people
who live within two or more cultures.
The area is also closer to such unity for yet two other reasons.
First, the elimination of the vast German minorities has meant that
German political influence has been trimmed.

It is still important,

but it can no longer use large sections of the local populations to
further its foreign policy goals.

In other words, the unification of

the East-Central Europeans could proceed independently of German
aspirations.

Second, the imperialism of the U.S.S.R. in 1948, 1956

and 1968, has demonstrated dramatically the conflict of political
interests between Moscow and the states of East-Central Europe.

The

two developments taken together mean that Germany is unable to impose
its authority and Soviet assistance has become less desirable to ward
off German influence.

In other words, there is a new realization of

the need for independence from both

Eastern and Western power centers.

Under Soviet hegemony the peoples of East-Central Europe have
only limited opportunities to work for political unification among
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themselves.

However, much of their cooperation through COMECON and

other Soviet sponsored agencies has provided them with invaluable
experience in working together.

Eventually, these lessons in coopera

tion could be utilized to establish a federal republic along the
Yugoslav pattern--a republic which would provide for economic and
political unity while it preserved cultural diversity.
The artificiality of existing nation-states would be replaced
with a multi-national state which could guarantee cultural autonomy
to all nationalities, while providing them wl;v_h common political
leadership.

This alternative to partition is at present merely a

utopian delineation of what would be the best solution for the peace
and security of East-Central Europe.

But it realistically points out

that if a political re-arranging takes place in the area, to last, it
would have to safe-guard cultural diversity.

For the Hungarians in

Transylvania and the Vojvodina, as for all the peoples of the area,
this is the solution that holds the most promise.
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APPENDIX A
SERBO-CROATIAN, RUMANIAN, HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN GEOGRAPHIC AND
HISTORIC PLACE NAMES IN TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA

Rumanian
I.

Hungarian

German

Major Geographic Subdivisions and Rivers of Transylvania

Ardeal

Transylvania (Latin)
Erddly

Siebenbtlrgen

Alba de Jos

Alsrf-Fehdr

Alba

Fehdr

Arie§

Aranyos

Arad

Arad

Arad

Bega

Bdga

Bega

Banat

Bdndt

Banat

Bihor

Bihar

Beretau

Berettyd

Bistri^a-Nasaud

Beszterce-Naszdd

Birzava

Berzence

Brasov

Brassrf

Bistra

Bisztra

Cara§-Severin

Krassd-Szflreny

Cerna

Cserna

Ciuc

Csik

Crasna

Kraszna

Cri§ana

Pdrtium

Criful Alb

Fehdr Kdrtfs

Cluj

Kolozs

Weiss Kflrds
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APPENDIX A (Continued)

Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Criful Negru

Fekete KGrfls

Schwarz Kbrbs

Covasna

Kova'szna

Cri^ul Repede

Sebes Kdrfls

Dunarea

Duna

Harghita

Hargita

Hlrtibaciu

Hurtobdgy

Jiu

Zsil

Lapus

Lapos

Maramure^

Maramaros

Mure§

Maros

Mure§-Turda

Maros-Torda

Niraj

Nyorad

Odorhei

Udvarhely

Olt

Olt

SSlaj

Szildgy

Some^

Szamos

Satu Mare

SzatmAr

Some^ul Mare

Nagy Szamos

Gross Szamos

Some^ul Mica

Kis Szamos

Klein Szamos

Sibiu

Szeben

Solnoc-Dobica

Szolnok-Doboka

Tirai§

Temes

Donau

Mieresch

Alt

Szamos

Temesch
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APPENDIX A (Continued)

Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Tirnava Mare

Nagy RukftllS

Gross Kokel

Tirnava Miclf

Kis KukulldJ

Klein Kokel

Treiscaune

Hdromszdk

--

Turda-Arie§

Torda-Aranyos

--

Cities and Towns of Transylvania
Adamos

Addmos

--

Aghiresu

Egeres

--

Agnita

Szentdgota

Agnetheln

Aiud

Nagyenyed

Strassburg

Alba Iulia

Gyulafehdrvar

Karlsburg

A lma s

Ridalmds

Anina

Stajerlakanina

Stejerdorf

Arad

Arad

Arad

Ardud

Erdfld

--

As ini

Aszonynepe

--

Bagara

BogdrteIke

--

Baia de Arie§

Aranyosbdnya

--

Baia Mare

Nagybanya

Baida

Bald

--

Baraolt

Bardt

--

Batani Mici

Kisbaczon

--

Bazia^

Bazias

Beelean

Eethlen

--

Neustadt

Bazias
—

-
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Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Beiu§

Beldnyes

--

Birtin

Rdv

--

Bistri^a

Beszterce

Bixad

Bikszad

Blaj

Baldzsfalva

Bod

Botfalu

--

Borsec

Borszdk

--

Brad

Brad

--

Brasov

Brassd

Bratca

Kirdlyhdgd

--

Breaza

Beresztelke

--

Bre^cu

Bereck

--

Caian

Pusztakaian

--

Capusul de Campie

MezOkapsus

--

Cara

Kolozskara

--

Caransebej

Karansebes

--

Carei

Nagyk^roly

Catina

Katona

--

Cehu Silvaniei

Szil^gycseh

--

Chiesd

Szil^gykdvesd

--

Ciacova

CsAk

--

Cimpia Turzii

Aranyosgyeres

--

Cincu

Nagysink

Bistritz

-Blasendorf

Kronstadt

Carol

Gross Schenk
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Rumanian

Hungarian

Cisnadie

Nagyaiszndd

--

Ciucea

Csucsa

--

Cluj

Kolozsv^r

Klausenburg

Codlea

Feketehalom

Zeiden

Coj c cna

Kolozs

--

Clovcisna

Kov4szna

--

Cristuru-Secuiesc

Szdkelykeresztdr

--

Cugir

Kudzsir

--

Cuzaplac

K&zdplak

--

Deda

Ddda

--

Dej

Dls

--

German

Des

D^sakna

--

Deva

Deva

--

Doboca

Doboka

--

Dumbr5veni

Erzs^betvAros

Dumbraviora

Sdromberke

--

B&g&ras

Fogaras

--

FSget

Facs^d

--

Flioara

Kisilye

--

Frata

Magyarfrata

--

Gheorghieni

Gyergydszentmiklds

--

Gherla

Szamosujvir

--

Gilau

Gyatu

--

Elizabethstadt
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Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Halmeu

Halrai

--

Ha£eg

Hdtszeg

--

Huedin

B^nf fyhunyad

--

Hunedoara

Va j dahunyad

IbSne^ti

Libdnfalva
(Gdrgdnys zent imre)

--

Jibou

Zsibd

--

Jimbolia

Zsombolya

Hatzfeld

Lipova

Lippa

Lippa

Lisnau

Liznyci

--

Ludu^

Marosludas

--

Lugoj

Lugos

Lupeni

Lupdny

--

Malna^

M^lnds

--

Marghita

Margitta

--

Martinus

Homor odszentm^rton

--

Medias

Medgyes

Miercurea Ciuc

Csikszereda

--

Mocin

Mdcs

--

Mueran

Magyarokereke

--

NSdrag

Nadrag

--

Nasaud

Naszdd

Nassod

Nimigea Ungureasca

Magyarnemegye

Eisenmarkt

Lugosch

Mediasch

--
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Rumanian

Hungarian

German

Nires

Nyires

Odorheiul Secuiesc

Szdkelyudvarhely

Oradea

Nagyvdrad

Gross Wardein

0r5§tie

Szaszvdros

Broos

Orlova

Orsova

Panticen

Pdncdlos

Petrila

Petrilla

Petro^eni

Petrozsdny

Poiana de Arie^

Aranyospolydn

Praid

Parajd

Prundu BirgSului

Borgoprand

Racu

Csikrakos

Radna

M^riaradna

Reghin

Szdszrdgen

SAchsisch-Reen

Resita

Re s iczabAnya

Reschitza

Rlsnov

Barcarozsnyd

Rosenau

Rodna

6 radna

Sacalul de Campie

Mezdszakdl

Saciava

Szacsva

SSlciua de Jos

Toroczko

S5lis^e

Szelistye

Salonta

Nagyszalonta

Pancelosch
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German

Rumanian

Hungar?.an

Sanpetru de C&mpie

Uzdiszentpdter

SSrma^u

Kis Sdrmds

S5rma§ul Mare

Nagysdrraas

Satu Mare

Szatmdrndmeti

Sathmar

Sebe§

Szaszsebes

Muhlbach

Sfintu Gheorghe

Sepsiszentgyorgy

Sibiu

Nagyszeben

Sic

Szek

Sighet

Maramarossziget

Sighi§oara

Segesvdr

Simleul Silvaniei

Szildgysomlyd

Sinnicolau Mare

Nagys z entmikIds

Somkuta Mare

Na

Somesfalau

Szamosfalva

Somfalau

Sofalva

Sopter

Septer

Sovata

Szovdta

o

“i t c

’O J

Hermannstadt

SchSssburg

Gross-St. Nikolaus

nmlri i+*
--

Szdkelykocsdrd
Teaca

Tdke

Tileagd

MezfJtelegd

Tilighioara

Olasztelek

Timisoara

Temesvdr

Temeschb”!";.

Ilrgu Mures

Marosvdsdrhely

Neumarkt
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Rumanian

Hungarian

Tirgu Secuesc

Kezdiv^sdrhely

----

TfrnSveni

DicsSszentmdrton

--

Toplita

Maroshdviz

--

Tulghes

Tdlgyes

--

Turda

Torda

--

Turea

Ture

----

Tusnad Bai

TusnddfttrdcJ

--

Valasul

Valaszut

----

Valea lui Mihai

Mihdlyfalva

----

Verespatak

----

ZalSu

Zilah

----

Zam-Sancreain

Kalotaszentkirdly

----

Zetea

Zete iaka

----

Zlatna

Zalatna

___

Serbo-Croatian

Hungarian

----

III.

German

German

Major Geographic Subdivisions and Rivers of the Vojvodina
Bafika

Bdcska

Bachka

Banat

B&ndt

Banat

Baranya

---

Drava

Dr^va

Drau

Dunav

Duna

Donau
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IV.

Serbo-Croatian

Hungarian

German

Sava

Szdva

Sawa

Srem

Szer^m

Tamis

Temes

Temesch

Tisa

Tisza

Theiss

Vojvodina

Ddlviddk
(Vajdasig)

Woiwodina

Cities and Towns of the Vojvodina and Vicinity
Ada

Ada

Alibunar

Alibunar

Apatin

Apatin

Apatin

Bac

B^cs

Batsch

BaCka Palanka

Palanka

Alt-Palanka

BaCka Petrovac

PetriJc.

BaSka Topola

Topolya

Badko Gradi§te

B^csfdldv^r

Bajmok

Bajmok

BaSaid

Basahid

Ada

Bajmok

Batina Skela
BavaniSte

Homokbatvdnyo s

Bela Crkva

Fehdrtemplom

Beli Manastir

Baranyavcfr

Beocin

Beocsin

Beograd

Ndndorfehdrvar

Weisskirchen

Belgrad
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Serbo-Croatian

Hungarian

German

Bezdan

Bezddn

Bezdan

Bogojevo

Gombos

--

Cantavir

Csantavdr

--

Crvenka

Cservenka

ffurog

Csurog

--

12
ualj

Ddlya

--

Darda

Ddrda

--

Deliblato

Delibldt

--

Erdevik

Erdovdg

--

Feketid

Feketics

--

Futog

(5futak

Alt-Futok

HorgoS

Horgos

--

Ilok

Uj lak

--

Jarkovac

Arkod

--

JaSa Tomid

Mddos

Karlovci

Karldca

Kovin

Kenevira

Kubin

Krnjaja

Kerdny

Kernei

Kula

Kula

Kula

Melenci

Melen

Miletid

Nemesmilitics

Mol

Mol

Nicidevo

Parddny

Tscherwenka

Modosch

--

-Mi /.ititsch

-Pardan
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Serbo-Croatian

Hungarian

Novi BeCej

TOrflkbecse

German

Novi KneSevac
Novi Sad

Ujviddk

Novo MiloSevo

Karlova

0d2aci

Hddsag

Op ova

6p£va.

Osijek

Eszdk

Pacir

Pacsir

Pa lid

Palics

PanCevo

Panesova

Pantschowa

Perlasz

Perez

Petrovaradin

Pdterv^rad

Peter Wardein

Ridica

Regdce

Ruma

Ruma

Rusco Selo

Kisorosz

Senta

Zenta

Smederevo

SzendrtJ

Sombor

Zombor

Srbobran

Szenttam^s

Sremska Mitrovica

Mitrovica

Stara Kanjiza

Tttrbkkanizsa

Stara Pazova
Stari BeCej

Neusatz

Hodschag

Esseg

Ruma

Mitrowitz

Alt Pasua
6becse
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Serbo-Croatian

Hungarian

German

Subotica

Szabadka

--

Tavankut

Tavankut

-----

TeleCka

Telecska

--

Temerin

Temerin

Temerin

--

Tiszaszentmiklds

--

--

Torontdlhalmas

--

--

Torontdlv^sdrhely

--

Uzdin

Ujozora

--

Veliki Kikinda

Nagykikinda

Gross Kikinda

Vrbas

Ujverb^sz

Werbass

Vrsac

Versec

Werschetz

Vukovar

Vukovar

Vukovar

Zabalj

Boldoga s szony fa lva

Zemun

Zimony

Semlin

Zrenjanin

Nagybecskerek

Gross Betschk

--
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APPENDIX B
The Second Vienna Award:
Some Reflections on an
Attempted Compromise
The Second Vienna Award has been maligned not only in the West,
but also in Rumania and Hungary.'*’ It was a compromise agreement and
by its nature was unable to satisfy everyone.
this agreement is in order.

2

Yet, a second look at

It represents the first concrete attempt
O

to find some way to an equitable Transylvanian adjustment.
Through this award the Rumanians returned to Hungary an area
4

of 19,300 square miles with a population of 2,385,987.

This area

^Western reaction to the Second Vienna Award was mainly antiHungarian.
First, because many Westerners were unaware of the issues
involved; second, because the Rumanians had a better outlet to the
Western press.
See R. C. Waldeck, Athene Palace (New York:
Robert M.
McBride & Co., 1942), p. 141; C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth (Edin
burgh, England: The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), I, 375, II, 179.
O
Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of R o m a n i a 1s Case /n.p.:
n . n . , 1941/, p. 16.
■^Many Western observers saw the Second Vienna Award as a mani
festation of Hitler's policy of divide et impera. That this was not
the case is convincingly argued by both Waldeck and Macartney. Waldeck,
Athene P alace, p. 296, states that ". . . a s Hungary and Rumania could
not do anything to Germany even if united, this argument did not hold.
What Hitler needed in his Southeastern Grossraum was not the tension
which goes with a policy of divide and rule, but a measure of quiet
and peace." Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 444, also maintains that
the motive was not divide and rule, but the desire to find a settle
ment that would keep Rumania and Hungary from fighting each other, at
least until the end of the war.
^"Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York:
Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1954), footnote 28, p. 59.
Clark, Racial Aspects of Roma
nia's C a s e , p. 1, gives slightly different figures.
He estimates the
territory as 17,000 square miles, and the population as 2,400,000.
For
a thorough analysis see Andres Ronai,
"Erddly Tajai <±s az Uj Hat^r,"
Fdldraizi KOzlemdnyek, LXVIII (1940), 240.
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covered the northern two-fifths of Transylvania.^

its population was

c.
mixed, but it did contain a relative majority (plurality) of Magyars.
The exact figures according to the census of 1910, 1930 and 1941 gives
the breakdown presented by Table la.

The statistics indicate that the

award left with Hungary approximately one million Rumanians.^

This

compares favorably wit h the Trianon "solution" which left 1,704,000O

1,356,675 Magyars under Rumania.

The Vienna Award saw both countries

on more or less equal terms, while at Trianon Hungary was the defeated
state that had to accept the diktat of the Entente.^

The Vienna Award

could, therefore, bring about a real compromise which was not all

% a l d e c k , Athene Pa l a c e , p. 150, refers to Hungary receiving the
"lion's share" of Transylvania.
This was a widely held misconception
in the West, but it is discouraging to see that even someone so close
to the events should make such a mistake.
Not only in population and
area, but also in natural wealth and industrial capacity, Hungary
received far less than what was left to Rumania.
See Rrfnai, "Erddly
T^jai ds az uj Hatdr," pp. 239-50.
^See Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 59, and Table la.
Philip E.
Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs, XIX (Oct., 1940),
p. 241, and Clark, Racial Aspects of R o m a n i a 1s C a s e , pp. 16-20, disagree
with this statement and with Kallay.
The dependability of the latter
two is questionable, however, since both are guilty of using figures too
loosely. Mosely, for example (pp. 242-43), alternates carelessly
between 1910 and 1930 statistics.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423; Kallay, Hungarian
Premier, p. 59.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 143.
of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.

The figures are those

^Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn,"
Foreign A f f a i r s , VI (April, 1923), p. 435, admits as much in spite of
the status quo bias of his a r t icle.
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THE NATIONALITY PORTRAIT OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN PARTITION OF 1940*

Nationality**

Further reproduction

Magyars
Rumanians
Germans
Jews (Yiddish;
Ruthenes
Slovaks
Other
Total

prohibited

Magyars
Rumanians
Germans
Jews (Yiddish;
Other
Total

1910
1,125,732
926,268
90,195
16,284
12,807
22,968
2,194,254
533,004
1,895,505
465,814
152,820
3,047,143

1930

1941

Area re-ceded to Hungary
911,550
1,176,433
68,694
138,885
99,585
2,395,147
Area left with Rumania
441,720
2,031,447
475,158
150,934
3,099,259

1,380,506
1,029,470
44*686
47,357
19,635
19,584
36 ,022
2,577,260
363,206
2,274,561
490,640
204,491
3,332,898

without p erm is sio n .

*This Table is based on C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary
1929-1945 (Second Edition; Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1961), I, 423; Recensamantul General
A1 Romaniei Din 1941 (> Aprilie; Date Sumare Provizorii (Bucuresti:
Institutul Central De Statistica,
1944), Table 1, p. IX; "Rezultatele Recensamantului Maghiar 1941," Comunicari Statisti.ce, No. 1
(Jan. 15, 1945), Table 18, pp. 14-15.
of mother language or accord
mother-language, while the
The Hungarian census of 1941
sake of simplicity only the
495

**Nationality is determined by census takers either on the basis
ing to declared nationality.
The Hungarian census of 1910 was based on
Rumanian censuses of 1930 and 1941 were based on declared nationality.
was based on both mother-language and declared nationality, but for the
declared nationality statistics are used in this Table.
***See footnote 42 in this chapter.

one-sided.This

can be seen in the gains and losses of the respec

tive states.
In terms of population, Hungary’s Rumanian minority grew from
25,000 to one million.

As opposed to this, Rumania's Magyar minority

of 1,704,000-1,353,675 was reduced to 533,004-441,720.^
changes make

the compromise even

clearer.

received the

poorer half not only in terms of

Territorial

In this category, Hungary
area, but also in

regard to natural resources and industrial capacity.

19

Thus, the

compromise was a real one, although neither side saw it in this light;
both alleged that the other received the "better end of the deal."
This decision has been presented to indicate that under unique
circumstances, the existing balance of power makes real compromises
possible.

In short, it reveals that not all "bourgeois" solutions

have been dictates of victor to victim.
However, it was short lived.
the war.

The Vienna Award did not survive

It

was annulled by the

Allies, who transferred the Hungarian

share of the

Award to Rumania as

a reward for her prior defection from

the A x i s . ^

■'•^Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 56.
■^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423.
of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.

The figures are those

•^Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," pp. 241-42; Rdnai,
"Erddly Tajai ds az Uj Hatdr," pp. 241-50.
■^By August 23, 1944 when Rumania switched sides, the Axis no
longer existed since Italy had already surrendered.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n pro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

V IT A

Andrew Luddnyi was born in Szikszd, Hungary, February 12, 1940.
He began his education in the little town of Hohburg in Upper Austria.
For a time he also attended school in a refugee camp near Linz.

In

1949 he emigrated to the United States and settled near Victoria,
later near Amelia, Virginia.

He continued his schooling in the public

schools of these respective communities.

In 1951 his family moved to

New York City, where he finished grammar school in P.S. 122 in Queens.
He attended Long Island City High School and graduated in June 1958.
For two years he worked in various occupations, primarily as a labora
tory technician at N.Y.U. Downstate Medical Center.

In February 1960

he started his studies at Elmhurst, Illinois, and graduated with a
B.A. degree in M a y 1963.

In September 1963 he began his studies on

the graduate level at Louisiana State University maj oring in Govern
ment.

He received the M.A. degree in 1966.

course work for the Ph.D.

In 1968 he completed his

Since September 1968 he has been an

instructor of Political Science at Ohio Northern University.
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